

**THE
SOCIAL ORIGINS
OF VIOLENCE
IN UGANDA**

 **1964-1985** 

A. B. K. KASOZI



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SHARE **IT**

*The Social Origins of Violence in Uganda,
1964–1985*

In *The Social Origins of Violence in Uganda* A.B.K. Kasozi examines the appallingly high levels of violence in Uganda since independence. He provides the first scholarly compilation and comparison of patterns and forms of violence under successive Ugandan regimes, as well as the first systematic analysis of violence under the second Obote regime.

Using a convincing causal model, Kasozi identifies the major causes of violence in Uganda as social inequality, the failure to develop legitimate conflict-resolution mechanisms, and factors such as language and religion that have influenced the nature of conflict in that society. He concludes the study by offering some prescriptions for alleviating the violence. Kasozi was assisted by Nakanyike Musisi and James Mukooza Sejjengo, who participated in the research on this book.

The Social Origins of Violence in Uganda is one of the most thorough and comprehensive analyses of the causes, levels, and incidence of more than two decades of violence in Uganda.

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*The Social Origins of
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With the assistance and collaboration of
Nakanyike Musisi and
James Mukooza Sejjengo

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*This book is dedicated to all who suffered or died
in the struggle for democracy in our homeland
from 1964 to 1985.*

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Abbreviations and Glossary

ABBREVIATIONS

CID	Central Intelligence Department
CMS	Church Missionary Society
COG	Commonwealth Observer Group
CP	Conservative Party
DC	District Commissioner
DP	Democratic Party
EGA/ESA	Entebbe Government/Secretarial Archives
EAISR	East African Institute of Social Research
EALB	East African Literature Bureau
EAPH	East African Publishing House
FEDEMU	Uganda Democratic Freedom Movement
FO	Foreign Office
FRONASA	Front for National Salvation
FUNA	Former Uganda National Army
GSU	General Service Unit
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IMF	International Monetary Fund
KY	<i>Kabaka Yekka</i> (Kabaka Alone) Party
MISR	Makerere Institute of Social Research
NASA	National Security Agency
NCC	National Consultative Council (UNLF)
NEC	National Executive Council (UNLF)
NRA	National Resistance Army
NRM	National Resistance Movement
NUYO	National Union of Youth Organizations
OAU	Organization for African Unity
PRA	People's Resistance Army

xii Abbreviations and Glossary

PRO	Public Records Office, Kew
SMP	Secretarial Minute Paper
SUM	Save Uganda Movement
UDRU	Uganda Democratic Redemption Union
UFA	Uganda Freedom Army (UFM)
UFF	Uganda Freedom Fighters
UFM	Uganda Freedom Movement
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UNLA	Uganda National Liberation Army
UNLF	Uganda National Liberation Front
UNLF-AD	Uganda National Liberation Front – Anti-Dictatorship
UPC	Uganda People's Congress
UPCYL	Uganda People's Congress Youth League
UPM	Uganda Patriotic Movement
UPU	Uganda People's Union

GLOSSARY

Baganda	The people of Buganda
<i>Bulungi bwansi</i>	Communal activities for the good of society
<i>Gombolola</i>	Subdivision of a county
<i>Kabaka</i>	King of Buganda
<i>Katikkiro</i>	The <i>Kabaka's</i> first minister
<i>Lukiiko</i>	Council
<i>Mailo</i>	Square mile of land (from "mile"); specifically freehold land under the 1900 Buganda Agreement
Muganda	One person from Buganda
<i>Muluka</i>	Subdivision of a <i>gombolola</i> ; a parish
<i>Saza</i>	County

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
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Obote in his true colours with Nyerere (second from left), Kaunda (fourth from left), and Kenyatta (facing Obote).



The late Bakulu Mpigi Wamala relaxing in his Scarborough apartment, Toronto 1985.




An inscription on a former hotel at Nakaseke turned into an officers' mess:
"A good Muganda is a dead one – shoot to kill."



Skeletons in the Luwero Triangle.



The author viewing skeletons at Matugga.



Daudi Ndiwa-Lana views one of the collections of skeletons that littered the Luwero Triangle, 1987.



Structural and human destruction at Kapeeka, Luwero Triangle.



Ruined house of a rich citizen at Kapeeka.



I.K. Musazizi speaking to the public at Kololo Airstrip, 26 January 1986.



A typical middle peasant's home, Buganda, 1986.



A home destroyed in the conflict, Luwero Triangle, 1986.




A disabled UNLA tank at Matugga.



Religious revival in the midst of misery.



A north-to-south greeting in the heart of Uganda.



Map 3
 Areas of Ethnic Victimization, 1980-85

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*The Social Origins of Violence in Uganda,
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Introduction

On the eve of independence, colonial Uganda was in many ways well equipped to embark on successful independent statehood. A resource-rich country, colonial Uganda had long been paying the costs of its administration¹ and by 1916 was no longer a burden to the British taxpayer. Nor was Uganda's subsequent development paid for by the mother country. Between 1945 and 1960 Ugandan peasants paid over £118 million pounds sterling to the administration and development of their country. After independence, unlike Kenya, Uganda attracted no substantial foreign investment or "aid," and, unlike other dependent ex-colonies, Uganda's subsistence sector was not only self-supporting but very strong. Subsistence agriculture covered seventy-five percent of cultivated land and cash crops – which were cultivated as an addition to food crops, not as a replacement – the remainder. The presence of many fish-bearing lakes and rivers greatly enriched the protein-over-carbohydrate content of the people's diet. Though Uganda is grouped among the world's less-developed countries, life expectancy was for a long time as impressive as that of some industrialized countries. The literacy rate was high, road and communication systems were good, and medical services reasonable.

Overall, the new Ugandan state was in a fairly good position to give its citizens more than the two years of relative peace and stability it enjoyed immediately after independence in 1962. Instead, between 1964 and 1985, Ugandans were exposed to a level of violence that far exceeds that of any other people in eastern Africa. Well over one million Ugandans were killed in this period through violence that was invoked for political purposes. Many were murdered with the approval or complicity of political leaders whose main duty was the protection of life.² Hundreds of others

were slain by powerful persons who were shielded by state authorities.³ It is estimated that the number of people slain for political motives during the first Obote administration (1962–71) ranged between four hundred and one thousand.⁴ The number of people killed for similar motives during the Amin regime (1971–79) was not less than 50,000 and could have been as high as 300,000.⁵ In the second Obote period (1980–85), the estimated number of those killed ranged between 300,000 and one million.⁶ In 1984 it was estimated that the Ugandan army had killed between 100,000 and 200,000 people, most of whom were noncombatants,⁷ since 1980.

Hundreds of thousands of Ugandans were violently torn away from their homes and turned into refugees. During the Amin regime, over 80,000 people were forced to leave Uganda as refugees either through expulsions or to save their skins.⁸ Many were highly educated and skilled. In the second Obote period, ordinary peasants were displaced from their homes in the Luwero Triangle, West Nile, southwest Uganda, and Karamoja. In the Luwero Triangle, 150,000 to 500,000 people were displaced and about 80,000 were put into concentration camps where living conditions were as bad as those of Nazi Germany.⁹ In the period 1982–83, about 75,000 ethnic Banyarwanda were forcibly evicted from their homes in southwest Uganda by government functionaries.¹⁰ Their property was vandalized. Many were killed; some committed suicide. Hundred of Baganda were displaced from Ankole and southern Lango in the Lake Kioga area. Imprisonment without trial, bad prison conditions, and extreme violation of human rights became an accepted way of life in Uganda between 1964 and 1985. Many Ugandans claimed refugee status abroad. By 1984, there were over 200,000 Ugandan refugees registered in the Sudan by the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR). But the number could have been as high as 350,000.¹¹ There were more than 63,000 Ugandan refugees in Zaire, over 5,000 in Kenya, and hundreds in Rwanda, Burundi, the US, UK, Canada, Australia, Austria, Scandinavia, Papua New Guinea, the Republic of South Africa (in the Bantustan enclaves), and Latin America.

Violent deaths and other violations of human rights have been carried out not only by political leaders, their accomplices, and opportunists ready to take advantage of the breakdown of social structure, established law, order, and social norms: thousands of other Ugandans were forced to flee their country or be killed by

fellow civilians who became social deviants exploiting the breakdown of law and order, and who turned to looting, extortion, and theft in a frenzy of random sociopathy. Finally – and harder to account for – there were those uncounted and unrecorded victims who died, and are still dying, from the legacy of violence caused by the breakdown of the social fabric and structures that formerly supported Ugandan society. This breakdown led to the lowering of the quality of life by (a) reducing overall life expectancy from over fifty to about forty years;¹² (b) raising the infant mortality rate from 91.9 per 1,000 in 1973 to 100 per 1,000 in 1984 (among the children of displaced persons, Red Cross workers found a figure of 305 deaths per 1,000);¹³ (c) raising the maternal mortality rate to unacceptable heights; (d) reducing the ratio of doctors per population from one for every 10,000 people to one for every 25,000 (from 1967–68 to 1979, the actual number of doctors dropped from 978 to 574, dentists from 42 to 22, and pharmacists from 116 to 15); (e) reducing citizen access to clean water, electrical power, good housing, and other basics. Ignorance, disease, and poverty became the norm for many Ugandans of all social classes.¹⁴

This study traces the nature and practice of violence in Uganda between 1964 and 1985. In the past, as well as now, most of the violence has been seen as the result of bad individual leaders. While there is some truth in this argument, it only partially explains a very complicated phenomenon. Volumes have been written on Idi Amin and his deviant personality, but few observers have tried to analyse the social origins of this strange man and assess what part the nature of Ugandan society itself contributed to his make-up and acquisition of power.¹⁵ Few have tried to find out whether there are structures inherent in Ugandan society that have been conducive to the production of dictators, fascists, and unprincipled leaders who have led the country into a situation of endless tears. By providing such an analysis, I do not intend to apologize for Obote, Amin, or the Okellos. On the contrary, my aim is to put dictators and lawbreakers in a social, political, and economic perspective; to locate the structural weaknesses in Ugandan society on which dictators and men of violence thrive; to pinpoint the social origins of violence in Uganda. It is in the material and social conditions of the country, rather than the personal traits of its leaders, that the origins of the dehumanizing violence Ugandans have endured for the last twenty-five years are to be found.

CAUSES OF VIOLENCE IN UGANDA

Broadly speaking, the conditions that gave rise to the Ugandan holocaust can be categorized as follows.

Social inequality. By the time Uganda achieved independence, it was structured around various inequitable and potentially volatile social relationships, some of which predated the colonial era, others of which were instilled by the colonial regime, but nearly all of which were exacerbated by the period of foreign domination before 1962. These structural problems were manifest at the international level in Uganda's relations with her mother country, the rest of the industrialized world, and her East African neighbours. Uganda was linked to the industrialized world in an unequal relationship that had a negative impact on the weaker country: an adverse trading relationship resulted in the extraction of surplus resources; Uganda became a producer of primary products and an importer of manufactured goods; the country was unable to develop a strong industrial sector – all of which tended towards the general impoverishment of the local population. The unequal relationship between Uganda and her neighbours, especially those countries through which Ugandan goods pass to and from the sea, led to a transfer from Uganda to her neighbours of resources that might have been used to improve social justice at home.

At the local level, inequality was manifest in overlapping cleavages and disparities between regions, races, ethnic and religious groups, classes and genders. As chapter 2 will show, there were visible and alarming disparities in income between rural and urban areas, white- and blue-collar workers, white immigrants and black nationals. These income differentials often coincided with the racial and ethnic divisions of society, as did social stratification based on education, occupation, and location. The higher incomes of Asian businessmen, for example, set them apart from the African population; hence Idi Amin's inability to distinguish class from race when he expelled *all* Asians in 1972 (see chapter 5). All these factors contributed to social fragmentation and, therefore, to violence.

Lastly, there was inequality of access to the means of violence. In most countries, those who wield political, economic, and ideological power also control the means of coercion. In Uganda, however, it was the economically disadvantaged ethnic groups from the northern parts of the country that controlled the instruments of violence, not the economically more privileged southern groups – a dangerous anomaly, given the country's regional and ethnic tensions.

To avoid outright violence, societies must establish justice based on just social relations. The unjust relationships that characterized Uganda affected the organization of social institutions, the structural arrangement of society, and, therefore, the way people relate to one another. Inequality – that is, the unequal distribution of the country's resources among different regions, ethnic groups, classes, religions, and genders – has been the main source of social conflict in Uganda, generating the *structural violence* from which all subsequent political, military, and civilian violence would erupt.

Substates and ethnic groups. The presence within Uganda of four substates weakened efforts to form a strong, united central government. Buganda, particularly, had a sense of its own nationality¹⁶ and, as chapter 2 describes, occupied a privileged – and resented – position within the protectorate.¹⁷ The rulers of Bunyoro, Ankole, and Toro considered their small kingdoms equal in status to Buganda and demanded similar privileges from the central government.¹⁸ There were other cohesive ethnic groups, each with its own language, culture, and history, that in turn considered their own collectives to be equal to the kingdom-substates. Some, like Busoga, demanded semifederal relationships with the central government.

Flimsy mechanisms for conflict resolution. Before 1950 there was no Uganda-wide representative political institution to unite these diverse ethnic groups and make them realize that they had a shared destiny. The colonial government had failed to create a central political institution where all Ugandan leaders from each region or district could sit and resolve disputes, draw up common legislation, and map a common strategy. The idea of a “Central *Lukiiko*,” or assembly of major African chiefs, was proposed in 1921, but the proposal was rejected.¹⁹ The Legislative Council that was retained became a forum for colonial public officials, not Africans. It was not until the late 1940s that a few Africans were nominated to the Council for cosmetic purposes. Directly elected Africans did not sit on the Council until the 1950s, a few years before self-government. This was too short a time for the Legislative Council – and later Parliament – to take root as a political institution. At independence in 1962, more than forty percent of the honourable members of Parliament were freshmen in the chamber. They had neither learned its procedures nor learned to respect it as the ultimate source of law, the embodiment of a united state, or a legitimate mechanism of conflict resolution.

Ethnic and religious factionalism. Ethnic fragmentation increased the possibilities of conflict as ethnic groups competed for the country's meagre and underdeveloped resources. It will be seen that these cleavages were exploited by greedy politicians who used primordial loyalties to further their own selfish ends. Similarly, the politicization of religious factions expanded the domain of conflict and further undermined the building of a peaceful national consensus.²⁰ In the wake of the religious wars in Buganda from 1888 to 1893 (see chapter 1), religion became not only a basis for identity but also a tool for political mobilization. After the 1900 Agreement between colonial officials and the Baganda élite, religious delineations also signalled class distinctions as the élite obtained access to political power and thus to resources. The extension of Bugandan forms of political behaviour to the rest of the protectorate meant that religious factionalism was exported to the whole country. By 1961–62, when Ugandans voted for leaders who would steer the nation to independence, religious affiliation influenced voting behaviour as much as ethnic and personal (selfish) considerations.

Absence of an indigenous property-owning class. From 1984 to 1922, when the Ugandan colony was being established, it was subjected to the colonial pattern of development planning based on the demands of an external market – industrialized Europe – and the domestic demands of an urban élite.²¹ Like other former colonies, it was thus linked to the international economic system as a dependent, peripheral nation. Because its economy was dependent, so too was its class structure.²² Class divisions were beginning to emerge in the last decade of the colonial era, but on the eve of independence the class structure was very fluid: as in most African countries, independence was granted to Uganda before an indigenous class structure had properly solidified.²³

In many dependencies and neocolonies in the Third World where peace has prevailed for some time, there has emerged a stratum of wealthy indigenous people, not yet consolidated as a “class for itself” but certainly united in defence of its privileges. Although unable to completely control the economy, it has sufficient resources to maintain a semidominant position in the indigenous society, maintain peace, fight for its existence, and preserve some stability. Members of this group – the ruling class – control the dependency on behalf of international capital and on their own behalf and provide the peace within which some form of economic development can occur. In return for a share, albeit a small one, in the local economy, this stratum distributes resources to its members

and controls society by means of its economic and, consequently, political power.

In Uganda, however, there was no such class. As chapter 2 will show, the colonial administration in Uganda discouraged the emergence of an indigenous class based on economic power that was capable of developing into a stratum with a stake in the country's dependence. It did this by passing laws that were detrimental to African participation in the higher levels of the economy. The colonial state preferred immigrants, and so did its successor regimes. The leaders of Uganda in the period under study would not tolerate the development of an alternative source of power in Ugandan society. They wanted to create a political system in which all major economic roles, all wealth in the state, were controlled by the "big man" at the centre, who uses patronage to stay in power. Competing or autonomous institutions such as courts, rival parties, semi-independent universities, wealthy cooperative unions, rich individuals or institutions are eroded and weakened because they are deemed a threat to the personal rule of the leader. The "Big Man Syndrome,"²⁴ so prevalent in Africa, is catastrophic since, when a president is removed, there is no strong institution or social force in place to challenge the emergence of a dictator like Idi Amin.

Decrease in national production. Levels of violence were expanded by the negative performance of Uganda's economy in the period 1969 to 1985. Obote's failure to develop the economy to its full potential, Amin's destruction of whatever had been put in place, the ravages of the devastating "Liberation War" that saw Amin deposed, the political chaos that followed Amin's fall, and the war to unseat Obote's second regime (1980–85) ruined the Ugandan economy. Moreover, throughout this period, the average annual rate of growth of the population was higher than that of the Gross Domestic Product. Almost all sectors of the national economy shrank. The increase in the appropriation of peasant production, the drying up of agricultural inputs following the decline of the industrial sector due to scarcity of hard currency and the flight of skilled manpower, Obote's choking of the Baganda's productive and entrepreneurial spirit, the excessive liquidity in the economy, and the consequent increase in the smuggling of Ugandan goods led to a breakdown in national production. This contraction in national production resulted in fewer goods available for distribution. In turn, this reduction led to more violence as the struggle to control reduced resources escalated. The case of Uganda and the socialist experi-

ment in the former Soviet Union show that possibilities of violence in societies are not only increased by the way resources are distributed but also by the quantity there is for distribution.²⁵ In the struggle to control the distribution of the country's shrinking resources, the petty bureaucratic bourgeoisie politicians generated vertical violence (i.e., from above, by competing political groups, the government, and paramilitary agencies). In turn excessive vertical violence influenced and increased the arena of horizontal violence amongst civilians. As a result, violence and violent social behaviour spread through the entire Ugandan social fabric.

Parochial, weak, and poorly educated leaders. Since there was no local property-owning class, political recruitment was confined to a weak group, the petty bureaucratic bourgeoisie, which, having no economic base in society, participated in politics only for personal gain. Their loyalties were not to their classes, for they had none, but to their stomachs. As later chapters will show, this applied to politicians of all ranks, including the "founding fathers" of the state. In the first four years after independence, energy that might have been exerted on economic development and the rectification of inequalities in the country was wasted in the struggle to control the ruling party, hence the state. Without political principles, many of these bureaucratic bourgeoisie changed loyalties; Milton Obote's private secretary and chief of police served Idi Amin as cabinet ministers until they fell out with him. This sector of society was a catalyst for violence. It could not develop lasting political institutions because of its economic insecurity. It could not, therefore, give the country lasting peace.

The language problem. The absence of a common language has been a major obstacle to national integration in Uganda. A nation cannot develop a strong sense of itself if its people cannot communicate with one another, have little in common, no sense of a shared past, and no shared dream of the future enshrined in literature and folklore that everyone can understand. Unlike Tanzania or Kenya, Uganda did not develop a common language to weld its various ethnic groups together. Ironically, the greatest efforts to come to grips with the problem were made not after independence but during the colonial period, when lobbyists on behalf of Kiswahili or Luganda tried unsuccessfully to get their preference enshrined as the official language in the protectorate (see Appendix 1).

To date, more than thirty distinct languages and dialects are used in Uganda,²⁶ belonging to four language groups – the Bantu,

Low, Sudanic, and Nilo-Hamitic. Since independence, English has been used as the official language of administration and instruction. But speakers of English are few, and, since it is clear that the mass of Ugandan peasants cannot be brought to fluency in the foreseeable future, Ugandan governments disseminate information in many different tongues. Ultimately, English is a "stratifying" agent separating society into two groups: the privileged, who speak it, and the deprived, who don't.²⁷

Taken together, these factors impeded Uganda's ability to achieve a more harmonious, constructive national integration. To be fair, a country like Uganda, which is small, landlocked, and underdeveloped, would not have been able to pull itself out of the vicious circle of neocolonialism without adverse consequences. But the combination of these complex elements was a recipe for disaster. In Kenya, Malawi, and Tanzania, the dynamics of power relations amongst ethnic groups was not as volatile as in Uganda. Neither Kenya nor Tanzania had a substate as consolidated as Buganda whose interests conflicted with those of the state. In Kenya, where the Gikuyu "controlled the state" and were in a position to gain by the Africanization of some sectors of commerce, industry, and large-scale agriculture, the creation of an African petty-bourgeoisie property-owning class went ahead unhindered.²⁸ There was a careful and smooth incorporation of Gikuyu and their allied ethnic groups into these sectors. As opportunities and pressure from other ethnic groups increased, people from other ethnic clusters were incorporated into the stratum of Africans whose interests were closely tied to foreign capital because of the economic stake they had developed in the Kenyan neocolony and the political influence derived from that participation. Kenya, Zambia, and Malawi, with fewer natural resources than Uganda, have successfully contained social chaos partly by their ability to resolve internal conflict without quick recourse to violence. And Kenya and Tanzania, in particular, were blessed with experienced, imaginative, well-educated, and highly respected leaders who understood the limits of political power and the danger of using violence as a political tool.²⁹

THE NATURE OF VIOLENCE IN UGANDA

The term violence is used in this study to mean the "use of force, whether overt or covert, in order to wrest from individuals or

groups something they do not want to give of their own free will.”³⁰ Most of the violence in the period under study was political violence – that is, violence connected with the struggle for, and maintenance of, political power and with “the definition of the political community itself.”³¹ Political violence also involves “all collective attacks within a political community against the political regime, its actors including competing political groups as well as incumbents or its policies.”³² Ugandan political violence, like that of other Third World countries, was originally aimed at taking over and controlling the state. In well-organized (often industrialized) countries, on the other hand, political violence is generated by groups aspiring to improve their social status within the established order.³³ Rarely do those groups aim at taking control of the state. In Uganda, the application of violence by the state’s leaders for what appeared to be their own desire to stay in power institutionalized the use of violence. As subsequent chapters make abundantly clear, political violence, carried out by the military, the police, and other agents of state, became an accepted means of attaining political goals and resolving internal political conflict.

But political violence, as Ugandan leaders discovered, is very difficult to contain. Unless it is tightly controlled from the centre, it tends to spread like a cancer throughout a society, spawning or encouraging other kinds of violence, unchecked by the “forces of law and order” that are themselves engaged in acts of violence either on behalf of the leadership,³⁴ or on their own initiative,³⁵ using violence negatively against the population instead of positively to protect the state and its citizens.³⁶ Thus, in the period under study, the incidence of “deviant” violence – homicide, rape, burglary, fraud, vandalism, looting, infanticide, arson, dangerous driving, and so on – increased dramatically. Such violence is perpetrated by those who deviate from the accepted social standards, norms, or laws of the community. While this kind of violence was not unknown in preindependent Uganda, it acquired a new face with the appearance of political violence as powerful and sophisticated weapons found their way into the hands of the lawless elements in society, who collaborated with government agents – the police, paramilitary, and the army – to commit crimes like *kondo*, or robbery with violence, which was transformed into a brutal, widespread, well-armed operation.

Deviant violence led in turn to vigilante violence, whereby citizens organized themselves into vigilante groups to protect their lives and property by day and night. There were numerous incidents where vigilante activities turned into brutal mob violence.

Strangers or perceived deviants were dealt with mercilessly and abruptly. It became very difficult for victims of vigilante violence to be heard for vigilante justice has no proper channels of appeal. This kind of violence was an indication of the state's inability to protect its citizens, police its territory, or control its agents.³⁷

The population, then, suffered not just from the vertical violence directed against it by the state and its agents but also from horizontal violence emanating from fellow citizens. People living on the edge and always facing the spectre of violence do not find it easy to maintain morality and honesty. Precolonial moral values were built on the roots of traditional beliefs, religions, and social organizations. With the establishment of the colonial state, morality, law, and social behaviour were derived from Euro-Judeo-Christian values. Although remnants of traditional beliefs still influenced social behaviour, they were increasingly undermined. It was hoped that the African leaders who replaced European officials would either carry on and enforce the moral fabric they inherited or create a new moral code, a new African belief system, from which a national social fabric could be woven. But they failed.

Without a national value system, it was difficult to create acceptable institutions for conflict resolution; force remained the more tempting option. The ensuing breakdown of the social fabric contributed to moral degeneration and abrasive social behaviour. Family violence increased; life became easy to lose, difficult to live, and impossible to enjoy. Ugandans began to live in an almost Hobbesian state of nature. Exiles returning to Uganda are often surprised at how dishonest their countrymen have become. But those who left forget that harsh conditions at home created this situation. The new Ugandan bears the scars of twenty-five years of violence on his body as well as on his mind.

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PART ONE

A Legacy of Violence

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CHAPTER ONE

Precolonial and Colonial Uganda

THE PRECOLONIAL PERIOD

Although the worst recorded violence in Uganda occurred after the granting of political independence in 1962, there was dehumanizing violence in the precolonial and colonial periods as well. Although historical records likely report only a fraction of the violence endured by Ugandans in the precolonial period, it is clear that the people who lived in what became Uganda all knew the torments associated with political, deviant, and structural violence.¹

The nature and extent of violence in the precolonial period depended on the structure of society and its level of development. At the organizational level, African societies could be divided into two categories: *stratified* and *nonstratified*. Nonstratified, or segmentary, societies were what some writers have erroneously called “stateless” societies² in which power, and therefore the right to use violence, was not centralized under a king or a hereditary ruling clan but was spread horizontally through the social unit, which was also the political and military unit. In both stratified and nonstratified societies the clan was the main unit or “cell” of social organization.³ A clan consists of a group of people who claim the same ancestor by blood or kinship. In some areas clan members lived in a single compound or locality; in others they did not.

On the eve of colonial rule, most of the people of northern and eastern Uganda lived under nonstratified social systems: the Lango, Madi, Lugbara, Karamajong, Acholi, Iteso, Sebei, Alur, Kakwa, Jonamu, Madi, Japadhola, Gwere, Samia, Bagishu, Badama, Banyuli, Bagwere, and, in the southern part of the country, the Bakiga, Bakonjo, and Bamba. In Lango and Sebei each clan had its own locality (on the eve of the colonial period there were about two

hundred clans in Lango, each comprising about three hundred people⁴), war cry, cattle brand, body markings, and other unique identifiers.⁵

Clan leaders were elected by the clan's elders. Disputes that might have led to violence were resolved by the consensus of elders, not by an individual's dictate. In Lango the clan leader led the clan in war or peace negotiations, but he alone could not make war or peace unless he had obtained the consensus of the elders. The clan leader was the chairperson of the council of elders, which sat to resolve conflict. But he respected, and had to abide by, its will. The clan leader in Lango had no power to extract labour, demand taxes, or enforce laws. This was true of Sebei and most of the nonstratified societies. The power to use violence within the clan was therefore not concentrated in one person.

But interclan violence was a different matter. There were many skirmishes, battles, and wars between clans or groups of clans united for combat. The quest for land, cattle, women, and material resources resulted in deadly conflicts in which hundreds of people were killed.⁶ Although in southern kingdoms peace could be maintained by a king's "monopoly of the legitimate use of violence," maintaining harmony in the North was difficult. Each clan unit had the right to make war or peace as long as there was internal consensus. Interclan wars were a menace to the ordinary people who bore the effects of violent conflict. In Karamoja, warfare was organized on a clan basis. Even today interclan violence still occurs among the "decentralized" societies. For example, the notorious Apa Loris, the warlord of Moroto who was killed by the Iteso militia in 1982, was the head of the Bokora clan, and it was from his leadership of the clan that his political power sprang. After he was murdered, the Bokora mounted a revenge expedition into Teso. It is interesting to note that during the 1980 election campaign, Apolo Milton Obote was in the company of Apa Loris and used his services.⁷ National politics in much of the northern and eastern regions of Uganda was conducted, in great measure, through clan organizations.⁸ It will be seen that numerous prominent Ugandan figures such as Apolo Milton Obote, Akena Adoko, Sir William Wilberforce Kadhumbula Nadiope, and others were either sons of clan leaders or belonged to prominent clans.

Stratified, or hierarchical, societies were those in which power was distributed vertically through a graded system of status groups or individuals. The social structure resembled a pyramid at whose

apex was a king, a paramount chief, or a clan leader. Social roles were distributed by the establishment and clothed in myths. Individuals as well as social groups knew their own responsibilities and social positions. Power, including the right to use violence, was centralized in the hands of the leader, though he could not make a decision without reference to the balance of power in the social system. The people of the kingdoms – Baganda, Banyankore, Batoro, Banyoro, and Basoga – lived under hierarchical social systems.

It is clear that the process of concentrating power – and therefore the right to use violence – was a gradual one. Formerly, these societies were decentralized and operated on a clan basis like their counterparts in the North and East of the country. The need to defend the fertile forest and livestock-grazing areas of southern Uganda made the local clans cooperate. When they went on the offensive, they often elected one of their number as a war leader. Because of the prevalence of war, power was gradually concentrated in the hands of the war leader, who was usually a clan leader and, at the beginning, a *primus inter pares*, first among equals. Because of his responsibilities, however, he gradually usurped control of violence from his colleagues. Such was the case in Buganda. The king, originally a clan leader, usurped power from his fellow clansmen and became a war leader. Kintu, who ruled during the first quarter of the fourteenth century, was the first to do this, and the move did not please his fellow clan heads.⁹ The state, once created, usurped more power from other social leaders and embarked on the division of labour. In Ankole certain groups that controlled the means of violence reserved for themselves the right to own cattle. Ankole thus became a class society based on the ownership of cattle.¹⁰ There was a lower class of people who tilled the soil, and a ruling class that owned cattle and controlled the means of violence. In Buganda, however, while no rigid division of society on class lines developed, power was still concentrated in the king, clan leaders, fighters, and chiefs. The rest of the people were commoners, enjoying no status beyond that of ordinary human beings.

The king, or *Kabaka*, of Buganda remained a first among equals for some time and seems initially not to have had the right to mete out capital punishment. When, out of rage, *Kabaka* Kintu inflicted fatal wounds on Kasolo, he became so frightened that he abandoned his kingdom, never to return; homicide, even by a king, was not permissible in those early days of Buganda's evolution.¹¹ However, as power to make war and peace became further concentrated in their hands, the kings of Buganda usurped control of the use of violence for both external and internal purposes. By the

reign of the fourth king, Tembo (1374–1404), the *Kabaka* had usurped or already acquired the right to kill his citizens. Tembo was advised by a medicine man to kill his prisoners to cure his madness. He did so, but was not cured.

From then on Buganda's history is littered with the violence of kings who massacred their subjects whenever it pleased them. Namugala (1734–64) killed a whole group of the Abatamanyanganda and buried two hundred of them in a mass grave. Kyabagu executed hundreds of Ssesse islanders, who had cured him of his illness, because they had embarrassed him by complaining publicly of not being given meat at Nakasero Hill. Suuna II (1824–54), one of the cruellest tyrants ever to govern Buganda, executed his subjects on the flimsiest of excuses. He slaughtered three hundred Bawambya because one of their number stole his firewood. He cut off the ears of his bearer Walonzi at a place later named Bwaise ("that which is already spilled cannot be retrieved"), after Walonzi's misfortune. He executed many of his sister's bodyguards and sixty of his brothers and half-brothers at Nansana. His orders to burn all the inhabitants of Kitende Island in Busoga were obeyed. One day, while returning from a visit to the jawbones of his ancestors, Suuna crossed the Katonga River ahead of some five hundred people and gave orders to kill all those who had not yet come over. This happened at Senge, in Busiro county. He executed sixty men whom his chief, Mukwenda, had sent to "die for him." While in council (*Lukiiko*), all chiefs were required to look on the ground while the king talked. Anyone who looked up or who looked upon the faces of the royal wives was poisoned there and then by his poisoner, Kataba. He killed handsome men, of whom he was jealous. His son, Walugembe Mutesa I (1854–84), was no different. The Baganda called him Mukabya, "he who makes people cry." European explorers have described graphically how easily he took human life.¹² Concentration of violence in the person of the king made life very insecure for the Baganda. People were killed on the king's whim almost daily. There were many official execution sites all over the country – Nalulangadde, Wabitembe, Nakinziro, Busanji, Kitinda, Mpiimerebera (Busega), Kubamitwe, Kijabi, and others.¹³ Thus, in Buganda, the concentration in the king of the right to use violence increased state violence directed against the population.

It is interesting that the Baganda accepted the king's right to kill. Many proverbs and saying demonstrate this acceptance, or, rather, resignation. Some of these saying excused the *Kabaka* and put the blame on courtiers and flatterers: *Kabaka tatta, musakiriza*

yatta (The king does not kill, it is the ambitious flatterer who kills). He was likened to a queen ant who has a right to feed on other ants – *Kabaka namunswa alya ku nsua ze*. But they realized his power; he was a heavy hammer that kills by its weight – *Kabaka nyondo; ekussa buzito* – or an ocean that kills not only those disturbing it, the fishermen, but also the travellers: *Kabaka nyanja, etta natawuba*. No one was safe where the *Kabaka* was. However, unlike the postcolonial presidents, the precolonial kings of Buganda had a “constitutional” right to kill their citizens. As the supreme judge of the land, the *Kabaka* was supposed to have a right to inflict the death penalty.

By the nineteenth century, the king of Buganda had an absolute right to use violence and an uncontested right to make war or peace. Suuna fought more than sixteen external wars. His son, Mutesa I conducted at least sixty-six external wars and raids.¹⁴ Buganda had by that time become a military machine, a predatory society that terrorized and spread its violence to most of the area adjacent to Lake Kioga in the North, the river Kagera in the South, and as far west as Lake George. The rise of Kabarega in Bunyoro and his ability to build a standing army, the *Abarusura*, tempered this violence but failed to destroy it.

Although state violence was hierarchically established in other centralized states like Ankole and Bunyoro, it was not as concentrated in the hands of the monarchy as it was in Buganda. The kings of Bunyoro and Ankole were powerful and could call upon territorial leaders to put armed units at their disposal in case of war. But their authority was moderated by other sources of power in the society. Several of the territorial leaders were hereditary and so had a say in the number of levies they could bring to the service of the king. Other kings did not have as much right over the lives of their citizens as the *Kabaka* of Buganda, who were absolute monarchs, absolute dictators, and real tyrants in the true sense of the word.

Wherever the right to use violence was concentrated in one person, a few people, or a clan, there was a probability of its being unfairly used against the very people it was intended to protect. The aim of state formation or the banding together of groups of clans to form a larger unit was to offer protection to its constituent members. The enemies were deemed to come from outside this polity. It was against external, not internal, enemies that violence was to be used. The exception was criminal deviants. As it turned out, many leaders employed violence against their fellows, a practice that continues today.

THE COLONIAL PERIOD, 1894–1962

Conventional wisdom has it that European colonialism ushered into “darkest” Africa an unprecedented era of peace, justice, and stability that was unlikely to persist once the colonial officials had departed. A casual glance at Uganda’s history since 1962 does not entirely contradict that assumption. With the signing of the Buganda Agreement in 1900, Buganda was put under British rule, though most of the administrative structures were left under the native government of the *Kabaka*. Policies were made by the British and implemented by the *Kabaka*’s government. Collaborating chiefs were allotted land, which resulted in the creation of a collaborating land-owning élite. The 1900 Agreement was followed by the Uganda Order in Council of 1902, which formalized the legality of British administration in the protectorate.¹⁵ It provided for the implementation, as far as circumstances allowed, of English statutes of general application, common law, and equity. African traditional laws and customs were allowed to operate provided they were “not repugnant to justice and morality”¹⁶ and written law. These steps brought about a period of peace bounded within the standards defined by common law. Deviant subjects were tried according to written laws that, while perhaps unfair to African values of social justice, were respected by the rulers. Interclan wars were checked, the *Kabaka*’s right to take human life was removed, and the right to license individuals to kill was centralized in courts and Her Majesty’s representative acting according to clearly formulated and well-understood procedures. Numerous ethnic groups were brought together into one viable administrative structure that became the Ugandan state.

This was a positive development. No one of good conscience, not even a nationalist, would have wanted to see the return of intertribal and interclan wars or the separation of the territories that were brought together to form a state. Nonetheless, while the imposition of British common law reduced manifest violence, the advent of colonial rule centralized violence for the first time, and colonial administrative methods generated a degree of violence that adversely affected Ugandans. To begin with, the advent of British rule was not peaceful. In Buganda, the original “component” of the protectorate, colonial rule was established by exploiting internal conflict between politicized religious groups – the Roman Catholics and Anglican Protestants – and traditionalists, later led by *Kabaka* Mwanga II. Captain Lugard, the representative of the Imperial British East Africa Company, and Colonel H. Col-

ville allied themselves with the Protestant group, defeating the rest in war. The western region was threatened by Kabarega, the Belgians, and the French. A line of British forts from Mbarara to Lake Albert was established to keep other European powers out and to cut off Kabarega's supplies from the South. Kabarega resisted the incorporation of Bunyoro into the Ugandan state for six years, while his opponents used a scorched-earth policy against populations perceived to be on his side. Villages were burnt, livestock destroyed, and hundreds of inhabitants annihilated. Tarsis Kabwehere cites cases where ordinary people were victimized by soldiers led by colonial officials. Thus, "violence was used to consolidate Uganda as a geopolitical entity."¹⁷

Other African people besides Kabarega engaged in rebellion and armed resistance to colonialism between 1894 and 1920. In southwest Uganda the Bakiga protested against Rwandan and, later, British rule in the period 1900–19. The Nyabingi cult, through which resistance was expressed, took time to suppress.¹⁸ The Lugbara and Kakwa people of the West Nile resisted colonial rule through a religious cult, the Yakan.¹⁹ In Ankole the British subcommissioner, Galt, was killed at Ibanda. Many people were rounded up for questioning. In Lango there were many localized revolts.²⁰ In Acholi there were similar small-scale, localized, clan-based rebellions.²¹ But the most serious threat came from within the ranks of those attempting to establish and consolidate the colonial state. The threat from Nubian soldiers – the backbone of the young colonial state – was a bitter challenge: harsh conditions prompted a mutiny in 1897, and by the time it was crushed numerous lives and much property had been lost. On 7 and 8 January 1898 the soldiers killed three Europeans, Major Thruston, Norman Wilson, and Mr Scott, at Luba's Fort in Busoga. Those apprehended, tried, and found guilty were executed in one of the first incidents of politically motivated capital punishment in Uganda. Similar punishments would be repeated in the 1970s by a descendant of the mutineers, Idi Amin. Bishop Tucker, who witnessed the public execution of nine Sudanese and three Muslim Baganda mutineers, did not entirely approve of the taking of life by the state, but thought it necessary, for "it made an impression, not merely on the Sudanese population, but on the Baganda generally."²²

The British practice of using Baganda agents as subimperialists to help establish colonial rule was a further cause of violence. Baganda agents were frequently used in areas where there was a lack of British personnel or loyal local staff to carry out official instructions. The British thought the Baganda knew more about

organized administration than their neighbours. In Lango, the Baganda were used because British officials thought the Langi were still backward. One British official wrote: "The Lango are raw savages. The only system which these people can be dealt with is through the use of intelligent agents as has been done in Bukedi."²³ Because these agents meted out violence to the people they ruled, the Baganda were at the receiving end of anticolonial violence.

Baganda agents were installed in most areas of the protectorate as soon as British administration began. Their duties included providing intelligence to the collector (European official), keeping the peace (in many cases by violent means), upholding the authority of chiefs, recruiting labour, supervising the storage of food reserves, and enforcing the resolution of conflicts "among people who had never acknowledged their authority."²⁴ Despite all these responsibilities they were not well paid and thus extorted "pay" from the unarmed population. They demanded food, beer, livestock, free labour, and, often, sexual partners. Many agents were lowly types who, unable to attain social recognition in Buganda, sought it by the gun in "frontier" areas of the protectorate. Many wanted to "get rich quick," others were soldiers of fortune. Tosh reports that in Lango the agents tortured their victims, filled with a sense of "racial superiority." But those who live by the sword die by the sword, and numerous Baganda agents died violently. In May 1898 about one hundred and fifty Baganda irregulars participated in Radcliffe's expedition against the mutineers. After looting a few Lango villages several Baganda were killed by the Langi in the Ocini area.²⁵ In the same district, nine years later, Bumbakari Kamyia, the agent of Kakungulu – who was himself the most powerful Muganda agent of the British – was murdered along with sixteen of his colleagues. To punish the Langi, the so-called Kioga Expedition was sent along the Abalanga River and the Namasale Peninsula: in all, about two hundred Langi were killed, some twenty to thirty thousand "dealt with," and 163 villages destroyed. But this was not the end of the slaughter. In May 1911 six Baganda agents were killed near Bar, in Lango. By the end of the year, over sixty-three agents had been killed in Lango. In Bunyoro, the Banyoro had "refused" in 1907 to have Baganda agents and engaged in a famous act of passive resistance, *Kyanyangire*.²⁶ In Toro, the people "resented the Ganda intruders and their overbearing manners."²⁷

Above all, most of the nonstratified societies detested the introduction of the stratified Kiganda social institutions. Wherever the Baganda agents were sent, the type of administrative structure

they introduced resembled Buganda's – a hierarchical structure with a country chief at the top, an assembly of county chiefs, subcounty chiefs, and parish chiefs at the bottom. This model introduced demands that the people in nonstratified societies had never heard of. For them, clan leaders or other prominent figures were *primus inter pares*. The Kiganda model introduced a defined and absolute hierarchical leadership model that gave complete control of violence to a single individual. The chief in Buganda enforced law and order, collected taxes, mobilized labour for public works, implemented colonial orders, and had to be obeyed by all.²⁸ The Baganda agents transplanted these practices to societies that were not so centralized. Part of the anti-Baganda sentiment in the rest of Uganda originates from this injustice, though the retribution exacted later in 1966 in 1980–85 was excessive and inexcusable.

In its desire to develop the country and incorporate it into the world market, Uganda's colonial administration put many demands on the African population that seemed strange to Africans and were often resisted; in many cases, violence was the result. Among the more onerous demands was taxation – beginning with a tax on dwellings and moving later to a poll tax payable by all adult males – through which colonial officials hoped to make Uganda pay the cost of its administration. The tax burden then, as now, fell disproportionately upon the poor, causing a great deal of human suffering.²⁹ In addition to their obligations to clans and clanheads, the masses in Buganda had to fulfil traditional obligations to the chiefs by contributing to *luwalo* (unpaid labour), *busulu* (rent to their new landlords as established by the 1900 Agreement, and *nvujo* (a tithe on their produce of cotton, beer, or other marketable commodities). And then there was the *kasanvu* – obligatory, cheap labour used on the government's public projects for which workers were paid for less than the market price. In Indian rupees, the initial currency of Uganda, the peasants paid a poll tax of five rupees, or two months' labour; two and a half rupees for *kasanvu*, or one month's labour; and two rupees for *busulu* – a total of nine rupees, or four months' labour. The burden was sufficient to cause mass migration from Buganda. Many went to Kisumu in Kenya, others to Bukoba in Tanganyika (now part of Tanzania), while others went to the Belgian territories of Rwanda/Burundi. Those who stayed composed songs about taxation that are still sung to this day. The chorus of one song goes: "*Olumbe musolo terudukwa,*

Werukusangira Wobera – “Tax or government’s obligations are like death. You cannot run away from them. Wherever you go, you will feel their wright. You will be taxed there.” In some areas of Uganda the imposition of taxes was resisted violently. In the Eastern Province, from 1903 to 1911, there were at least seventeen revolts against taxation followed by punitive expeditions.³⁰ Many ordinary people were killed in the process.

In the latter part of the colonial period, Africans began to struggle for equality and justice – for basic human rights and respect. While it is fashionable nowadays to refer to these people as nationalists, few of them had any clear concept of the Ugandan nation and sought only justice. Colonial officials answered their struggle with violence, albeit a subtler violence than what followed after independence. People who were perceived as a threat to the colonial *status quo* were ousted from the environment in which the “nationalist” functioned best. Such forcible removals amounted almost to a death warrant. Many Ugandans were exiled to strange places where they were unable to integrate or function. Kabarega and Mwanga, for example, were captured and exiled to an island in the Indian Ocean where they were like fish out of water. Kabarega’s queen mother, Nyamutahingurwa, and several of her children were exiled from Bunyoro to Buganda and thus rendered politically “toothless,” unable to help the Banyoro.³¹ Kabagambe, who had long lived on the Namasale Peninsula, was deported to Jinja for his supposed involvement in the killing of a Muganda agent by Langi warriors in 1906.³² In the wake of the Kyanyangire rebellion, British officials deported some fifty-two Banyoro chiefs to the East African Protectorate (Kenya).³³

In Buganda, Joswa Kate, the *Mugema* (maternal uncle of the *Kabaka*) and leader of the Bataka who published the newspaper *Munyonyozi*, was exiled to Arua in 1930 for his alleged connection to a meeting of the Bamalaki religious sect, held in the previous year, protesting the dismissal of Bamutta as secretary to the *Lukiiko*, or Bugandan parliament. The gathering had developed into a riot in which six people were killed and many injured. Kate, who had not been present at the meeting, was finally allowed to return home in 1942, when he was old and gravely ill. He died a few years later and was buried in his ancestral land (*butaka*) in Buganda.³⁴ In 1948, Sir William Kadhumbula Nadiope was deposed by colonial officials as ruler of Bugabula in Busoga for misuse of official power and deported to Bunyoro.³⁵ In February 1945, the popular Mu-

ganda politician Samwiri Wamala, who had just resigned as the *Kabaka's* first minister, or *Kattikiro*, was deported to Hoima where he died a year later of "an incurable illness."³⁶ Others deported with Samwiri Wamala were Ignatius Musaazi, Samwiri Bazongere, Ferkasi Musoke, and David Mukubira. The Deportation Ordinance was used to exile and therefore cripple all those who fought to give African rights equal to those of colonial officials. After the 1949 riots, deportees included Ignatius Musaazi, Spartas Mukasa, Reuben Musoke, Shem Spire Mukasa, and a few others.³⁷ In 1953 the same ordinance was used to deport Sir Edward Mutesa II, the *Kabaka* and leader of the clan heads of Buganda. In 1959, after the trade boycott against businesses, especially shops, owned by non-Africans, six people perceived to be the instigators of the boycott were deported. Among them were the selfless nationalist Ignatius Musaazi and a young, energetic politician from Kooki, Eridadi Muliira.

Religious violence just before the colonial period probably caused more devastation to human and animal life in Buganda than the kingdom had experienced since its foundation in the fourteenth century. Beginning in 1888, political parties based on religion – *Bafransa* (Roman Catholic), *Bangereza* (Anglican Protestant), *Bawadi* (Muslim) – armed themselves, united, and overthrew the king of Buganda, Mwanga II. Their aim was not only to survive (they claimed that the king wanted to eliminate them) but to grab power and formulate laws derived from their new religious beliefs. From then on, foreign religions in Buganda became a springboard for political mobilization. In 1888, however, political cooperation between the crescent and the cross ended when the Muslims expelled the two Christian groups from the government. Under Kiwewa and, later, *Kabaka* Kalema, the Muslims turned Buganda into an Islamic state, and much blood was spilled in the struggle for control.

The bitterness of these religious wars has coloured Christian-Muslim relations in Buganda ever since. Each group has accused the other of the most inhuman atrocities. While the Roman Catholics and Anglicans were out of power and regrouping, they agreed that in future, institutionalized religion would be the basis for sharing power and resources. A treaty made at Bukuumi specified that political and social rewards would be divided equally between them.³⁸ The Muslims and those who had not adopted foreign religions were to be excluded. After the Muslims were removed from power the Christians kept their word: Muslims were not given any social rewards. However, the Catholics and Protes-

tants in turn fought for control of the state in the first battle of Mengo, in 1892. The Protestants won with the help of imperial forces, and after their victory, things changed. Captain Lugard invited the Muslims back and gave them some crumbs both to check the arrogance of the leading Christian group and to be seen as being fair to all religious factions.³⁹ But the Muslims were not happy and, a year later, staged a rebellion that was crushed by Major MacDonald.⁴⁰ The protestant victory at Mengo was enshrined in the terms of the 1900 Buganda Agreement with the British. Henceforth, Anglican Protestantism became virtually the established religion, while the Roman Catholics took second place and the Muslims were marginalized to the lowest stratum of society.

By 1920, it was clear that the establishment of colonial rule had been very costly in terms of human and animal life, the environment, and resources. The disruption of settlements led to a halt in cultivations, which in turn disrupted the ecological balance. Pests like the tsetse fly, which spread sleeping sickness, multiplied and destroyed people and animals. The disruption of settlement in northwestern Uganda between 1884 and 1900 had a more devastating impact than many have realized.⁴¹ The activities of Emin Pasha's unruly soldiers and the wars waged against Kabarega by the colonial regime depopulated the area as thousands of people died or moved away. Bush encroached on previously cultivated land, leaving a perfect breeding environment for the tsetse flies, which destroyed plant, human, and animal life⁴² before migrating further south to the shores of Lake Koga, Lake Victoria, and the Islands – then the most populated parts of Uganda. Approximately two-thirds of an estimated 300,000 southern Busoga people and over 400,000 Baganda living on the Buvuma and Ssesse islands and on the shores of Lake Victoria would die from sleeping sickness between 1895 and 1906, while colonial rule was being established. The people of these areas have not forgotten the sleeping sickness – *Mongoota*, as it is locally called. Few know that this terrible epidemic was less a natural disaster than the result of human error.

There were other diseases connected with the establishment of colonial rule. Between 1890 and the 1920s, bovine epidemics caused by black-quarter disease, pleural pneumonia, and East Coast River Fever destroyed cattle in Teso, Ankole, and Buganda, thus carving a huge hole in the resource base of rural communities. These diseases too were an after-effect of colonial violence. Other effects of colonial rule that constituted violence to the local

population are difficult to quantify. The removal of able-bodied men from rural areas for government work, the setting aside of land for cultivation of cash crops like cotton, and excessive demands on the people by the chiefs in Busoga all contributed greatly to the devastating famine of 1908, during which the population of Busoga declined by some sixty percent, from one million in 1890 to four hundred thousand in 1908.⁴³ Between 1888 and 1920 Buganda's population was also slashed by about forty percent, from about one million to six hundred thousand. This kind of structural violence has never hit the headlines. But it is bitter and painful, and even today, it is sadly accepted as a normal pattern of life among peoples who are just as sensitive to loss as their contemporaries in other parts of the world.

The colonial period was violent, but, to reiterate, it was a subtle kind of violence, less blatant and crude than the violence that was to erupt under African leadership. As later chapters show, those who ruled after independence were excessive, selfish, and shameless in their use of violence, often parading their crimes in the open. It can fairly be said that some of them have washed their hands in blood.

Nonetheless, as noted in the introduction, modern Uganda is a creature of its colonial past.⁴⁴ Under British administration, certain tensions and inequities were enhanced, others were generated. The next chapter looks in detail at the principal forms of inequality that are woven into the tapestry of Ugandan violence.

CHAPTER TWO

Inequality and Violence in Uganda

People are not simply killed by direct violence but also by the social order.'

INTRODUCTION

It was argued earlier that inequality – the unequal distribution of the country's meagre resources – is the main cause of violence in Uganda. There was, and still is, inequality based on region, ethnicity, class, religion, and gender, and these forms of inequality were entrenched during the colonial period. Uganda is shaped by several enormous disparities. First, the adverse economic relationship between colonial Uganda and the former colonial power established at the turn of the century has now been extended to other countries of the Western industrialized world. The unequal relationship between Uganda and her neighbours, especially Kenya, through which Ugandan goods must pass to reach the sea, has deprived the country of resources that might have been used to alleviate deprivation and therefore ease tension at home. Alarming inequalities of income between rural and urban dwellers have created discontent in the countryside and led to an influx of people to cities, exacerbating urban problems that lead to violence. Regional inequalities meant that people in the South, where cash crops were produced, received higher incomes than people in the North and in areas that became designated as nothing but sources of labour. In practical terms, and to ordinary folk, this inequality, which ran along ethnic or tribal lines, was considered "ethnic favouritism" or "victimization." As this chapter will show the main beneficiary was Buganda. There was inequality between blue-collar and white-collar workers. The educated élite, those who "used their heads rather than their hands," received and still receive disproportionately higher incomes than manual workers. Nonblack immigrants – Europeans and Asians – received very high incomes,

whereas black workers from surrounding countries like Rwanda, Burundi, Zaire, and Sudan received only subsistence salaries. The privileged "white" immigrants therefore became targets of envy. Inequalities based on religious affiliation meant that Protestants were preferred for political and administrative positions. Catholics and Muslims saw their own prospects for upward social mobility determined by factors other than their level of education, aptitude, or experience. Demarcations based on income created social cleavages. The process of national integration was slowed because people were loyal to the groups they thought would rectify their grievances.

This situation required mature politicians able to identify the real causes of inequality and find ways to correct them. But at independence, Ugandans were handed a country with no integrated economy geared to the satisfaction of domestic demands; no indigenous property-owning class with an economic stake in the country – a class that would have had a lot to lose by the occurrence of social conflict – and no consolidated ruling class that could offer a strong base for social stability. Those to whom power was handed at independence sought mainly to accumulate personal wealth in an inequitable social system. What efforts they made to rectify the inequalities and imbalances in Uganda were themselves undertaken for selfish political purposes. Instead of trying peaceful methods to resolve political conflict, they used violence, unchecked by any coherent political culture based on well-defined political, economic, and social rules and institutions.² And once the first bullet was fired, there was no going back.

ECONOMIC MARGINALIZATION OF AFRICANS

As already noted, the colonial administration in Uganda effectively barred Africans from participating in the higher levels of commerce, industry, and agriculture, thus precluding the emergence of an indigenous class with a stake in the country's economy and, hence, its social and political stability. As early as the 1890s the colonial state began excluding Africans from the processing and marketing stages of production – the most lucrative in the colony's commodity-based economy. *Kabaka* Mwanga tried to buy a sawmill but was prevented by the authorities from doing so.³ In 1909, Governor Bell ordered the destruction of hand gins, which handled some thirty-five percent of cotton produced in the colony. Although improvement of quality was cited as the reason for Bell's

decree, nothing was done to give the hand ginners alternative employment in the processing sector.⁴ In 1913, *Kina Kulya* Growers' Society of Ssingo Farmers was discouraged from marketing its own cotton.⁵ The Cotton Rules of 1918 restricted middlemen from operating within five miles of a ginnery, all of which were owned by foreigners. The Buganda Growers' Association tried to market its own cotton in 1923 but was discouraged by the government. Four years later, Seperiya Kaddumukasa tried to erect a ginnery on his land but was refused a licence.⁶ In 1920 the Buganda Cotton Company was prevented from ginning and marketing its own cotton. In 1932, when the Uganda Cotton Society tried to obtain high prices by ginning and marketing its own cotton and "eliminating the Indian middleman," it was not allowed to do so. In the same year, the Native Produce Marketing Ordinance (Coffee) curtailed the buying activities of African businessmen.

The *Bana Ba Kintu* (Children of Kintu) Association was brought into being in 1938 partly to address the problem of excluding Africans from marketing commodities. Similarly, Mikairi Wamala's Uganda Growers' Association addressed itself to economic and political grievances, chief of which was the exclusion of Africans from marketing commodities and engaging in profitable trade.⁷ The *Bataka* Party, building on the *Bataka* movement of the 1920s, was founded in 1946 to "fight the exploitation of the Asian cotton buyers." Hence when the cotton hold-up – the refusal by peasants to sell cotton – was organized, their demand was to participate in the marketing of agricultural commodities. The 1949 riots were directed against the *Kabaka* as the colonial agent who participated in denying African middlemen and farmers opportunities to participate in marketing commodities, peasant access to stabilization funds created by the governor to start an agricultural bank, and the democratization of Buganda's institutions, especially the election of chiefs sympathetic to African economic needs. African producers pointed out that the European growers in Kenya and Tanganyika not only marketed their commodities internally and externally through producer monopolies like the Kenya Farmers' Association, the Kenya Co-operative Creamers, and others *but also* obtained the real prices offered for these commodities in international markets.

However, instead of curtailing foreign control of the economy and encouraging Africans to participate, the Ugandan authorities increased levels of immigration from 1949 to 1959. European immigration grew from 3,448 to 10,866, an increase of 215 percent, and Indo-Pakistani from 35,215 to 71,933, a growth of 105 percent.⁸ The banking system was controlled by British- and Indian-

based banks like the National and Grindlays Bank of India (banker to the protectorate government), the Standard Bank of South Africa, the Bank of India, and the Bank of Baroda. They did not lend to many Africans, although they operated on an accumulation of African peasant savings, which was lent to foreign businessmen to further exploit national resources.⁹ In 1949, Musaazi called for the use of peasant stabilization funds to create an agricultural bank. It was not until later that such a bank, the Uganda Credit and Savings Bank, was floated. By that time Africans had been left so far behind in business expertise and capital that they could not compete with Indo-Pakistanis and Europeans. Africans could not participate in the lucrative wholesale trade because the colonial government issued wholesale licences only to traders with permanent buildings of stone or concrete: very few African traders had such buildings. By 1959, when a trade boycott of all foreign-owned stores was proclaimed by Augustine Kamyu of the Uganda National Movement, Africans handled less than ten percent of national trade.

Although the colonial government did not actively discourage the emergence of a class of large-scale farmers who could be called capitalist farmers, three factors prevented the smooth emergence of such a class. First, as they did not control the processing and marketing of their products they obtained only a fraction of the proceeds. Their surplus, like that of the peasants, was appropriated by the immigrant nonproducing classes. Second, the establishment of large-scale farms was complicated by the *Busulu* and *Envujjo* law of 1927, which benefited peasants by giving them permanent rights over their holdings provided they paid *busulu* (rent) and *envujjo* (tithe) to the landlords. The presence of many small plots of tenants who could not be dismissed made it very difficult for a landlord who wanted to establish a large farm. The Land Reform Decree of 1975, which allows lessors to evict tenants on six months' notice, was aimed at an individual landowner near Bombo and did not help many landlords.

Finally, the subdivision of estates in the Buganda area through inheritance and sales further fragmented landholdings. In 1900, some 4,138 people were allotted land under the *mailo* freehold system. By 1934, the number of registered landowners had increased to 16,000 and by 1967 to 112,000.¹⁰ No more than two hundred landowners possessed over a thousand acres each; the average holding was no more than five acres.¹¹ Outside Buganda, where the freehold system did not operate, it was difficult for people to invest in

land because they lacked security of tenure.¹² Moreover, the landed chiefs who might have had surpluses to invest were increasingly removed from official positions in the colonial administration. The colonial state moved steadily away from employing the landed aristocracy in favour of "a salaried administration functionally divorced from land ownership and from production."¹³

UGANDA AND THE INDUSTRIALIZED WORLD

As noted in the introduction, Uganda's economy, like those of other colonies, was conditioned by the needs of the economies of industrialized Europe. Uganda was developed to produce primary products, especially cash crops like cotton, coffee, sugar, rubber, and tea, and, in turn, to import manufactured products. Any attempt at Ugandan industrialization, which would have led to competition with the mother country, was discouraged. Thus, for example, in 1935 the governor of Uganda rejected a proposal to set up a blanket factory because, as he reported to the Governors' Conference, he wanted to "preserve" both the agricultural population and import duties from the effects of industrialization.¹⁴ This trading relationship has continued to the present in Uganda, although some processing industries have been established. The problem with depending on the production and export of primary goods is that while it is labour intensive, the income yield is minimal and does not equal the cost of importing manufactured goods. Since 1950, Uganda's four principal products, coffee, cotton, tea, and copper, have all been exported in "primary" form. In return, the country purchased capital goods, chemical products, transport and telecommunications equipment, as well as a wide range of durable and nondurable products. Because of the rising cost of these imports and stagnating prices for primary products, Uganda has experienced persistent adverse trade imbalances since the late 1960s. Table 1 and Figures 1 and 2 document this relationship for the years 1966-75, with 1964 as the base year. The price differentials shown here mean that Uganda has had to export more primary goods in order to buy a static amount of manufactured products. Recent studies show that the situation has not changed.¹⁵

This adverse trading relationship is a major contributor to inequalities between the developed world and the Third World, Uganda in particular. Resources flow out of the poor countries through many channels, and in many directions and forms. Unequal terms of trade; unfair monetary exchange rates; loans or aid

Table 1
Uganda Trade Indices (Fisher's Ideal Index) 1964=100

	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975
<i>Exports</i>										
Total Exports*										
Price	90	91	95	97	105	110	107	127	162	154
Quantum	114	114	108	115	128	113	127	117	97	86
Value	103	104	103	111	134	125	136	149	157	133
Domestic Exports*										
Price	89	90	95	95	104	109	105	123	160	151
Quantum	116	112	108	119	130	119	137	131	110	100
Value	102	100	103	113	135	130	144	164	178	151
Inter-community										
Exports										
Price	110	107	109	110	111	117	115	140	171	157
Quantum	99	122	102	99	114	79	72	35	23	10
Value	107	131	111	99	126	92	82	50	39	15
<i>Imports</i>										
Total Imports										
Price	103	108	106	106	112	120	138	186	229	292
Quantum	123	114	120	127	118	161	90	74	73	54
Value	127	123	127	134	133	192	125	138	167	158
Net Imports										
Price	101	105	103	104	110	120	139	189	230	277
Quantum	129	119	130	134	120	174	89	55	62	52
Value	130	126	134	139	132	208	124	104	144	144
Inter-community										
Exports										
Price	108	114	114	110	117	121	135	153	228	325
Quantum	112	100	97	112	115	128	94	110	99	59
Value	122	114	110	124	134	155	127	168	225	192
<i>Terms of Trade</i>										
Total	87	84	90	91	94	92	78	68	71	53
External	88	86	92	92	94	91	76	66	70	55
Inter-community	101	94	95	100	95	97	85	92	75	48

Note: *Excluding Re-exports.

1975 indices are provisional.

Source: Action Program

tied to programs that generate an often artificial market for manufactured goods; aid tied to the purchase of specified commodities, coupled with the marketing practices of multinationals and the corruption of Third World leaders: these factors all contribute to the flight of capital and, ultimately, to Third World underdevelopment. In turn, this situation has a direct bearing on the social causes of violence in Third World countries in general, and Uganda in particular. Uganda, despite her poverty, is a net exporter of capital. Throughout the 1950s Uganda suffered an adverse capital




Figure 1
Uganda's Terms of Trade, 1966-75
Source: Action Program




Figure 2
Import and Export Prices, 1966-75
Source: Action Program

outflow of some £5 million per year. This amount increased to between £20 million and £35 million in the period 1960–63.¹⁶ In the latter part of the colonial period, peasant wealth – in the form of “stabilization funds,” which the colonial government appropriated from peasant agricultural production reportedly to stabilize prices – was kept in the mother country. The stabilization fund was established with £3,925,000 sterling. By 1948–49 it had grown to £8,000,000, and in 1952–53 to £44,475,000. These funds were literally an interest-free loan to the mother country. Figures calculated from official records indicate that between 1966 and 1970, the total outflow of capital (expressed in Ugandan shillings) was 160 million against an inflow of only 110 million.¹⁷ Whenever there was a political or social crisis, capital rushed out of the country. When Obote announced his half-hearted Nakivubo economic measures in 1970 (see chapter four), their immediate effect was to frighten the controllers of capital in Uganda. In 1969 the total outflow had been only 40 million Ugandan shillings; in 1970 capital outflow more than quintupled to 263.7 million shillings. Capital inflow also suffered. In 1969 the figure was 170.2 million shillings but in 1970 only 105.9 million.¹⁸ Uganda’s capital account registered a deficit of 157.8 million shillings in 1970, compared to a surplus of 124.2 million in 1969. Idi Amin’s expulsion of Asians in 1972 made matters worse. Uganda was taken from the economic frying pan of Obote’s regime into a fire of even more frightening economic doldrums. Private capital fled the country and was not repatriated. The state lost its creditworthiness, and even Ugandans exported their savings. Resources that could have been used to “buy off” social conflict were exported, and community leaders found themselves with less and less wealth to distribute. Decrease in national wealth creates possibilities of social conflict as political participants struggle to control scarce resources. Uganda is a case in point.

UGANDA’S RELATIONS WITH HER NEIGHBOURS

In normal circumstances the aim of foreign policy should be to meet an internal need – that is, to be an extension of internal policy. Foreign policy should never influence internal policy. But the weakness of Third World states like Uganda has ensured that internal policies are shaped by external forces. As a small, landlocked country, Uganda is prey to the policies of countries through which she gains access to the sea. Uganda’s internal weakness has been exploited by her neighbours since the country came into be-

ing in 1894. The result has been an enormous transfer of resources out of the country, which in turn has increased the potential for internal conflict. Ugandan surpluses subsidized the "Uganda Railway," of which not a single foot had been laid on Ugandan soil when this line reached its "completion" at Kisumu in 1901. Ugandan peasant agriculture partly subsidized the costly settler agriculture in Kenya. Uganda lost untold thousands of dollars in customs revenues at the East African coast for decades. The transfer of resources was accelerated in 1973-77 after the break-up of the East African Community. From then on, Ugandan goods lost the protection they had enjoyed while in transit.¹⁹

Of Uganda's relations with her neighbours, none has a more direct impact on Ugandan society than those with Kenya. Whenever strains develop, Uganda feels the effects almost immediately. This was so in 1976 and 1986, when Kenya cut off fuel supplies to Uganda. In the later case, the action was preceded by a minor exchange of fire.²⁰ However, each country needs the other's goodwill. Uganda needs Kenya in order to survive and contain internal conflict. Uganda's shortest route to the sea, whether by rail or road, is through Kenya; Kenya's manufactured goods should, under normal circumstances, be cheaper for Uganda than those made overseas; and Uganda has a lot to learn from Kenya's industrialization, especially in the area of technology transfer. It should also be noted that Kenya has given refuge to many Ugandans fleeing their homeland, although one hopes that the need for sanctuary will not be permanent.

But Kenya also needs Uganda. Uganda offers the shortest and cheapest route for Kenyan goods to markets in Rwanda, Burundi, western Zaire, and southern Sudan. Kenya's industrial capacity was intended to serve Uganda, Tanzania, and other interior markets, and Uganda is a big consumer of Kenyan goods. Beginning in 1971, when Uganda's industrial sector was ruined through Idi Amin's mismanagements, Kenyan industries benefited enormously by exploiting opportunities created by this vacuum. Kenya developed a favourable balance of trade with Uganda: exports to Uganda reached \$77 million in 1976 and \$175 million by 1980, and by 1986 Kenya was the largest *single* exporter of manufactured goods to Uganda.²¹ Finally, Kenya has benefited from a contract signed in the colonial period whereby Ugandan electricity is sold more cheaply to Kenyans than to Ugandans themselves. Because Uganda's potential power generation is much greater than its neighbour's, Kenya would be wise to remember that it is likely to benefit when Uganda puts her house in order.

Thus, Kenya and Uganda need each other. Neither can develop its industries beyond a certain level without bilateral cooperation. Neither should embark on policies or practices that increase the possibilities of conflict in the other's house. Yet Kenya, like others of Uganda's neighbours, has not always observed this principle. The breakdown of social organization in Uganda between 1971 and 1985 prompted the smuggling of key resources from Uganda, thus reducing domestic resources and increasing social conflict. Ugandan goods were smuggled to Kenya, Zaire, Rwanda, and Burundi. Smugglers developed contacts and collaborated with some of the rulers of these countries – links that complicated what would otherwise have been a simple issue to resolve once Uganda had put her house in order. Because certain elements within the political élites in the countries surrounding Uganda profited from smuggling, they did not wish to see an end to the chaos in Uganda. But smuggling cost Uganda dearly. Between 1976 and 1977, the years of the coffee boom, over thirty percent of Uganda's coffee production, about 50,000 metric tonnes, was smuggled. Most of it went to Kenya or Rwanda and was exported from there. In 1980, some 70,000 metric tonnes of Ugandan coffee and forty million shillings worth of gold were smuggled out of the country.²² A study by the International Development Research Centre reported that between 40,000 and 60,000 metric tonnes of coffee were smuggled out of Uganda each year.²³ Besides coffee, other goods such as petroleum products were being smuggled out of the country and imports were diverted to other destinations. General merchandise, including spare motor parts, drugs, and textiles, were also smuggled, as well as foodstuffs such as fish, beans, groundnuts, soya beans, peas, bananas, and maize. The weakness of the Ugandan shilling contributed to the temptation to smuggle. It was also a reflection of Uganda's weakness as a state that it was unable to protect its interests.

The whole issue of the transportation of goods between Kenya and Uganda became a source of friction in itself. In 1987 the Museveni government correctly calculated that it would be cheaper to transport Ugandan goods by rail than by road. Such a move would minimize smuggling and help to conserve Uganda's resources. In 1987, Ugandan and Kenyan authorities reached an agreement aimed at harmonizing their railway systems. Uganda saved money by using the railway. Transporting a ton of coffee from Kampala to Mombasa cost US \$116 by road but only \$36 by rail. Even sending goods through Tanzania by rail was cheaper than by road to Mombasa: only \$41 in 1986 prices. Uganda railway ship-

ments grew from 150,000 tons in 1980, to 275,385 in 1983, 169,331 in 1985, and 600,000 in 1986. The saving in 1986–87 was \$56 million.²⁴ But Uganda's shift from road to rail transport displeased certain elements in Kenya. A dispute between the two countries in 1987 led to an unfortunate clash and a Kenyan minister's complaint that Uganda had imposed strict conditions that delayed the transport of goods by road.²⁵ But the main problem between the two countries – which almost led to war after exchanges of fire at the border – was the basic issue of road versus rail²⁶ and hinged on the desire of the trucking interests in Kenya not to lose money by the shift.²⁷

To avoid being vulnerable to unfairness on the part of other countries, Ugandan leaders must maintain friendly relations with Kenya *and* Tanzania. Doing so will give Uganda the option to transport goods through Mombasa, Dar es Salaam, or Tanga. To be hostile towards either country for a prolonged period would eliminate Uganda's freedom of choice. After Idi Amin soured his relations with Tanzania in 1971, he was left with no options when he fell out with Kenya in 1976. Such a situation can lead to violence at home. Despite Tanzania's 1978–79 military incursion into Uganda and apparent favouring of one of the Ugandan leaders, there have developed no permanent differences between the two countries. Uganda still needs the Tanzanian option to gain access to the sea.²⁸

URBAN/RURAL INEQUALITY

One feature of Ugandan society is a permanent and alarming income gap between rural and urban dwellers. Inequalities in income and quality of life lead to violence. Educated people who have good jobs in urban settings are naturally reluctant to lose their privileges and will struggle fiercely to control the distribution of state resources. Controlling the produce of peasants is the key to controlling Uganda. Ninety percent of Uganda's production occurs in rural areas but over forty percent of the wealth is consumed in urban areas. Thousands of youths in search of a better life flock to towns each year. Indeed, Ugandan urban areas have registered a population growth rate that is far higher than the national average. For example, while the national population growth rate was 2.6 percent between 1969 and 1980 and 2.5 percent between 1980 and 1991, that of the city of Kampala was far higher. According to provisional figures of the 1991 census recently released by Henry Lutaya, the acting chief government statistician, Kampala's popula-

tion is now 773,500, compared to 330,000 in 1969 and 458,400 in 1980. That represents a growth rate of 38.9 percent in the decade of the 1970s, a 68.7 percent rise in the 1980s and an overall growth of 139 percent in those twenty years. Jinja, which had a population of 29,741 in 1967, now has a population of 60,000, while Mbale has gone from 13,569 in 1967 to 40,000. Masaka, Gulu, Entebbe, Soroti, and Mbarara have 40,000 people each. It must be added that, besides youths, urban areas were swelled by internal refugees during the heat of the social conflict. Many who sought "refugee status" in cities never returned to rural areas because of the destruction of their homes. However, the dearth of employment opportunities in towns increases the potential for violence.

Uganda's rural sector consists largely of peasants, "rural cultivators whose surpluses are transferred to a dominant group of rulers that use their surpluses both to underwrite their own standards of living, and to distribute the remainder to groups in society that do not farm."²⁹ Ugandan peasantry could be divided into several categories. Rich peasants cultivated fifteen to one hundred acres of coffee or cotton; many used hired labour on a permanent basis. They probably constituted about fifteen percent of the population of the cash-crop-producing districts. The middle peasants were relatively well off farmers who, while employing others, laboured on their own farms. Their houses were iron roofed, and they could afford to send their children to high schools. The poor peasants, referred to as cultivators, comprised thirty to forty percent of the total population. They produced just enough food and cash crops to feed their family and could not afford to employ hired labour. Their holdings, whether owned or hired, often consisted of no more than one or two acres. The rural workers, about twenty percent of the general population, were landless and had nothing to sell but their labour. Many of them, especially in southern Uganda, were immigrants. In general, peasant surplus is appropriated by town dwellers who are not directly involved in production.

In addition to peasants, there are rural capitalist farmers who, though few in number (about two percent of the population), are rich by local standards. Each has up to 165 acres of coffee or cotton under cultivation, employs fifty workers, and annually sells up to two hundred tons of coffee or cotton. Although these farmers are richer than the average peasant, they live in rural areas and do not share in the amenities of town life. Their produce, like that of poor peasants, is appropriated by people who do not directly participate in production. From the time cash crops were introduced to Uganda in the first decade of this century, the classes that control

the state have appropriated more than half of what these goods fetched on the world market. The appropriating classes lived in urban centres and used peasant surplus to maintain their high standards of living. Table 2, adapted from a table in Jan Jelmert Jorgensen's book on the political history of Uganda, shows the price paid to the Ugandan government or its agents for coffee and cotton per metric tonne and the proportion that they paid in turn to the growers. On average, between 1912 and 1975, the cotton grower received about twenty percent of the value obtained at Mombasa. Coffee growers fared a little better, receiving about thirty percent of what their coffee fetched at Mombasa from 1916 to 1962. When Obote came to power, he levied heavy taxes on robusta coffee grown in Buganda. As a result, the percentage of coffee revenues obtained by Baganda farmers dropped to an average of twenty-one percent.

The ruin of Uganda's agricultural base would continue. Amin's chaotic rule made the country increasingly dependent on coffee because his persecution of people in Acholi, Lango, and Teso destroyed cotton growing in those areas. Similarly, plantation crops like tea and sugar, which depended on foreign expertise, suffered when foreigners left the country. But peasant-grown coffee in Buganda and Bugishu survived the exodus, though quantity and quality were affected. The effect of dependency on a single cash crop was disastrous not only to the state but to the coffee farmers. The government shifted the tax burden onto the farmers' shoulders as its taxation base in the urban areas weakened during Amin's misrule. In the period 1973-77, coffee producers received only twelve percent of what their produce fetched on the world market. The remaining eighty-eight percent was appropriated for use by state controllers who resided in towns. It should be no surprise that many coffee farmers switched to subsistence crops.

The control of peasant production by the urban classes began as early as 1908, when the government enacted measures affecting cotton growers. In 1919 a government tax was imposed on cotton. When coffee growing was extended to Africans, the government supervised its marketing. During the Second World War peasant-produced coffee and cotton were sold in bulk, a practice that "brought greater benefits to Britain than it bestowed" on her colony.³⁰ Although bulk selling was intended to ensure the sale of peasant produce during the war, the system was left unchanged when the war ended. New coffee and cotton marketing boards continued to sell peasant produce in bulk below world market prices. In the 1940s African farmers, led by progressive traders and the

Table 2

Uganda Cotton and Coffee Data 1910–1978 (modified and simplified)

Year	Cotton Lint Exports			Raw Coffee Exports		
	Price per metric tonne (FOB)	Growers price per metric tonne in shillings	B/A Per- cent	Price per metric tonne (FOB)	Growers price per metric tonne in shillings	E/D
	Mombasa in shillings	tonne in shillings	cent	MSA in shillings	tonne in shillings	Per- cent
	A	B	C	D	E	F
1910/1911	1453			580		
1911/1912	1226	196.87	16	594		
1912/1913	1085	234.13	22	1054		
1913/1914	1258	230.16	18	744		
1914/1915	1178	110.23	9	765		
1915/1916	1033	230.60	22	794	265	33
1916/1917	1762	268.30	15	923	265	29
1917/1918	2127	378.97	18	785	728	93
1918/1919	3873	357.15	9	768	728	95
1919/1920	3650	616.63	17	1079	750	70
1920(9mo)	8734	1190	14	1483		
1921	1736	176.37	10	758		
1922	2003			762		
1923	2538			1044		
1924	2988	617	21	1607	882–1323	55–82
1925	2635	551	21	1837		
1926	1860	397	21	1753		
1927	1415	353	25	1542		
1928	1970	441	23	1602		
1929	1789	397	22	1693		
1930	1328	331.79	25	1249		
1931	877	237.66	27	908		
1932	842	236.55	28	1009		
1933	1003	193.56	19	826		
1934	1130	223.55	20	749		
1935	1229	258.60	21	723		
1936	1141	209.66	18	656		
1937	1391	291.45	21	642		
1938	939	181.66	19	460	132	29
1939	888	167.36	19	503	132	26
1940	1365	227.41	17	539	132	24
1941	1284	194.45	15	604	132	22
1942	1336	169.31	13	804	287	36
1943	2906	276.90	10	1144	309	27
1944	2933	290.57	10	1044	309	28
1945	2928	326.94	11	1144	309	27
1946	2826	361.55	13	1083	331	31
1947	3101	406.75	13	1450	375	26
1948	4717	450.18	10	1690	419	25
1949	4899	652.78	13	2381	463	19
1950	5285	699.96	13	5149	551	11

Table 2 (cont'd)

Year	Cotton Lint Exports			Raw Coffee Exports		
	Price per metric tonne (FOB) Mombasa in shillings	Growers price per metric tonne in shillings	B/A Per- cent	Price per metric tonne (FOB) MSA in shillings	Growers price per metric tonne in shillings	E/D Per- cent
	A	B	C	D	E	F
1951	9157	951.51	10	6157	882	14
1952	8735	1048.51	12	6160	1102	18
1953	5541	1075.44	19	6364	1543	24
1954	5852	1089.07	19	7657	3307	43
1955	5898	1296.53	22	5323		
1956	5646	1148.82	20	5019	1653	33
1957	5721	1175.93	21	5066	1764	35
1958	5160	1210.33	23	5209	1764	34
1959	4556	974.43	21	4161	1499	36
1960	4987	987.88	20	2863	1235	43
1961	5291	1151.46	22	2666	1102	41
1962	5044	1147.71	23	3032	1213	40
1963	4798	1180.78	25	3684	1058	29
1964	4917	1245.60	25	5066	1257	25
1965	4852	1170.48	25	3856	950	25
1966	4397	1235.18	28	4158	880	21
1967	4214	761.87	18	4339	880	20
1968	4796	933.54	19	4705	880	19
1969	4744	1130.56	24	4089	880-1060	22-26
1970	4493	974.99	22	5305	1060-1190	20-22
1971	5121	1130.56	22	5626	1190	21
1972	5567	1123.09	20	5268	1190	23
1973	5194	1170.49	22	5936	1190	20
1974	7522	1493.65	20	8761	1250	14
1975	8303	1724.47	21	7968	1400	18
1976				15362	2500	16
1977				34420	3500	10
1978				22440	3500	16

Adapted from Jan Jørgensen *Uganda: A Modern History*, 1982. St Martin's Press, London, pp. 349-50 with full permission of the author.

educated élite, began organizing to demand African participation in marketing their agricultural production. Not even the peasants' monetary receipts were allowed to accumulate in the countryside. They were funnelled to the towns in several ways through foreign banks, which opened many rural branches in the 1950s and 1960s and lent to multinationals, non-Ugandan firms, certain rich urban Africans, and the government.³¹ Little of this capital trickled back to rural areas in the form of jobs, agricultural investments, or social

services since it was lent to and spent by people who either exported it or consumed it in urban areas.

To date, there has been minimal investment in Uganda's rural areas. There are no power supplies or facilities to meet emergencies, and few health-care centres, all-weather roads, clean-water wells, or police stations. But urban areas do have most of these facilities, although twenty years of misgovernment have undermined their quality. Indeed, Uganda's development has been shouldered by peasant-generated revenues and rural surpluses. Peasant accumulation, not foreign aid, has financed most of the outstanding development projects, such as the initial capital for the Uganda Development Corporation, the Owen Falls Dam with its hydroelectric complex at Jinja, the initial development of a good road system, and secondary schools built before 1962. Kyesimira was of the view that peasant production surplus has contributed about seventy-five percent to Uganda's overall development.³² One British economic historian puts the contribution of rural producers to the "prosperity" of the country in a proper perspective by pointing out that they received no more than "three quarters" of the price which their produce fetched in the world market and that by 1953, they had paid more than £82 million sterling towards the welfare of the country.³³

In contrast to rural producers, those who lived in urban centres and were not involved in direct production earned very high incomes. The urban sector could be divided into a commercial and industrial bourgeoisie, a bureaucratic petty bourgeoisie, the proletariat, and Europeans. The commercial and industrial bourgeoisie, small but powerful, consisted mainly of "white" immigrants from the Indian subcontinent. By 1966 Asian immigrants controlled over 73.6 percent of wholesale trade, and Africans only 4.6 percent. During the last years of the first Obote regime, many Asian merchants penetrated into large-scale agriculture with government encouragement. The bureaucratic petty bourgeoisie included the political élite, civil servants, heads of parastatal bodies, and African employees of foreign corporations. Their incomes were as much as forty times that of ordinary Ugandans. Monthly pay cheques rather than ownership of commerce or industry determined their lifestyles. The proletariat was not numerous; there were very few people "who had nothing to sell but their labour." Most urban workers were peasants first and workers second. They had roots in the country, symbolized by the *kibanja* (plantation) to which they returned after earning money in the city. Thus, although there were urban workers who were poor, received low incomes, and

lived in squalid conditions, there were few proletarians. Finally, the Europeans were employed mainly by the colonial state, though a handful of them represented foreign capital as managers, trading agents, distributors of merchandise, or manufacturers at the few local plants. They earned almost fifty times more than ordinary Ugandans, and they set social standards.

It is clear from this outline that the class structure of colonial society was complicated by the racial division of labour. The position of Asians as middlemen between international capital and peasant producers, coupled with their conspicuous consumption, drew particular resentment. Africans attacked the Indo-Asian petty bourgeoisie as an "Asian" race that was perceived as exploitative and anti-African. As early as 1921 Sefanio K. Sentongo, the editor of *Sekanyolya*, published an editorial lashing out against the Indians: "It is useless to be the friend of an Indian because he is like a broken reed. We want the Indians out of the country because, while they are here we cannot make any progress."³⁴ G.R. Kizza, writing in *Gambuze* in 1946, called the Asians "parasites" who were "a millstone weighing many pounds around the neck of the African, and which would destroy us the people of Uganda."³⁵ In 1959 a trade boycott was organized by the Uganda National Movement to reduce the Asians' control over commerce and lucrative sectors of society. Although it was limited to Buganda and was crushed by the colonial state, anti-Asian sentiments did not disappear. Politicians from both Buganda and the rest of the country indignantly expressed the dangers inherent in concentrating wealth in Asian hands and their dominance in urban centres. As Grace Ibingira wrote, "It suddenly became humiliating that all the towns in the Protectorate should be inhabited and owned by Indians." He moaned that the future capital of the nation was like Delhi.³⁶ Before Amin expelled the Asians (see chapter 6), other prominent Ugandans had called for a reduction in the Asians' control of trade.³⁷

While many saw the problem of inequality in racial terms, few criticized the draining of resources from rural to urban areas. And few realized that merely changing the race of owners of shops, businesses, and industry would not alter social inequality. The concentration of wealth in Asian hands was, admittedly, an unfair social reality but also one that might have been resolved with less pain.

Educated urban Africans began to receive high incomes as independence approached. Government jobs formerly occupied by

Europeans were opened to Africans, giving them a new-found access to previously denied wealth. Although the salary structures of the colonial government were tailored to meet European lifestyles, Africans who "Africanized" European posts received the same salaries as their European counterparts. That is, similar salaries for similar positions were paid whether the worker was African or European. The independent government that took power in 1962 did not change the colonial salary structure. This meant that the big gaps in income between government civil servants and ordinary workers were maintained. Thus, a high-ranking civil servant with a Class A salary received 36,000 Ugandan shillings per year, lived in a government house (free or subsidized) with running water, electricity, furniture, etc., used a government car or received a car loan at minimal interest, had free medical care in Grade A wards, lived in the best quarter of town, received leave, educational, acting, and mileage allowances, and various other perks. Middle-ranking civil servants received between 10,000 and 30,000 shillings and had almost the same privileges as their superiors.³⁸ Between 1962 and 1973, not only was the Ugandan shilling stable but its internal purchasing power was buoyant. Civil servants enjoyed a fairly high standard of living.

Rural incomes, on the other hand, were low and stagnant. Between 1960 and 1969, annual rural income per capita remained at between 305 and 355 shillings a year – about 1 percent of what a senior civil servant received. On average, civil servants received about twenty times more per annum than peasants from the rural areas. In Acholi District, 2 percent of the 340,000 people working for the civil service received 55 percent of total district earnings – about 42.6 percent of growers' income from the sale of cotton.³⁹ Most of these civil servants lived in the towns of Gulu and Kitgum. Even in rural Buganda, where peasants were relatively well off, incomes were low compared to those of town dwellers. The average annual income in Buganda in the mid-1960s, including the value of subsistence production, was 1,730 shillings.

Idi Amin's rise to power worsened the situation of rural dwellers. He increased the appropriation of their surpluses. Cotton and coffee were more heavily taxed as the collapse of the commercial and industrial sectors shifted the tax burden to peasant producers. The prices of agricultural overheads – hoes, insecticides, machetes, fertilizers, and so on – went up. The price of goods peasants needed for daily use – soap, sugar, blankets, clothes – reached unaffordable levels. Many imports were consumed by urban dwellers who had the money to purchase them. Rural life in Uganda

became extremely unpleasant. Until Idi Amin came to power, Africans who held good jobs and earned high incomes were the educated élite. In a study of Makerere college students in 1955, Goldthorpe found that there was a well-defined relationship between education and income.⁴⁰ After the departure of Europeans, many of these lucrative "Africanized" jobs could be maintained only by extracting more resources from the already overburdened countryside and maintaining inequality between the rural and urban sectors of society. Together with the commercial petty bourgeoisie, which consisted of immigrant ethnic groups, government officials benefited from social inequality by receiving the lion's share of Uganda's national pie. The problem with the African educated élite was that their high incomes, far from being secure, were dependent on the possession of government jobs either as civil servants or politicians. As more people acquired an education and felt "qualified" to enter the government, the struggle to control the government in order to control the allocation of these lucrative positions generated violence. Control of the state was the key to allocating the country's lucrative jobs and other national resources.

REGIONAL INEQUALITY

Uganda was developed as a collection of ethnic entities, each based on a district level. Clear demarcation lines between districts coincided with district "tribal" boundaries. By 1955 Uganda could be conceived of as a series of concentric rings, with Buganda at the centre, Busago, Bugishu, Teso, Toro, and Ankole as the semi-periphery, Kigezi, West Nile, Bunyoro, Lango, and Acholi as the periphery, and Karamoja as the periphery of the periphery.

There have been varying levels of inequality between regions and districts and, therefore, between ethnic groups. The people of Teso, for example, enjoyed greater privileges and received higher incomes than the people of Mubende District in Buganda. The people of Toro earned more than those of Kigezi, and West Nile tobacco growers were better off than the people of Koki in Buganda's Rakai District.

There was also localized inequality within districts themselves. In Ankole, the Bahima, whose distinct physical features were different from those of the Bairu, constituted a ruling class based on ownership of cattle and thus controlled the distribution of major resources in the area instead of the Bairu agriculturalists. In Teso there was inequality of development and opportunity between the southern and northern parts of the district, a division that inter-

ferred with the functioning of the district administration.⁴¹ In Acholi there were complaints that some clans and certain areas received a larger share of government benefits than others.⁴² In Toro District, the Bakonjo and Bamba claimed that their home counties were left undeveloped and neglected even though their area produced most of the district's resources. They sought to have their district constituted as a separate entity to be called Ruwenzururu.⁴³ The people of Sebei felt that their resources were being unequally consumed by the Bagishu and persuaded the colonial government just before independence to create a new Sebei District.

Discrepancies in regional – and therefore ethnic – development and wealth in Uganda have produced antagonisms that have often, directly and indirectly, led to violence. Simply put, people from the underprivileged parts of the country wanted an equal share in the wealth of the privileged centre, while the rich reacted by trying to close the gates. The greatest, and most problematic, disparity was precisely between the centre, Buganda, and the rest of the country, or, geographically, between North and South.

By the time colonial rule was established, Buganda was already a consolidated state in the southern part of the country with clearly defined and viable political institutions centring on the monarchy under the *Kabaka*, or king. The kingship as an institution was the link that bound all Baganda into a “nation,” and the relationship with the *Kabaka* was almost sacred. Every Muganda belonged to a clan whose ultimate head – whose real relative and protector – was the *Kabaka*. As leader of the clan heads, the *Kabaka* was connected to every single family in Buganda; he *was* the Buganda in a political, social, and cultural sense. He was the “queen ant,” the *Namunswa*, the fire that warmed every home, and the protector of all people.

Buganda was more homogeneous than any other substate in the nation, being held together by a common language, customs, territory, clan structure, and, above all, the monarchy. It was also more developed. For example, Buganda developed a lively press sooner than any other area in Uganda.⁴⁴ The first newspapers, such as *Munno* and *Ssekanyolya*, were printed as early as the 1920s; others followed. In 1924, the *Uganda Herald's* Michael Moses hired Daudi Basudde to edit his Luganda version, called *Matalisi*. In the same year Apolo Kagwa founded a paper, *Njuba Ebireese*, to defend the interests of chiefs, but it ceased publication within one year. *Gambuze* followed *Ssekanyolya*, which collapsed in 1925. Before the end of the 1920s another paper appeared – *Ddoboosi lya Buganda*, edited by Yusufu Bamutta. By 1960 there were many Luganda daily news-

papers as well as weeklies and monthlies. All concentrated on Buganda's problems and thus projected Buganda's interests as a nation, *egwanga*. Other areas, like Toro, Bunyoro, or Ankole, were considered foreign nations, *amawanga*, by Baganda. Thus, the notion crystallized that Buganda was a nation while the rest of Uganda was different, an "appendage to Buganda," a nation evolved from a "native state to a colonial protectorate."⁴⁵ This view would influence the political behaviour of many Baganda politicians, who saw themselves as Baganda first and Ugandans second. It also influenced some non-Baganda politicians who saw in the destruction of Buganda a fulfilment of their political goals.

Buganda formed the original geopolitical centre of the protectorate. It came under British protection through the 1900 Buganda Agreement. By this treaty the Baganda erroneously understood that they had as a sovereign nation voluntarily accepted British protection until their substate was developed enough to look after itself.⁴⁶ But, like other colonial treaties, the 1900 Agreement could only be interpreted by the colonial power, which regarded all "natives and their possessions" as conquered peoples: Buganda was but one of the provinces. The British colonial administration did, however, consider the Baganda to be superior to other ethnic groups in the protectorate⁴⁷ and it was in effect by extending Buganda that the rest of Uganda was consolidated. Its political institutions were exported to the rest of the country; the Baganda were used as partners in the conquest of Uganda and, later, as subimperialist agents; and the colonial headquarters was located in the substate. Such moves were bound to upset other Ugandans, feed anti-Baganda sentiments, and encourage other ethnic groups to unite against the Baganda.⁴⁸

The substate was favoured in many ways. Individual land tenure was allowed in Buganda under the *mailo* system but not elsewhere. In 1915 the colonial secretary, in vetoing the extension of the *mailo* system, made all land outside Buganda Crown land.⁴⁹ The Buganda *Lukiiko* could veto any tax increase proposed by the colonial government. In 1919 the *Kabaka* and his ministers obstructed a proposed poll-tax increase from five to seven and a half rupees, by appealing directly to the British government.⁵⁰ The Colonial Office appeased the governor but reprimanded him for not being diplomatic with the Baganda. Baganda chiefs, by outmanoeuvring the colonial state, occupied the best land in Buganda, a fact that did not please visiting chiefs from other areas. It is true that by 1921 the colonial government realized that Buganda was an uncontrollable pet that needed to be handled with the greatest care and that

the advantages given to the substate could not be extended to the rest of Uganda. But the colonial state did not take away Buganda's advantages. In fact, the 1955 Agreement, which replaced the 1900 Agreement between Buganda and Britain, was a capitulation to its demands: the substate was given more powers, although the *Kabaka* was legally made a constitutional leader. Buganda could directly elect its own members of Parliament; other areas could not. The *Lukiiko* acted like a state parliament and more social services were transferred to Bugandan control.

Buganda was the nucleus from which European expansion to the rest of the country radiated. It was thus the first to receive the benefits of European rule, thereby winning a head start in the race for development. All communication networks converged at its capital, Mengo, near Kampala. Because of its proximity to the administrative centres of Kampala and Entebbe, Buganda gained more from the multiplier effects of government development initiatives than the more isolated regions of the protectorate. When cash crops were introduced, Buganda was the first region selected for experimentation. It was easy to administer economic development in Buganda. There was little social resistance to central authority, a beneficial and predictable climate with two rainy seasons a year (the climate was so good it was said that "one old woman could feed ten men" from her plantain garden⁵¹), and a hierarchical social structure with clearly defined patterns of authority that ensured the basis for a sound local economy. As a result, cash-crop production spread rapidly in the kingdom.

While other areas, including the Eastern Province, began to grow cash crops in the 1950s, "one of the principal developments since the war has been the concentration of agricultural wealth in certain areas of the Protectorate and especially in Buganda."⁵² In a discussion of crop sales by area, Wrigley shows that Buganda produced slightly over forty percent of Uganda's total output. This regional concentration of agricultural wealth meant that Baganda peasants were richer than others despite the official appropriation of their surplus. In 1959, according to the then *Kabaka* of the substate, per capita income was US\$57, the Eastern Province's \$30, the West's \$15, and the North's \$15, while Buganda contributed fifty-three percent to Uganda's total exports in the same year.⁵³ Wrigley put Buganda's 1956 per capita figure at £35 sterling, a slightly higher sum.⁵⁴ In 1958, the Statistics Department of the colonial government came out with shaky but more reliable estimates of African incomes in Uganda. Nearly eighty percent of gross money income was concentrated in Buganda and the Eastern Province,

especially in Mengo, Busoga, Masaka, and Bugishu districts. About thirty-three percent of the £58,731,000 sterling or £20,000,000, was allocated to Mengo District, the heart of Buganda. However, these estimates, like most data, are questionable. First, the population figures were estimates calculated each year since 1948, when the previous census was held. The general census scheduled for 1958 was postponed to 1959 because of the general elections to the Legislative Council planned for 1958. Next, the total money income did not include the value of subsistence production, nor did it include export taxes and surpluses or deficits of marketing boards and public enterprises. And, lastly, the district analysis of money incomes was derived from the production of cotton, coffee, and wages as calculated from estimates of the Agriculture department and annual enumeration of employees. As a result, the district incomes were subject to a high degree of error – as much as plus or minus ten percent. Nonetheless, despite these shortcomings, it is clear that Buganda and, to some extent, Busoga, received the lion's share of income in colonial Uganda.

Western formal education – the passport to the civil service – was first introduced to Uganda by missionaries who went first to Buganda, bringing with them social services such as schools and hospitals. Because of their head start in education, Baganda, not surprisingly, became overrepresented in the higher echelons of the civil service. Representing 16.3 percent of Uganda's population of about six million in 1959, Baganda held 40.7 percent of senior civil-service positions in 1959, 46.9 percent in 1961, 38.1 percent in 1963, 37.3 percent in 1965, and 35.6 percent in 1967.⁵⁵ The result was more well-paid people among the Baganda than among any other single ethnic group. This development, perceived as favouritism by the rest of the country, contributed to the anti-Baganda sentiment displayed in the establishment of political groups such as the All Uganda People's Union to combat Buganda and Baganda influence.

Because Kampala is located in the Buganda heartland, opportunities for employment in the central government, commerce, and industry were greater there than elsewhere. In 1967 there were 109,800 registered employees in Buganda, 58,800 in the Eastern Province, 53,300 in the Western Province, and 20,000 in the Northern Province.⁵⁶ The Baganda were able to grow their food at home and commute to jobs in Kampala. Even in the private sector, Baganda workers were better paid than those of other ethnic groups, mainly because of their higher education. In a 1955 study of African labour at a Jinja factory, Elkan found that, "when it

comes to wages, it is the [Baganda] who figure, if anything, more prominently in the upper ranges ... The higher rates are earned by supervisors, clerk and tradesmen."⁵⁷ Clearly, during most of the colonial period, the Baganda were the most highly paid African social group in the protectorate's workforce. It will be seen that the remainder of the ethnic groups within the Ugandan protectorate could not accept this inequality without complaint.

One of the main factors contributing to regional economic inequality was the designation, in the early days of the protectorate, of some areas of the country as producers of cash crops, and others as suppliers of the necessary labour. The central region – most of Buganda and Busoga – was designated a producing area while the outlying districts of Kigezi, Ankole, West Nile, and parts of Acholi were earmarked to provide labour. In 1925, when the director of Agriculture tried to assist cotton growing in West Nile, he was informed that "the policy of this government is at present to refrain from actively stimulating the production of cotton or other economic crops in outlying districts on which it is dependent for the supply of labour for the carrying out of essential services in the central or producing Districts."⁵⁸ West Nile and Acholi supplied labour to Bunyoro planters. Teso was elevated to producing status when cotton growing proved to be economically viable. Lango supplied labour to Teso until cotton growing was stimulated there, and Busoga supplied most of its labour. Buganda received labour from Ankole and Kigezi. In 1953, 28,000 workers from these districts entered Buganda, the number increasing to 42,000 in 1954. However, the largest suppliers of labour to Buganda from 1938 onwards were the Belgian territories of Rwanda/Burundi. Workers came in the thousands from these territories: 101,141 workers in 1938, 110,897 in 1942, and 86,232 in 1944. This policy enriched the producing areas and impoverished the others, increasing both inequality and the potential for violence. Most workers spent their money where they worked and, because of increases in the cost of living, were able to send only minor portions of their salaries back home. Most settled in Buganda.

The influx of cheap labour from inside and outside Uganda had an impact on Buganda's agricultural economy and raised the income gap between Buganda and the rest of the country. With their high incomes, the Baganda developed sophisticated tastes: as Elkan pointed out, "Everybody [in Uganda] needs money to pay their poll-tax, and in most areas there is a sale for cloth, cigarettes, soap and bicycles. In Baganda there is also a sale for refrigerators, motor cars and dinner jackets."⁵⁹ Houses in Buganda were roofed with

iron and Baganda women had a change of clothes for Sunday. Unfortunately, the Baganda began to realize that they were more prosperous than the other inhabitants of the country.⁶⁰ They became arrogant; in 1930 they were described as having “translated the old sense of superiority into the idea that skilled labour is the sphere of the Baganda and unskilled work that of other tribes.”⁶¹ They regarded themselves as the employer class and other ethnic groups as hewers of wood and drawers of water. To them, all non-Baganda were “Banyoro” – the ethnic group whose kingdom had competed with Buganda for centuries but whom the Baganda crushed with the help of the British.

The arrogance and economic advantages of the Baganda made them unpopular with other Ugandans. Under colonial rule, they had felt, with reason, that the British administrators had favoured the Baganda at their expense. Indeed, the ongoing disparity between Buganda and the rest of the country in terms of income and opportunity was, as shown, entrenched in the period of colonial rule. In one crucial area, however, the Baganda were less advantaged than other ethnic groups in Uganda. For understandable political reasons, the colonial regime had armed the economically disadvantaged Lwo and Sudanic speakers and demilitarized the more privileged Baganda and other Bantu speakers. When Apolo Milton Obote took power after independence, he continued the recruiting practices of the colonial regime with the result that by 1969, the Baganda constituted only five percent of the Ugandan army, although they represented more than sixteen percent of the population. The northerners, nineteen percent of the population, comprised sixty-one percent of the army. The situation was the same in the police forces. In 1961 the largest group of police recruits – 15.5 percent of the force – came from Acholi, although the Acholi made up only 4.4 percent of the country’s population. The Iteso, 8.1 percent of the population, made up 15.2 percent of the police force. The Langi constituted 7.5 percent of the police force with only 5.6 percent of Uganda’s population.⁶² No single southern or Bantu-speaking group constituted more than five percent of the police force, and the numbers were similar in the correctional and secret services. To justify this exclusion of southerners, a myth was created that they could not fight. The myth makers ignored the fact that it had taken colonial officials years to defeat Bunyoro’s King Kabarega and that it was the Baganda under Semei Kakungulu who conquered the Eastern Province and parts of the Northern Province for the British. A number of prominent Ugandans from the North apparently believed in this myth.⁶³

This underrepresentation in the repressive institutions of the state boded ill for Buganda. Because the balance of power in underdeveloped countries lies more with coercive elements than with those who own the means of production, underrepresentation of the Baganda and other Bantu ethnic groups in Uganda's armed forces created a dangerous imbalance.⁶⁴ Those who controlled the means of violence could dictate terms to the unarmed; since they were economically disadvantaged, the temptation for them to use these tools in order to rectify their apparently inferior social position was great. As chapter 3 will show, this is precisely what happened in 1966.

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PART TWO

*From Nakulabye to
Namugongo*

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CHAPTER THREE

From a Negotiated to an Imposed Constitution, 1962–66

INTRODUCTION

On 9 October 1962, Uganda achieved independence from Britain and became a republic, replacing the white governor general with an African president a year later. This transfer of power marked the only peaceful change of government in Uganda's history as an independent nation. Between 1966 and 1985 there were six changes of government and several institutional transformations. Each was violent, involving loss of life and property among the guilty and innocent alike. The traditional rulers were deposed in 1966–67 not through the votes of their subjects but by decree; the 1967 constitution was imposed on the nation by force; this dictatorial constitution was not endorsed by the population but by members of Parliament whose terms of office should have ended that year. Apolo Milton Obote was replaced in 1971 by Idi Amin through a *coup d'état*; Amin was removed in 1979 through a devastating war; blood was shed in the chaos following the ouster of his successor, Yusuf Lule, in the same year; Godfrey Binaisa was violently deposed in May 1980. Obote regained power after Paulo Muwanga's coup against the Electoral Commission followed by a "barrage of gunfire," his second regime was ended violently by the Okellos in 1985, and they, in turn, were forced out at gunpoint by the National Resistance Movement (NRM) army in 1986. All former heads of state have tasted the bitter bread of exile; only one former president, Godfrey Binaisa, has returned to visit his country as a private citizen after losing power; and two former presidents, Sir Edward Mutesa II and Yusuf Lule, died in exile.

As this chapter shows, political violence grew out of the deadly competition amongst various members of the political élite to grab state power as a means of securing economic benefits for them-

selves. This “élite” was not a united class. It was not a class in itself and certainly not a “class for itself.” It was fragmented; it had no economic base – no roots in commerce, agriculture, or industry – and no clear-cut political program. To the members of this group, who were for the most part members of the petty bureaucratic bourgeoisie, politics was a means of personal enrichment and eventual entry into the commercial and industrial classes. Without political power many of them would be paupers.

Uganda’s politicians were too inexperienced to know that violence, once used as an instrument of internal policy, becomes very difficult to control. They could not guarantee that it would be confined to the specific purposes for which it had been invoked. Nor could they control the soldiers who perpetrated acts of violence on their behalf. There was no guarantee that these men of war would not realize that it was they who possessed ultimate power and that it could be used against the very politicians who had commanded its use in the first place. As noted in the introduction, violence used to resolve internal political conflict led to other forms of violence – among the lawless, or deviant, elements in society and among citizens trying to protect themselves by fighting fire with fire, until everyone became “lawless,” using violence for personal ends. Ultimately, the whole of Uganda’s body politic was engulfed in violence, from the moment the first shots were fired at unarmed citizens at Nakulabye in 1964 to the defeat of the *Kikoosi Mahuum* at Katonga River in 1985.

OBOTE AND THE UPC

Independence was granted in 1962 to Apolo Milton Obote, leader of the Uganda People’s Congress. The UPC was formed in 1960 through the merger of a section of the Uganda National Congress (UNC) led by Obote and the All Uganda People’s Union, a reportedly anti-Baganda party whose main goal was to address the “challenges” of Bugandan subnationalism and Baganda dominance in an independent Uganda. Where most political parties are governed by an ideology or ideas that represent the interests and views of its members, the leaders of the UPC were divided in their aims; they had different ethnic and religious loyalties; they were power hungry and, for the most part, unprepared to act honourably towards one another and the nation.

Most of the UPC leaders were notables who derived their authority from colonial appointments as traditional chiefs or civil servants. Many were lineal successors of chiefs or clan leaders, the majority

were Protestant, and a number had gone to boarding schools based on the British public-school system.¹ With the exception of John Kakonge, Daudi Ochieg, and a few others, their political bases were confined to the districts where they were born, and they were influenced by the ethnic and religious composition of, and competition within, their home districts: in Ankole, Toro, Bukedi, Bugishu, and West Nile, many ethnic groups competed for resources, especially political positions.²

For the most part the UPC leaders wanted to rectify regional inequality, especially the uneven development that favoured Buganda, and contain the speed at which Bangada educated élites were taking up Africanized posts in the country's civil service. Beyond that, little united the party leadership. Few acknowledged or wanted to correct the rural/urban income disparity and other potential sources of conflict. Indeed, the majority saw independence as a chance to join the high-income strata of the civil service or "to fall into things" in the urban areas. None sought a fundamental transformation of the economy such that domestic rather than external needs might be served or wealth shared with the masses. It was the UPC's failure to work as a team and its externalization of internal party conflicts that led to armed struggle and the militarization of Uganda's social and political institutions.

Apolo Milton Obote, the party leader, was not highly educated. He dropped out of Makerere University before completing his bachelor's degree. Like many another Ugandan politicians, he had no personal stake in industry, commerce, or agriculture.³ Politics was his main source of income. When he assumed leadership of the nation, he had only a few years' political experience behind him. In 1959 he had led a section of the Uganda National Congress and became a leader of the Uganda People's Congress in 1960. In 1962 he became effective head of state after receiving less than fifty percent of the votes cast in the 1962 elections.

Between 1961 and 1964, Obote appeared to be a consensus leader whose negotiating ability had persuaded the various sub-states to agree upon a federal formula for living together in the new Ugandan state. The deprived peripheral areas saw him as a saviour who would rectify regional inequalities, and he had the trust of the Baganda Protestant neotraditionalists (see below). But most of this support came from élite groups sitting on kingdom and district councils, not from people at the polls: Obote's power did not rest on the popular vote.

Nor was his party united under him. The right wing of the UPC, led by Grace Ibingira, consisted of powerful notables from the

higher-income areas of the South – W.W. Nadiope, the traditional ruler of Bugabula in Busoga, George Magezi, Balaki Kirya, and others – who belonged to traditionally prominent families that had supplied chiefs to the colonial state since its establishment. Although many of these families owned land, they had no vested interests in commerce or industry. Their high incomes derived from colonial appointments and their prominence from their political power as chiefs. Thus, their social position was precarious. The UPC right, which had the backroom support of Mutesa II, *Kabaka* of Buganda,⁴ represented the interests of traditional rulers, and its members were strongly in favour of maintaining the *status quo* at the local and international levels. Their aim was not to preserve accumulated personal wealth – like most traditional rulers in Uganda, they had none – but to hold on to power, the ultimate source of wealth.

The centre of the party, which included Adoka Nekyon, Alex Ojera, and Felix Onama, was headed by Obote himself. It consisted of petty bureaucratic bourgeoisie from the disadvantaged regions of Uganda, especially the North, who were intent on correcting the regional inequality that favoured Buganda: as early as 1952, the real issue for Obote was not Ugandan independence but raising the North to the same level of development as Buganda, even if this meant reducing Buganda to the same level of underdevelopment that persisted in the rest of the country. Some centrists, like Godfrey Binaisa and Serwano Kulubya from Buganda, were unhappy with the undemocratic political practices of the Mengo establishment. But none had any desire to change Uganda's structural relationship with the industrialized nations, or to redistribute wealth to benefit the masses; on the contrary, they cooperated with Western capital.

The UPC left consisted of young, well-educated politicians and trade unionists who shared certain ideas with the centre on correcting regional inequality, but disagreed with them on the kind of social transformation that should be implemented, as well as on Uganda's structural relationship with the Western economic system. They spoke for the rights of the disadvantaged, the urban and rural poor, and advocated the creation of an economy that would serve domestic needs. They believed that independence, far from being an end in itself or a means to enrich a few Africans, should be used to raise the overall quality of life to a level enjoyed by "the dominant races."⁵ The nucleus of the left included John Kakonge, Bidandi Ssali, Kintu Musoke, and Kirunda Kivejinja, all of whom had obtained their higher education in India. Others such as

Dan Wadada Nabudere and Chango Macho had studied in Western Europe.

The first eruptions of political violence in Uganda were caused by the struggle among the different factions of the UPC for control of the ruling party and, hence, the state. The fight for central leadership in Uganda began with the struggle to control the party in Buganda, and it is to politics in Buganda that I now turn.

BUGANDA AT INDEPENDENCE

Before 1955 Buganda had the potential to lead Uganda peacefully into the postcolonial era. In the years leading up to independence, an enlightened leader might have Bugandized Uganda the way Bismarck Prussianized Germany without using excessive force. He might have capitalized on Buganda's leadership in the anticolonial struggle for which the substate had been so famous in the 1940s and 1950s to create alliances with other ethnic groups in Uganda from a position of strength. But Sir Edward Mutesa II, *Kabaka* of Buganda, was neither an enlightened nor an experienced practical politician. Far from achieving leadership through merit or personal struggle, he was a prince upon whom power had been "thrust" at birth. Nor was he highly educated; instead of studying subjects appropriate to the administration of a modern state, he spent most of his time in sport.⁶

While to the outsider Buganda was a strong, united substate that had influenced Uganda for years, the situation had changed substantially since Mutesa II had come to the throne. By the time Uganda became independent, Buganda was a divided house with contending social and political forces that could not handle a protracted political struggle as a unit. Chief among these forces were the nationalists, the educated élite, the neotraditionalists, and the educated Catholic élite.

The nationalists, who included such people as Yoswa Kate Mugema, Daudi Basudde, Eriabu Lwebuga, and, above all, Ignatius Musaaazi,⁷ spoke for the interests of peasants as opposed to those of appointed chiefs and the colonial system. Although many were the sons of chiefs and educated, they embraced peasant concerns, sentiments, and problems. They fought to retain agricultural surpluses and secure a full share of the value of crops by gaining direct access to the world market. The nationalists wanted to democratize Buganda's government by electing members of the *Lukiiko*, fixing maximum terms for chiefs, and curbing the exploitation of landlords by abolishing *mailo* estates. They saw no contradic-

tion between Buganda and Uganda. Indeed, they realized that the substate was an integral part of the state.

Particularly between 1945 and 1955, nationalist activity based in Buganda was followed with sympathy elsewhere in the country. In 1953–55, the *Kabaka* went into exile, having disagreed with the colonial government over the methods of turning Buganda constitutional proposals into law; he also feared that the British were about to incorporate Buganda into the larger East African federation that they wanted to create. During the *Kabaka's* exile, the Uganda National Congress, a Uganda-wide party led by Baganda, campaigned throughout the country for his return. Once back in the country, messages of welcome were sent to him from many district councils, including Lango.⁸ Had Mutesa II realized how important it was for the survival of the substate that the central government of Uganda remain in Bagandan hands, he might have capitalized on this modicum of good will earned by the Baganda in the struggle to achieve independence to consolidate the Bantu-speaking peoples of Uganda into a strong pro-Buganda alliance that would have challenged the emergence of stronger leadership amongst the peripheral peoples of the nation.

But Mutesa II did not take up the challenge either to lead Uganda himself or encourage Baganda nationalists to lead it for him. Instead, he aligned himself with the neotraditionalists – the ruling Protestant oligarchy at Mengo, often referred to as the Buganda “official nationalists.”⁹ The neotraditionalists included bureaucrats in the Buganda government, descendants of landowners, and a number of petty traders and farmers. The landowners were beneficiaries of the 1900 Buganda Agreement, which had established Christianity as the source of secular law¹⁰ and created definite social classes based on religion that obtained access to resources by acquiring political power. Resources in the form of land and political offices were allocated to the two Christian factions that had combined to defeat the Muslims in the civil wars of 1888–93. Not only were Protestant and Catholic chiefs given land as individuals; they received communal benefits as members of the Christian missions working in Uganda – the Church Missionary Society, the White Fathers, and the Mill Hill Fathers – all of which received enormous tracts of land. By 1965 the Church of Uganda, with more than sixty square miles, was one of the biggest landlords in the country. The numerous Catholic missions together owned more than fifty square miles of land. In contrast, the only Muslim who received land under the 1900 Agreement was Prince Nuhu Mbogo, for “himself and his adherents.”¹¹ A landed aristocracy consisting of Christian chiefs was therefore created.

The majority of neotraditionalists came from or were related to a ruling oligarchy of about ten to fifteen families that, along with their relatives, friends, and acquaintances, dominated Buganda's political, economic, and social affairs from 1900 to 1966. They were mainly Protestant, with a few Catholic and one or two Muslim families. Although new chiefs replaced about 145 of the old guard between 1921 and 1923, many of them were sons of, or otherwise related to, members of the ruling oligarchy, and *their* sons, who were more highly educated, maintained in turn the tradition of using political power for economic gain – controlling the appointment of chiefs (except for the *Kabaka* and about five percent of high positions, administrative chiefs in Buganda were appointed), the *Lukiiko*, the legislative assembly of Buganda, and the distribution of land titles.¹²

These same families had an immense influence on religious policy, with Protestant chiefs dominating the church councils.¹³ Most political and administrative offices were distributed on the basis of religious affiliation. Anglicans, in receiving the lion's share of political positions, appeared to be – and behaved as if they were – the established church. The Buganda royal family became Anglican. From 1900 to 1955, two out of three ministers at Mengo were Anglican and one was Roman Catholic; of twenty county chief, eleven were Anglican, eight Roman Catholic, and two Muslim; of eighty-nine members of the *Lukiiko*, forty-nine were Anglican, thirty-five Roman Catholic, and two Muslim.¹⁴

The neotraditionalists wanted to keep their positions and privileges as chiefs; enjoy peasant surpluses derived from rents and tithes, as well as the rents from official *mailo* estates; sit in the *Lukiiko* and thereby influence policy; maintain power in the hands of Baganda Protestants; and limit the number of Catholics in high positions, even if this meant making alliances with Muslims. They disliked highly educated people, whom they viewed as being critical of elders, and defended their right as chiefs to act as intermediaries between the *Kabaka* and the people. Above all, they wanted to keep non-Baganda politicians and bureaucrats from enjoying Baganda peasant surpluses; immigrants were tolerated as long as they remained low-income labourers. Because they wanted to preserve Buganda as a state, they would not accept losing an inch of it.

The ruling oligarchy remained virtually unchanged between 1900 and 1956, as did the power it controlled.¹⁵ During the *Kabaka's* exile its members increased their power and social control by identifying with the peasants' promonarchy sentiments. Michael Kintu, one of the neotraditionalist leaders, chaired the review of the Namirembe Submissions, the constitutional proposals of a

government commission appointed to deal with the 1953–55 Buganda crisis and headed by Ian Hancock, a British professor. Kintu's committee added only one item to the submissions – that proposals for local government and clan matters await the return of the *Kabaka*. This proposal, popular with peasants, put Kintu in the limelight and gave new blood to the oligarchy. Its leaders formed the vanguard of the *Kabaka Yekka*, or Kabaka Alone (KY), party,¹⁶ sponsored by Mutesa II, who thus allowed the oligarchy to use the name of the monarchy for political purposes. By 1956 Buganda was controlled by a section of society that had benefited from the 1900 Agreement by gaining control of administrative positions, securing a head start in education, and exploiting the peasants' emotional attachment to the monarchy.

In addition to the nationalists and the neotraditionalists, there was a third force to be reckoned with, a pseudoclass of people who were highly educated by local standards. By 1955 this group included E.M.K. Mulira, Joseph (Jolly Joe) Kiwanuka, Luyimbazi Zake, Abu Mayanja, and others, all of whom had postsecondary education. They wanted a directly elected *Lukiiko*, curtailment of the chiefs' privileges, fixed tenures for chiefs, an end to official *mailo* estates, full participation of Africans in the marketing of crops, and the Africanization of commerce. Like the nationalists, they believed that Buganda was an integral part of Uganda. Unlike the nationalists, they were in no way committed to mass mobilization, redistribution of wealth, or defending the interests of peasants. Like the chiefs, they wanted to appropriate peasant surpluses. They were interested in minority élite control of society with themselves, the educated, as rulers and peasants as subjects.

Meanwhile, Buganda's educated Catholic élite had been so alienated by Protestant dominance as to form a separate, and formidable, force in its own right. In 1955, Mutesa II was thought by Catholics to have conspired to prevent the Catholic Matayo Mugwanya from becoming the *Katikkiro* of Buganda on the basis of religion.¹⁷ In 1961 he tried to arrest Joseph Kiwanuka, the Roman Catholic archbishop, for writing a pastoral letter articulating the political views of the Catholic élite.¹⁸ When the author of the letter could not be found, his deputy, Father Sebayigga, was locked up instead. Though he was released shortly afterwards, the incident was of symbolic political importance: Catholics in Buganda perceived that Mutesa II was not looking out for their interests. In 1956, the Catholics formed a political party of their own, the Democratic Party (DP), to fight the Protestant oligarchy in the preindependence elections. The DP sought fairness in the distribu-

tion of official positions between Catholics and Protestants and the democratization of Buganda's political institutions. Like most Bugandan politicians, they believed in the Kingship and wanted to uphold the integrity of the monarchy. But they wanted it to be a constitutional monarchy.

It was vital to the institution of the monarchy in Buganda that the *Kabaka* be impartial, or perceived to be so. It was impolitic for the *Kabaka* to identify with the interests of one section of society at the expense of another, and imprudent to alienate a strong section of his society. Mukabya Mutesa I, who was faced with complex destabilizing forces originating mainly from the outside world in the period 1875–84, had understood his role so well that the monarchy was not compromised in his lifetime and he died with the kingdom still intact. But Mutesa II failed to deal impartially with the forces that made up “the mind of Buganda.”¹⁹ Instead, he aligned himself with one privileged section of Bugandan society and made the rest of Buganda blindly follow suit. In 1945 Mutesa sided with unpopular chiefs and the colonial government. When he did the same in 1949, rioters almost burned down his palace. He made other political blunders in the years leading up to independence. He allowed several unpopular decisions to be made by the Protestant chiefs and given the stamp of the *Kabaka*. In 1958, for example, the ministers at Mengo tried to ban political parties in Buganda in the name of the king, but the governor vetoed the move.²⁰ In 1956, Mulira was banned from the *Lukiiko* for claiming that the *Kabaka* was a constitutional monarch. Two years later, Jolly Joe Kiwanuka was accused of conspiring to kill the *Kabaka*. The case had been fabricated by chiefs at Mengo, and the Uganda high court found Kiwanuka innocent. But at no point did the *Kabaka* intervene in the name of justice. In 1955 Mutesa II helped Michael Kintu become *Katikkiro* by replacing his representatives in the *Lukiiko* with more compliant ones and persuading a number of them to vote for his protégé. In 1958, he intervened again to ensure that Kintu retained his position against Yusuf Lule, a future president of Uganda. In 1962 he helped Kintu become chairman of the Executive Committee of *Kabaka Yekka*.

The chiefs at Mengo were protected from public criticism by the iron screen of the king, and the Mengo officials made it clear that “if you criticize the [Kintu] government, you are criticizing the *Kabaka*.”²¹ The Mengo regime used the *Kabaka*'s name for selfish ends, described their political enemies as anti-*Kabaka*, and used

lumpens to harass those politically opposed to the regime. Its members had mob organizers like Musa Bulwadda, A. Kisitu, Haji Busungu, and others muster crowds to intimidate their enemies. Meanwhile, the Ghai Report, which investigated Buganda's finances, revealed unpardonable misuse of public funds. The Buganda government was bankrupt and the central government would not advance it any more money. As Ian Hancock wrote, "there was a growing sense that Buganda's leaders were unable to solve Buganda's problems."²²

By involving the monarchy directly in politics, Mutesa II demythologized the institution of the *Kabaka*, thus undermining his own trump card and forfeiting the substate's chance to lead Uganda to peaceful development after the colonial officials left. Political power in the postcolonial state shifted from people in the centre to a peripheral ethnic group that lacked the materials and experience to lead.

Moreover, the leaders of the neotraditionalists, Mutesa II included, did not immediately realize that to rule Buganda it was vital to control Uganda. As long as the central government controlling the means of violence in Uganda was opposed to Bugandan subnationalism, a semi-independent or independent Buganda could not exist. Instead of coming to terms with the Catholic élite and addressing their grievances fairly, Mutesa II and the neotraditionalists considered only their own immediate political fate and invited an outsider, Apolo Milton Obote, to save them from the internal political force represented by the DP, despite Obote's perceived republican and known anti-Bagandan sentiments.²³ In 1961 an alliance was forged between *Kabaka Yekka* and Obote's party, the UPC. Among the terms of the alliance was acceptance of the *Lukiiko* as the electoral college for Buganda members of Parliament and a prohibition on the UPC opening party branches in the substate. So narrow was the political vision of the neotraditionalists that they did not even put the alliance in writing; they just believed in Obote's good will. To them, he was the guarantor of their substate and privileges – a mistaken view, as they would find out. The main aim of the alliance was the destruction of the DP. In the end, it was Mutesa's kingdom that was destroyed.

THE STRUGGLE TO CONTROL THE UPC: RIGHT AND CENTRE VERSUS LEFT

The first stage in the struggle to control party and state saw the right and centre wings of the party joining forces to eliminate the

left in a series of manoeuvres characterized by intrigue, conspiracy, and backdoor decision making. In 1960, John Kakonge replaced George Magezi, an elder and an influential member of the former All Uganda Peoples' Union, as secretary general of the newly formed UPC. By working vigorously, Kakonge became so powerful that by 1961, he was able to defeat a proposal by Grace Ibingira that the 1961 elections be postponed "until the Buganda issue was resolved to minimize the DP's strength" and persuade the UPC to participate in the elections.²⁴ He also wanted the party to hire full-time workers, in contrast to his colleagues, who preferred part-time, or "weekend," political workers who would not develop power bases outside the party establishment. His personality must have frightened the centre, whose members, represented by Obote, worked quietly with the right to remove him and the influence of the left from the party.

Kakonge does not seem to have come to grips with their intentions to dump him. Because his riding was in Buganda he could not run for a seat in Parliament in 1962 because of the UPC-KY alliance, which accepted the *Lukiiko* as the electoral college for Buganda members of Parliament. He believed that he would be specially elected instead, but his beliefs were dashed when he was passed over.²⁵ Later on, he became convinced that Obote was part of a conspiracy to block any active role he might play in politics.²⁶ At the 1962 UPC conference an attempt to remove him as secretary general failed.²⁷ Angry and upset after realizing that he was the victim of a conspiracy to block his election to Parliament, he flew out of the country to "seek peace and solitude," and become Uganda's ambassador to the United Nations.²⁸ He was prevailed upon to return in 1962 as secretary general, but two years later he lost this post.

According to Kirunda Kivejinja, who was in charge of the UPC Research Bureau in 1963-65, the conspiracy to remove Kakonge was finalized in 1964 at Kampala's famous Uganda Club, three days before the UPC delegates' conference convened at Gulu. Obote, Ibingira, Nadiope, and others of the right and centre are believed to have called an emergency meeting of the executive. The meeting, chaired by Obote as party leader, resolved that because of its special position, as the second most powerful substate after Buganda, Busoga District would get more representatives to the conference than other districts. In Busoga, the parish (*muluka*) and not the subcounty (*gombolola*) was to form the basis of the party's branch. This meant that each parish in Busoga would send two delegates, for a total of 684, while the rest of Uganda put together would send 1,086 delegates. The total was 1,770. Kakonge sensed

trouble and objected by saying that such a move ran contrary to party procedures, rules, and guidelines, but he was overruled. At the Gulu Conference, his report was rebuked for its "communist leanings," and Obote attacked Kakonge for criticizing "my government." However, Dan Wadada Nabudere intervened and asked those criticizing Kakonge to cite a "communist" passage in the report.²⁹ The delegates burst into applause at Nabudere's remarks and the meeting was adjourned; clearly, more sophisticated plotting was needed to defeat Kakonge. New white entrance cards were then printed and the normal red ones approved by the secretariat were suspended. Those lacking the new cards were barred from participation. Kakonge pointed out that bringing nondelegates to the conference by using white cards was undemocratic and contrary to party procedures, but again he was overruled. The conference then voted on who would be secretary general: Kakonge lost to Ibingira by two votes.³⁰

This incident dramatized a brand of undemocratic political behaviour that became endemic in Uganda. It centred on the belief that in politics, the end justified the means used by the victors. The internal divisions that ripped the UPC through the middle at the Gulu Conference were soon externalized. Two policy makers, Kakonge and Adoko Nekyon, publicly debated the ideology, merits, and demerits of "scientific socialism" at the Clock Town Gardens in Kampala on 1 June 1964. Although ordinary people could not understand what was going on, keen observers realized that the ruling party was not a consolidated unit. In March 1965, a number of party workers who had been recruited by John Kakonge – Kirunda-Kivejinja, Charles Onyuta, Wadada Musani, Chango Macho, Raiti Omongin, Lomiy Obbo, Livingstone Ojepa, and Naitilo Masaba – were expelled or made redundant in a radio announcement. Later Wadada Nabudere was expelled at an executive meeting chaired by Obote.³¹

Having dealt with the left's top brass, the winners turned their attention to the UPC youth organization, the Uganda People's Congress Youth League (UPCYL), which was perceived as leftist because its members were believed to share Kakonge's ideas and economic views. Like the Kakonge group, most of the UPCYL members were generally better educated than those who controlled the party's central executive and the state. They were extreme in their dealings with groups they identified as representing Western capital, such as companies and the media. The UPCYL went further than the UPC central executive or the government in emphasizing the rights of Africans and the supremacy of the new Ugandan state,

and in criticizing the West. They replaced portraits of the queen with those of the prime minister and held captive the minister of Internal Affairs, Mr Felix Onama, for having enforced what they termed "colonial property laws." In 1963 they demanded the deportation of a white man who ridiculed Kenyan independence at a private party in a private house on Tank Hill. They also called for the establishment of a one-party state and the abrogation of the UPC-KY alliance. The Youth League did not forgive Grace Ibingira and the right for having eliminated Kakonge.³² The government countered by creating a well-funded parallel youth group, the National Union of Youth Organizations (NUYO). Official support in terms of finances and legislation for NUYO cut through the UPCYL constituency but some of its spirit remained. When the right itself was eliminated in 1966, some from the left, like Kakonge, were rehabilitated into what remained of the party, but their spirit and enthusiasm were never the same.

The struggle for control of the ruling party was intensified by the influx into the UPC of unprincipled members of Parliament who crossed the floor from *Kabaka Yekka* and the Democratic Party in the period 1963–65. This move strengthened the UPC in general – and the UPC right, up to 1966, in particular – in the National Assembly.³³ Most of those who crossed the floor realized that it was violence, not votes, that decided who controlled the distribution of resources in Uganda at that material time; since Obote had the means to satisfy their greed, it was ultimately Obote who benefited from their shift in party allegiance. The political behaviour of these newcomers gave the UPC an inflated opinion of its real strength in the country. Obote, with a majority of parliamentary members, was able to claim to the world that he had the country behind him. By early 1964, the number of UPC MPs rose from forty-three to fifty-eight, only three short of a two-thirds majority. The most important breakthrough for the UPC came on 31 December 1964 when the leader of the opposition, Basil Bataringaya, in a move that was dishonest, treacherous, and opportunistic, left the DP for the UPC and brought five other MPs with him, giving the UPC a psychological boost. In July 1965 six KY members crossed the floor. By December 1964, the UPC had seventy-four seats, the DP nine, and the KY eight. It is doubtful whether these numbers represented the UPC's actual level of support among voters, but this apparent political "legitimacy" gave Obote the legal, "moral," and psychological ability to use violence against his competitors in party and state.

Some of Uganda's politicians
from 1910 to the 1980s

	Political Parties or Assns															
	Young Baganda Assn.	Bataka Assn.	Abaana Ba Kintu	Uganda Motor Drivers Assn.	Bataka Union	UGT & Workers' Union	Bataka Party	Uganda Af. Farmers Union	FF Uganda Af. Farmers	Uganda National Congress	Progressive Party	The Democratic Party	Uganda People's Union	Uganda National Party	Uganda National Movement	Uganda People's Congress
1 Kate, Joswa Mugema	x															
2 Bassudde, Daudi	x															
3 Musaazi, I.K.			x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x					x	x
4 Miti, James	x				x											
5 Mukubira, D.		x														
6 Ssemakula Mulumba					x		x									
7 Kivu, J.				x		x										
8 Bamutta, Yusufu					x	x				x						
9 Musoke, Fenekansi				x												
10 Ssonko, Peter					x			x								
11 Kununka, Dr E.									x							
12 Muwazi, Dr						x			x					x		x
13 Kulubya, Sserwano					x										x	
14 Kavuma, Paulo		x														
15 Oda, G.											x					
16 Oola, P.									x							
17 Obwangor, Cutbert										x					x	
18 Mukasa, Spartas				x	x											x
19 Mulira, E.M.K.								x	x				x	x		
20 Mayanja, Abu Kakyama								x	x	x				x	x	
21 Obote, Apolo Milton								x						x		
22 Kiwanuka, "Jolly Joe" J.W.								x					x	x	x	
23 Kiwanuka, Ben K.											x					
24 Kironde, A.K.								x					x			
25 Kironde, Erisa								x						x		
26 Kirya, Balaki								x	x					x		
27 Magezi, George												x			x	
28 Lule, Y.K.										x	x					
29 Mkombe Mpambara											x			x		
30 Babiiha, John												x		x		
31 Binaisa, Godfrey								x						x		
32 Ssemogere, Paul										x						
33 Kamyia, Augustine														x	x	
34 Mayanja-Nkangi								x							x	x
35 Senteza-Kajubi, W.										x						
36 Kalule Ssetaala													x	x	x	
37 Luyimbazi-Zzaake									x						x	
38 Nekyon, Adoko A.										x				x		
39 Bataringaya, Basil										x				x		
40 Onama, Felix														x		
41 Babumba, Eriya														x	x	
42 Muwanga, Paulo									x					x	x	
43 Museveni, Yoweri K.														x		x
44 Bidani-Ssali, J.														x		x
45 Kintu-Musoke														x		x
46 Kirunda-Kivejinja, A.														x	x	x
47 Kisekka, Dr S.															x	
48 Ruhakana-Rugunda, Dr															x	x
49 Kategaya, E.																x
50 Chango-Macho															x	x
Approximate year of party's foundation	1919	1921	1938	1938	1938	1938	1946	1947	1950	1952	1955	1955	1956	1958	1959	1961

Figure 3
Changing Loyalties of Politicians to Political Parties and Associations, 1919–80

Figure 3 (cont'd)

Notes: UGT & Workers Union = Uganda General Transport and Workers Union. FP Uganda African Farmers = Federation of Partnership of Uganda African Farmers. Not included: United Congress Party, Uganda Taxpayers Party, Uganda Labour Party, Uganda Reform Party, Bewejjere, Uganda Monarchist and Traditional Unity, Mubende-Bunyoro Committee. Sources: Apter, *Political Kingdom in Uganda*; Fallers, "Social Stratification in Uganda"; Jorgensen, *Uganda*; Low, *Political Parties in Uganda*; *Buganda in Modern History*; Pratt, "Nationalism in Uganda."

The dishonesty of the petty bureaucratic bourgeoisie members of Parliament in changing party loyalties without reference to their electors contributed to the eruption of armed political conflict in Uganda. Table 3 shows the shifting loyalties of Ugandan politicians. The table lists the number of parties joined up to 1980 and the parties' foundation dates. Some politicians moved only when their party was replaced by a similar party with similar aims, but the majority just crossed to the party in power.

This phenomenon was initially most prevalent in Buganda. The ministers at Mengo, after Obote defeated the *Kabaka* in 1966, crossed to the UPC. One of them was Francis Walugembe, who began to sing the songs of the UPC in Masaka when earlier on he had defended the right of the *Kabaka's* government to operate without criticism. In 1955 Michael Kintu, who ruled as *Katikkiro* for more than ten years, wanted direct elections to the national parliament in Buganda and pressured the colonial government to grant them. Bug during the 1961–62 negotiations for independence, he opposed Democratic Party leader Ben Kiwanuka on this question and reversed his position completely. His lieutenant and intellectual leader, Amos Sempa, provides the interesting example of a politician reversing positions more than twice. Before the KY-UPC alliance was made, Sempa viewed Buganda as a sovereign state that could not sacrifice its independence on the altar of Ugandan unity. However, in 1962, after the alliance had crystallized, he asserted that Buganda was indeed an integral part of Uganda.⁸⁴ But when the alliance fell apart, he demanded, at the last meeting of the *Lukiiko* at Mengo, that Buganda break away from the state.⁸⁵

Undependability and political opportunism, although typical of hierarchical societies like Buganda, spread throughout Uganda. Changes of political loyalty, crossing the floor, and the inability of politicians to stick to their promises have made it difficult for political groups to consolidate. The strength of the UPC from 1964 to 1971 lay only in Parliament, not in the countryside. Although Obote controlled a majority of MPs and could employ violence to subdue opposition, the UPC feared elections. After the fall of Obote

many of his closest friends, those responsible for the policies he had tried to implement, served Amin comfortably. In this "cynical and ... suspicious attitude towards politicians,"³⁶ the catastrophe that would befall Uganda could be foreseen.

PRELUDE TO NAKULABYE

The most difficult task confronting the leader of Uganda was the peaceful integration of Buganda into the state. Obote's failure to do this has exacerbated Uganda's political problems since independence. A wiser politician might have taken stock of the various forces operating in the substate, differentiated between positive and negative elements, and worked with them towards a peaceful resolution of the issue. It has been seen that a number of Baganda held views on certain issues similar to those of the central government. Among them were Baganda civil servants and the educated élite, who believed in a united and strong Uganda and wanted to see the Mengo oligarchy trimmed, although it is doubtful whether they would approve of the harsh measures that Obote was to use.³⁷ Abu Mavanja had clashed with the Mengo establishment on several occasions regarding the democratization of political institutions,³⁸ and his views were largely shared by E.M.K. Mulira, Jolly Joe Kiwanuka, Godfrey Binaisa, and others. A number of prominent Baganda were willing to work with Obote³⁹ and might have been induced to do so had the UPC leader had a true desire to deal honourably with the substate.

Instead, educated Baganda civil servants who had opted to serve the central government saw that Obote was deliberately demoting them to lower-status jobs. Between 1961 and 1967, the Bagandan share of high-level jobs decreased from 46.9 percent to 36.6 percent. Obote did not appoint Baganda to policy-making or policy-implementing positions in the key ministries of Defence, Internal Affairs, Commerce, or Industry. They were excluded from important positions in the army, police, and secret services. In 1963, for example, Obote promoted E. Oryema as chief of police over the highly experienced senior police officer Timothy Lwanga. The civil service was the only branch of government in which they could serve at high levels; yet even there, they were barred from "sensitive" positions.

It was in 1964 that the gates of political violence in independent Uganda were first opened at Nakulabye, a suburb of Kampala. The atrocities committed there by government forces were the culmina-

tion of a series of incidents that occurred in the same year, all of which were rooted in Uganda's complex politics. The first of these concerned the Lost Counties, a long-standing bone of contention between Buganda and Bunyoro. The Lost Counties had been transferred from Bunyoro to Buganda in 1894-95 by the colonial administration. For years the Banyoro had tried to have them returned without success. The Munster Report of 1961 recommended that a referendum be held in the area to allow residents to make their own decision. Census figures showed clearly that there were more Banyoro than Baganda in the contested areas, a finding confirmed in the Molson Report of 1962. But the Buganda government refused to believe that the counties should be repossessed by Bunyoro and rejected the proposal for fear that loss of the counties would weaken their substate. They spent a lot of time settling Baganda ex-servicemen in the area, hunting, and getting drunk. At the 1961 London Conference two of the counties, Buyaga and Bugangazi, were transferred to the central government pending a referendum. The constitution of 1962 provided that a referendum should be held two or more years after independence.

In June 1964 Mutesa II burned down a Banyoro village in the Lost Counties because, as he himself explained, "a meeting to whip feelings" against him was to be held there.⁴⁰ In the same period a Munyoro tried to poison him. The attempt on the *Kabaka's* life annoyed the Baganda, who, with their master, are reported to have killed seven Banyoro at or near Ndaiga.⁴¹ Mutesa went to the Lost Counties to try to prevent their transfer to Bunyoro.

Since his party had gained an absolute majority in June 1964, Obote was no longer dependent on Buganda's good will for political survival in Parliament.⁴² So confident had Obote become that he indicated publicly that he would prefer a one-party state in Uganda.⁴³ Early in 1964 the UPC felt strong enough in Parliament to open party branches in Buganda despite the KY-UPC alliance's prohibition against doing so. By the end of 1964 the UPC controlled Parliament and most of the local councils, and Obote decided to move against the right.⁴⁴ There was a general feeling outside Buganda that the injury to Bunyoro had to be redressed. In August 1964 a referendum bill was introduced in Parliament. The Baganda MPs who were still members of *Kabaka Yekka* crossed the floor and sat with the Democratic Party opposition. Since the UPC no longer needed KY members, the "alliance" between the two parties was broken and in September, the government announced the date of the referendum on the counties Bunyoro had lost to Buganda.

These moves heightened tempers and upset the Buganda estab-

ishment at Mengo. Apart from anything else, Obote had made a serious mistake in entering into an alliance with a person who was perceived as an institution by his subjects. Such an alliance was considered by the peasants to be semidivine and unbreakable. To the Baganda, the KY-UPC alliance had been sealed between the *Kabaka* and Obote by a blood-brotherhood bond, or *mukago*; so too did the Basoga perceive the alliance between Nadiope and Obote. In blood brotherhood, only death can separate the partners, and each agrees to protect the other. Anyone who breaks such a bond is considered an outcast. Obote was perceived to have broken the bond with the *Kabaka* and to have done so intentionally. The majority of peasants in Buganda and Busoga could not believe that a man who broke a *mukago* and used violence against his two blood brothers could be balanced. Obote's actions hardened the separatist and "arrogant" sentiments of the Baganda, including peasants, weakened his political base in Buganda, and led to greater use of violence as an instrument of public policy.

Then, in October 1964, a tragic and avoidable incident occurred on the Entebbe road. Fourteen students from St Mary's College, a Roman Catholic school for boys in Kisubi, were killed by an army truck: "An army detachment deliberately pushed an empty truck into a crowded bus carrying Baganda school children home – to school – from a soccer match, killing fourteen persons. Without apology the army justified the actions on the grounds the school boys were believed to be heading towards the capital of Entebbe to take part in a Baganda plot to assassinate Obote."⁴⁵ The death of the students saddened the Baganda in general and Roman Catholics in particular.

But more frustrating news was yet to come. On 5 November 1964 the referendum results in the Lost Counties were announced: Buyaga and Bugangazi voted overwhelmingly to join Bunyoro. In Buyaga, 8,327 people voted for transfer and only 1,287 against. In Bugangazi the figures were 3,275 for and 2,253 against joining Bunyoro.⁴⁶ The results were received with anger, frustration, and a general sense of helplessness in Buganda. In the usual Buganda fashion, frustration was focused on one individual – in this case, Michael Kintu, the *Katikkiro*, or prime minister. He was seen as the cause of all Buganda's failures. There was rioting at Bulange, Kintu was mobbed, and Obote's government came to his rescue. Central-government troops shot into the air, but no one was reported injured. The crowd then boarded whatever transport was available to create a presence in the Lost Counties. Baganda ex-servicemen, whom Mutesa II had taken with him, were still there. But the

central-government troops intercepted many of the crowds. There were reports of police and army violence but no reported deaths. In the *Lukiiko* there was anguish and bitterness. On 7 November 1964 the county (*saza*) chief Sebwana (Semakula) proposed a motion of no confidence in Kintu's government. When the *Omulamuzi* (Justice minister and chief judge) tried to delay the vote to Monday, another *saza* chief, the *Kago*, declared that the *Lukiiko* members would not adjourn until Kintu's government agreed to resign. Although Mutesa II wanted Kintu to stay, the latter had had enough. He submitted his resignation as *Katikkiro* of Buganda.

For the Baganda, Kintu's resignation marked the passage of an era of government that was sectional, inept, neotraditional, conspiratorial, insensitive to good counsel, unable to solve problems, and self-destructive.¹⁷ The end of Kintu's government closed the reign of the Baganda neotraditionalists and brought in moderates who were better educated and realized that Buganda was an integral part of Uganda. They were therefore prepared to work with the central government. On the other hand, the central government under Obote did not give the moderates a chance to walk the tightrope of binding and balancing Buganda's social and political forces while at the same time trying to integrate Buganda into the state with honour – a very delicate job. Even though in Parliament Obote had correctly identified the *Kabaka*, his courtiers, and the chiefs as the group responsible for misleading the people, he continued to define all Baganda as anti-Uganda and anti-Obote and thus to fan anti-Baganda feelings in the nation. The political polarization that should have waned with Kintu's exit remained unchanged. The security forces, which were mainly recruited from the North, had by now been taught that the Baganda – all Baganda, irrespective of class – were the enemy of the northern-led government, and they were prepared to use violence against them at any time.

NAKULABYE

On 10 November 1964, between 6:00 to 7:00 P.M., at a place on Balintuma Road some hundred yards from the Nakulabye roundabout on the Mengo side, a woman called Night had a quarrel with her Congolese "husband" that developed into a fight. She ran into a neighbour's house but the man followed her and continued to harass, assault, and beat her. A crowd gathered to witness what was going on. The neighbour called the police who, without bothering to investigate the nature of the conflict or its causes, simply fired on

the people. An eyewitness, Ernest Majoje Salongo Enserebyeta, describes what he saw and heard:

I was in my shop when the fight between Night and the Congolese was reported to me by my wife Nalukwabo. Sometime later I heard a gun shot at a time when Mr Benwa, a Mutoro, was in my shop. As he left my shop I saw him being stopped by a policeman who started beating him with a riot stick. I closed my shop and put out the lights, locking in three children and two women. Then guns started booming outside punctuated with the words "kuba, piga" ... shooting started around 7 pm and stopped at about 10 pm. As I have two homes, I went to my second shop with my first wife who was carrying a small baby on her back. It was round about 11 p.m. We found my second wife Nalongo and our children in indescribable state of fright but they were alive and God had protected them well.⁴⁸

Six people were killed by the security forces. Kalungi, a taxi driver, was pulled out of his car as he approached the Nakulabye roundabout from Wandegeya. He seems not to have known what was going on but was merely doing his job. He was shot at point-blank range with a .303-calibre rifle. Fabian Masika, a non-Muganda of about sixty, was talking to his neighbour Ketu Wanyana when he suddenly saw the security forces. He decided to run back to his house but went out again to empty some water from a basin. When the security men saw they fired but missed, followed him back to the house, forced his door open, and shot Masika in his bedroom. Mayanja, a Munyoro, was sharing a meal in his small one-room house with his wife, Erina Bangisibanno. The police burst in, dragged him outside, beat him, and shot him in cold blood. Charles Kaita, a seventeen-year-old student at the Aga Khan High School, had just returned home and was helping his mother with domestic chores and holding a baby. The police ordered him to come out; he did so and they began to beat him. His mother yelled for mercy but they shot him in the stomach. Though his mother tried to push his bowels back into the wound he died later in the night. Silas Matovu, a Muganda tailor, was in his house when his son came home. The son forgot a pound of sugar on his wheelbarrow, returned to get it, and was shot at. Wounded, he managed to return to the house. As Matovu tried to nurse his son, shots were fired through the window and he was caught by one of them. The last victim was Ezama, a student at Muhamood High School. He was killed by stray bullets as he tried to pick up his books and run. Two dogs were also killed at Nakulabye. One, belonging to Mr Nantonogo, was fierce, and when it threatened the police they shot it.

Another dog, belonging to Mr Sekajolo, was called "Steel" because it was rough and tough. It too had threatened the police.

The debate in Parliament and the press that followed the tragedy indicates that the violence at Nakulabye was politically motivated.⁴⁹ According to Mr Latim, MP, the security branch followed orders emanating from the highest levels of government. On 6 November 1964, Prime Minister Obote had given a very stern warning to what he termed lawless elements: "I have therefore today issued very firm instructions to the Army Commander and the Inspector-General of Police, to use such powers as they have to protect the lives and the properties of the public."⁵⁰ Latim goes on to say that he spoke to highly placed security officers who told him that the government had authorized the use of violence against civilians.⁵¹ Available evidence supports Latim's view of government complicity in the killings at Nakulabye. People arrested at Nakulabye that day were not charged and were released the following day. The coroner's report established that, while the crowd had "gathered peacefully to know what was going on," the security unit that went to Nakulabye broke down doors and forcibly entered houses; moreover, all victims were "violently and deliberately shot by a group of armed policemen."⁵² Eyewitnesses told Latim that they heard security forces shout to the crowd, "You Baganda are boastful. You Baganda have troubled us."⁵³ Yet none of the security men was charged with murder or misuse of power. Neither did the government apologise or compensate the victims' relatives. Moreover, Assistant Superintendent of Police Ezama, who directed the operation, gave contradictory accounts of the incident.

Despite the evidence, however, the government protected the police while denying complicity in the murders. The minister of Internal Affairs, Felix Onama, denied "any charge that the police acted brutally."⁵⁴ But the population was not satisfied. Many perceived the government to have had a hand in Nakulabye, and the way the authorities behaved did not improve its image.

Nakulabye is important in understanding the institutionalization of violence in Ugandan social and political relations. It did not just come out of the blue. It had its origins in the social problems of Uganda in general and specifically in a political struggle between Baganda neotraditionalist members of the Protestant ruling oligarchy and moderates in Buganda. These moderates faced "nationalist" extremists whose hatred of Buganda, a Buganda they failed to define properly, blinded them to the dangers of using violence to

resolve internal political conflict without first exhausting all peaceful options. Kenya and Tanzania, like Uganda, had bureaucratic bourgeoisie struggling to control the state. But unlike their Ugandan counterparts, they were not faced with the struggle to dismantle a culturally homogeneous five-hundred-year-old substate led by an oligarchy whose leaders were impervious to common sense.

The incident marked the first major application of political violence in independent Uganda and the first time that civilians in Uganda perceived that the violence was politically motivated, aimed at a specific section of society. It was also the first time since independence that government security men opened fire on unarmed crowds who were not in a riotous mood; the first time that the authorities were seen openly to be a party to violence aimed at civilians. The whole incident showed Obote the effect of violence on the Baganda. He realized that he could use firepower against them and get away with it. Nakulabye inaugurated the use of the gun by government agents, who have been pointing it at civilians ever since.

CENTRE VS. RIGHT

By 1965 the rift in the UPC was evident to outsiders. It manifested itself in the struggle to control the Buganda branch of the party as well as branches in various other districts outside the central region. In the UPC elections that year in Buganda, Godfrey Binaisa, a Centrist, was elected party chairman while Bidandi Ssali, a supporter of the left, was elected secretary general of the region. But the right complained that the elections had been rigged and the UPC central executive appointed J. Kahigiriza to investigate the problems of the Buganda branch. He recommended nullifying the elections and holding fresh ones under the supervision of the central executive. Balaki Kirya, a supporter of the right, was appointed to supervise the new elections, to be held on 13 February 1966. Dr E. Lumu, a supporter of the right, was elected chairman. The right was now in full control of the Buganda branch of the party.

In other districts, the UPC was divided by local and personal issues for which support was sought from either of the factions in the central executive. In Kigezi, there was a division between the *abanyama* (meat eaters), who supported John Wicliffe Lwamafa, a minister of Regional Administrations, and *ababoga* (cabbage eaters), who supported John Bkangaga, the district head. In January 1966 Metusera Katuramu, the *Katikkiro* of Bunyoro, survived a vote of no confidence by a mere nine votes in an all-UPC council. In January

1966, S.G. Okello-Olong, the secretary general in Lango, just managed to escape ouster from the District Council. In Sebei, a motion to remove the head of the district was passed but fell short of the required two-thirds majority. In Acholi, interclan disputes delayed government business. The UPC had no mass support. In Lango, for example, supposedly one of the UPC's strongholds, there were only two thousand dues-paying members in 1967 out of a population of three hundred thousand.

It was at this late hour that Mutesa II finally realized that to rule Buganda, he must control or influence the centre of power in Uganda by making alliances with politicians from other ethnic groups, subscribing to a national party, and acquiring an influence in the army – as Sir Ahmadu Bello, still in command of the Sokoto Empire, had done in Nigeria. One of Mutesa's strategies was to try to infiltrate the UPC: it is likely that he asked Baganda MPs to join the UPC and link forces with the party's right. This Trojan Horse strategy almost succeeded.⁵⁵ However, by the time Mutesa began fighting Obote through Uganda's political system in 1964–65, he faced a strong opponent who had a good head start in Parliament, the armed forces, and the paramilitary.⁵⁶ Mutesa joined forces with the UPC right, which included Shaban Opolot, then head of the army, in an effort to help Ibingira create a favourable alliance within the UPC to challenge Obote's leadership. The right under Ibingira might have won, considering the weight of the Bugandan establishment that supported it. But the nature of politics had changed; control of violence, not votes, was what mattered. The right, failing to realize just how weak the Buganda establishment was, lost precisely because Buganda was used as a base.

Grace Ibingira was consolidating his forces. Late in the year, he visited the US and other Western countries on travels many of his opponents claim were designed to help him build a political base.⁵⁷ The centre was also working hard outside Uganda to muster the resources needed for the final confrontation. Obote visited Eastern Bloc countries in 1965 and solicited assistance, including military aid.⁵⁸ Without the approval of cabinet or the UPC central executive, Obote assisted the Stanleyville regime of Christopher Gbenye, Thomas Kanza, and Nicholas Olenge, which was fighting Tshombe in the Congo (Zaire). Idi Amin Dada was the contact man who was covertly to help the Congolese rebels. On 13 February 1965, two Ugandan villages were bombed by forces perceived to be supported and backed by the US. Obote's supporters dramatized the issue into an anti-American demonstration in which the US flag was burnt.⁵⁹ The West awaited a chance for revenge.

At this juncture an ethnic or "tribal touch," interpreted as a Lwo-Bantu struggle, was added to the conflict to "explain" what was going on to the masses. A Kampala city councillor, Mangan Aurrah, is reported to have described the struggle as a move by Bantu to oust "Nilotic leaders" from power.⁶⁰ Boniface Byanyima, a prominent MP from Ankole, endorsed this idea when he said that he had warned Mr Abassi Balinda, his friend and fellow MP from the same area, not to join the "Bantu group" working to oust Obote.⁶¹ Like other ordinary Ugandans, he thought this was a "tribal struggle." But it was a struggle of the petty bureaucratic bourgeoisie for political control; ethnicity was only the instrument that gave it legitimacy in the eyes of the masses.

An opportunity came in 1966 for the right to embarrass the centre. Amin's bank account was leaked to Obote's enemies by a foreign banker. A motion of corruption naming the prime minister as a party was tabled in Parliament⁶² and rejected by the UPC Parliamentary Group on 31 January 1966. However, on 4 February, the cabinet, under the influence of the right, reversed the earlier decision, deciding in effect to stab Obote in the back while he was away in the North. As already noted, intrigue and conspiracy were characteristic of the UPC's *modus operandi*. On 15 February, Obote returned to Kampala and tried unsuccessfully to persuade the cabinet to change its stand on the motion. The next day, he issued a statement denying that he was involved in corruption or had received proceeds from the sale of gold. When cabinet met on 22 February to appoint a commission of inquiry into the Gold Allegations, Obote moved fast. He arrested and imprisoned Ibingira and four other ministers – M. Ngobi, B.K. Kirya, George Magezi, and Dr Emanuel Lumu – who were about to defeat him on the motion of corruption. This use of violence to solve a political issue secured for him the control of the UPC. The arrest of Ibingira silenced the UPC right. But Ibingira's powerful friend, Sir Edward Mutesa II, was still kicking.

THE "OBOTE REVOLUTION" OF 1966

To complete his victory, Obote had to eliminate Ibingira's powerful friends outside the party. Although his main aim was to survive as party leader by eliminating the right, he took the opportunity to sweep away all Ibingira's friends and their political bases, claiming publicly that he was fighting monarchism and subnationalism. That the struggle was initially a UPC affair was never publicized. It was in

Obote's interests to make the rest of Uganda believe that the Baganda and their leader were trying to destabilize the state.

The conflict within the UPC could have been resolved peacefully. But peaceful options meant political solutions that involved the risk of losing at the ballot box. As a member of the petty bureaucratic bourgeoisie with no base in the local economy and nothing to fall back on, Obote would lose his income if he lost at the polls. And losing was a possibility, especially in Buganda, where the UPC had never directly faced the electorate.⁶³ After the arrest of the five ministers and a number of their supporters, the centre under Obote had undisputed mastery of the party and, later, the state. The problem with this victory is that it was achieved through the use of naked violence applied by an undisciplined army led by a monster general called Idi Amin.

The option of using force was considered quite early. Indeed, both sides had made contacts in the army. Mutesa II and many southerners perceived that Obote favoured the North in his administration of the army. As noted earlier, the colonial state had favoured northerners for army recruitment, and Obote wasted no time in exploiting this advantage. A northerner himself, he had no interest in changing the army's recruitment methods or fundamentally changing the balance of power within the forces. The minister and permanent secretary of his new Defence ministry, Felix Onama and Lutara, were both from the North. When Mutesa II tried on 19 November 1965 to have the military band play at his birthday anniversary, his request was refused.⁶⁴ This move showed who controlled the army, and Mutesa II should have taken note. In February 1966, while Obote was in the North, Shaban Opolot, the army commander, tried to move troops and change the balance of power against him, but failed.⁶⁵ On 23 February, Obote gave Opolot a "sideways" promotion as chief of defence staff. Amin became chief of staff for the army and air force, which gave him complete control of the forces, and David Oyite Ojok, who had been demoted to a minor post by Opolot, was appointed deputy adjutant and quartermaster general; his predecessor, Major S. Kakuhikire, was transferred to the Third Battalion. In April 1966 Obote passed out eight hundred new recruits at Moroto, of whom seventy percent came from the northern region. Major Senkeeto, who associated with Mutesa II, was accused of stealing weapons from the army and was removed.

On the day Obote arrested the five ministers, he claimed that a military *coup d'état* had been planned against his government and accused Mutesa II of being a party to the conspiracy. He appointed

three judges to his own commission of inquiry into the Gold Allegations. The party was now under his control. Obote then moved to take over the state by eliminating the Ibingira supporters who ruled Buganda. On 24 February, he announced the abrogation of portions of the 1962 constitution regarding the powers and rights of the president. He accused Mutesa II of refusing to sign the Lost Counties bill, refusing to open Parliament after the referendum, ordering troop movements without consulting the prime minister, and approaching foreign embassies for military assistance (Mutesa II later admitted the latter charge by saying he had "sounded out" the idea of military assistance to a foreign ambassador).⁶⁶ On 2 March 1966 Obote abolished the offices of president and vice president, assuming all executive powers of state. While Mutesa II appealed in vain to the secretary general of the United Nations, Obote moved to consolidate his position with speed and accuracy. On 15 April, the National Assembly was forced to abrogate the 1962 constitution and pass a new one, which members had not yet seen but were told would be in their pigeon holes. As Parliament listened in silence, military aircraft flew over the roof of the House, soldiers patrolled the city, and intelligence officers were posted in potentially explosive spots. Fifty-five MPs voted for the new constitution while four (E.M.K. Mulira, Dr Francis Sembeguya, A.J.R. Kangahho, and S.K. Masembe-Kabali) voted against it. Obote was sworn in as executive president of Uganda and all members of Parliament were required to take an oath of allegiance to the new constitution. The masses were not consulted; they had become mere spectators. Supported by Amin the general, Obote was the key player.

Under the new constitution, all executive powers were to be vested in an executive president, Uganda was to become a unitary state, and the federal and semifederal status of kingdoms and districts was abolished. Also abolished were the right of appeal to the Privy Council in London, independent civil-service commissions for federal units, and the Buganda high court. There was to be much more rigorous control of district finances and other local administrative units. Official land privileges of chiefs were abolished, but private *mailo* lands were left intact. Voting rights of chiefs in kingdom assemblies were curtailed; Baganda members of Parliament were to be directly elected (a provision the DP had sought at the London constitutional conference in 1961); and the distribution of offices on the basis of religious affiliation was abolished.

This was the so-called "Obote Revolution." It was an abrupt departure from previous administrative practices. It did not usher

in a complete transformation of society. The *mailo* land system was not altered, nor was the unequal distribution of wealth between urban and rural areas or the inequality between regions addressed. The personnel of those holding official posts changed as did the nature of political institutions. It was an administrative, not a social, revolution. It was, however, achieved by spilling blood. If spilling blood makes any change of government a revolution, then 1966 deserved the term.

THE DEFEAT OF THE NEOTRADITIONALISTS AT MENGO, 24 MAY 1966

Having obtained complete control of the party, Obote moved against the Mengo establishment. The war against Mengo had already started at the centre of the state when the right was eliminated. In their helplessness, the neotraditionalists who controlled Mengo gave Obote an excuse to move against them, and he made full use of it. A motion sponsored in the *Lukiiko* on 20 May 1966 ordered the central government to remove itself from Bugandan soil. The sponsors, forgetting that they did not have the military power to enforce the motion, pointed out that Obote's government was no longer legal. But their enemy controlled the means of violence in the geographical area called Uganda. It was rumoured that the *Kabaka* was in favour of the motion but the *Katikkiro*, Mayanja-Nkangi, who had replaced Michael Kintu in 1964, was not. Obote pointed out that the motion was tantamount to rebellion. On 23 May 1966 three of the sponsors, militant county chiefs who were very close to the *Kabaka*, were arrested. These were Lameka Sebanakitta of Kyaggwe, James Lutaaya of Ssinga, and Omwami Matovu of Buddu. Angry mobs joined by Baganda ex-servicemen began a desperate, foolhardy, and uncoordinated show of resistance. On 24 May Obote sent his loyal lieutenant, Idi Amin Dada, to the palace (*Lubiri*). Thus began the second battle of Mengo. Amin surrounded the *Lubiri* but the British-trained captain Sir Edward Mutesa II, with only 120 bodyguards to defend the enclosure, kept him at bay for twelve hours. After the *Kabaka* fled, the palace fell to Amin. Mutesa II took refuge in a nearby Catholic mission before fleeing to a former Belgian territory and, later, to Britain.

Amin carried out a neat job of destruction that he was later to repeat in other areas of Uganda and Tanzania's Kagera Salient. Old and young, chickens and goats, and all living creatures that did not

leave the palace in time were wiped out, including the Baganda ex-servicemen who had gone there to guard their king. Pondering these events, Mutesa II wrote, "I had not foreseen the random, pointless quality of their violence. Huts were burned for no conceivable tactical reason and I heard the screaming of an old woman as she burned."⁶⁷ Mutesa, who thought he could employ violence only for "tactical reasons," was himself swept up in it: "Once I was overwhelmed with emotion and foolishly returned to the palace garden alone. There I selected a looter and shot him out of honest rage. I felt calmer and somewhat uplifted as I made my way back."⁶⁸ He recounts the sight of bodies that later became a daily phenomenon in Uganda; of "the gate which was already surrounded by corpses."⁶⁹

The violence at the palace was not confined to the killing of human beings alone. All the royal regalia, all the traditional relics of the Buganda nation – drums, spears, crowns, insignia, stools, and so on – were destroyed.⁷⁰ The vandalizing of the *Kabaka's* palace was to the Baganda more than a political error on Obote's part. The *Kabaka* was not only the political head of the Baganda but the expression of what they were as individuals. He was the leader of the clan heads and therefore the clan head of every Muganda. As Mutesa II put it, "My people wanted to shake my hands, and even thought some sort of blessing would come if they touched me."⁷¹ In Buganda, when the *Kabaka* died, active social life ceased; everyone felt the loss – the state was literally dead. Law and order broke down, "civilized" life ceased.

There was rioting in rural Buganda and a number of police stations were attacked. Several people were killed. According to the minister of Defence, Felix Onama, the army, under Idi Amin, "was forced to reply."⁷² Government estimates put the number of deaths at forty, but the Baganda cited a figure ranging between four hundred and four thousand or more. Eyewitness evidence from palace occupants to the Human Rights Commission set up by the Museveni government tends to corroborate the larger figure.⁷³ In the Kinoni village of Masaka, some hundred miles from Kampala, the private house of a *saza* chief was broken into and his wife killed. All his property was looted or vandalized. Roadblocks became places where civilians expected personal abuse, loss of property, or life.⁷⁴ Even Baganda who were fed up with the political behaviour of the Mengo neotraditionalists and had given Obote the benefit of the doubt were appalled by Amin's excesses. While some believed that Obote had ordered Amin to behave as he did, the masses did

not differentiate between the actions of master and servant.

Faced with the soldiers' lawlessness, some members of the government realized there was a need to discipline the troops. An order was issued from army headquarters "in an attempt to stem the tide of growing lack of discipline," but the wording of the order "suggested that the situation was perceived as a state of war, with the Baganda being regarded as the enemy."⁷⁵ It was then that the notorious Military Police was created to enforce military discipline, with Idi Amin supervising its development. The creation of this unit shows that political violence was, by May 1966, out of control. The soldiers had got a taste of the power they held as arbiters in civilian political conflict and became a law unto themselves.

Thus ended five hundred years of Bugandan and African history. The *Kabaka*, the core of Buganda's collective identity, escaped – dying in exile in 1969 while most of his semieducated advisers languished in prisons – but the spirit of Bugandan nationalism died that day. When Obote was overthrown in 1971, elements of the old Protestant oligarchy tried to make Amin revive the kingdom. But it was not in Amin's interest to do so. In the 1980 elections the last *Katikkiro* of Buganda, Mayanja Nkanji, led a conservative party that had elements subscribing to the revival of the monarchy and the Buganda substate. But the party's poor showing at the polls in Buganda itself indicated how the Baganda had been politicized. No longer subnationalists, they aimed at winning political power in all Uganda. Whether the rest of Uganda still regards the Baganda as a challenge is not the subject of this study, but it is important for the future development of the country.

CHAPTER FOUR

From a Civilian to a Military Dictatorship, 1966–71

INTRODUCTION

Obote had depended on the army for the 1966 victory over his enemies in party and state. But it was a Pyrrhic victory, in the end: when the army unleashed violence on the civilian population, Obote could do little about it because he had become entirely dependent for power on an undisciplined army led by the brutal Idi Amin. The victory over Mutesa II institutionalized violence as the main instrument of political control. But the politicians no longer had complete control over the violence they had sanctioned in the first place.

Under Obote's tenure the army grew enormously, to the point where almost every district in Uganda had a military base. In 1964 the army had mutinied. Without consulting Mutesa II, who was not only titular president of Uganda but commander in chief of the army, Obote called in a British detachment to put down the mutineers. Then, instead of court martialling, dismissing, or executing the mutineers, Obote reincorporated most of them and capitulated to their demands. Their pay was raised and even those who had been dismissed were later recalled to service and some were promoted. Uganda's army became the best paid in East and Central Africa.² By 1968 the country's expenditure on the army was 10.2 percent of the national budget, as opposed to 3.8 percent in Tanzania and 6.9 percent in Kenya. Uganda spent \$17 million on its army in 1968, ten percent more than the expenditures of Kenya and Tanzania combined on similar items. In a similar situation, Tanzania had dismissed mutineers and constituted a new politicized army conscious of national aspirations, while Kenya had neutralized its army through the use of strict measures. Obote did

neither. He chose to retain people who had rebelled because they came from his own province and many spoke Lwo like him.

By 1969 Uganda's army was very much a "tribal" army, recruited mainly from the Northern Province,³ and Obote's ability to command the army's loyalty was initially due to his belonging to the same ethnic and linguistic groups as the majority of its recruits. After the events of 1966 twenty-five officers were dismissed, almost all of them Baganda.⁴ There were appeals from concerned citizens to rectify the ethnic imbalance in the army.⁵ Both Mutesa II and Grace Ibingira had complained that Obote promoted people from his own ethnic groups and frustrated the Bantu speakers in the army like Karugaba and Kakuhikire. But nothing was done. Obote depended on this imbalance for survival and did not wish to alter it.

Obote's military power was supplemented by three key paramilitary units established during his first administration. The General Service Unit (GSU) was set up in the Prime Minister's Office in 1964 to gather information outside the police force's Central Intelligence Department (CID). Its first chief was Mkombe Mpambara from Kigezi,⁶ but it was later taken over by a close relative of the president's, Akena Adoko. Loyal recruits were sent to Israel and trained by MOSSAD, the Israeli counterintelligence agency.⁷ The GSU later spied on Ugandans inside and outside the country, and it is no wonder that Akena Adoko got a chilly reception upon his return from exile in one of Uganda's nonprofessional newspapers, *The Economy*. While he was rightly angered by the paper's excesses, many Ugandans disapproved of the GSU's surveillance.⁸

The Special Force was an élite paramilitary police unit as meticulously trained for combat as the army. The unit, with its headquarters at Nsambya, was extremely loyal to Obote – seventy-five percent of its members were believed to be Langi, though the figure may be exaggerated – and Amin, who considered it a rival army, made it redundant when he took over the government in 1971. It was dispatched to wherever opposition was thought to exist, patrolling streets, political rallies, and even sports matches at stadiums. The Special Force struck terror into the hearts of potential opponents of the regime.

Lastly, the Military Police, headquartered at Makindye, was established in the aftermath of the 1966 crisis to control the behaviour of soldiers towards civilians. As noted earlier, Amin was made responsible for creating it and he loaded West Nilers into its ranks. The notorious Hussein Marella was in this unit.⁹ Although the Military Police was intended to discipline soldiers, it extended its acti-

vities to civilians and, when Amin seized power from Obote, proved adept at the art of killing. Its creation was directly connected with the struggle to control party and state, and its violence under Obote and Amin must be seen in this light.

Thus, as Ali Mazrui put it, "it was Milton Obote, not Idi Amin, who began the militarization of Uganda's political system. Obote did this partly by treating the Baganda as a conquered people in a clearly military sense. He also did this by expanding the domain of fear as a strategy of political persuasion, complete with an elaborate system of internal informers and with a readiness to display military might as a method of silencing dissent."¹⁰

OBOTE'S ECONOMIC POLICIES

The Ugandan economy had been neglected during Obote's struggles to consolidate his hold on party and state. When, in 1969, he felt himself in uncontested control of events, he announced, "We will now begin to acquire our true identity."¹¹ With this he began a move towards what he called "the left," embarking on a policy of state participation in business. His economic policies were enshrined in the Nakivubo Pronouncements of 1 May 1970. Briefly, it was decreed that all import and export businesses except those involving fuels were to be conducted by the state through a public corporation. In addition, the government took over sixty percent of all companies, industries, and financial institutions operating in the country, and over sixty percent of mines, especially Kilembe Mines. However, the criteria for nationalization were not made clear; nor was it clearly indicated whether the list of companies to be nationalized was complete, whether compensation was to be paid out of future profits within fifteen years or immediately, or whether the aim of the measures was to take commerce away from foreigners, nationalize it, or give it to Africans. But the effect of these provisions on class formation was to prevent the Baganda from emerging as a commercial élite and, thus, as a powerful economic force in Ugandan society.

There were more problems at the implementation level. To begin with, previous owners were asked to manage their nationalized companies on behalf of the government. Many of them were Asians who shared Obote's fear of an emergent Baganda business élite – but they had an equal fear of government control. Next, the import/export corporation set up to conduct government business was headed by none other than Jayant Madhvani, a millionaire with the most to lose should state control of business be fully imple-

mented. The government also nationalized more companies than it could manage profitably. Nor was there much chance that the costs of administration, expansion, and loss would be proportionately shared. What is believed to have happened in joint ventures is that companies took their forty percent in profits while the government paid sixty percent in losses. Later, in Amin's time, most of the more than one hundred companies taken over by the government after the Asian expulsion lost money; many of these companies either were operating on bank overdrafts or had few assets in the country.¹²

Some foreign companies were pleased with Obote's economic measures because they retained management of their companies, obtained access to government contracts, and received protection from workers' demands because the government, as co-owner, would not tolerate strikes. Moreover, it was easier for the foreign companies to repatriate forty percent in a favoured position than one hundred percent in a hostile one. In principle, however, Western companies did not like government interference in business. They preferred private enterprise and they feared the impact of Obote's policies on neighbouring Kenya, where they had greater investments and which was of greater strategic value to the West than Uganda. Obote's policies were therefore disapproved of by the West, and he lost a number of friends abroad. Overseas, many knew that his political base was too narrow to offer political support for such bold moves.

It was unfortunate for Uganda that the ethnic group in power when independence was granted came from a disadvantaged minority that saw any development in light of its minority and marginal status. Rather than allowing other ethnic groups to overtake it, it decided to hold others back, regardless of the risk this posed to national development. Under Obote's economic policies, the state or "white" immigrants, but not black Africans, were allowed to participate in industry, commerce, and large-scale agriculture. This was the real meaning of Obote's "move to the left": no Africanization of the economy was permitted if it might benefit the Baganda. Obote admirer Vijay Gupta, using Jan Jorgensen's words without acknowledgment, puts this very clearly: "On the question of Africanisation, Obote was pragmatic. He was not prepared to transfer ownership of business and trade from non-citizens, mostly Asians, to Africans. His regime had recognised that an economic policy which sought to shift economic control simply from non-citizens would tend to favour the Baganda landlords."¹³ Obote concentrated instead on rectifying the regional inequality that favoured Buganda.

He continued to redistribute national income from peasants in the rural areas to urban consumers, but he made no effort to encourage the emergence of an African merchant, industrial, or agricultural élite. Instead, he allowed European and Asian businessmen to expand their bases in agriculture and industry. More Asians were allowed into large-scale agriculture than ever before, especially the production of raw sugar, tea, and dairy products. Instead of allowing African entrepreneurs into the lucrative commodity market, Obote tightened the state's monopoly. The marketing of coffee and cotton was controlled at the national and international levels by the coffee and lint marketing boards. At the local district level, these crops were marketed through government-directed unions whose secretary managers were appointed by the government. To transport crops it was necessary to obtain written permission from the district officer, a procedure that involved bribery and weeks of delay. Businessmen and growers lost interest in the commodity and produce markets because of government red tape.

The state undertook to do business by creating many government-owned companies (parastatals) whose nucleus was the Uganda Development Corporation, strengthening two fully Asian owned industrial groups – the Madhvani and Metha giants – as well as naming large Asian firms as agents of big parastatal bodies. Three out of nine “specially elected” members in the House were Asians, a figure far higher than their proportion in the population. Such a move blocked the entry not only of Baganda but also other Africans into the property-owning class. Participation in politics became the only channel through which Africans could accumulate wealth. But as it became increasingly ethnicized and militarized, the political arena itself was shrinking. The expansion of the state into commerce, industry, and large-scale agriculture increased the arena for corruption. The few resources that were not used by foreign firms and the immigrant bourgeoisie were consumed by the expanded government bureaucracy in government companies, the army, police, secret service, the party, and the labour aristocracy further reducing national wealth. Most of those who worked in these concerns were employees who did not accumulate money for investment and could not develop as a petty commercial or agricultural bourgeoisie with an economic stake in the country.

Obote's leftward drift was motivated in part by a desire to rebuild his civilian base. The masses were told that nationalization of

business was socialism and would lead to a more equitable distribution of wealth. But Obote had already undermined his support among too many groups in the country that might have proved useful to him. The trade unions, for one, suffered under Obote's centralizing and dictatorial policies. In 1964 Humphrey Luande, a trade unionist, resigned from the UPC because he felt the government was interfering in the internal affairs of the Trade Union Congress. Two years later the government encouraged the formation of a new general trade union, the Uganda Labour Congress, whose leaders were more compliant. Among the laws passed to control strikes was the 1964 Trade Disputes (Arbitration) Act, under which the registrar of Trade Unions could refuse to register a union if another represented the same interests, while the minister could cancel a union's registration. The International Labour Organization pointed out that the government was interfering with the rights of workers. By 1970, however, only the Uganda Labour Congress had government recognition.

The cooperative unions had also been alienated. Under Obote they were no longer allowed to manage the marketing and processing needs of farmers. Obote deprived them of their independence and subjected them to government control. In this way the emerging class of capitalist farmers who, through independent cooperative unions, were beginning to gain a footing in the processing and marketing of agricultural production were dealt a death blow. Their eclipse had a multiplier effect on the social and political development of Uganda. Obote robbed himself of a stratum of society that might have implemented his export/import economic-expansion policy, a class that might have supported him for economic rather than tribal reasons and preserved peace in Uganda by offering an alternative to dictatorial regimes.

A 1959 ordinance had brought almost all aspects of cooperative-union organization under state control. Union finances were managed by government "experts" seconded to these organizations. In 1963, after independence, a new act gave the unions complete managerial and financial autonomy. However, when unions, their owners, and capitalist farmers began to acquire economic power after 1965, Obote became frightened. Many beneficiaries of the cooperative unions were, after all, Baganda capitalist farmers whom he perceived to be his enemies. He therefore brought in the 1970 Cooperative Societies Act, which gave the government "greater power for the guidance, direction and control of the co-operative societies and unions generally and on matters of finance and management of their affairs in particular." Elected union secretary

managers were to be approved by the government, but in practice they were appointed. No wonder Mamdani felt that Obote's government did not move to the left but simply moved against the right.¹⁴

Even the marketing of minor crops was controlled by the state. A 1968 act of Parliament for the "supply, the storing, the handling, the transportation, and processing" of minor crops such as beans, ground nuts, and maize gave the government a monopoly to handle all marketable minor crops. Obote therefore undid what little benefit thirty years of political struggle had reaped for Uganda.

And, of course, Obote had alienated the Baganda to the point where they would always be eager to see him go, even if he was ousted by a monster like Idi Amin. After 1966, there had been no coordinated Buganda-wide insurrection against the central government.¹⁵ Yet in victory Obote was not magnanimous. In addition to his economic policies, which stunted the growth of the Bagandan economy and curtailed the development of a Baganda property-owning class, other harsh measures had been brought to bear against the Baganda. The state of emergency declared in Buganda in 1966 lasted until 1971 and was used by government troops to brutalize civilians of all classes. All political activities were banned in the substate and prominent Baganda were locked up on flimsy grounds. More than sixty percent of the political detainees in Obote's prisons from 1966 to 1971 were Baganda. Among them were all key members of the royal family, including the *Nalinya*, or official sister of the *Kabaka* (i.e., the female double). The substate was divided into artificial districts. To control opposition from the masses, more barracks and battalions were established at Masaka, Mubende, Lubiri, and Nakasongola in the former Bugandan kingdom. More youths from the Northern Province were recruited into the army. To add insult to injury, Obote made Bulange, the former seat of Buganda's government, headquarters of the army in 1968. The *Lubiri*, or *Kabaka's* palace, was occupied by the army as of 1966 and was made the seat of a well-equipped military unit that was ready to intervene in civil conflict at any time.

These actions humiliated the Baganda, who felt that an administration under Obote was a government of foreigners controlling their land by force and showing publicly that the Baganda were a conquered people, not part of the nation. In yet another display of anti-Baganda sentiment, the Baganda were blamed for an attempt to assassinate Obote on 19 December 1969. He was shot at as he left the Conference Hall at Lugogo Indoor Stadium to attend

a UPC party conference. The chaos that followed led to death and suffering for many Ugandans. Soldiers were dispatched across Kampala and any moving vehicle was stopped, its occupants pulled out, and, if they happened to be Baganda, manhandled. Many were killed. Particularly in the north of Kampala, near Lugogo Stadium, any car, truck, bus, or motorbike travelling between Kitante Road and Lugogo Bypass was shot at. Conservative estimates by mortuary workers at Mulago Hospital put the total number of deaths resulting from the assassination attempt at some one hundred people. The number could have been higher. Evidence now available implicates not the Baganda but members of Obote's armed forces, who at least had knowledge of what was going on.

It seemed that the regime's interpretation of the fruits of independence was limited to the Africanization of the bureaucracy, redressing regional imbalance by halting Buganda's development while other areas caught up, increasing commodity production, building a few import-substitution industries, and, of course, staying in power as long as possible by stifling groups and individuals that could threaten his position. When Obote was overthrown in 1971, there was no strong African social group or class with an economic base sufficiently powerful to fight Amin's dictatorship or provide an alternative source of power. His economic policies frightened the owners of capital, made no fundamental change at the local or international levels, and did nothing to improve the lot of the masses. As the flight of capital increased, the economy began to shrink. The amount of wealth to distribute among the élite had not substantially increased since 1962. This scarcity of resources increased the levels of violence in the struggle to control what little there was, especially after Amin grabbed and lost power. In other words, violence was caused as much by the lack of resources to distribute as the unequal nature of the distribution itself.

THE CONTROL OF IDEAS

Obote tried not only to centralize political, economic, and military power under his presidency: from 1963 on, he also sought to centralize the content and dissemination of ideas. In the process of doing so he clashed with, and alienated, certain members of society who thought the control of ideological power was their monopoly. The first area that he turned to was education. Through education, the missionaries socialized the young into what was in effect a

Christian society built on Euro-Judeo-Christian values. But he feared the tight control the Catholic church had on the children of Uganda, especially since many Catholics were perceived to be opposed to the UPC and presumed to look favourably to the DP. Between 1963 and 1964, Obote's government formulated education policies that increased government control over secondary education and expanded the number of senior secondary schools built on Anglican Protestant missionary foundations to almost the same number as those built on Catholic ones. Muslim schools were also increased.¹⁶ These moves did not please Catholics, and although they staged huge demonstrations against Obote's education policy, he did not change his mind.

Obote tried to influence religious policy with some success. But his success depended on the strength of the institution in question. Like Amin after him, Obote was partially able to influence the Anglicans and Muslims because of the weakness of their administrative institutions. It is thought that he influenced the election of Eric Sabiiti as Anglican archbishop of Uganda, Ruanda, Burundi, and Boga-Zaire because of divisions within the church of Uganda – Obote is believed not to have wanted a Muganda, Dustan Nsubuga, to take over as leader of the Church of Uganda. He succeeded in dividing the Muslims and secured for himself supporters who disseminated his political views in mosques, *mauledis*, and other Muslim gatherings. He exploited the internal differences of Muslims by supporting one faction, the National Association for the Advancement of Muslims, over the Uganda Muslim Community, which was led by a prince of the royal house of Buganda.¹⁷ He wanted to get a bridgehead to the Baganda Muslim masses as well as undermine the authority of Prince Badru Kakungulu in the Muslim community. Although he got the support of some Baganda Muslims, his failure to estimate Prince Badru Kakungulu's fighting power partly contributed to his fall in 1971. Realizing that Amin and Obote were no longer on good terms, Kakungulu allowed Amin to speak in *Mauledis* organized by the Uganda Muslim community. In one of the gatherings at Kiyunga in Buganda, Amin is reported to have said that he feared no one but God.¹⁸ Many people, including high-ranking non-Muslims, clapped and cheered. Amin, who was consolidating his control of military power in the armed forces, was beginning to build a political base in Buganda; the subsequent detention of Prince Badru Kakungulu did not increase Obote's popularity amongst the alienated Muslims.

Obote tried, but failed, to influence the Catholic church in Uganda.¹⁹ With clearly demarcated lines of authority based on the

power of the pope in Rome, the Catholic church institution in Uganda was impervious to external pressure. However, Obote used the pope's visit in 1969 to win the sympathies of Catholics in Uganda by playing host to the pontiff. His government supervised the arrangements for the visit, including the making of shirts and dresses displaying his own and the pope's pictures. But many of these garments were not bought; kept in Luzira prison, they were stolen by prisoners of Idi Amin's regime as they marched to their freedom at the fall of the dictator in 1979. It seems that Obote did not fully get what he wanted.

Censorship played a part in Obote's attempt to win ideological power. While he tolerated, and often encouraged, free expression of political views by foreign nationals, he was sensitive to criticism from local intellectuals. For example, he allowed Professor Ali Mazrui – a Kenyan academic who commented favourably on Uganda – to express his views, publish, debate, and speak out on politics freely. However, when a brilliant local intellectual, Abu Mayanja, asked why the government was not appointing Africans to the high court and stated that he did not believe the motive was “for tribal reasons,” he was arrested, along with the editor of the paper in which these views were published.²⁰ The latter was released when the authorities found out he was British. Ugandan academics at Makerere were watched and many were careful not to express their political views in lecture halls and classrooms. But foreign professors could say what they felt in relative safety. Obote thus narrowed his political base by antagonizing many social groups, including the educated élite who still had some impact on the formation of perceptions in society.

Obote gradually tightened government control over the media. Before 1963 differing political views were expressed on Radio Uganda. However, by 1965 only government and UPC views could be aired on the government-controlled transmitter. Similarly, when Uganda Television was launched, only progovernment views could be broadcast. From 1966 onwards, independent newspapers were censored and the progovernment paper, *The People*, became a government mouthpiece whose briefs other papers were encouraged to print.

CONTINUED DIVISIONS WITHIN THE UPC

It should be clear from the foregoing that the 1966 conflict changed the country's administrative institutions dramatically. To

the extent that Ugandans accepted the changes, they did so because of the threat of violence wielded by Obote with the backing of the military, which constituted his main political base. Civilians perceived, to some extent correctly, that the government approved of the violence meted out to them by the soldiers. They also perceived that key members of the UPC, government, and repressive services had been recruited mainly from the Northern Province; that "tribalism," or ethnic favouritism, had re-emerged in Ugandan politics, this time practised not by the Baganda but by those who were earlier thought to be its victims.

Throughout the remaining five years of his first administration, Obote used force to concentrate power in the central government under the presidency and depoliticize all sectors of society that vied for political, economic, or ideological power. Yet Obote's regime was still not a consolidated unit. Now that the right wing of the UPC had been eliminated, cracks began to show in the centre as the leaders tried to define social institutions to fit their perceptions of the Ugandan state. Indeed, the 1966 crisis itself could be described as a "revolt against Obote"²¹ by his colleagues in the UPC and not just a matter of Buganda versus Uganda, or "democrats" versus "feudalists," as Obote and his pet historian Akena Adoko maintain.²² While Ibingira's alliance with Mutesa II landed both leaders on the losing side, Obote's affiliation with Amin secured for him five more years of dictatorial rule. But his brand of government and his economic adventures in particular won him opponents in the party, cabinet, and the army.²³ This time, Obote's opponents, unlike the Mengo establishment, had the backing of a major section of those who controlled the means of violence.

Obote operated undemocratically. Party and government were ordered to endorse his four "leftist" policy documents – the *Common Man's Charter*, *National Service*, *Communication from the Chair*, and *Election Proposals* – without discussion.²⁴ He sought to recreate a base from the dispersed left of the UPC, while in the army, as already noted, he began to "tribalize" his support by reducing the influence of Amin's West Nile recruits on his own people.

Democratically minded Ugandans were denied the right to participate in politics; the only time before 1980 that they elected their leaders was 1962. They did not participate in decision making or in choosing or removing leaders, nor could they enforce their views on those who held power. Ugandans became effectively disenfranchised.²⁵ Furthermore, the government installed its agents in

political institutions like district and municipal councils that had once been democratically constituted. In September 1966, the government abolished twelve elective seats on the thirty-three-member council of the City of Kampala, six on the twenty-eight-member Jinja Municipal Council, and eight on the twenty-four-member Mbala Municipal Council.²⁶ In Buganda the government refused to hold by-elections to fill the vacancies left in the national Parliament by six members who refused to swear by the 1966 constitution. District councillors in Buganda were appointed, not elected, although Obote realized that not all Baganda were disloyal.²⁷ Obote refused to support proposals to amend a colonial-era electoral law intended to help illiterates vote because it could be exploited by those who controlled violence, as the elections of 1980 showed.²⁸

During Obote's fist administration there were few free democratic elections at either the local or national levels. Any political activity, except that of the UPC, was discouraged after 1969. Using the attempted assassination of Obote as an excuse, the government banned all political parties and organizations, including the Democratic Party, Uganda National Union, Uganda Conservative Party, Uganda Farmers' Voice, Uganda National Socialist Party, and the Vietnam Solidarity Party. The *Kabaka Yekka* had been inoperative since the second battle of Mengo in 1966. With the banning of these political organizations, only members of the UPC could participate in politics. A number of people just withdrew rather than belong to a party that displeased them. Some of the get-rich-quick lumpens, especially from Buganda, joined the UPC to "eat"; these would become the notorious UPC chairmen of the 1980s who killed thousands of Ugandans.

Despite these measures, it was becoming clear that the master schemer and warrior was losing ground. On 17 June Adoko Nekyon, an inner member of the party, a relative of the president, and the man who had publicly debated the merits and demerits of scientific socialism with John Kakonge, resigned. Speaking to the Historical Society at King's College, Budo, he said that he disagreed with the UPC's stand on the one-party system, the postponement of national elections from 1967 to 1971, the continuing state of emergency in Buganda, police refusal to allow the opposition Democratic Party to hold public rallies, and the indirect method of electing members to district councils, which he thought was undemocratic.²⁹ The UPC's secretary general, Felix Onama, correctly pointed out that calling elections was the president's prerogative,

but he did not add that the president was bound by law to hold elections every five years. Eight years later, Sheikh Abdu Kamulegeya, one of Nekyon's confidants, told me that Nekyon had advised Obote to take the democratic option instead of depending on violence for political survival; Obote, saying that such an option was impracticable, had refused.

In the wake of Obote's leftward drift, as Onama and Amin were pushed to one side with Obote on the other, the alliance of Sudanic and Lwo-speaking leaders from the Northern Province began to disintegrate. In addition to a few faithful henchmen, Obote came to depend on his lieutenants in the army who were members of his own ethnic group, Langis and Acholis,³⁰ while Amin consolidated his position in the army and the Military Police by recruiting from West Nile and from the Nubi urban groups. From 1969 on, Obote tried to eliminate anyone who would not move with him to the left, had differing views, or tried to take over the party leadership. In an effort to free himself of the party's new "right," i.e., those opposed to his nationalization policies, he suggested the universal election of the president. The proposal was rejected at a meeting of the UPC National Council on 12 and 13 August 1970, but he did not give up the idea, hoping now to push it through at the party conference later in the year. Quite contrary to party rules and procedures, Obote took over the responsibilities of the secretary general and organized the 1970 conference himself.³¹ Onama declared at the conference that the National Council stood by its decision on the method of electing the president.

But Obote was a fighter. He decided to conduct constituency elections. After the Electoral Commission drew up constituency boundaries, he took three steps reminiscent of 1966.³² First, he removed vital files from party headquarters and supervised the organization of the elections from his office, using compliant civil servants. Second, he scrutinized grassroots party elections at the subcounty and constituency levels. Branch officials along with ten branch delegates met at constituency headquarters to elect the chairmen and committee members. Lastly, he made sure that the elections were not only supervised by people from "other" constituencies but that they were promptly held a day after subcounty elections. By the time the new "right" and the old guard realized what was happening, Obote, by using "*coup* tactics,"³³ accomplished a lightning victory. Most of the old guard, including certain ministers were eliminated, and the constituency replaced the

national administrative district as the base of party political activity. Obote then called a new emergency party conference for 18 and 19 December 1970 at Mbale, which was attended by representatives selected according to his plan. The Obote program was carried with a very comfortable majority. The old guard were unhappy, but chose to bide their time.

As it happened, events were not to unfold as they had in 1966. Although the army still formed the basis of Obote's power, it was neither united nor interested in his political innovations and was increasingly doubtful of his ability to lead. Amin was known to be unhappy with Obote and fearful of being replaced. Onama, the minister of Defence and secretary general of the UPC, who was believed to be Obote's main political opponent, came from the same district as Amin. He had no interest in "leftist" ideas. Most observers feared a bloodbath in the struggle to control the party and state.³⁴ Although Obote controlled the party, by the end of 1970 his competitors had shifted their struggle to the army. They had learned, as he had before them, that in underdeveloped social systems, controlling the means of violence was the ultimate arbiter of political conflict. Whether they knew that it can never be a permanent instrument of political control, we cannot say.

THE END OF THE REGIME

As the civilian struggle for power intensified, the army was increasingly expected to mediate. In 1964 Shaban Opolot was promoted brigadier and appointed head of the army. Amin, who was promoted colonel, was made his deputy. Amin had a brutal past and it was Obote who saved him from being court-martialled for multiple murder. As noted earlier, he was brought close to Obote as a contact with the Congolese rebels. But Amin also had contacts with his tribesmen – the Kakwa of southern Sudan and Zaire – and freely recruited them into the army. Moreover, he was popular with ordinary soldiers. This probably explains why the troop movements ordered by Opolot in support of Mutesa II in January and February 1966 proved abortive. For two years after the 1966 crisis, there was cooperation and understanding between Obote and Amin. About six months after the defeat of Mengo the loyal lieutenant was promoted. In January 1967 Amin was moved up again, to brigadier. By April 1968, a year later, he was a major general.

When the aim of political participation is self-enrichment there are usually no permanent personal loyalties. Such was the case

between the master, Obote, and the servant, General Idi Amin. From 1969 onwards, Obote and Amin competed in a cutthroat game of political survival that ended in the military *coup* of 1971. Had Obote succeeded in rebuilding his civilian base through his "leftist" economic policies, the army might have been afraid to remove him by force. However, as pointed out earlier, Obote had narrowed his civilian political base by alienating various social forces. His fear of the people was evident from the way his heavily guarded motorcade drove on public roads, especially the section between Kampala and Entebbe; any motorist or pedestrian unfortunate enough to be on the road when Obote was being driven by will never forget the experience.

Although Amin was not educated, he was attuned to the game of Ugandan political survival: use of violence at the right time decided who would rule the country. This Amin learned from Obote. In the army Amin had had a free hand with recruitment since 1965.³⁵ Between 1968 and 1969 Sudanic-speaking recruits – West Nilers – increased by seventy-four percent, Lwo speakers by thirty-one percent, and Bantu speakers by only twenty-nine percent, though the latter comprised over fifty percent of Uganda's population.³⁶ He recruited members of his own ethnic (tribal) group, the Kakwa, into the Ugandan army regardless of their citizenship. He aided the Anyanya rebels fighting the government of Sudan for a separate state. He spoke their language well. His simplicity and ability to talk to the common man at the grassroots level in Luganda and other local languages helped him reach out to many in the former kingdoms.

By mid-1970, Amin seemed to have a more popular base than Obote, especially in Buganda. The Baganda began to see the very man who stormed the palace of their king, the man who ordered his soldiers to rape, loot, and vandalize their property, as their saviour. But they had been forced into this unenviable position by Obote himself. As the saying goes, a "drowning man will clutch on a serpent," and that is what the Baganda did. Obote had thrown the Baganda into the ocean and they were willing to pull themselves out on the back of a hydra. In September 1969 Obote was shot at. The incident was blamed on the Baganda by Obote supporters, but Amin came under suspicion when another soldier, Okoya, criticized him for being absent at a critical moment. About three months later, on 25 January 1970, Okoya was murdered in Gulu. A board of inquiry established under Brigadier Suleiman Hussein found ample circumstantial evidence to implicate Amin. But Obote did not act as decisively as in the past. He failed to take

action in the face of the Amin threat. Preferring to move cautiously along a tried path, he decided to remove Amin in the same way he had removed Opolot: he kicked Amin upstairs by removing key responsibilities from him and placing them with people he could trust. This decision was tragic in the end because Amin, who had been part of the earlier conspiracy, knew how to survive if similar tactics were used against him.

As Amin left for Egypt in late September 1970 to attend the funeral of Gamel Abdel Nasser, Obote reorganized the army. He appointed Brigadier Suleiman Hussein acting commander of the army and chief of Defence staff. Major David Oyite Ojok, a Langi and one of his most loyal supporters in the army, was made military secretary in the Ministry of Defence and secretary to the Planning Committee of the army. Most senior officers who were thought to be loyal to Amin were moved from strategic positions in the army or transferred to the civil service. These included Lieutenant Colonel S. Kakuhikire, Major Barnabas Kili, and Major S. Lukakamwa. When Amin returned from Egypt an abortive attempt was made to arrest him; the attempt failed reportedly because he was warned by Israeli intelligence in Uganda.³⁷ Now extremely alert to the possibility of arrest, he lived and moved with his trusted security men. As Obote left for the Commonwealth Conference held in Singapore in 1971, he put Amin on the defensive with an ultimatum: Amin would have to explain financial malpractice in the administration of the forces. The auditor general had revealed a reported deficit of some £2,500,000 sterling. Amin was asked to explain as soon as Obote returned. But Obote never returned to get the answer. Amin deposed Obote in what is now accepted to have been a bloody *coup d'état* on 25 January 1971. The Baganda rejoiced and applauded the change not because they loved Amin but because they hated Obote. It was more a negative vote against Obote than a positive one for Amin. Violence was the only way left to change a government, and though the Baganda were not part of the army they were still a strong social force in the country.³⁸

CHAPTER FIVE

Idi Amin and the Politics of Survival, 1971–79

Before President Amin came to power in 1971, the human rights situation in Uganda gave cause for concern ... However, the scale of human rights violations changed dramatically after President Amin came to power.¹

Idi Amin Dada was not “a bizarre or a maverick intrusion upon the Uganda political scene but deeply and significantly entwined in it.”² He was a product of Uganda’s political culture; his coming to power was directly linked to the social cleavages that have hindered Uganda’s national integration, the failure of Uganda’s politicians to devise peaceful methods of conflict resolution, and, above all, the greed of Ugandans to “eat” by controlling the state.³ Amin used violence more openly and certainly more brutally than his predecessors. It is estimated that between 50,000 and 300,000 people were killed during his eight-year dictatorship; the number could be more.⁴ But he operated on the examples they had already set in a society that had become inured to the violence of its leaders.

Amin ruled Uganda for over eight years. His aim while in power was not to implement a program, impose an ideology, or improve the lot of his people, but merely to have power and reap its benefits. His greatest preoccupation was survival. He survived by physically eliminating his enemies in the army, the police, in prisons, and among civilians. He capitalized on Obote’s mistakes in his appeals to the public. He used the foreign powers Obote had alienated. He played on the religious factor to his advantage. He built up a “core” support base among people from the West Nile, northwest Zaire, and South Sudan areas. He used the Islamic-Arabic card to his advantage and was always ready to shift in order to survive. But his ruinous economic policy and brutalization of society ultimately weakened his base – the army; in this respect he had learned nothing from his predecessor. In the end his terror machine disintegrated like butter in a hot oven.⁵

CAPITALIZING ON OBOTE'S
MISTAKES

Akena Adoko criticizes the hysteria with which Amin was greeted, but people welcomed the change not because Amin had come but because Obote had gone.⁶ Indeed, many saw it as a palace *coup*: the servant had overthrown the master. The Baganda would have welcomed anyone who replaced Obote. A young military officer told me in 1975 that there were at least two groups in the army trying to overthrow Obote in 1970–71; that one group was led by young, educated army Officers; that they planned the 1971 coup; and that when Captain Wilfred Aswa read on radio the eighteen points explaining why Obote was being overthrown, he thought that one of the young, educated officers, not Amin, was to take over. He added that Amin had been helped by Israeli intelligence, and the British government hurried to recognize Amin to counter the officers. I have not interviewed many officers to assess the political forces in the army at the time, but the fact remains that Amin's name was not mentioned in the radio announcement, and his later statement that he was "arrested," meaning forced, by the rank-and-file soldiers to take power lends credibility to the younger officers' version of the story. Further research is required on this point.

Obote's government had been a military regime camouflaged in civilian attire. Amin, who knew that Obote was unpopular, especially in Buganda, lifted the state of emergency and released more than 1,500 political prisoners, including former prime minister Kiwanuka, the sister of the *Kabaka*, *Nalinya* Ndagire, and Prince Badru Kakungulu, the leader of Muslims and caretaker chair of Buganda's royal family.⁷ He reduced Obote's "sixty percent socialism" to forty-nine percent state participation.⁸ He brought back the body of Sir Edward Mutesa II from London for burial at the Kasubi Tombs in Uganda. He smashed the iron curtain that Obote had erected between the people and their leader. Unlike Obote, he did not need interpreters wherever he went in Uganda. The highly westernized Apolo Milton Obote, who could quote Shakespeare with ease, could not bridge the linguistic gap between the masses and the presidency. Amin spoke Bantu languages (Luganda and broken Kiswahili), a number of Sudanic languages (Kakwa, Lugbara, Lendu, Logo, Madi, etc.), Lwo (Alur), as well as Kinubi, a "creole" form of Arabic spoken by Islamicized (and Arabized) peoples of southern Sudan, northeast Zaire, and northwest Uganda

who spread to most of East Africa as soldiers during the colonial period.⁹ He could thus communicate directly with the people of northwest Uganda and with most of the people of the southern, western, and eastern parts of the country. In his first year in office, when he was still popular, he used to drive his Land Rover to markets, sports matches, or wherever crowds gathered and talk to the people, thus narrowing the gap between ruler and ruled.

However, Amin refused to restore the kingdoms.¹⁰ This upset the Baganda neotraditionalists, who have always used the institution of the monarchy for their personal benefit. Nor did it please the Baganda peasants, whose love of kingship was part of their tradition. The Baganda educated élite did not care as much. Their interest was to grab and keep fat positions in government no matter who was leading it; and many did so.

Amin also exploited the good will of influential foreign countries that Obote had alienated. One of the first countries to recognize Amin's government was the United Kingdom. Obote had frightened British firms by his move to the "left" and his irritating public criticism of Britain's economic relationship with South Africa, none of which pleased Edward Heath, the Conservative prime minister. The British press was pleased with the fall of Obote, whom they considered dangerous to British interests.¹¹ Of all foreign powers, however, Israel was thought to have been the most instrumental in the initial installation of Amin, helping him exploit the internal conditions that facilitated Obote's overthrow.

Relations between Uganda and Israel began in 1963. Israel's desire to have an impact in Uganda was tethered to her own plan for survival: the Israelis wished to divert the Sudanese army from the Middle East by focusing it on internal problems. To this end they helped keep the issue of Anyanya separation burning. They also wished to influence events at the source of the Nile, on whose waters the Sudan and Egypt depend. As soon as Uganda became politically independent a number of prominent Israelis visited the country: Golda Meir in 1963 as foreign minister, Prime Minister Levi Eshkol in 1966, and Abba Eban as foreign minister in 1969. Israeli officers trained Ugandan police, secret services, and the army. Their activities were concentrated in northern Uganda, from where they assisted Sudanese rebels with their knowledge of Idi Amin.

Obote's feelings towards the Israelis began to cool when on 25 May 1969 a change of government in the Sudan resulted in negotiations with the rebels. In August 1970, General Zamir, the Israeli chief of Intelligence in the region, was reportedly refused permis-

sion to refuel in Uganda when ferrying arms to the Anyanya rebels. That same month the Ugandan cabinet ended Israel's contract to train the Ugandan police, and a West Germany mercenary, Rolf Steiner, who had fought for Biafra and was working for the Anyanya, was arrested when he came out to make contact in Uganda. His diaries showed that he had met with Amin, an Israeli military officer, and one of the rebel leaders, General Joseph Lagu.¹² If all this is true, it establishes Amin's connection with Israeli intelligence and operations, both of which are believed to have helped him come to power by exploiting Uganda's internal cleavages. Amin played this card well in the initial period.

EXPLOITATION OF RELIGIOUS CLEAVAGES

Amin, like Obote, desired to wield ideological power. He seems not to have understood the power of educational ideas. But he turned his attention to religion and the media instantly, again turning Obote's mistakes to his own advantage. There was a feeling that Obote had interfered too much in religious matters, that he had meddled in Muslim affairs, not given Catholics their due, and, for ethnic reasons, prevented a qualified candidate from becoming head of the Anglican church. The moment he grabbed power, Amin began to portray himself as an impartial God-fearing religious man, an "ecumenical mediator" who would see that there was complete religious tolerance and noninterference in the affairs of religious organizations.¹³ He created a department of Religious Affairs, organized the Kabale and Kampala religious conferences in 1971 and 1972, and persuaded the Muslims to work under one umbrella organization, the Uganda Muslim Supreme Council. All other Muslim organizations were asked to disband and hand over their property to the new organization. The Anglican dioceses of Namirembe and West Buganda had threatened to secede but Amin would not permit it: he asked the Anglicans to unite to avoid schism in the Church. The Catholics, whose institution was strong, he left alone.¹⁴

Amin began to consult with, and be seen in the company of, Uganda's religious leaders. At the 1972 Organization of African Unity at Rabat, he was accompanied by the Roman Catholic archbishop, the Anglican archbishop, and the Muslim chief kadhi.¹⁵ On 31 December 1971 the government donated 100,000 shillings each to the Muslim, Catholic, and Protestant faiths. In June, twelve acres of land in Old Kampala were donated for the construction of a

mosque and headquarters of the Uganda Muslim Supreme Council. In the same month, he donated all his monthly salary to building the Christian martyrs' shrine at Namugongo. Each of the three religious leaders was given a Mercedes Benz. Amin clearly wanted to build a popular political base on the religious emotions of Ugandans of all faiths, but he did so only in the initial phase of his administration. He shifted ground as time went on.

By the end of his first year in power, Idi Amin could no longer be seen as an "ecumenical mediator." The Roman Catholics and the Anglicans were sophisticated enough to see through his naive political games. Like Obote he decided to reveal his true identity. He not only believed he was a good Muslim but, as state leader, he wanted to be taken as leader of the Muslims. When he failed to get the financial help he hoped for from Israel and the West, he cultivated friends in the Arab world by successfully using the Muslim card. On 10 July 1971, Amin went to Israel with a large shopping list of military hardware he expected his hosts to pay for. Although he promised to open a Ugandan embassy in Jerusalem, Israel was not willing to give him all he asked. They promised, however, to give him a number of command cars and train his troops.¹⁶ In February 1972, after an unsuccessful tour of West Germany, Amin stopped in Libya where he was reportedly promised what he wanted. On 21 February, while an Israeli trade delegation was in Kampala, a ten-man delegation from Libya arrived in Uganda and met with Amin, who then announced an agreement between the two countries concerning trade, economic, and cultural cooperation.¹⁷ From then on relations with Israel began to sour. On 22 March 1972, Amin announced that he would not renew the agreement with Israel to train Uganda's army, air force and paratroopers. The following day, he told the Israeli ambassador that all Israeli training personnel must leave Uganda within three days and that the embassy had to restrict its personnel to four people and cut its wireless services. On 25 March Amin denounced Zionism, and on 30 March, while addressing the police, he ordered all Israelis to leave the country within ten days.¹⁸ A long friendship had been terminated.

Libya moved quickly to fill the vacuum. Amin needed funds to lubricate his terror machine. Because he could not generate the money locally he mortgaged himself to foreigners. In the three-week period following the expulsion of the Israelis, Libya offered Uganda \$2 million for economic and military purposes. Amin

further consolidated his image in the Arab world by healing his differences with the Sudan. In March 1972, General Numeri and the Anyanya rebels concluded a peace accord at Addis Ababa that ended hostilities between northern and southern Sudan. Numeri no longer had reason to be hostile to Amin, whose past support of the rebels was now irrelevant. In June, Uganda and Sudan formalized relations. Obote's guerrilla training camp at Owiny Kibul in southern Sudan was moved further away from the Ugandan border to an inland location at Kodok. In November, King Faisal of Saudi Arabia visited Uganda. This was the crowning episode in Amin's relations with the Arab/Islamic world. King Faisal promised to give Uganda some \$6.1 million in aid, but in fact Saudi Arabia gave more than this.¹⁹ Later on, Colonel Muamar Qadhafi of Libya also visited Uganda. The country was accepted as a Muslim state on the assumption that its leader was a Muslim and that it had a substantial Muslim population.

In 1974, Uganda was ratified as a member of the Organization of Islamic Conference sitting at Lahore. At first many Christians objected. But they came to realize that Uganda's connection to the conference was a major source of capital inflow. And Amin maintained tight control over Muslims in Uganda, especially over the Muslim Supreme Council. He had a hand in the selection of delegates when officers of the council were being elected. Prince Badru Kakugulu realized what was happening and withdrew from full personal participation. Juma Marijan, a soldier, was "elected" chairman and effective controller. Sheikh Abdul Zaake Matovu was made the titular head, or chief kadhi, of the organization and thus became the country's Muslim religious leader. But Amin could intervene directly wherever he wished. In 1975, for instance, he called Sheikh Abdul Zaake Matovu, Sheikh Ali Kulumba, his deputy, and Sheikh Kassim Mulumba, the secretary general, to his chambers. He lectured them, dismissed them, and appointed Sheikh Yusuf Sulaimani Matovu as chief kadhi. The correct procedure would have been to involve the Muslim Supreme Council. Later, after complaining about the circumstances of the murder of the Anglican archbishop, Janan Luwum, Amin's chief kadhi got involved in a suspicious motor accident. He escaped with major injuries but was subsequently dismissed by Amin, who administered the Muslim institution through a secretary general, Haji Mufanjara. When Brigadier Moses Ali tried to pick up the pieces of the Uganda Muslim Supreme Council and build the central mosque, Amin suspected him of trying to create a political base among Muslims. He warned Muslims that, unless they behaved, he would ask Chris-

tians to manage their supreme institution. In fact, he did so in 1977 when he selected a commission headed by a Catholic, E. Mondo, to inquire into the financial administration of Muslims. Another officer from the Ministry of Finance countersigned all the council's cheques. No one except Amin could speak on behalf of Uganda's Muslims. He acted as their chief kadhi although he was neither well versed in Islam nor pious. But foreign Islamic states, especially Libya, remained loyal to Amin to the very end. Many Ugandan Muslims did not.

By 1974, Amin's terrorism and maladministration had succeeded in alienating many Ugandans, including Christians who had not initially minded having the Muslim Amin as their leader. He had liberated them, they believed, from Obote's dictatorial practices. However, when they saw that he was favouring Muslims, aligning Uganda's foreign policy with Islamic states, and attacking Christian leaders, their perception changed. Amin's rule brought the ever-precarious Muslim-Christian relations in Uganda to their lowest level of the century. In 1972, some fifty-eight white Christian missionaries, of whom fifty-five were Catholic, were expelled. In 1977 twenty-eight religious denominations were banned, twenty-seven of them Christian and one (the Ahmadiyya) Muslim. Amin wanted uniformity in religion and could not understand groups that differed from the main church of Uganda, the Roman Catholic Church, or the main Sunni sect of Islam (as interpreted by the Uganda Muslim Supreme Council). Between 1973 and 1978, a number of high-ranking Christians, including clergy, were killed. Alienated as they were, Christians perceived Muslims to be a party to Amin's policies.

CONSOLIDATION OF THE REGIME'S MILITARY BASE

In the first few weeks after the *coup d'état*, Amin had set about eliminating his opponents in the army. While Obote used the 1967 Detention Act to lock his opponents in prisons where they were "well treated," Amin killed them. Such was the fate of various high-ranking officers known or perceived to be his opponents.²⁰ There were mass killings of members of the GSU, the Special Force, police, prisoners, and civilians. Victims were abducted by loyal security men, put on trucks, and taken to prisons like Luzira, Makindye, Mutukula, and Jinja, which had been turned into slaughterhouses.

Bodies were dumped in lakes, rivers, forests, and isolated areas. Mass graves were dug near barracks by prisoners who were themselves eventually killed. Traditional Kakwa rituals were resurrected. Parts of the body, including the penis, were often cut off and ceremoniously put into the mouth of the victim. If the victim was a tough opponent of the regime, his head was preserved and "addressed" by those in authority.

Like Obote, Amin consolidated his base in the army by using his own ethnic groups.²¹ While the friendship between Amin and Obote lasted, their Lwo and Sudanic recruits cooperated to provide a strong military base for both men. After the *coup d'état* Amin brutally eliminated most of the Lwo speakers, especially the Langi and Acholi. In March 1971 more than thirty Acholi/Langi soldiers were dynamited at Makindye Barracks. On 22 July 1971 about 150 to 500 Acholis and Langis from Simba Battalion, Mbarara, were herded into trucks, taken to an isolated ranch, and gunned down. On going to Israel and Europe in July 1971, Amin gave orders for the elimination of the Langi and Acholi soldiers, fearing they might organize a *coup*. At Mbarara soldiers from these ethnic groups were separated from the rest and taken to their deaths. On 9 July 1971 about twenty new Acholi/Langi recruits were killed; more died the following day. Between 10 and 14 July 1971 some fifty Acholi/Langi soldiers were killed at Magamaga Ordnance Depot. Further massacres of these ethnic groups occurred at military barracks at Masindi, Soroti, and Kitgum. On 5 February 1972, about 117 soldiers and other security men of the Obote regime were mowed down as they tried to escape.

What is upsetting about Ugandans is that while the Langi and Acholi suffered, many laughed, thinking their turn would never come, just as they had laughed at the Baganda in 1966. But wherever violence occurs in the state, it eventually overflows to everyone. By 1971 the fires of political violence that had been lit at Nakulabye were spreading into the rural areas of Apaci, Lira, and Gulu. Soon they would scorch all the land.

Amin based his support in the army on the Kakwa and Nubi, with the former Anyanya Zairous and Sudanese forming the nucleus to which were attached other West Nile groups like the Madi, the Lugbara, and the Alur. Other individuals were bound to Amin or his lieutenants on a clientele basis, including Smartus Guwedeko, Francis Itabuka, Kassimu Obura, and many others. His political fortunes began to decline when he narrowed his base by gradually trimming the large West Nile support in the army. From 1971 to 1972 the Alur were gradually marginalized. Lieutenant

Colonel Ochima, an Alur with a following in the army, was imprisoned in July 1971 and shot the following year. After the 1972 invasion of Uganda by Ugandan exiles (see below), Alurs were removed from most strategic positions. The turn of the Madi came in late 1972. Amin accused all Madi of drunkenness and removed them from sensitive positions. He then called in Madi elders to explain to them the crimes of "their sons."²² Pruning of the Lugbara began in early 1972. Their "son," Obitre-Gama, was dismissed in March as minister of Internal Affairs, brought back in a minor portfolio, and again dismissed in mid-1973. Another Lugbara, Lieutenant Colonel Ondoga, the ambassador to Moscow, was recalled and made minister of Foreign Affairs. He was later publicly dismissed and his body was found floating in a river. Many Lugbaras were killed at this time. Amin dismissed his Lugbara wife, though he took the opportunity to divorce two more from other ethnic groups as a show of "tribal impartiality."

By 1975 the Kakwa-Nubi-Anyanya core had closed ranks and was the foundation of Amin's power machine. They held most of the strategic positions, manned key installations, and easily grouped whenever there was trouble. The other alienated West Nile groups did not fight Amin because they rightly judged that it was not in their interest to overthrow him. If he were overthrown, they would be punished for their natural association with him. As a later chapter will show, subsequent events have proved them right: the Acholi/Langi militia brutalized the whole population of West Nile in 1980–83 for being associated with Amin on ethnic basis.

GOVERNMENT BY TERROR

The Repressive Organs

Amin kept thorough surveillance on Ugandans through five repressive organs that were either created in Obote's period and then recreated and given new names by Amin himself, or founded after January 1971. Amin replaced the General Service Unit with a similar intelligence organ called the Bureau of State Research. Located at Nakasero near what had been Obote's official Kampala residence, the bureau used the same house, headquarters, and surveillance equipment as those used by the deposed president. Amin also established the Public Safety Unit in 1972 ostensibly to curb *kondo* – robbery with violence – but in reality to give security personnel an opportunity to arrest enemies of the regime. Its headquarters were at Naguru Police Training School. The Military Police, created

under Obote, was expanded. Makindye, its headquarters, became notorious as a slaughterhouse in Amin's time. As the economy worsened, another paramilitary unit, the Antismuggling Bureau, was created under Bob Astels. It accused successful businessmen of smuggling and hoarding.²³

These repressive agencies helped Amin gather intelligence on his enemies and survive in office. Although their methods were crude, they succeeded by not taking chances: any suspect was instantly presumed guilty and eliminated. Between January and August 1972, for example, in a wave of intensified political violence, political prisoners who had been locked behind bars because of their presumed opposition to the Amin regime were killed. Most were members of the police, the GSU, and the Civil Service who had served Obote with loyalty, including the brass of the Police Central Intelligence Department, which had investigated Amin's part in the murder of Brigadier Okoya. The victims included Mohammed Hassan, the chief of CID, Festus Wawuyo, his deputy, and Ocungi, another deputy in the CID. Twenty Acholi/Langi military bandsmen who had been arrested and put under the care of Major Hussein Marella in December 1971 were also killed in this period, reportedly on Amin's orders. Hundreds of innocent people were trapped in a vicious circle of violence. All the members of these paramilitary units used violence for their own selfish motives: the demarcation line between officially sponsored and private violence was very thin.

Thousands of people in Uganda were tortured by government agents.²⁴ Detainees might be made to go through humiliating muscular ordeals such as "hopping like a frog" while being beaten. The victim's eyes might be gouged out and left hanging out of their sockets. During the "wheel torture," the victim's head was put in a wheel-rim that was repeatedly struck with iron bars. People were beaten with hammers, mallets, or iron bars to break their limbs as well as kill them. Wires were attached to the victims' genitals, nipples, or other sensitive parts of the body and then connected to an electric battery or wall socket. Women were raped or otherwise sexually abused. Prisoners were slashed with knives and bayonets, body organs were mutilated and limbs cut off. Prisoners might be lined up and every second one would be ordered to hammer the first to death, the second would be hammered by the third, and so on, until only one was left to tell the tale to other prisoners. Such incidents often happened at Makindye prison.²⁵ There were by no means the only forms of torture; there were many others.

Important or prominent people were killed like other prisoners. However, their bodies were dismembered and parts used for ritual

purposes. For example, the head of Brigadier Suleiman Husein, who was killed at Makindye, was cut off and taken to Amin, who is reported to have addressed it and kept it in a fridge. The penis of Colonel Mesesura Arach, commander of the First Infantry, was severed and plugged into his mouth. Few victims were given a proper burial. Their bodies were thrown into rivers (such as the Nile at Karuma, Jinja, and other places), in Uganda's many lakes (Victoria, George, Albert, Salisbury, Kioga, Wamala, etc.), in mass graves, or burnt in their houses or cars. Michael Kagwa's body was left in his burnt car as was the body of Father Clement Kiggundu, editor of *Munno*, a daily.

Absence of the Rule of Law

As chairman of the Defence Council, Amin signed a number of decrees that overturned the rule of law.²⁶ All political institutions, such as parliament, district, or town councils, were suspended after the military *coup d'état* in 1971. All political activities were banned: the president ruled by decree. Citizens had no political or constitutional rights. The security forces could arrest people without warrant and detain them for as long as they wished.²⁷ But they were immune from prosecution.²⁸ They were allowed to use any force they saw fit in arresting or preventing the escape of anyone suspected of being a *kondo*.²⁹ In practice, the soldiers were given the right to "shoot to kill." Military Tribunals, formerly intended to handle cases involving military discipline in the army, were given the power to try civilians³⁰ as well as extra powers to try suspected subversive elements.³¹ Many members of the tribunals had no legal training and were illiterate. As the economy began to decay, tough decrees were aimed at "economic crimes" such as overcharging, hoarding, smuggling, corruption, fraud, illegal currency sale, diversion of essential goods to "unscheduled destinations," and so on. Judges who were supposed to arbitrate in civil conflicts within the legal bounds of the law were intimidated. Chief Justice and former Democratic Party leader Ben Kiwanuka was murdered by government agents who abducted him from the High Court on 21 September 1972. Amin had publicly criticized his independent judgment, referring to him as a prominent "Masaka citizen" with a big job in whom the government had lost confidence. There was a rumour among Ugandan exiles that Obote might have been instrumental in Kiwanuka's death by making Amin believe the chief justice was involved in a conspiracy; it was said that Obote wrote letters to Kiwanuka while leaking copies to Amin. But there is no evidence

to support these charges. The president of the Industrial Courts Raphael Sebugwaawo Amooti, was killed by State Research Bureau officers on 13 March 1978.

Court verdicts were not respected by the security forces. Any lawyer who successfully defended a client in whom security men were interested was in trouble. Not only was the verdict ignored by the security forces but the lawyer could also be arrested. Enos Sebunnya is a case in point. In 1973 he successfully defended a businessman, Samson Ddungu, who was acquitted against the wishes of a security man who had an interest in Ddungu's business. Ddungu was shot dead and Enos Sebunnya was arrested and tortured. He later left the country and went to live in Canada.

"Disappearances" were the most visible manifestation of the absence of rule of law. People were arrested or abducted and killed outside established legal structures. The government became the major law breaker in the country and bad elements in society followed.

Disregard for Human Rights

Human rights as articulated by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights were completely disregarded and violated in Uganda during Amin's tenure, as before. The right to freedom of opinion and association was violated. Political parties, student organizations, trade unions, and all popular associations were prohibited. Although the major religious sects (Roman Catholicism, Islam, and Protestantism) were allowed to operate, minor religious sects were banned. The right to freedom of movement was violated. All Ugandans travelling out of the country required permits, even though many were in possession of passports. Government agents could search private houses without warrant. As a rule, they helped themselves to private property in the houses they searched.

Like all dictators, Amin was scared of writers. Byron Kawadwa, who wrote a play that Amin thought ridiculed the person of the president, was killed without trial, as was Father Clement Kiggundu, editor of *Munna*, the oldest newspaper in Uganda. Kiggundu had publicized the anguish of women whose husbands had been killed. There was no freedom of the press. The government controlled the dissemination of information, and all newspapers were required to toe the government line. Foreign newspapers were banned. In 1975 a prominent lawyer, Elizofani Mawagi, was detained and killed for writing a letter published in a newspaper requesting that Ugandans be permitted to read foreign newspapers. Letters

were opened in the postal system and read by members of the State Research Bureau, thus limiting detailed written communication.

Official Complicity

Public perceptions that the government was either a party to various acts of violence or had knowledge of them were reinforced by official indifference in cases involving violence meted out to civilians by the security forces. The Nakulabye tradition of government complicity in crimes committed by security forces was adopted by Amin, who had learned very well from his master, Apolo Milton Obote. Amin told his soldiers that the gun was their bread winner, their mother, their father, their great protector. Many who heard this speech thought he was giving licence to the security forces to get whatever they wanted from civilians by violence.

An inquiry in July 1971 by Justice Jeffrey Jones into the murder of two Americans, Nicholas Stroh and Robert Siedle, in Mbarara Barracks implicated three army officers – Captain Taban, Captain Juma Sabuni, and Major Sabuni Ali – but the officers were not punished. Indeed, the latter two were subsequently promoted to ministerial posts. The Ugandan government did not publicly accept responsibility but paid compensation to the relatives of the dead. An inquiry into the fatal shooting on 6 March 1976 of a Makerere University student, Paul Serwanga, by a member of the Public Safety Unit was interfered with. The chairman of the inquiry, Professor Brian Langlands, was expelled from the country although he had worked in Uganda for over twenty years. A new compliant chairman was selected and reported on 12 November 1976 that if university rules had been followed, no shooting would have taken place. Like those who shot people at Nakulabye, the gunman who killed Paul Lwanga was not punished. When on 16 February 1977 Archbishop Janan Luwum and two cabinet ministers were reportedly killed in a car accident, contradictions in the official reports exposed government complicity in the deaths, and the public believed that the three had been murdered by government agents.

AMIN'S ECONOMIC POLICIES

Amin's ruinous economic policies did more to dislodge him than his enemies. His neglect of the rural agricultural sector, his failure to control excessive government spending, his mistreatment of managerial professionals, and his failure to provide peace destroyed the Ugandan economy. From 1972 to 1980, the GDP, with the

exception of the "coffee boom" years of 1976–77, declined by –0.6 percent in 1973; –2.0 percent in 1975; –4.6 percent in 1978 and –11.9 percent in 1979. Almost all sectors of the national economy, except the government bureaucracy, shrank. Amin continued Obote's policy of shifting wealth from rural to urban areas by appropriating and taxing peasant surpluses. But unlike his predecessors, he did it to a point that broke the peasants' backs. As Table 2 indicates, the share of peasant growers in the proceeds of their export fell enormously. After the expulsion of the Asians, who comprised the commercial and industrial class, the tax burden was shifted to the rural sectors. The peasants revolted by not growing the cash crops from which the government obtained foreign exchange. Thus, peasants in Uganda, like their counterparts in other Third World countries, voted with their feet against Amin's government. Peasants could sell subsistence crops in the local market and obtain immediate cash. The government, and indeed the country, was deprived of foreign funds. Further, the drying up of agricultural inputs for want of foreign cash increased the plight of farmers. The whole agro-economy was ruined. The expulsion of Asians in 1972 created a management vacuum in key sectors of the economy, especially the industrial, which, though small – by then ten percent of the total production – supplied key agricultural inputs like fertilizers, hoes, and essential commodities.

The need to lubricate the government's repressive machine led to excessive liquidity in the economy, a trend begun in the Obote period and accelerated under Amin. It became visible in 1966 when extreme violence was used to resolve internal political conflict. From this period on, total public and private deposits in banks exceeded the growth in output of goods and services as measured by real GDP. Between 1966 and 1969 real GDP grew by 17.2 percent, but the monetary portion grew by 17.6 percent. Total money growth in the period was 43.2 percent. In the period 1970 to 1974 total GDP grew by 2.2 percent, but the total money circulation grew by 170.2 percent. From 1973 onwards the situation became uncontrollable. Real GDP continued to decline while money supply increased. In 1972, 1973, and 1975 there were GDP declines of 0.6 percent, 2.0 percent, and 2.5 percent. But money growth in the same period was 37.4 percent, 33.1 percent, and 21.4 percent respectively. This trend continued until Amin fell in 1979.

Like agricultural production, the small industrial sector in Uganda declined considerably. Its decline can be directly linked to the political environment of violence and general violent social relations. Uganda's manufacturing sector, which consists mainly of

processing agricultural commodities, has always been small. Its contribution to monetary GDP has ranged between nine and twelve percent. It consists of light industries geared to import substitution that can be divided into seven broad categories: food, beverages, and tobacco; textiles, leather, and footwear; wood and paper; nonmetallic products; chemicals; steel and metal products. Between 1966 and 1970 there was a slow and halting growth in industrial production. From 1970 onwards, when violence intensified, production declined in most industries. Proceeds from this sector declined from 740 million Ugandan shillings in 1972 to 254 million in 1979. Only spirits, cigarettes, and beer registered positive developments, but then they were needed by the social classes that controlled the allocation of resources.

This key sector of the economy was very fragile for several reasons. First, it depended on imported machinery and raw materials. Without foreign exchange industries were in danger of closing. But the industrial sector earned very little foreign exchange because few manufactured products were exported. Trade was confined largely to primary agricultural products. The closure of industries directly affected the agricultural sector, which in turn influenced national production, the end result being an increase in the incidence of violence. There was no vertical integration of industries except among those based on cotton. This meant that there could be no exchange of intermediary goods among the various Ugandan manufacturing concerns that produced them. Each industry was vertically linked to external sources of raw-material supply. Nor did industrial development increase employment. Between 1964 and 1969, employment in 322 establishments of more than ten people rose only by 4.8 percent (from 20,157 to 295,000 workers). The government, as noted earlier, could not manage the more than one hundred industrial and commercial concerns it had nationalized, and losses in these state companies, or parastatals, were subsidized by the rural sector through taxation. All these factors led to the flight of capital.

The breakdown of the East African Community in 1973-77 adversely affected transport in Uganda. Kenyan road transporters profited when Amin agreed to let Kenyan trucks use Uganda's shaky roads. The increased traffic slowed the marketing of Ugandan agricultural goods, damaged the roads, and put another nail in the coffin of Uganda's industrial sector. The smuggling of Ugandan produce, especially coffee, increased due to the difficulty of policing road transport. Between 1976 and 1977 some 50,000 metric tonnes of coffee were smuggled out of Uganda.³² In 1980 alone,

over 70,000 tonnes of coffee and some forty million shillings worth of gold were smuggled out. Illicit (*magendo*) trade increased. Prices skyrocketed to such an extent that "inflation" no longer accounted for the phenomenon. The coffee boom of 1976–77 did not really benefit Uganda as a good part of it was smuggled and sold as the product of other countries.³³ Worse, the population growth rate of 2.6 percent per year in the period 1969–80 was higher than the annual average GDP growth in the same period. By 1977, the economy was Amin's major enemy. The decrease in distributable wealth led to more violence as the struggle to control reduced resources intensified.

THE EXPULSION OF ASIANS IN 1972

A major incident of government violence directed against one particular section of the population was Amin's expulsion of Asians in 1972. Many had lived in Uganda for more than two generations; still, they were asked to wind up their affairs within three months and leave. It is not my intention to go into the details of the expulsion incident because substantial literature exists on the subject.³⁴ Of interest here is that the expulsion was an act of violence.

At the time of the expulsion some 75,000 Asians of Indo-Pakistani origin lived in Uganda. Many were British subjects holding British passports but some were Uganda citizens with no other home. After the expulsion many were admitted to various countries. Britain took the majority (27,200); others went to India (4,500), Canada (6,000), Kenya (2,500), Pakistan (1,000), West Germany (1,000), Malawi (1,000), the United States (1,000), Australia (500), Sweden (300), New Zealand (200), Austria (100), and Mauritius (100); and 3,600 were put into refugee camps before resettlement in other countries. About 20,000 were unaccounted for.³⁵

However, it was not only those who were expelled that suffered from Amin's action. Ugandans who stayed behind felt its adverse economic effects. As a commercial and industrial class, the Asian population was the grease that lubricated the upper sector of Uganda's economy. Their expulsion had four unwelcome repercussions. First, the government's urban taxation base was destroyed, so that the tax burden was transferred to the already overtaxed rural sector of society. Second, the Asian exodus created a shortage of highly skilled workers that could not be easily overcome. This shortage was particularly acute in industries that produced agricultural inputs for the rural sector of the economy; as industrial

production dropped, so did agricultural production. Third, the expulsion marred Uganda's international credibility. Uganda became a laughing-stock, an outcast amongst nations, and no credible organization, financial or otherwise, would take her seriously. And last, Kenya was able to take Uganda's internal and East African market because of Uganda's stagnating production. As noted earlier, Kenya could thus afford to discard the East African community and further strangle Uganda's exports by giving Uganda adverse terms of transit to the coast.

It should be remembered that the 1972 expulsion was not the first in the annals of independent Uganda. In October and November 1969 Obote's government expelled about thirty thousand Kenyan workers.³⁶ They constituted some ten percent of Uganda's urban work force and had long lived in the country. Their expulsion did not hit the headlines like that of the Asians but it was an equally brutal action. Had Amin learned the art of expulsion from Obote? We cannot say, but as Mamdani has put it, expulsions are "a result of the failure to expand the productive forces and thus the economic base of the appropriating classes."³⁷

OPPOSITION TO THE RULE OF IDI AMIN

Amin faced armed and subtle opposition both at home and abroad as soon as he grabbed power. Most of this opposition was uncoordinated and often resulted in brutal reprisals. The failure of Ugandans to agree on a unified resistance program helped Amin survive many overthrow attempts: individual Ugandans were interested in deposing Amin not to establish a better society, but to take power themselves. Amin feared his army, elements of which had staged numerous rebellions, abortive *coups*, and failed assassination attempts. On 23 March 1974 the Malire Mechanized Regiment rebelled and fighting erupted in Malire Barracks in the centre of Kampala. Amin's close confidante, Marella, was blamed for the death of a prominent Lugbara, Lieutenant Colonel Michael Ondoga, in an attempt to stop a planned *coup*. However, alternate views are that the Lugbara under Brigadier Charles Arube (a Kakwa) tried to take over the government but Marella stopped them or that the Lugbara and Ugandan Nubi were trying to remove Marella, a southern Sudanese, from his influential position. In any case, Charles Arube was shot in the stomach and killed. Marella was forced to retire to southern Sudan with full military honours and a large booty, and a new unit, the Marine Brigade, was

stationed on the opposite side of Kampala at Bugoloobi, where a civilian estate had originally been planned. In the same year airforce pilots, many of them Baganda, tried unsuccessfully to shoot Amin down. They revealed their plans to the Muganda chief of the airforce, Smurtus Guweddeko, who, in the typical Kiganda fashion of putting the interests of the patron before those of the group, reported the plan to Amin. The pilots were arrested and killed.

Amin's vulnerability was exposed by the Israeli raid on Entebbe in 1976. Angered by Israel's successful rescue of its citizens, Amin turned his wrath on those he perceived to have collaborated with Israel, ushering in yet another wave of intensified violence against the local population. About four or five air-traffic controllers at Entebbe, one of whom had been on leave during the event, were killed for not having detected the Israeli raid. A famous photographer, Jimmy Parma, was killed because he was thought to have photographed the body of Dora Block, one of the hostages held at Entebbe: she had been taken to hospital because of illness and was not in the group rescued by the Israeli commandos.³⁸ After the raid she was abducted from Mulago Hospital and killed. Her remains were recovered after Amin's fall. In Kampala and the surrounding areas anyone who talked about the raid or seemed to belittle the weakness of the Ugandan armed forces was killed. Despite the purges and mass eliminations that followed Entebbe, no Ugandan news media mentioned the event.

A further wave of violence that lasted from February 1977 to the end of the year was triggered by attempted sabotage activities by Obote's agents. When these attempts failed, death squads were sent into Acholi and Lango and the élites in these areas were massacred. It is estimated that about ten thousand people were killed in this period.³⁹ One of the more famous victims was Janan Luwum, the Anglican archbishop of Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, and Boga Zaire. He had been summoned by Amin on 16 February 1977 and questioned about a letter written by the House of Bishops complaining of human-rights violations. Janan Luwum was subsequently accused of being a party to a conspiracy to overthrow the government and killed.

The last period of government violence against the population was the final year of Amin's regime, namely March 1978 to April 1979. This was a period of mutinies, rebellions, and conspiracies in the army. Hundreds of people who were thought to belong to conspiratorial groups were eliminated, and the chaos in Amin's armed forces led to the blunder of invading Tanzania. In April 1978 Amin denounced Brigadier Moses Ali, Isaac Lumago, the army chief of

staff, and Kassimu Obura, the police commissioner and a Langi. Moses Ali was later stripped of all his military honours. In August 1978, a group of Lugbara soldiers was believed to have mutinied on behalf of General Mustapha Adrisi, the vice president; Adrisi was later involved in a suspicious motor accident on Jinja road and was flown to Egypt some time later for medical treatment. These commotions within Amin's troops led to mutinies in the army beginning with the Malire Mechanized Regiment at Bombo and spreading to other barracks at Tororo, Masaka, Mutukula, and Mbarara. However, his loyal elements in the army quelled the rebellion, pursuing the mutineers to the Tanzanian border. Amin then completely took leave of his senses by pursuing the rebels into the Kagera Salient and attacking Tanzanian civilian and military positions. Tanzania responded by mobilizing.⁴⁰

The regime's external enemies consisted of Ugandan exiles and bordering states. All exiles aimed at returning to their homeland and re-establishing themselves in Ugandan society. Bordering nations received the overflow of violence from Uganda: Ugandan army units often infiltrated neighbouring territories on raids, and Ugandan exiles were a burden to host countries. It was the overflow of violence that prompted Tanzania to intervene militarily in Uganda.

The Ugandan exile groups that waged a struggle against Amin can be grouped into two categories: those with an armed wing or military muscle, and those without. The first group of exiles to attempt a violent ouster of Amin were those clustered around the former president, Apolo Milton Obote. Once overthrown, Obote wanted to return to Uganda and continue the fight from within. But he was held in a Nairobi hotel by Kenyan authorities and lost valuable time in which to influence events in Uganda. He then went to Tanzania where he planned the simple strategy of fighting back with élite troops. He was not prepared to involve the masses in a people's war against Amin as Museveni did when fighting him in Buganda in 1981–85. General Jafar Numeri of the Sudan gave Obote a training camp, Owiny Kibul, close to the border with Uganda. Numeri regarded Amin as anti-Arab and "an agent of colonialism and Zionism." He asserted that the people of Uganda would remove "the stooge."⁴¹ Amin protested that he had assisted the black South Sudanese rebels on humanitarian grounds; he felt that the "way the Sudanese government has persecuted Christians and non-Arab was nothing short of barbarism" and warned Numeri

to "keep his fingers off Uganda."⁴² Obote trained some 1,500 guerillas and began transferring them to Tanzania. The transfer intensified after Numeri signed the Addis Ababa agreement with the southern Sudanese fighters.

On 17 September 1972 a joint invasion by armed exiles was launched from Tanzania into southern Uganda. It was a fiasco.⁴³ Wary of Obote's return, some Baganda peasants living in the area leaked news of the invasion to Amin.⁴⁴ In any case, the exercise had been badly planned, and the incident gave Amin the excuse to eliminate his opponents in the country. In the Ankole/Masaka area, Amin rounded up and killed many of those who had UPC sympathies or were presumed to be collaborating with the invaders. It was in this period that Ben Kiwanuka was killed. Mbarara, the area to the southwest that the guerillas had penetrated, witnessed brutal eliminations. Most of those presumed to have been supporters of Milton Obote were killed, including Basil Bataringaya, a former minister, Tibayungwa, Bekunda, Rwabashoka, Kanyonyore, Kabaterine, Kansinsi, and hundreds more. In other areas of Uganda prominent people were eliminated as well: Joseph Mubiru, the governor of the Central Bank; Francis Walugembe, the mayor of Masaka; John Kakonge; Joshua Wakholi and Shaban Nkutu, former ministers; John Kasasa, manager with American Life Insurance in Uganda; Patrick Ruhinda, a lawyer; David Ocaya, acting secretary to the Lint Marketing Board; and many others.

Between June and December 1973, Amin received information that the guerilla group called Front for National Salvation (FRONASA) had been formed under Yoweri Museveni; that this group would not topple the government by an attack from the outside but would fight from within Uganda by establishing training bases. Museveni's forces had been among those that invaded in 1972. Amin retaliated by giving more powers to his repressive machinery, especially the Military Tribunals to crush the resistance. In western Uganda, where the leaders of the organization were presumed to have been born, violence against the population was increased. A military spokesman warned the population in an announcement on Radio Uganda that "villages in whose district guerrillas are found will be burned down. Taxi drivers who give guerrillas lifts will be blown up in their cars and house owners hiding them will be blown up in their homes. People hiding guerrillas will lose children and never see them again. Any person whose son is convicted of hiding or feeding guerrillas will not see that son any more because that son will be dead."⁴⁵ Earlier in Mbarara, Paul Bitature, a prominent businessman, was killed by soldiers although his relatives had paid

the ten thousand shillings (\$1,500 at the time) in ransom the soldiers had asked for. In December 1973 three other prominent Ugandans – Jolly Joe Kiwanuka, former MP and newspaper editor, Captain Wilfred Aswa, who had announced Amin's takeover of the government on Radio Uganda, and Captain Kenneth Onzima – were refouled from Kenya and killed. (Refoulement involves the forcible return of a refugee to his country to face death for political reasons.) Hassan Simbura, the chief engineer at Lugazi Sugar Works, was killed in the same period.

Many political groups philosophized on ways of overthrowing Amin and creating a better society in Uganda. After the murder of Janan Luwum these groups intensified their activities.⁴⁶ They included the Uganda Passive resistance, in Kenya; the Front for the Liberation of Uganda, in Tanzania; the Uganda Action Group and the Uganda Group for Human Rights, in Great Britain; the Freedom of Uganda Movement, the Uganda Freedom Movement (UFM), and the Committee on Uganda, in the US. Many others located around the globe consisted of only two or three people. In August 1977 most of these groups met at Lusaka and formed an umbrella organization called the Uganda National Movement. Obote was not a party to the Lusaka meeting and his supporters did not encourage its development.

THE LIBERATION WAR

As pointed out above, Amin ordered his unsettled and rebellious troops into Tanzania's Kagera Salient north of the river of the same name. He said he had annexed those territories and that the Kagera was to form the boundary between Uganda and Tanzania. His soldiers went on a looting spree and did a thorough job of destruction. Tanzanians who had never been exposed to such violence were rightly appalled. Tanzania mobilized and asked Ugandan exiles and patriots to join the struggle against Amin. Obote's group was the largest; his unit, the *Kikoosi Maluum* (Special Unit), numbered seven hundred. The other group that could field fighters was Yoweri Museveni's FRONASA, which had some three hundred trained men. Each fighting group was designated a zone of operation and was expected to recruit as it progressed. *Kikoosi Maluum* was to enter Uganda at the centre near Mutukula and FRONASA in the West in the Ankola area.⁴⁷ The last group with military muscle consisted of fighters and nationalists who were not committed to Obote or any other leader. The majority of its members belonged to the Save Uganda Movement, or SUM, whose heroic sabotage acti-

vities were unfortunately not part of an articulated and coordinated plan to seize the state. Among the prominent Ugandans in this group were Robert Serumaga, Kimumwe, Zed Maruru, and Onyango. About three hundred of its fighters left Tanzania in two lake boats. One sank in Lake Victoria, killing more than 140 Ugandans in what is believed to have been an act of sabotage by the *Kikoosi Maluum*. Those who reached Uganda were either disarmed, forced to join the *Kikoosi Maluum*, imprisoned, or too demoralized to continue participating in politics.

As the war progressed, other groups picked up courage in the typical bandwagon fashion of Ugandans. Particularly after the fall of Masaka on 24–25 February 1979, there was need for political direction in case Amin fell. Tanzania realized that it faced two problems. To begin with, if she pulled her forces out of Uganda, Amin would return and wipe out the civilian population that had “collaborated” with Tanzania. In an interview, Tanzanian president Julius Nyerere said that, “as far as we are concerned, we could have pulled our people out, but the Baganda were going to be in real trouble because Amin, if they were left without adequate forces, would really teach them a lesson, and I would be having thousands of refugees in Tanzania.”¹⁸ This was indeed true. Kassim, the governor of Masaka, said publicly that its streets would be painted with blood if it was reconquered by Amin’s troops. Secondly, Tanzania realized that many political forces in Uganda would not willingly accept its own most-favoured Ugandan candidate, former president Milton Obote, as leader. Yet Tanzania wanted Ugandans to create a vanguard organization to give political direction to the war effort. The Tanzanian minister of Foreign Affairs reportedly stated that his country wanted Ugandans to succeed but would favour no one group at the expense of others.

Meanwhile, Ugandan groups began coordinating the efforts of all the exiles to give direction to the war effort and help restore peace. On 1 January 1979 seven exile groups met in Nairobi to discuss national unity. They set up a ten-man consultative committee to effect unity and bring peace to their homeland. They coordinated their efforts with the Ad Hoc Committee for the Promotion of Unity that had been set up by “intellectuals” from Tanzania. Their view was that democracy was the answer to Uganda’s problems and that all exile groups and associations should form a democratic organization to lead the country to freedom. Obote’s group and FRONASA, on the other hand, believed that only those groups with military clout had the ability to change events in Uganda. Tanzania, which subscribed to the former view, allowed a

meeting of various Ugandan organizations to take place at Moshi from 24–26 March 1979. The Moshi Conference resolved to form an umbrella organization, the Uganda National Liberation Front (UNLF), to fight Amin and restore democracy in Uganda.⁴⁹

The UNLF had four major branches. The supreme organ was the National Consultative Council (NCC), which had policy-making powers. Its members, elected from the exile groups, were to act as a surrogate parliament if the UNLF took over the country. The National Executive Council (NEC) was put in place to carry out the council's policies. Its members were elected by the NCC and were subordinate to it. Yusuf Lule, the former head of Makerere University, was elected chairman. The Political and Diplomatic Commission had a mandate to streamline political, administrative, and diplomatic matters at home and abroad, while the Military Commission was tasked with pursuing the war effort, defeating Amin, and creating a national army.

Events moved faster than expected. After the fall of Jinja, Amin's soldiers had been on the run, and people in eastern and northern Uganda suffered brutal violence from the retreating soldiers. In their wake they left a stream of blood from Jinja, Nakasongora, and Fort Portal. Thousands of people were shot and their property vandalized. All types of motor vehicles were snatched from unarmed civilians. Then, on 11 April 1979, two weeks after the meeting at Moshi and before the UNLF had crystallized as a political institution or a tried fighting group, Kampala fell to Tanzanian forces and a few Ugandan exile fighters. People who had never worked with one another were suddenly placed in positions of responsibility involving power and wealth and asked to cooperate. Their failure to do so and the consequences are described in the next chapter.

Most Ugandans rejoiced when Tanzania decided to help exiled Ugandans overthrow the military dictatorship. Many ordinary Ugandans contributed to the war effort by providing information, food, shelter, medicine, and the like to the Tanzanian forces. It was a contribution the fighters could not afford to neglect. However, in their rejoicing, and taking their cue perhaps from Amin's soldiers, Ugandans did violence to the infrastructure of their country and to sections of society that were perceived to have collaborated with Idi Amin. Looting, which many Ugandans had not known before, destroyed the country's physical assets. Whenever Tanzanian soldiers completed a task, Ugandans rushed to the scene and looted whatever could be found and destroyed what they could not take. Van-

dalism was not limited only to what could not be carried away; even standing structures such as government offices were destroyed for no tactical or military purposes. As the Commonwealth Team observed in 1979, "crops were damaged and livestock killed; houses, factories and public buildings were gutted; school supplies, textbooks and writing materials were looted; food, furniture and clothes were taken from houses and shops; office records were lost or stolen; tools and equipment were taken from workshops and thousands of cars and trucks were taken out of the country to Sudan, Tanzania, Zaire, Rwanda and Kenya."⁵⁰ The towns of Masaka and Mbarara were razed after they had been occupied by Tanzanian forces and exiled Ugandans. All the best houses in rural Masaka, Ankole, and Mpigi districts were destroyed. One angry Muganda told me that Oyite Ojok gave orders to his soldiers to destroy the South to reduce it to the same level as the North. Many of the destroyers were Ugandans. What took forty years to build was destroyed in less than one year.

Revenge against certain sections of society – groups that were perceived to have supported Idi Amin or to have benefited from his rule – was another sad aspect of the Liberation War. The suffering of the West Nile people, whose whole district was identified as an enemy area, is described in a later chapter. The Muslims in southern Uganda suffered the same fate as the people of the West Nile: Amin, a Muslim, had attacked and indeed killed prominent Christians and Christian sects. Muslims were perceived to have supported his actions. Thus, Muslims in the rural areas of Ankole and Masaka were persecuted after he fell. According to information obtained at the Uganda Muslim Supreme Council, some eighty Muslims were killed in Ankole, 131 houses belonging to Muslims destroyed, and over forty mosques desecrated. In Masaka District, some fifty-three Muslims were killed, thirty-seven houses destroyed, and thirty-two mosques desecrated or vandalized. Communal revenge against groups is common in Uganda. The problem is that many innocent peasants find themselves the victims of issues they do not understand. A rural Ankole Muslim peasant in Kashari or a Kakwa in Koboko had no power to make or unmake Amin as president; but he suffered the consequences of his presidency.

Ugandans were gladdened by Amin's departure. But their pride as a nation was hurt. They had failed to change their own government without the aid of external forces. The violence that accompanied the struggle to remove Amin and the destruction that followed have left a permanent mark on Ugandan society and on the country's physical structures.

CHAPTER SIX

Weak Governments and Social Chaos, 1979–85

After the fall of Idi Amin it was hoped that Ugandans would realize that the country's problems were mainly due to political disorganization, that they should strive to build viable political institutions with mechanisms to resolve conflicts peacefully. The Moshi Conference in 1979 was a step in the right direction. Most delegates realized the need for a constitution that was acceptable to most of Uganda's social groups and for free and fair elections at the local and national levels. However, the UNLF's failure to complete the democratization of Uganda plunged the country into chaos.

Between April 1979 and January 1986 Ugandans were subjected to the inept rule of five separate governments. These governments possessed a number of weaknesses. First, none of them had complete control over all violent elements in Uganda. None had a firm hold on the police, the secret services, or the prisons. Lines of authority and power in both government and paramilitary agencies were chaotic, with the result, for example, that soldiers in the Binaisa, Obote, and Okello governments, often defying orders, could indulge in unprofessional behaviour throughout most of this period: Amin's soldiers had been unruly and undisciplined, but until 1977 he had enforced brutal control over them and, in consequence, most of Uganda. None of the five governments that succeeded Amin was elected by the people; hence none had political legitimacy. Obote claimed that he was voted into office in 1980, but in fact he was put into power by the army. Lule, Binaisa, the Presidential Commission, and Okello were all placed in power either by the gun or by sections of armed Ugandans able to enforce their will on the population.

Most of these governments were overly dependent on foreigners for political survival. Internal political forces were too weak and too fragmented to permit one group to monopolize the legitimate use of

violence in the state. For instance, Tanzanian forces maintained the Lule, Binaisa, and Military Commission governments; Obote's coming to power was eased by the presence of Tanzanian troops who were poised in the background to handle any potential opposition. Tanzanian advisers stayed on until as late as 1984. Two Tanzanian noncommissioned officers, Sergeants Lawrence Masenge and Simon Wawa, were captured by the National Resistance Army (NRA) at Masindi Barracks on 20 February 1984. North Korea sent high-ranking officers to fight in Obote's army. The Commonwealth Team helped train Obote's soldiers. Financially, too, these governments were dependent on donors and external assistance. International financiers extended huge amounts of capital – reportedly \$2.1 billion – to Obote. Of course, no nation, especially a Third World state, can be totally independent, particularly in economic matters. But the complete dependence on external sources of power for internal authority shows how weak these governments were and how lacking in independence Uganda had become.

THE BRIEF LULE PERIOD, APRIL TO JUNE 1979

Yusuf Lule was elected Chairman of the Uganda National Liberation Front at Moshi and became president in April 1979 after Amin's fall. But after only sixty-eight days of rule, he was violently removed. His inability to contend with Uganda's political forces contributed to his fall. Although these forces were determined to remove him, he might have survived longer had he played his cards well. When the UNLF took over after the fall of Amin, there were at least nine such forces to contend with. The first and most important was Tanzania, whose military forces had conquered Amin. Tanzania had sacrificed enormous resources to rid Uganda of dictatorship and could not be expected to leave its interests unprotected. Second, there was the thirty-member National Consultative Council elected at the Moshi Conference. Tanzania wanted the outside world to perceive that decisions in Uganda were made by Ugandans through the main organ of the UNLF – the council, which acted as a surrogate parliament. But instead of trying to influence the NCC, Lule fought it.

The third force was the pro-Obote elements in the army and civilian administration, including General Tito Okello, Chief of Staff David Oyite Ojok, and numerous soldiers in the *Kikoosi Mahuum*. Comprising about seven hundred fighting men, this unit had been instructed to recruit as it fought its way to Kampala. Oyite

Ojok refused to do so in Buganda but kept his unit intact until he reached Kampala. At that moment, all Langi, Acholis, and some Iteso in and around Kampala were recruited and hurriedly trained. Residents of Kampala can recall gangs of recruits singing as they ran around the city late at night and early in the morning. Many thought they were liberators in training; little did they know that a tribal army was being recreated in their midst. When the battle front reached the northern homelands of the leaders of the *Kikoosi Maluum*, more widespread recruiting took place. Within a short period the Obote elements had built a large army loyal only to the former president. As Lule clearly stated, there were many pro-Obote elements in the government that had been forced on him by Tanzania.¹ They occupied key positions in his administration and sought Obote's return to power.

Next, there was FRONASA, headed by Yoweri Museveni, the minister of Defence. About three hundred strong when it left Tanzania, FRONASA recruited youngsters as it advanced, swelling to a force of some three thousand fighters by the time it reached Kampala. There were also the strong political-exile groups like the so-called Gang of Four (Edward Rugumayo, Dain Wadada Nabudere, Omwony Ojok, and Yash Tandon) and the Nairobi Group, which included Tarsis Kabwehere. These groups had no military units but they were strong political forces in the NCC. Rugumayo was NCC chairman and would not have minded becoming chairman of the Executive Council of UNLF. Omwony Ojok was the secretary of the NCC and Nabudere chairman of the Political and Diplomatic Commission.

A number of minor groups, only some of which were armed, claimed to have contributed to the fall of Idi Amin. These groups also had to be taken into account, along with the many former soldiers of the Ugandan army who were termed "Amin's men" because on the day he had fallen they had been doing their job as soldiers for the brutal president; that they were employees of the Republic of Uganda was forgotten. In addition, members of the Democratic Party, which Obote had banned in 1969, had gone underground and were very well organized at the grassroots level. Its leaders saw the UNLF government as a transition to universal democracy. Lule did not clash with the DP; indeed, after his overthrow he is reported to have said that he had been a member of the party for over twenty years. Finally, there were the vultures, the majority of whom were bureaucratic petty bourgeoisie, who hovered over Lule as they do with other presidents. Although they were not united into a neat, articulate group, they were sufficiently

strong to mislead the president and secure positions that gave them access to resources. While waiting for their spoils, they misinformed Lule and kept correct ideas at bay.

Lule should have found a way to contend with these political forces, to divide those working against his interests or unite them into a single force working for, instead of against, him. He should have exploited the bitter differences between the "intellectuals," such as the Gang of Four, and the Obote elements. Instead, he united them against himself and claimed that he ruled the country on the basis of the 1967 constitution. He did not realize that it was the UNLF, not the constitution, that had put him in power. He did not realize that Uganda was, in reality, a conquered country and that he had to be subtle with the conquerer. Who would foot the bill for the war effort? What guarantee was there that the bill would be paid? How could Tanzania forestall the recurrence of an Amin in Uganda? Was Tanzania expected to do a job for Ugandans, pay the financial, human, and social price involved, and then just leave.

Lule, like many Ugandans, naively stuck to the idea that the government was in control. On 7 June 1979 he reshuffled the cabinet without consulting the NCC (or Tanzania). He appointed Obote's archenemy, Grace Ibingira, as minister of Information. Ibingira had fewer than one hundred loyal soldiers in the field. By June 1979 Obote himself commanded over five thousand armed men who, though working for the UNLF, were loyal to the *Kikoosi Maluum* and had the backing of Tanzania.

Furthermore, Lule was accused of favouring Baganda. He made the political mistake of making his first address to the nation in Luganda. Although the number of Baganda he appointed to key ministries was proportionate to their overall share of the population, this was enough to frighten the non-Baganda. As Mazrui has written, "Uganda is an impossible country to govern with the support of the Baganda, but it is also impossible to govern effectively without the support of the Baganda." The Buganda problem recurred and seemed to override other issues in the conflict. Lule's enemies began to label him a "monarchist," a "feudalist," and the like. When he suggested recruiting proportionally for the army from each of Uganda's regions, he was opposed on the grounds that such a move would give undue advantage to the Baganda. His administrative innovation of creating four regions and appointing four regional commissioners, two of whom, Shaban Opolot and Balaki Kirya, were Obote's enemies, clearly showed to the Obote elements that he was strengthening the forces opposed to their leader. They dug in, allying themselves with the forces in

the NCC that were opposed to his insistence on presidential prerogatives over the council.

Frightened, Lule retreated on 19 June 1979. He agreed to drop from the cabinet people the NCC did not like, but he insisted on his right to make appointments without consulting the NCC. On the night of 20 June 1979, the NCC voted him out of office. From the start, he had faced the real threat that force would be used against him by the *Kikoosi Maluum* and its external backers. Pressure was brought to bear on him at State House, Entebbe, to resign, and eventually he was taken by force in a military plane to Dar es Salaam. He managed to leave Tanzania later on. Throughout his brief tenure there was a fear that the army would turn their guns on the population to undermine his authority, as they did later in the Binaisa period, and the transition from Lule to Binaisa was indeed followed by bloodshed. When the population went into the streets in Lule's support, troops were sent out and dead bodies were later discovered in the Kololo golf course in Kampala, and elsewhere.³ Binaisa's government also admitted that force had been employed against the population.

Lule's press conferences, in which he blamed Tanzania, did not improve his image as a naive politician, or, as one of his former colleagues at Makerere put it, a reluctant politician. He did not fully comprehend the dynamics of the prevailing political forces. However, his involvement in the struggle against Obote in the period 1980–84 taught him a lot. By 1981, he had grasped the nature of political forces in Uganda to such an extent that he knew exactly how to coordinate a resistance struggle at the head of a well-organized fighting movement.

BINAISA'S ATTEMPT, JUNE 1979 TO MAY 1980

Godfrey Binaisa replaced Lule as president of Uganda on 21 June 1979. He was elected by the National Consultative Council and endorsed by Tanzania. He tried his best to contend with the political forces discussed above. However, he fell victim to the conspiratorial methods of political behaviour so typical of Uganda by his complicity in eliminating forces that would have protected him. He had to contend with forces that desired Obote's return to power by hook or by crook, as well as those that wanted to organize free and fair elections. His failure to perceive the overriding aim of those around him saddled Uganda with another purely military regime, the Military Commission.

The population clearly understood the political nature of the change from Lule to Binaisa and reacted by withdrawing the good will it had conferred on the first post-Amin administration. People stopped voluntarily surrendering their guns and ammunition to the government and kept them instead for the rainy day they now realized would come. Merchants and farmers freed the prices of goods they had initially kept below market levels in a gesture of support for the government. A plan to burn the Nile Mansions, home to most of the top officials of the UNLF government, was discovered just before it was carried out. A resistance movement, the Internal Joint Underground Liberators, met in the Kabowa and Mutundwe suburbs of Kampala to organize strikes, riots, and attacks on officials. Crowds released political prisoners at Katwe police station, among them people who had supported or worked for Amin. More than eighty people were killed between June and August 1979, in the aftermath of Lule's deposition.⁴ The government imprisoned suspects on a far greater scale than before Lule's fall. By September, more than thirty thousand people had become political prisoners.

When Binaisa came to power he accepted that the NCC, as a surrogate parliament, was supreme. For the first three months the NCC and the presidency worked cooperatively. Among the immediate priorities was the enlargement of the NCC to accommodate those who had not gone into exile and, therefore, had not attended the Moshi Conference.⁵ Arrangements were made by the minister of Local Administrations, Jaberu Bidandi Ssali, to expand the NCC from its original thirty to ninety-one members. The district was made the basis of political participation and district electoral colleges were set up under Ssali's close supervision. Prospective members were asked to apply. Some 1,428 applications were received, of which 718 were approved for further competition by the exile-dominated NCC. The Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA) was allocated ten seats in the council; those who held the seats were to be selected by the Ministry of Defence.⁶ The method of electing members to the council caused political alienation. There were complaints that the UPC, a party to which the minister responsible for NCC expansion had once belonged, was favoured. The DP leader, Paul Ssemogerere, complained that the NCC was biased.⁷ On 8 October 1979, the enlarged NCC was opened.

However, power gradually slipped from the NCC to the Obote elements in the army, cabinet, State House, and the council itself.

Binaisa's inability to distinguish between his enemies and his friends did not help the situation. Exploiting this weakness, the *Kikoosi Maluum* worked to take control of the Ministry of Defence and government. In northern Uganda, children under eighteen, men over forty-five, and women were recruited, hurriedly trained, and given uniforms to join either the army or the militia. There were militia at Apac, Kitgum, Lira, Kumi, and Soroti. The training was so secretive that all non-Langi were expelled from the Lango region (Apac and Lira). In this way the creation and training of an illegal army was concealed, at least for some time.

The *Kikoosi Maluum* then started a campaign of terror to discredit the Binaisa government and present Obote as the only leader who could restore law and order. High-ranking civil servants, especially doctors, were systematically killed, including Dr David Barlow and Kaija Katuramu, the famous real-estate millionaire. This campaign of terror started in 1979 and went on until the *Kikoosi Maluum* won control of the state in May 1980. Yoweri Museveni and a number of NCC members tried to regularize the situation by streamlining recruitment procedures: they compiled an official list of those in the army and imposed a ceiling of 5,500 on recruits. The NCC was worried about illegal recruitment, especially in the North. But Oyite Ojok and his group could not accept this plan. The Obote forces identified Museveni as their chief stumbling block and conspired to have him removed from the Ministry of Defence by Binaisa. He was accused of recruiting members of his own ethnic group into the army, but an NCC committee under Sempebwa found the accusations to be false; on the contrary, it pointed a finger at illegal recruitment in the North and the creation of unauthorized militia. But Binaisa, suspicious of Museveni's charisma, listened to the anti-Museveni forces and removed him from the Defence portfolio, thereby giving Oyite Ojok a free hand to build a huge army that knew no law except that of its master and its own greed – an army that would eventually depose the president.

THE MILITARY COUP, MAY 1980

Although it was not happy with Museveni's removal from Defence, the NCC came to a compromise that enabled it to work with Binaisa: this was the only way to fight the antidemocratic forces of the *Kikoosi Maluum*. In this struggle, however, the democratic forces lacked an armed base. Although Binaisa, Edward Rugumayo, and

their colleagues controlled the NCC in terms of voting power, they did not control the means of violence and could not, with words alone, enforce their decisions. Thus, the NCC passed by a large majority a motion to hold elections in December 1980 under the aegis of the UNLF as the only political organization. However, the UPC group led by Paulo Muwanga, Cris Rwakasisi, Dr Luwuliza-Kirunda, and, of course, Oyite Ojok, refused to accept the council's decision. The UPC group argued that to hold elections under the UNLF was tantamount to making the country a one-party state. Lawrence Sebalu, claiming to represent the DP, sided with them in a joint statement to the press. Dan Nabudere and Tarsis Kabwehere warned Ugandans in a TV discussion that undemocratic forces were gaining momentum. Indeed they were. Oyite Ojok began to address rallies on the merits of multiparty democracy and promised to fight for this principle if necessary. Political violence intensified, and other forms of violence raged in its wake. There were numerous killings, abductions, rapes, and robberies, some of which are documented in Appendices 2 and 3.

By March 1980 Obote was rightly saying that Uganda was leaderless. He pointed out that his forces were already in the country grouped around his party and that he wanted to be the last person in his team to go back to Uganda.⁸ Yoweri Museveni was in no position to help Binaisa; he had been alienated and his forces were disintegrating. Ugandans waited for the inevitable triumphant return of Obote from Tanzania. On 1 May Oyite Ojok mounted an authorized search of houses, people, and vehicles around Kampala. Seventy-two people, most of them journalists, were arrested. Among them was James Namakajjo, Binaisa's press secretary, who was suspected by Ojok of having leaked intelligence reports that were published in the *Economy* and *Citizen*. The editor of the *Economy*, Roland Kakooza, was also arrested. There were thunderous shootings at night in Kampala. Upset, Binaisa took decisions he could not enforce. He sacked Oyite Ojok for "insubordination and disobedience," appointed him ambassador to Algeria, and then named Nanyumba to replace him. On 10 May the Military Commission, an organ of the UNLF under the chairmanship of Paulo Muwanga, announced its refusal to accept the dismissal, pointing out that it had not been done through established procedures and questioning whether the president even had the right to take such a step. Meanwhile, Oyite Ojok's *Kikoosi Maluum* elements of the UNLA took over all strategic positions in and around Kampala. The Tanzanian troops withdrew from the city, albeit temporarily, to

distances from which they could intervene should their protégés need them. Binaisa had no army. He just waited at State House in Entebbe for his captors to take him wherever they wanted.

On 12 May 1980, Radio Uganda carried an announcement that "the Military Commission has taken over all Presidential powers. This is an action of the Military Commission and not of the army." Late in the day the Commission's chairman, Paulo Muwanga, announced that "the assumption of power shall not be questioned in any court of law." He later added that all political parties were free to resume political activities.⁹ Muwanga's deputy was Yoweri Museveni. Other members were Oyite Ojok – the real power – Tito Okello, Zed Maruru, and Captain Omaria. It therefore came to pass that the Military Commission, an arm of an organization, took over the responsibilities of the main body, the UNLF: the branch had usurped the duties of the trunk. History is full of irregularities and this incident is one of them. A titular Presidential Commission consisting of Wacha-Olwol, Polycarp Nyamuchoncho, and Saulo Musoke was appointed, but decisions were taken by the core of the Commission, Oyite Ojok and Paulo Muwanga. Binaisa remained like a sitting duck at State House for a few days and was then transferred to a private residence in Entebbe. After his fall, he realized that his private secretary and head of security had been moles serving Obote's interests. As soon as a cloud appeared over Binaisa's future, these servants, in the manner typical of Uganda's petty bureaucratic bourgeoisie politicians, simply shifted their loyalties to the Obote forces.

REVERSING THE VOTERS' MANDATE: THE ELECTIONS OF 1980

The Military Commission took power in order to give it to Obote in a manner that would be perceived by the international community as democratic and, therefore, legal. Obote wanted to maintain his image as a civilian ruler who could assume power only through legal means – through the ballot, not the bullet. Tanzania, which had protected Obote, eliminated Amin, and helped Obote's forces in Uganda to consolidate, did not wish to appear to be returning him to power in an undemocratic and illegal way. Therefore, both Obote's UPC and the Tanzanian authorities accepted the principle of national elections before the UNLF's two-year term was over, all in keeping with the terms agreed upon at Moshi. However, preliminary sounding of opinion showed that the UPC could not win in a free and fair election, so the UPC nucleus – which could not accept

a loss, defeat, or humiliation at the polls – decided to take control of the election process by seizing political power.

The Commission's main task was to organize national elections. But every intelligent person in Uganda and abroad knew that the UPC had already taken power and that the elections would provide only a veneer of legality. The UPC and the Uganda Patriotic Movement (UPM), which was led by Yoweri Museveni, clearly knew that the UPC had most of the power and would give none of it away. Most keen observers knew that even if the DP had been allowed to form a government after its electoral victory in 1980, the *Kikoosi Maluum* section of the army, which controlled the means of physical force around Kampala and was supported by the occupying forces, would have removed that government by force.

As indicated earlier, the chairman of the Military Commission, Paulo Muwanga, accepted the UNLF's stand on elections as planned by the Binaisa government, except that the date was brought forward.¹⁰ He further stated that electoral political activity would be conducted through an array of political parties, which were called upon to participate. An interparty committee was set up to determine the election's policies and procedures.¹¹ The Democratic Party, which commanded the masses, lacked military muscle. However, the DP was "assured" by both the Military Commission and Tanzania that free and fair elections would take place, and that whatever government was elected would be "protected" by Oyite Ojok and Tanzania. For this reason, the DP adopted "a positive attitude" towards the intentions of the Military Commission.¹² All parties went into elections organized, planned, directed, and controlled by a UPC strongman who was also chairman of the Military Commission.

When the election campaigns of 1980 began, the UPC section of the Ugandan army, the *Kikoosi Maluum*, held military power. The Military Commission was nothing but the UPC's military arm and therefore could allow no other party to take over the state it already controlled. On many occasions UPC supporters said publicly that they had already won the elections. Obote was given a hero's welcome at Bushenyi on his return. The Military Commission gave him all the facilities, protection, and honour that are bestowed on a head of state. Although other parties – the Democratic Party, Uganda Patriotic Movement, and Conservative Party (CP) – were allowed to run, they found themselves disadvantaged in many ways. The UPC intimidated their supporters all over the country. The

Military Commission, although aware of this, did little to alleviate the situation. In the North, in Gulu, Kitgum, Soroti, and Kumi, UPC militia intimidated members of other parties. They accused the DP of being a Baganda party bent on restoring the *Kabaka* and enslaving northerners. Langi and Acholi peasants were told that if the DP won, they would be made to carry bricks on their heads all the way from the North to Kampala to rebuild the *Lubiri* in preparation for the restoration of the Buganda monarchy. The secretary general of the DP, Charles Bwengye, was arrested by UPC militia. The vice president of the same party, Tiberio Okeny, was similarly intimidated. In Buganda a DP supporter, Haji Wamala, lost his arm after he was shot at during a political rally in the Nakiswera subcountry, Bulemeezi. In Mbale, a UPC motorist drove through the crowd at a political rally, injuring more than ten people. In Moyo District, the head of the DP complained of numerous injustices "engineered by some members" of the army,¹³ while the *Weekly Topic*, a high-quality magazine, complained of the extensive pre-election violence and pointed out that "anything could happen."¹⁴ It listed numerous cases of violence against the population perpetrated by the UPC and their armed units. Paul Ssemogerere, the DP's leader, complained bitterly of this political violence, saying that the killings of DP supporters "were politically motivated" and that the Military Commission had broken its promise to be nonpartisan.¹⁵

Yoweri Museveni, leader of the UPM, released a statement on 24 October 1980 in which he too complained of the violence. He thought that sections of the UNLA were responsible for the excesses. Two drunken men who had mentioned the DP at Kamwokya near Kampala were picked up and killed. The following morning their mutilated bodies were found in Mackenzie Vale, Kololo, a suburb of Kampala. This "shock," of which no reports were published, prompted Paulo Muwanga to mount an investigation under the minister of Internal Affairs. Olara Okello, a prominent soldier of the *Kikoosi Maluum* section of the UNLA, rounded up four civilians at Rubaga Road near the Lohana Sports Club and had them killed.¹⁶ In the Kasese District, Amon Bazira, a UPC member, is reported to have terrorized DP supporters. The local DP candidate, Victor Muhindo, was shot dead by UPC political elements. In the Karamoja area, the UPC joined cattle rustlers, especially Apa Loris, the warlord of Moroto, in terrorizing its opponents. The chairman of the Military Commission did not even appear to be neutral. He sided with the UPC and banned four of its former members who had crossed to the DP from addressing public rallies until they were publicly reprimanded by their party.¹⁷ He warned the "donkeys and

hyenas" who were "flexing muscles" to stop it because he was more "learned in the ways of violence" than they were.¹⁸ The four religious leaders (Muslim, Protestant, Orthodox, and Roman Catholic) sent a message to President Nyerere of Tanzania asking him to review the situation in Uganda. They wanted him to send an international force to bring peace and stop the violence before elections were held. But nothing was done.

Meanwhile, although the Military Commission had seized power on the excuse of allowing free political activities, it did not keep its promise of neutrality. As noted, the Commission did set up an interparty committee to draw up procedures for the elections. These procedures, to be followed strictly, stipulated that there be only one ballot box, instead of separate boxes for each party as provided for in the law existing from the colonial era; that new ballot paper be used for all candidates at each polling station; that votes be counted on the spot immediately after voting; that party agents must stand at each Registration and Polling Station; that 146 constituencies be demarcated as a basis for national representation; that a Constitutions Inter-Party Committee be set up to study and recommend necessary amendments to the 1967 constitution and the relevant electoral law (a report of this committee, of which the attorney general was a member, was in fact submitted to the government but no action along the lines suggested was taken); and that all four parties refrain from manipulating state organs to benefit a particular party in the interim period.¹⁹

The DP was particularly interested in the issue of one ballot box. Previous experience had taught them that those in power used their control of violence to take away the ballot boxes of their opponents to isolated areas, where they changed the vote signs on the box. The authorities reduced the number of parliamentary seats to 126 from 146 to give the Military Commission room for gerrymandering. The attorney general, Stephen Omoding Ariko, a UPC supporter, refused to amend those sections of the 1957 election laws that concerned the ballot and ballot boxes. It had been agreed by the Inter-Party Committee that no announcement would be made on registration or any other election program until the election laws were amended. But the attorney general changed the law whereby the leader of the majority party in Parliament became president without running for a seat in a constituency. This law was enacted and gazetted without the approval of the Inter-Party Committee.²⁰

Although the DP lawyers had agreed to draft the necessary legislation to amend the electoral law, especially the one regarding

the use of one box, nothing had been done by 3 December 1980. The DP had demanded registration of voters in West Nile (Arua, Moyo, and Nebbi districts) but the demand was not accepted and the people of West Nile were not put on a register. Surprisingly, a decree – announced after the elections – stated that those who had not registered in West Nile could vote.²¹ Obote publicly pushed his idea to elect the president by universal ballot. But Muwanga overruled him, also publicly. Many could see through this political gimmick. On 14 November, a DP delegation went to see Nyerere to register complaints over the failure of the Military Commission to implement the Inter-Party Committee decisions. Nyerere insisted that he did not wish to interfere in Uganda's internal affairs. He advised Ssemogerere to speak to Muwanga (who was in Dar es Salaam) to iron out their differences, especially since the UPC wanted universal election of the president and the DP wanted one ballot box. He advised them to compromise by dropping each of these demands.

The issue of one ballot box was still not resolved at the meeting between Ssemogerere and Muwanga in Dar es Salaam. The universal election of the president was not a burning issue; it was a political ploy. The UPC wanted to transfer ballot boxes to the district commissioner's office for ballot counting and to have them guarded by soldiers, not party representatives. The DP would not accept these conditions and threatened to withdraw from the election. The Commonwealth Observer Group (COG), which was invited to monitor the elections, agreed with them, insisting (i) that votes be counted immediately after polls closed; (ii) that results be announced immediately at each polling station; and (iii) that party agents stand ready to countersign the results in the presence of officials who would then immediately announce the winner. But the DP lost on the key issue of the single ballot box.

During the 1980 election campaign the UPC was given all the government's facilities to conduct its political activities. Government radio, television, and newspapers were put at the party's disposal.²² Supplies entering the country as relief or aid were billed as aid forthcoming from the UPC. Essential commodities such as salt, sugar, and paraffin were distributed by the UPC using the government transportation system. A ministry of Supplies under a UPC supporter was created to coordinate the party's tapping of government resources. To give just a few examples of such diversion, thousands of bicycles financed by a foreign development bank were

diverted to the UPC for distribution. All vehicles that had belonged to the UNLF were impounded by the Military Commission and later given to the UPC. Motorcycles ordered for the Ugandan army were airlifted and given to the UPC for use in campaigning. Uganda Transport Company buses were diverted from their normal duties to serve the needs of the UPC. In Karamoja a UPC supporter and a former minister grabbed relief food and distributed it as UPC food.²³

The election process itself was rendered illegal since the Electoral Commission – whose chairman, Kosea Kikira, was one of the founders of the UPC – broke a number of laws. The surrogate parliament, the NCC, did not approve the demarcation of constituencies. Notices calling on voters to register whenever a new voters' register was being compiled were not gazetted. The late Bakulu-Mpagi Wamala, as a representative of UPM, took the Electoral Commission to court over these issues.²⁴ While election preparations were under way, Justice Peter Allen agreed that Bakulu-Mpagi Wamala was correct but stated that he did not wish to stop the election preparations since doing so would be extremely inconvenient and expensive. As a result, many people were left off the register. Most of those who were perceived to be opposed to the UPC were either not registered or harassed. In Bushenyi, a reported sixty percent of the population were omitted from the register. In Mbale the registration officer was arrested. In Kasese, registration was delayed until four days before the exercise was officially due to end. In West Nile a massacre of the population was arranged by the militia and the *Kikoosi Maluum*, and no registration took place.²⁵ On nomination day many candidates of the DP, UPM, and CP were harassed, detained, and prevented from handing in their papers. In West Nile, all DP candidates were rejected on minor technicalities. As a result, all seventeen members of Parliament who were technically returned "unopposed" – five from Arua, one from Moyo, four from Lira, three from Apac, one from Soroti, one from Kotido, and two from Kasese – belonged to the UPC. The UPC went into the election with seventeen seats in the 126-member house. Despite this illegal head start, the party did not fare well at the polls.

The Military Commission, in what amounted to a *coup*, took over the work of the Electoral Commission when it realized that the UPC was about to lose the national elections. There was no disguising the dislodging of the Electoral Commission, whose secretary,

Vincent Ssekono, went into hiding and later fled the country. The Commission might have worked through the electoral body, which was in any case constituted by the Military Commission and not by the head of state (at this time, the Presidential Commission), as the laws of Uganda clearly called for.²⁶ The usurping of the Electoral Commission's powers began in the early months of the campaign when fourteen district commissioners who were part of the Electoral Commission (because they act, according to law, as returning officers for their districts) were dismissed. Later, the district commissioner of Rukungiri was also dismissed. Thus, out of some thirty-two district returning officers about fifteen, or forty-five percent were dismissed. The chief justice, Samuel Wako Wambuzi, whose job was to make impartial judgements on election irregularities, was replaced by George Masika a few days before the elections. None of the DP candidates who filed a complaint subsequently received a fair hearing.

Voting started in a seemingly satisfactory manner on Wednesday, 10 December 1980. Because of "administrative problems" the voting was extended to 2:00 P.M. on Thursday. By mid-afternoon on the eleventh it was clear that the DP was winning many seats, and there was rejoicing at its headquarters. But the leader of the DP, after holding discussions with the chairman of the Military Commission, told the people to go home and listen to the radio. Shortly afterwards the army arrived at DP headquarters and ordered the people to disperse. The Commonwealth Observer Group, believing that results as determined by the voters were about to be announced, released its interim report, which stated emotionally that the elections were "free and fair": "Surmounting all obstacles, the people of Uganda, like some great tidal wave, carried the electoral process to a worthy and valid conclusion."²⁷ A number of credible international radio stations carried the news that the DP had won the elections; Charles Bwengye, the secretary general, told the media that the DP had won eighty-one seats; Uganda's ambassador to Tanzania, Francis Hatega, told officials in Dar es Salaam that the DP had won. He was later to lose his job and suffer exile for his hasty remarks.

The Military Commission decided to fight for the UPC. A statement on Radio Uganda complained of violence and intimidation directed against the UPC in Busoga and Buganda and warned the Baganda to observe the law or suffer the consequences.²⁸ Paulo Muwanga moved swiftly. He forbade anyone, whether chairman, secretary, agent of the Electoral Commission, or private citizen, to announce results on pain of a 500,000-shilling fine or imprison-

ment of up to five years, or both. The order was carried by Radio Uganda at 8:00 P.M. on 11 December 1980. Only Muwanga himself could announce any results once he was satisfied that a candidate had been properly elected. This step reversed the population's election mandate: it was the chairman of the Military Commission, not the voters, who decided who had been elected and who had not, which results were correct and which were not. Ugandans had not voted for eighteen years. Now their general will as expressed through their choice of representatives was snatched from them. Everyone waited to see what would happen next.

Overnight, so it is reported, the leader of the UPC and the chairman of the Military Commission "stayed together in intensive conference" in a house at Kololo, doctoring the results.²⁹ A list of seventy-four constituencies to be won by the UPC was drawn up. Most were far from Kampala in areas with poor communications. Outmanoeuvred, the Commonwealth Observer Group protested the curtailment of the independence of the Electoral Commission. The following night, there was "a barrage of gunfire from a variety of weapons from sources" that the COG could not identify. Many of the observers rushed out of Uganda by the fastest route. After fourteen critical hours, the chairman of the Military Commission agreed to hand back some of the electoral body's powers as demanded by COG. But only clerks remained at the Electoral Commission headquarters. The key man, Secretary Vincent Ssekono, had fled the country or was in hiding.

At dusk on Friday the twelfth the results were announced on Radio Uganda. The UPC had been allocated seventy-four seats, the DP fifty-one, and the UPM one. COG should have been able to discern the source of the "barrage of gunfire." The Military Commission was telling the public that it had handed power to the UPC, or, to put it more correctly, that it had put a "legal" seal on their assumption of power after overthrowing Binaisa in May 1980. It was also intended to warn would-be rioters. That is why "no authoritative explanation" for this "barrage of gunfire was forthcoming."³⁰ Later on, Paulo Muwanga announced that the Uganda National Liberation Army would be permitted to send ten members to Parliament – all UPC. This move gave Obote eighty-four members, leaving the DP its original fifty-one and the UPM one.

Obote then formed his second administration in December 1980. Of fifty ministers, forty-two were Anglican and seven Catholic. The one Muslim, Muhamod Ntege-Lubwaama, was soon forced out of

the country after a rocket-propelled grenade destroyed his house, killed his daughter, and injured his wife. He told me four years later that his refusal to approve without scrutiny the building of a huge hotel at Busenyi, coupled with his outspoken stand on Islamic religious issues, might have been the cause for this brutal attempt on his life. The Military Commission was well prepared to hand power to Obote. Most elements in the army opposed to the UPC were posted far from the centre in distant areas like Moroto and Arua. While the UNLA patrolled Kampala during the election exercise, Tanzanian troops guarded Uganda's sensitive towns of Masaka, Mubende, Fort Portal, and Mbale. The commission was thus able to handle any internal or external threat to the UPC's taking power. When the bitter truth registered in the minds of Ugandans, most thought there was no alternative but to fight: the ballot had been tried without success, leaving violence as the only way to dislodge the UPC from its illegal assumption of political power. And fight they did. From February 1981, civil war and chaos raged.

CHAPTER SEVEN

Four and One-Half Years of Brute Violence, 1980–85

SECRET
WHEN YOU COME HERE,
WHAT YOU SEE HERE,
WHAT YOU SAY HERE,
WHAT YOU HEAR HERE,
WHEN YOU LEAVE HERE,
LEAVE THEM HERE.

SECRET

Signpost in the courtyard of Makindye military barracks

Violence had been a permanent feature of the Amin regime. Each day, someone in Uganda was at the receiving end of political or other forms of violence. However, violence under Amin was like a tide, peaking and subsiding at certain periods. Whenever there was a political crisis in the ranks of the regime itself, or when an attempt was made to dislodge the dictator, violence intensified. But in the second Obote period, violence was always at high tide.

The greatest disservice Obote did to his country was to return to power undemocratically in 1980. If he had allowed the democratic process to run its course, the bloodbath of 1980–85 could have been avoided. However, by thinking that he could force the population to accept him, he failed to measure the limits of political power. The opposition Obote faced was intense and sustained throughout his second tenure. In February 1981, civil war erupted. Although Obote victimized ethnic groups that would not willingly support his administration, he failed to cow them into submission. Instead, as chapter 8 will show, they fought back using the same tool he himself had used to rule, silence, and victimize his opponents since 1966: violence. Human error had again changed the course of Uganda's history in a direction that led to more violence. By the time the National Resistance Movement stormed Kampala in 1986, close to half a million people had been killed, the infrastructure destroyed, social services neglected, the economy ruined, the need to preserve the environment forgotten, social discipline abandoned, and the quality of life undermined.

MASS KILLINGS OF CIVILIANS

There were massive killings of civilians in this epoch. Wherever the security forces were thwarted in tracking down their major oppo-

nents – the guerrillas – violence intensified. Whenever guerrillas attacked a government target, nearby civilians suffered the consequences. Security forces not in a position to engage their armed opponents vented their anger on noncombatants, killing hundreds of civilians. Paid in almost worthless Uganda shillings, and without discipline, soldiers looted civilian property in areas where the guerrillas were not even present as a way of economic survival. So whenever security forces wanted to loot, they would put it about that guerrillas were to be found in a given area and seek permission from their superiors to operate there; permission was often given. Civilians who wanted to get rich could use soldiers to loot in the areas they chose. In such chaos hundreds of people lost their lives and property.

The evidence of civilian deaths in this period was the ugly sight of decomposing bodies that had been dumped in various places. So many people were murdered that it became impossible to bury them all. The appendices indicate some of the places where bodies were dumped. As early as February 1981, when armed political conflict between the government and rebel groups had just begun, dead bodies became a daily sight. In Namanve Forest seven bullet-riddled bodies were discovered in the second week of February 1981. In the following month seven-nine bodies were found in the same forest. Two of the bodies belonged to schoolgirls. In May 1982 some thirty bodies washed up on the shore of Lake Victoria. In June 1982 fifty-one bodies were dumped at Mabanda near Matugga by a military truck in broad daylight. In the same month a Uganda National Liberation Army truck dumped twenty bodies near Kakiri on Hoima Road. Again, in June 1982, a hundred bodies were picked up on the shores of Lake Victoria. They probably belonged to people who had been rounded up in the "Panda Gari" operations that will be discussed later. On 14 July 1982, bodies were dumped at Naziri on Mityana Road by a military vehicle. On 10 September seventeen bodies were discovered at Manja; a survivor of the massacre, Deziderio Sembatya, said that the victims were aged twelve to twenty and had been rounded up by soldiers. There was a belief in government circles that all young Baganda boys of that age group were potential guerrillas. Wherever such boys were found they were questioned thoroughly. Those with no identity cards often ended up as corpses.

Massacres were reported daily in the papers, especially in *Munansi*. No week passed without an incident of mass murder.¹ A few incidents will be mentioned to acquaint the reader with the intensity of violence in this period. On 19 August 1983 at Kiteego

Village, seven people were reported to have been buried alive by soldiers to show the general population that authorities would not hesitate to use any kind of force to combat guerrilla activity. On 28 May 1983 over two hundred people were killed at Kikyusa camp, one of the places the government called "relief centres" but that were, in reality, concentration camps. Soldiers, UPC functionaries, and National Security Agency (NASA) personnel entered camp with guns, knives, machetes, and other types of weapons and began the slaughter. Kasanje and Nakawuka in Mpigi District suffered the same fate.

The Obote terror machine used all methods possible to get victims from the general population. It is very difficult to classify neatly all the methods used, but the following were employed repeatedly.

Military Operations in Civilian Areas

Detachments of security forces would be sent into an area suspected of harbouring antigovernment guerrillas or having utilitarian material the forces wanted. During these operations soldiers often killed civilians, looted property, raped, and vandalized at will. In June 1983, for example, a group of soldiers raided several villages in the Kajjansi area,² robbed residents, destroyed what they could not take, raped women, and arrested most of the young men. Amazingly, the soldiers first reported their intentions at Kajjansi Police Station before embarking on the operations. In March a similar raid in the Wabusana area of Luwero District left sixty people dead and thousands arrested and taken to concentration camps. Many of the prisoners were taken to Wabutungula Camp, about fifty-six miles from Kampala. After Wabusana, government forces raided the villages of Giryadda, Babuubi, Masunkwe, Nabbembe, Nabiteete, Wanjaza, Kiyimbwambwa, Kyawangabi, and Kiwanguzi. In the same year a massive operation was carried out in the areas around Kampala, covering Gyaza, Katalamwa, Mpererwe, and Kamwokya.³

One of the most infamous military operations was called *Panda Gari*, a Kiswahili term meaning get aboard, climb onto the lorry, boat, or bus. Soldiers would station their vehicles at places where people collected, such as markets, sports matches, or religious places. They would select young people from the crowd and have them board trucks or other military vehicles by force, shouting "*Panda Gari*." Identification was often asked for. However, since many of the soldiers in the second Obote regime were illiterate, they could not read identity cards or passports, and many innocent

young men were carried away. Less than ten percent of those forced into military trucks in the *Panda Gari* operations survived. In June 1982 some thirty peasants of Sekanyonyi near Mityana who were picked up in a *Panda Gari* operation were killed and dumped at Myanzi. Only one returned to tell the story. This incident was surprising because *Panda Gari* operations were usually carried out in urban rather than rural areas. In January 1983 there were extensive *Panda Gari* operations in Mengo, Kibuye, and Makindye areas, during which about sixty people were killed.

Abductions

Victims were abducted from homes, offices, streets, and while abroad. The newspaper *Munnansi* described abduction as follows:

A wave of abductions of people from office, streets and homes still goes on in Uganda. In most cases the bodies of the victims are found dumped in forests or in hospital mortuaries. The latest victim of this ugly practice is the Chief Traffic officer at the Uganda Railways Corporation, Mr D.Z. Rwabihigi, who had worked for the Uganda Railways for a very long time. The abduction of Rwabihigi occurred only on Tuesday, 22 December 1981 in his office at the Railways Corporation Headquarters in Kampala, in broad daylight. The abductors claimed to have been security men from the Vice-President's office. They were clad in military uniforms and had come travelling in a military Land-Rover, arriving at the Railways at about 11:00 a.m.⁴

His body was later retrieved from Mulago Hospital Mortuary by his relatives.

There were many such instances. A thorough examination of the appendices should enable the reader to identify the victims of abduction.

Killing of Élites and Prominent People

The killing of élites and prominent citizens with the ability to influence the direction of social policy started in the Amin period and continued into the second Obote epoch, and on into Okello's brief period in power. Prominent men were arrested for political, economic, or other reasons. Those who were feared as political threats were killed, likewise those who were rich and could use money to influence society. A few names will be mentioned but the reader is again referred to Appendix 5 for a fuller story. One of the

first prominent men to die in the second Obote regime was Stephen Mulira, manager of the Lint Marketing Board. He was arrested on 4 April 1981 on orders from Oyite Ojok, probably because someone wanted his job. Another, Richard Serunjoji Mulondo, was arrested 9 June 1981 and later killed. He was a manager of an insurance company and a prominent member of the Conservative Party. Beatrice Kyomugisha, a lecturer at Makerere University, was arrested by soldiers in 1981 and has never been seen again. Peter Oboma, the commanding officer of the Moroto army barracks, was arrested on 24 December 1981 and killed. Samuel Kintu, the son of former Buganda *Katikkiro* Michael Kintu, was killed on 17 May 1982 at around 6:00 PM as he arrived home from work: "a Bazooka [was] thrown at him and his whole body was almost charred."⁵

Members of Parliament were not safe from the gun either. In February 1982 George Bamuturaki, the opposition MP for Kabarole North, was shot by people clad in military gear. He was relaxing at a pub called Kisementi in North Kampala with the general manager of the National Housing and Construction Corporation, Mr Zek Okao. According to the survivors, the gunmen, heavily armed and dressed in army uniform, arrived at the pub in a Land Rover bearing UNLA license plates. They opened fire on him and Okao, killing four people instantly.⁶ Another MP killed during the Obote regime was Africanus Sembatya, a director of the Foundation for African Development. He was gunned down at his house at 11:00 on 6 October 1983. A member of the opposition Democratic Party for Masaka South, he won his riding with ninety percent of the votes cast. It is believed that Sembatya's success in business sealed his fate, for the Obote regime detested African, especially Baganda, businessmen. Lieutenant Colonel Ndahendekire, a high-ranking officer, was killed on 8 June 1981, apparently because the authorities were afraid of his military skills. Ndahendekire was murdered at his home in Mbarara where he had gone to bid farewell to his family and relatives before proceeding to Moscow to take up his new post as military attaché. When the murderers arrived they accused him of being pro-Museveni and fired two magazines into his body in full view of his family while he sat in a chair.

THE AGENTS OF DEATH

The agents of death were representatives of the government who carried out capital punishments outside the established judicial system. The major responsibility of a government is the protection

of life and property of those it governs. But the Uganda government in this period did not do so. Indeed, many of its employees and supporters were responsible for the killing of innocent people and went unpunished. Government institutions were used to massacre people, yet those in authority did not try to remedy the situation. This was not all: officials of the Obote regime actually killed prisoners themselves.⁷

The Soldiers

Government soldiers, serving in the Uganda National Liberation Army, killed innocent people with impunity. As the reader will recall, the nucleus of the UNLA was Obote's unit, the *Kikoosi Maluum*, and ethnicity was the key to joining the army. Political education for the troops consisted largely in identifying the Baganda in particular and other Bantu speakers, in general as the enemy: an inscription on a disused Nakaseke hotel telling soldiers that a good Muganda is a dead Muganda and exhorting them to "shoot to kill" tells the tale.

Ordinary soldiers within the *Kikoosi Maluum* took their cue from their military superiors, who showed by their actions that human, particularly Baganda, lives could be taken with impunity. Raiding expeditions, looting parties, and killing sprees were often led by high-ranking officers like Barjilio Olara Okello, commander of the Fifteenth Battalion, a *Kikoosi Maluum* insider, and later chief of staff under Tito Okello Lutwa, and Sokolo, the officer in charge of the Mpigi military unit.⁸

As Tanzanian soldiers began to pull out in large numbers after the Liberation War, UNLA soldiers began to prepare for their looting and vandalizing exercises. Several new battalion commanders are reported to have ordered UNLA units all over the country to help themselves to civilian property within a radius of some five to six miles of their barracks. This practice was particularly prevalent in the western regions and eastern Buganda. In the Masaka area, Nyendo was raided three times in 1982, Kirumba twice, Butego and Nakayiba twice, Ssenyange three times, Kidda once, St Henry's College, Kitovu, and St Joseph's Hospital once each. In addition, soldiers set up unauthorized road blocks, discussed below, all over the country to collect money.⁹ UNLA soldiers were not protectors of society but agents of death. They did not represent the general will of society, only the sector that controlled the state. They were a sectional army.¹⁰

UPC Functionaries

The second category of agents of death and destruction were the party functionaries. These included UPC constituency, parish, and village chairmen, as well as other party officials like secretaries, treasurers, and members of committees. They also included ordinary party members who had been rewarded with political offices. They collaborated with UNLA soldiers by providing information and, in many cases, misinformation. They decided which areas were to be raided and which people victimized and were thus a key element in the destruction of life and property. The notion that the killers were northerners is a fallacy: most of the party functionaries were sons of the areas terrorized by the UNLA: in Buganda, these functionaries were Baganda, in Busoga, they were Basoga, in Ankole, they were Banyankole. Only a few belonged to ethnic groups other than those towards whom violence was committed.

Among the most notorious was Edward Kabira, UPC chairman for Mpigi South East constituency, who, in collaboration with the army, organized the death of some one hundred people.¹¹ Miss Night Kulabako, subcounty chief of Katabi, Entebbe, is another party functionary who made people weep. A fanatic who perpetuated a state of terror in the area, she is known to have set fire to one young man named Mukasa, killed a pregnant woman, and castrated a young male. She constructed a private prison at her house to detain people until they paid a ransom. Those who failed to pay were forwarded to Katabi army barracks.¹² These are but two of the many UPC functionaries who engaged in murder, torture, extortion, and terrorism in many parts of the country.¹³

Roadblocks

In Uganda, a roadblock is any place on the road where the security forces position themselves to check road users by blocking the free travelling of anyone using the highway. Initially, roadblocks were used to track down social deviants like criminals and were manned by the civil police. However, with the militarization of politics, roadblocks were increasingly manned by army and counterinsurgency agents. Hundreds of people were abused at these barriers. As government dependence on violence as an instrument of political control increased, the roadblock became one of the major "institutions" of repression. People were robbed there, women mishandled, and hundreds never survived the stop; they were killed

there. Apart from "official" roadblocks, private barriers were created by the security forces for their own gain. Any soldier who needed money in an area of conflict would just pick an isolated, strategic part of the road, put logs or chains across it, and wait for unfortunate travellers. These twentieth-century highwaymen would rob everyone of anything they fancied: cash, watches, cassette radios, clothes, and the like. Women were often raped at roadblocks. There are very few Ugandans who have not experienced a deep sense of fear, anxiety, and apprehension when approaching and passing through a roadblock. According to *Munnansi*, the normally jovial busloads of Ugandans travelling through provinces would fall silent in mid-sentence and lower their faces as the bus approached an army roadblock. Everyone knew that life could be ended there without question, that gross abuses of human rights could be meted out and valuable property lost.

Those manning the roadblocks respected no one. The Right Reverend Benon Ogwal, bishop of Northern Uganda, was harassed at a UNLA roadblock as he was going to Kalongo in Kitgum District to attend a fund-raising ceremony on 11 December 1983. When the bishop stopped at the roadblock he introduced himself, but the soldiers ordered him out of the car, checked all its contents, frisked him, looted his property, including his foodstuffs, and ordered him to leave. He was lucky to escape with his life. Roger P. Winter, the director of the US Committee for Refugees, recalls his experience of roadblocks in general and those of the UNLA in particular: "On a January 1983 visit to the southwest, I saw the UNLA up close. The destroyed homes of the Banyarwanda told the tragic story of that pilloried group. Fear of the soldiers was palpable. Driving from Mbarara to Kampala required clearing eighteen road-blocks, paying at each one, putting up with drunken soldiers arrogantly waving automatic weapons at civilian travellers ... The UNLA had clearly become the worst enemy of the bulk of the civilian population."¹⁴

There were many roadblocks in the country, more than twelve between Kampala and the Kenyan border in 1984. And, as Winter writes, at each of them one had to pay money to get fair treatment.¹⁵ Then there were innumerable episodes of death and brutalization between 1980 and 1985. On 2 May 1981 a three-month-old baby was slashed to death at Namanve on the Jinja-Kampala road by UNLA soldiers because two hundred shillings were found folded within the baby's diapers. The mother was forced to sit down and watch her baby bleed to death. When she was released she was told, "Now you can tell your Baganda friends that we shall do the same to them each time they try to hide their money. Tell

your husband your bank has been destroyed." On 4 May three people were killed at the Kireka roadblock because they had no money to pay the UNLA soldiers. Earlier, on 13 April eighteen people were humiliated at a roadblock at Kamwokya west of Kampala. They were made to taste one another's urine to entertain UNLA soldiers. From 15 to 28 February 1982, more than fifty people were killed at the Mpigi roadblock on the Masaka-Kampala road, including schoolboys with proper identity cards. The soldiers dumped ten bodies in the nearby eucalyptus forest. On 29 January 1983, the Special Force manning a roadblock at Buloba on the Kampala-Mityana road shot five people dead. Among the five was a woman who had tried to resist being raped. Other women and girls travelling on this day through the same roadblock were robbed of whatever they had and then raped. The victims' names were not immediately established. In August 1983 Special Force personnel manning a roadblock at Kyebando opened fire on a moving truck, killing two uniformed occupants believed to be UNLA soldiers; two truckloads of soldiers were then dispatched to the area where they began indiscriminately killing residents.¹⁶ The roadblock as a vehicle of repression had become an agent of death.

UNDERMINING THE RULE OF LAW

Like Amin's, Obote's regime undermined the rule of law: it interfered with the administration of justice; extended the use of the secret police, NASA; used torture; demoralized the civil police; and employed widespread imprisonment without trial.

The administration of justice. From 1980 to 1985, only the law of the strong was respected. Judges who made impartial decisions were removed or persecuted and often replaced by UPC supporters, regardless of their qualifications.¹⁷ A number of competent magistrates were harassed whenever they gave decisions contrary to the wishes of powerful individuals, or even when it was suspected that they might render such a decision.¹⁸ Nor were lawyers free to defend their clients, particularly when the case involved government officials, party functionaries, or soldiers. Any who did so risked being imprisoned or tortured like Enos Ssebunya, whose story was told earlier. Tom Rubare of Kabarole was abducted from his offices in Fort Portal. Cyprian Kawoya was taken from the High Court by soldiers as he prepared to handle a case against a prominent UPC official. Gideon Akankwasa, Chris Kasibayo, and Jonathan Kateeba of Hunter and Gregg were abducted by soldiers – they had

been handling a sensitive case against some high officials in authority. Kateeba Mushanga, a young, outspoken lawyer, was imprisoned without trial by order of the minister responsible for the intelligence networks.

The secret police. The National Security Agency, as the secret police was called in the second Obote regime, terrorized the population in the same way as its predecessors, the General Service Unit and Amin's Bureau of State Research, had. Like those agencies, NASA had no legal powers of arrest, yet it had complete power over life and death. Its agents arrested thousands of people. Its headquarters were in the Nile Mansions, where the military intelligence centre was located. NASA operated many interrogation centres, such as those at Park Hotel, Nile Mansions, Impala House, Kamukuzi in Mbarara, and small offices spread all over the country. Wherever there was a UPC branch or office, there was a NASA agent near by. The head of NASA was a minister of state in the president's office, believed to be Chris Rwakasisi.

NASA agents were very active in schools, factories, hospitals, and other institutions. Their job was to gather antigovernment information to protect the UPC government. In the Luwero Triangle they hunted down presumed enemies of the government. Because they often listed the names of their victims on computer printouts, NASA agents were sometimes called "computer men." The secret police arrested thousands of people. A number of them went into the Nakasi camp in Luwero with printouts and removed certain inmates, many of whom have never been seen again. In 1984 "computer men" made massive arrests in Ankole. About one hundred people were detained at the NASA centre at Kamukuzi. Some of the prisoners were sent to Luzira. NASA had its own prison at Ihugu in the Masindi area, where, among others, John Muhanguzi, an assistant district commissioner, and George Nkakale, a civil servant, were detained in August 1984. The former was eventually transferred to Kampala Central Police Station.

NASA became notorious in its handling of exiles. Ugandans who were identified as enemies of the regime and who crossed the border to neighbouring countries were not safe. They were often abducted and returned to Uganda against their will. The Minority Rights Group explains their predicament: "The most feared development has been the proliferation of intelligence networks, some of which are highly unofficial. The most significant intelligence operations, however, had been those in foreign countries. The long arm of the regime has reached out, notably to Nairobi, where

several of the guerrilla groups have established bases.”¹⁹ Balaki Kirya, the Uganda Freedom Movement chairman, Laurence Ssemakula, the founder of the Federal Democratic Movement of Uganda (FEDEMU), and Sajat Mohammed, an alleged UFM mercenary, were abducted and forcibly taken to Uganda. However, attempts on Francis Bwenje and Andrew Kayiira, both of the UFM, were abortive.

The use of torture. Torture under Obote was no different from torture under Amin. Prisoners were mostly tortured in military barracks, such as those at Makindye, Lubiri, Bombo, Kireka, Mbarara, Mbuya, and elsewhere.²⁰ According to Uganda’s laws, soldiers have no right to arrest civilians. They may hold civilians for only a limited period during armed conflict or if an exchange of fire threatens civilian life. The law required that apprehended guerrillas be transferred to civilian authorities for court appearances as necessary. The soldiers arrested and tortured their victims without reference to law, as the ordeals of those in the most infamous military barracks – a prison, really – at Makindye make clear.

On arrival at Makindye prisoners went through the Quarter-Guard Gate and were beaten with iron bars, cables, pieces of nail-studded wood, rifle butts, machetes, or hammers. They were then distributed to various rooms, one of which was the “Go-Down,” a former storeroom with iron doors, no windows, and little ventilation. About a hundred prisoners were held there but the turnover was rapid. Prisoners were often starved to death. At best, they were fed twice a week. The captors would throw maggot-infested *posho* (maize flour) at the inmates who, lacking plates, had to scramble to catch it before it fell onto the floor; because there were no toilets, the floor was covered with urine and faeces. Many prisoners in the Go-Down perished from disease, beatings, starvation, and exhaustion. Dead bodies were left to decompose; the removal of bodies was done by prisoners.

One of the commonest forms of torture involved molten rubber. The victim was tied down and a car tire suspended over him. The tire was set alight and molten rubber allowed to drip onto him, resulting in pain and extreme burns. One prisoner relates his experience: “They tied my legs and hands and tied me onto a metal chair ... After questioning me the soldiers came and tied an old tire over my head, lit it and then left me there ... The hot rubber droplets were made to fall on my head, my face, my right hand and on the right side of my chest. The hot rubber droplets fell and spread all over my upper body causing untold suffering to me.”²¹

Sexual torture involving the genitals was also common. The victim was made to sit on a chair and his hands were tied together with a thin string looped over a beam in the ceiling. A brick was then attached to his testicles with a thin strip of iron or hard sisal string. The string around his hands was then pulled until the pain forced the victim to stand up, causing the brick to pull down on his testicles. Here is one detainee's account: "They would tie a two-kilogram stone onto our testicles so that with the terrible pain we would be able to say what they wanted us to say. Every morning we received beatings which was termed as our breakfast and electric cable was the stick for this type of beating. We were taken into special torture theaters as they called them, then given electric shocks."²²

For women, rape was part of their daily lot. Cutting off breasts was not unknown. *Munnansi* describes another practice: "Tens of children from the troubled Luwero District have been forced to 'marry' UNLA soldiers ... There are a number of young girls between the ages of 11 and 13 staying in the barracks against their will."²³ The paper then relates the story of Joyce Bukirwa, a twelve-year-old girl from Kigogwa who was abducted at Bwaise and forced to live with a soldier who infected her with a sexually transmitted disease at Makindye Barracks.²⁴

One brilliant scholar, fighter, and university professor, Bakulu-Mpagi Wamala, a victim of detention and torture at Makindye military barracks, has left us an account of his experience there. It will later be repeated in full as an epilogue to give an idea of the level of violence practised in military barracks during Obote's second regime.

Demoralization of the civil police. The civil police, some of whose members were well trained in the protection and enforcement of law as well as in dealing with civilians, were demoralized by the excessive misuse of power by the army, NASA, and other security agencies. Like judges and lawyers, many policemen found themselves in trouble whenever they dealt with cases involving army or paramilitary personnel. There were numerous incidents of soldiers firing on policemen, raiding police stations, or freeing prisoners in police custody.²⁵ Since the civil police were not as well armed as the army they were often on the losing side. They stopped working effectively and were unable to protect civilians from the unruly army.

Imprisonment without trial. Between 1980 and 1985, many people were imprisoned without trial under the Public Order and Security

Act of 1967. This act empowered the government to detain any perceived to be a threat to order, security, and peace. In practice it was used to lock up political opponents. As soon as Obote returned to power his regime imprisoned most of its bitterest critics.²⁶ Amnesty International regularly published the names and circumstances of those detained without trial, but only of people who were prominent and therefore known. Thousands more were locked up with publicity.²⁷

In July 1984 the government publicly agreed that the number of detainees under the Public Order and Security Act was large. The minister of Internal Affairs gave the number as 1,142 but excluded 700 who had been released just before he made the announcement.²⁸ In November 1984 the names of 251 detainees were published but these were from Luzira Prison only. The names of the remaining 891 detainees were not published, nor were the names of detainees from other prisons. Yet the act requires that all names of citizens arrested under its auspices must appear in the Official Gazette. The government was a law breaker.

Prisons and police cells. Ordinary prisoners held in civilian "rehabilitation" institutions lived in bad conditions. Before 1966, social deviants were held in various prison centres throughout the country for rehabilitation. After 1966 the situation changed. Political prisoners held under the Public Order and Security Act were also put in these prisons. As political struggle intensified, the number of political prisoners increased. The prisons soon acquired the name "University" since they were places to which political opponents were sent to learn the arts of political complicity with the ruling establishment. These prison institutions were meant for a few inmates, but in the period 1980–85, they were filled beyond capacity. Luzira Prison was built by the colonial state to hold a maximum of four hundred people.²⁹ In 1984, however, the Minister of Internal Affairs said that Luzira held one thousand inmates (private reports put the number at over two thousand). The situation was the same at many Ugandan prisons.

Because of overcrowding, lack of clean water, toilet facilities, fresh air, and regular nutrition, disease spread easily in these institutions and many died as a result. In 1984 disease claimed the life of the DP chairman of Kamuli District, Mr Nelson Kirya Kalikwani, in Luzira where typhoid had broken out in July. Other political prisoners who died in Luzira included Muhammad Namburu and Abdu Kabuto. A letter smuggled out of the prison revealed these terrible conditions. Still other prisoners died in police

cells before being brought to trial. Police cells became notorious in the second Obote regime as places where prisoners were tortured and denied their civil liberties.³⁰ That month, George Ssemakula is reported to have committed suicide there. Other police stations where prisoners lived in bad conditions were at Kira Road, Jinja Road, and Katwe.

Imprisonment of juveniles in ordinary prisons. People below the age of eighteen were put in ordinary prisons intended for adults, a surprising move since Uganda had a large centre at Kampiringisa for juvenile offenders. What is also surprising is that Obote condemned Museveni's use of "children soldiers" in the army.³¹ If Obote had remembered that his regime imprisoned a number of children and killed many in military operations he would not have been so bitter. Many of the juveniles who joined the ranks of NRM were orphans whose parents and homes had been destroyed by the Obote terror machine. Not only had these *Kadogo's* the motive to fight Obote but the guerrilla army gave them useful occupations and habitation. A few of the juveniles held in ordinary prisons are named in a *Munnansi* publication of 24 September 1984 on page two giving their names, ages, parents, former villages and the date of arrest of each of the children.³² The *Munnansi* estimated that there were at least two hundred juvenile detainees in 1983 alone.³³

The killing of prisoners. In a civilized community, prisoners are given a fair trial. They must be produced in court if the judges so wish. In the Uganda of 1980–85, prisoners were often killed by military officers without legal action being taken. It is reported by Munnansi that a number of prisoners held at Mpigi military barracks were killed on the order of the officer in charge, Sergeant Sokolo; some forty-two prisoners were killed in the Mpigi area in September 1983.³⁴ Massacres of civilian inmates of camps in the Luwero Triangle are another case of government complicity in the slaying of prisoners. On 28 May 1983, some two hundred inmates were killed at the Kikyusa camp and about twenty from Kanyogoga the following month.

DESECRATION OF HOLY PLACES

Government security forces and those perceived as representing the government violated the religious sentiments of many Ugandans.³⁵ Ugandans of all classes are for the most part religious people. For the peasants and the rural folk, religion is a real factor

in their lives. It gives them security of mind by providing a pillar upon which to lean and hang their problems in a country whose social fabric has been torn asunder. Facing the altar or the Qibla gives the poor peasants a hope for the future, a strength and confidence that is missing elsewhere in the destroyed social system. For the educated élite, religion, especially Christianity, provided a link with the West; a hope that the West cares about what is happening in Uganda. Similarly, for the Muslims, religion provides a bridge to the Arab-Islamic cultural world. Amin's attack on Christianity and his perceived favouring of Muslims had as one of its consequences the revival of Christianity. Religion seems to benefit in periods of persecution, misery, deprivation, and desperation. During the Obote period, however, there were more scandalous desecrations of holy places. Places of worship and those who were looked upon as mediums between God and human beings were attacks. Soldiers committed shameful acts of violence against holy places, priests, and worshippers.

The Catholic church bore the brunt of government violence in this period. Of the many incidents in which soldiers desecrated Catholic centres of worship, I will mention a few here. In January 1982, five worshippers were pulled out of Katiiti Church in Kalasa subcounty, Luwero District, on a Sunday. On 24 February 1982, Ash Wednesday, soldiers entered Rubaga Cathedral where an estimated two thousand people were praying. The priest was pulled from the altar at gunpoint and a number of worshippers arrested. The leader of the Catholic church, Emmanuel Cardinal Nsubuga, was away at his Kyankwanzi farm. When he returned he demanded a public apology from the government and decided to boycott all civil functions until an apology was given. On 17 March 1982 President Obote apologized, telling the archbishop he regretted what had happened.³⁶ On February 1982, the Reverend Father Michael Wasswa-Kalembe of St Mbaga's Archdiocesan Major Seminary was shot dead by men in military uniform manning a road-block on the Mityana to Kampala Road.³⁷ On Sunday, 16 May 1982, about a dozen UNLA soldiers raided and ransacked Bukalammuli Catholic parish in Mubende District.³⁸ After an intensive barrage to frighten the residents the soldiers broke into the teachers' houses, assaulted the occupants, and looted nearly all household properties, including money, clothes, bedding, etc. They then proceeded to the nuns' convent where twelve sisters were staying and stripped them of all their belongings. In the third week of September 1982, security personnel searched the house of the Catholic bishop of Masaka, Adrian K. Ddungu. They arrived at 6:00 AM as the bishop

was about to conduct prayers with his aides, Monsignor Joseph Kasule and Father Charles Kayemba. The search lasted six hours but nothing was found. Over a hundred soldiers "guarded" the bishop's residence as it was being searched.

Probably one of the most brutal attacks on a Catholic centre occurred at Ombaci Mission in the West Nile. Missions in Uganda are places of refuge and hope to the surrounding communities. They supplement a number of social services – educational, medical, and others – not provided by government and are sometimes the sole provider of these services, irrespective of religion. As places of refuge, to which many exiles, including *Kabaka* Mutesa II, have fled before proceeding elsewhere, there was an implicit understanding that mission stations were not to be attacked by government troops. The attack on Ombaci Mission in the West Nile should give the reader a glimpse of how UNLA troops behaved. In June 1981, UNLA soldiers, angry that the mission hospital had treated wounded guerrillas,³⁹ opened fire on civilians and refugees there.

Although the Catholics were the most numerous victims of desecration and religious murder, other religious groups also suffered. The Muslims endured several horrifying incidents. At Butambala in the county of Gomba, for example, soldiers burst into a mosque on 7 July 1983 while the imam, leader of the group in prayer, was conducting the *Idd-el-Fitri* ceremonies. They entered the mosque with their boots on and pulled the imam out of the *mihrab*, or altar. Five people including the imam⁴⁰ were taken to a place called Lubugumu Kamooya and beheaded.

The Anglican Church also suffered from the actions of the troops. On 8 August 1982 the Anglican archbishop, Silvanua Wani, was attacked by men in military uniform who physically assaulted him and made off with his car. The events of Namugongo, which are described in chapter 8, affected all three major religious groups.

THE SUPPRESSION OF PROTEST

Voices of protests are normally aired by the mass media: radio, television, and newspapers. In Uganda, however, radio and television systems were controlled by the government and are not able to transmit balanced news. Before Obote seized power in 1980, there were several privately owned newspapers. When some of them began to report on the atrocities committed by government soldiers, many of them were banned. Within six months of taking

office Obote had outlawed at least five: the *Weekly Topic*, *Citizen*, *Economy*, *Africa*, and *Mulengera*. Local journalists who reported the violence and injustice in society were either imprisoned or forced to leave the country.⁴¹ Foreign journalists whose views ran contrary to what the government felt was in its best interests were expelled.⁴² A Mr Keith, for example, was forced to leave after reporting to the BBC that five worshippers had been pulled out of a church in Katiiti (Kalasa subcounty, Luwero District) and killed.⁴³

In addition to keeping news of the atrocities out of the internal and international press, Obote recruited prominent journalists, Africanists, and writers – respectable scholars and experts – to state that reports of massacres by his regime were not true.⁴⁴ Because of their “credibility,” the international community believed these reports. The result was that the groans of Ugandans were inaudible not only within the country but also abroad. The suppression of information was helped by the fact that the international community saw Obote as the only leader who could heal the wounds Amin had created. Ugandans were grateful for the international community’s moral support concerning Idi Amin’s many violations of human rights. In addition to Amnesty International’s numerous reports of human-rights violations in Uganda, the Amin regime was condemned by the United Nations Commission on Human Rights’ International Commission of Jurists (1974, 1976); the Commonwealth heads of state (June 1977); the European Community foreign ministers (21 June 1977); and the US Congress, which imposed a trade embargo (19 October 1978).⁴⁵ During the second Obote period, however, the international community was reluctant to publicize human-rights violations in Uganda. Indeed, various bodies made every effort to strengthen Obote’s government: the Commonwealth arranged to help train Ugandan soldiers even though it was well aware that Uganda’s problems needed political more than military solutions; the IMF, the World Bank, and other lending agencies came to Obote’s rescue by pumping more money into the country than ever before.⁴⁶ It seemed to many Ugandans that Obote’s political base was outside Uganda rather than inside, that he had more friends abroad than at home.

But the regime was unable to block all leaks. Some international humanitarian organizations, Amnesty International in particular, managed to tell the world what was going on. In 1982, it revealed many instances of atrocities and human-rights abuses, sent Obote a petition demanding that he halt the abuse (January 1982), and published a detailed report of particular crimes (June 1985). The most significant individual contribution to revealing human-rights

abuses in Uganda was made by Elliot Abrams, the US assistant secretary of state, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs. He testified to a joint committee of Congress in August 1984 that between 100,000 and 200,000 people had been killed in Uganda since 1981, especially in the Luwero Triangle, and listed numerous instances of human-rights violations.⁴⁷ These revelations brought to an end Obote's efforts to suppress knowledge of human-rights abuses in Uganda: The world began to know the true nature of his regime.

A number of Ugandans helped to bring out the truth. The most important was Emmanuel Cardinal Nsubuga, head of Uganda's Catholic church. He spoke out as early as 1981 when he helped organize a meeting of four religious leaders to discuss human-rights violations. The participants drafted a memorandum (Appendix 7) appealing to the president to help rectify the situation. On 21 November 1982, he read a letter from the orphans of Uganda to a congregation gathered in Rome to pray at the Uganda Martyrs' Church, and the following April he called upon all the "warring parties" in Uganda to end the suffering of the people. In a letter to the speaker of the National Assembly, Cardinal Nsubuga wrote that thousands were being senselessly killed in cold blood while many thousands more were being made homeless. His call for a dialogue to end the conflict was widely publicized. His credibility as one who had stood up for justice from the first Obote period through the Amin regime made Obote's friends think twice before trying to refute him.

Paul Ssemogere, the leader of the Democratic Party, also waged heroic political, and often psychological, warfare against the Obote regime by speaking out in Parliament, at political rallies, in papers that hadn't been stifled, and in open letters to the president. Ibrahim Mukiibi, an ambassador to the Scandinavian countries, not only resigned his post but also gave a widely publicized press conference citing human-rights abuse as the cause of his resignation (see Appendix 10). Ambassadors Arnest Rusiita (Moscow), William Rwetsiba (Ottawa), Kibuuka-Musoke (Australia and New Zealand), James Ekwaro (Peking), and E. Kanyanya Wapenyi (Paris) also left their posts in protest.⁴⁸

The realization that Obote, like Amin, supervised a regime that did not respect human life further discredited Uganda's standing in the international community. The world had banked on Obote as the only candidate who could solve the country's problems, but he

turned out to be as bad as Amin. Could Uganda produce no better leadership? Obote had created a favourable image abroad. He had successfully presented himself as a law-abiding leader who had come to power through the ballot and not the bullet, which is probably why he had insisted on going through the election exercise, rigged though it was. He always maintained that he was not a party to acts of vandalism, mischief, or transgression by members of his security forces and that any of his forces caught in such acts would be brought to court. He constantly reiterated that he ruled according to law and that all law breakers and detainees were tried in civilian courts, not in military barracks. In 1983 he was quoted as saying, "There are no detainees in military barracks ... there are no detainees who are tortured or murdered, or killed in any way in government custody."⁴⁹

This statement is surprising considering the number of prisoners who died in military barracks in Uganda from 1980 to 1985, but it shows Obote's success in presenting himself to the international community as what he was not. When the atrocities of his regime were publicized, many people were disappointed because they had thought he would solve Uganda's political and economic problems. The IMF, the World Bank, the Tanzanian leadership, the North Koreans, Zambia, and India were also let down by Obote. They had given him backing, helped him in his struggle to legalize his government, and lent moral support. But by the end of 1984 the country was in ruins. Uganda as a country seemed incapable of producing the right leadership. However, what Obote's supporters failed to take into account was that his regime "lacked the popular support of the people," while the army was "incompetent, and undisciplined."⁵⁰

CHAPTER EIGHT

Civil War, 1981–85

1 THE STRUGGLE AGAINST OBOTE

Within Uganda, armed struggle against Obote had started almost as soon as he grabbed power in 1980. There were initially many foolhardy, uncoordinated, and ineffective resistance bands. Effective resistance began with the formation of fighting groups that later crystallized into formidable movements that robbed both the UPC administration and Uganda of peace for over five years.

The National Resistance Movement

The nucleus of the future National Resistance Movement was born at 8:30 A.M. on 6 February 1981 when a platoon of twenty-seven young men under Yoweri Museveni attacked Kabamba School of Infantry. Although they did not achieve all their aims they survived and learned from their experience. Meanwhile, a number of civilians began to organize a political arm of this group. These people included some of the brass of the Uganda Patriotic Movement: Eriya Kategaya, Kirunda Kivejinja, Bakulu-Mpagi Wamala, Dr Ruhakana Rugunda, etc. Politicized individuals like Haji Moses Kigongo and others met in various houses in Kampala to map out the struggle (one house in which many meetings were held was One Prince Charles Drive in Kololo, very near Obote's own house). Their aim was to organize the people, consolidate them into a force, and fight for democracy. They founded the People's Resistance Council, which consisted of various resistance groups of fighters and civilians. Its military wing was called the People's Resistance Army (PRA). In June 1981 meetings in Uganda and Nairobi brought various fighting groups together. The PRA, Uganda Freedom Fighters

(UFF), Uganda Freedom Movement referred to above, and the Uganda National Rescue Front (UNRF) were represented at the Lovington meeting in Nairobi (at Mathew Rukikaire's house). An attempt to form a union of all such groups proved abortive, but the People's Resistance Army and the Uganda Freedom Fighters merged to form the Uganda Resistance Movement. Yusuf K. Lule, the former president of Uganda, was elected chairman of the new movement, while Yoweri K. Museveni became vice chairman and chairman of the High Command. The National Resistance Movement was organized into the National Resistance Council and the National Resistance Army. The former was the main political organ and the movement's supreme body. Alhaji Moses Kigongo was elected chairman. The council ran its affairs through various committees: Finance and Supplies, which took care of military and civilian materials in the war zone; the Political and Diplomatic Committee, which politicized the masses and informed the international community about the Uganda question; Publicity and Propaganda, which performed public-relations work at home and abroad; and the External Committee, based outside Uganda, which was to mobilize all expatriate Ugandans, raise contributions for the war effort, and do public-relations work abroad.

The duty of the National Resistance Army was to organize and win the war effort, politicize the army, educate the public, and defend the population. Few Ugandans can say it did not achieve these goals, and it did so by strong organization at the grassroots level, forming resistance councils in villages, parishes, and in subcountries with clarity of aim and dedication. It accomplished its task because its aims and military strategies were clear.¹ Unlike the UFM, which opted for quick seizure of power, the NRM decided to fight a protracted struggle, reasoning, first, that a *coup d'état* could not work since the Tanzanian forces in Uganda could reverse it with ease; second, that insurrection would fail with a population that was neither politicized nor armed; and third, that conventional methods could not be used in the initial stages because Obote had more troops and equipment than the resistance movement. The NRM leaders were very clear about their aims, tactics, and abilities. They believed, as Museveni put it, that "war is a science, war is not a gamble."² Their initial priority was not to capture or retain territory but to build a cohesive, effective, and politically motivated army that could also fight. Museveni felt that the success of the NRM was due to its "correct line in military, political and organizational matters."³ The movement depended on local resources for war materials, capturing the bulk of them from the enemy. It used local

manpower, training recruits in combat. Making recruits aware of the causes of the struggle and the possible solutions to Uganda's political problems were part of their training.

The Uganda Freedom Movement

After Lule's fall in June 1979, those in his cabinet who had advised him to resist the National Consultative Council – A. Kayiira, Sam Sabagereka, Arnold Bisase, and others – dispersed and left him. In June 1980, a group of young educated men from Uganda met with former Lule colleagues and sounded them out on the possibility that an unnamed Middle Eastern country might help Uganda overthrow dictatorship. Between August and October talks intensified amongst Ugandans, including truck owners, who united to form the Uganda Freedom Movement. Mr Balaki Kirya was elected its chairman. Unlike the NRM, the UFM executive was externally based. By December 1980, it had already stockpiled arms in Uganda. Its fighters were former soldiers in the colonial, Amin, and UNLF armies. The UFM did not believe in a people's army or a protracted struggle: it believed in a quick *coup d'état* and a quick "fall in things." Its officials claim that they would have started hostilities earlier but that they wanted to see how the elections were conducted. As it happened, the elections were rigged. Thus, on 9 February 1981, the UFM attempted a military removal of Obote's government. The attempt aborted, ending as a series of uncoordinated, foolhardy sabotage activities in Kampala at Luzira Prison, the Post Office, Radio Uganda, and a few other key positions. Nonetheless, the UPC government was shaken. Obote's soldiers fled the city and left their barracks open for over twelve hours. They returned only after they had made sure the attackers had withdrawn. PRA leaders had warned the UFM that the strategy could not work, but the UFM did not listen. In April, a second *coup* attempt aborted. President Milton Obote ran to Soroti, where he is reported to have given an inflammatory speech against the Baganda as a whole, warning that they must accept his authority or face his wrath.

There are a number of reasons why the UFM failed to crystallize as an organization and pursue the war effort. To begin with, its recruitment of fighters was casual; anyone who claimed ever to have been a soldier or who was willing to join was accepted without much scrutiny. The candidate's quality as a soldier, commitment, and level of national dedication were never tested. Secondly, the UFM did not make internal bases or camps from the start like the

NRM, whose fighters could be uniformly trained and their behaviour monitored. Instead, UFM fighters were housed in private residences in Kenya, Uganda, or elsewhere, making it very difficult to group them for action. Moreover, the fighters exposed the owners of these houses to danger. One residence housing UFM fighters was that of John Mugwanya, heir to Matayo Mugwanya at Naziri on Mit-yana road. It was attacked by UNLA rocket-propelled grenades, and seven people lost their lives. John Mugwanya escaped to Nairobi.

Another problem was that the executive of the UFM was based in Nairobi. Its members were very jealous of those who were able to enter Uganda and expose themselves to death: Andrew Kayiira, for all his inexperience in the arts of politics and warfare, was the only UFM executive member who was internally based and able to go in and out of the country, yet far from offering praise and support, some members of the executive conspired on several occasions to have him killed. Each member of the executive in Nairobi had his “fighters” inside Uganda. He could order them to carry out an action such as shooting at UPC headquarters, capturing guns at a police station, or shooting at diplomats without approval of the executive, thus fragmenting the movement. Further, the executive used the ugly, classic Ugandan weapons of conspiracy, intrigue, and slander to control the movement rather than to accomplish military tasks. In one incident, Charles Bwengye, former secretary general of the DP, accused Andrew Kayiira of favouring Catholics to the exclusion of all others in the organization. Bwengye was himself a Catholic, but when the executive investigated it became clear that the issue was getting control of the movement, not Kayiira. The bickering over that concern wasted three valuable months during which all other business was suspended. The UFM as a whole was not free of corruption: some revenues that had been collected were never reported to the chairman. Lastly, the movement was overly dependent on foreigners. A number of embassies from East and West alike had contacts within the UFM and thus heard about several of its inner strategies, some of which were leaked to Obote and Muwanga.

The UFM began to disintegrate after its preemptive attack on the Lubiri Barracks in Kampala on 23 February 1982. Although this attack had a positive element – it increased internal and external awareness of the guerilla opposition in Uganda and kept government forces at bay for some time – it was disastrous for UFM fighters and the population. The movement, having failed to beat a quick retreat, lost most of its arms and sought “refugee status” in NRM-protected areas. The second setback was the abduction of UFM

chairman Balaki Kirya from Nairobi in July 1983. He was flown back to Kampala and put into prison. Kirya was the only man capable of keeping the moribund organization together. His honesty, integrity, and age were unifying factors. The vice chairman of the UFM, Badiru Kateregga, decided to keep a low profile since one UFM faction under Amin Mutyaaba, Dr Nsibirwa, Charles Bwengye, and others was operating as if it were the executive. Meanwhile, the internally based faction under Lawrence Ssemakula and Dr Lutakome Andrew Kayiira was displeased with most of the Nairobi factions although it worked with Henry Kajura, a UFM fund raiser living in Nairobi. In September 1982 Kayiira left the Uganda bush where he had tried to start camps on the NRA model. He was careless in recruiting trainees and government agents infiltrated UFM "headquarters." In the same month UFM camps were stormed by government forces and many highly trained fighters were caught and killed. These included Luyima, a university graduate who was an expert on antiaircraft guns. Some of the captives were shown to the press and exhibited in the mass media by the government. The UFM never recovered from these events.

The Uganda National Rescue Front

The Uganda National Rescue Front consisted of Ugandans of West Nile origin who had fled to the Sudan after the fall of Kampala in 1979. This group coalesced into a movement with "at least the informal permission of the Juba Government and the security forces."⁴ The chairman of the UNRF, Brigadier Moses Ali, was a guest of powerful elements within Sudanese society and government. President Numeri was not pleased at the way Amin's government had been toppled, though he probably did not care much for the Ugandan dictator. The UNRF scored a number of victories against government forces in 1980, and between 1980 and 1982 it held most of the northern part of West Nile. This period of triumph was halted not only by the pressure of Obote's forces but by divisions amongst the West Nile people and within the UNRF itself – divisions caused, predictably, by the struggle for power, for control of the UNRF, and for influence in the West Nile. A group of soldiers led by Colonel Elly Hassan arrived in the West Nile and, claiming to be Amin's representatives, divided the fighting forces. What made matters easy for Hassan was that the chairman of the UNRF, Moses Ali, was not there. He was in the Sudan and moved to Pakistan later on. Colonel Hassan announced that Amin would come back, bring supplies, and reconquer Uganda.⁵ He organized

and operated through a suspicious organization called, simply, Uganda Army. It was later renamed the Former Uganda National Army (FUNA). He promised to regroup and re-equip all the dispersed "civil servants" who formerly served the government as soldiers. After taking the government they would be reinstated in their former positions. He appealed to ethnicity, telling the Kakwas that Koboko would be for Kakwas only. His soldiers, unruly and corrupt, smuggled commodities from Uganda to Zaire and Sudan. The UNRF decided to fight back, expelling Colonel Hassan's group from West Nile with heavy losses. (Hassan settled at Kaya on the Sudan border.)

Meanwhile, internal cleavages began to eat into the UNRF organization. Certain elements wanted to replace Moses Ali with E. Mondo, but Mondo, politically aware of the problems, refused the offer. A meeting was held at Chei in the area under their control. The aims of the meeting were to unite the movement, elect a civilian political leadership, remove corrupt leaders, and reaffirm the UNRF's dissociation from Amin. Not all of these aims were achieved. In December 1982 Obote's troops launched their "Christmas Offensive," pushing the UNRF fighters to the Sudan border. The UNRF lost its momentum after this reverse but fought on, especially in the area around Obongi. They mounted isolated but brave surprise attacks on Obote's army.⁶ Because of the chaos that followed the fighting, many civilians left West Nile and fled to the Sudan — an estimated 14,000 people as a result of the "Christmas Offensive" in December 1982 and January 1983. One of the problems encountered by the UNRF was how to control its soldiers. Unlike the NRM, it did not have a code of discipline. Many of its fighters mistreated the civilians they were supposed to protect. West Nilers objected to the "paying of tax" demanded by the fighters. Instead of soliciting materials peacefully from peasants, a number of UNRF fighters used force. The UNRF leaders were, however, in contact with fighting movements in the South.

The UNLF Anti-Dictatorship (UNLF-AD)

This group was a political organization composed of former officials of the Uganda National Liberation Front that lost power in May 1980. Its officials included Edward Rugumayo, Dan Wadada Nabudere, Omwony Ojok, Yash Tandon, Paul Wangoola, and Luutu-Mukasa. Their strategy for solving Uganda's problems was to gather, or to define and cater to, the general will of all Ugandans, in the true Rousseauian sense of the term, by sitting at a round-

table conference. They thought that the solution to Uganda's problems was democracy and that democracy could only be achieved by all political groups coming together as they had at Moshi and planning a strategy. Their aims were noble and few would argue with their view that democracy was the solution to Uganda's ills. However, two problems hindered their success. The first was that democracy cannot be established in a political vacuum. A dominant group must assume power and provide the security and conditions in which it can flourish. The dominant group must be aware that it is holding power on behalf of the people and must prepare to give it back to the people. If it does not, then it must face the likely return of the problems it is trying to solve. Like any of its predecessors who have ruled by force, the new dominant group must perish and become a footnote in history unless it honours the pledge to restore democracy that brought it to power.

Secondly, the UNLFA did not address itself clearly to the role of peasants in the political process. If, as their plans suggested, a round-table meeting were held in a foreign capital, would it be any different from the one at Moshi? Would Ugandans inside the country participate or be left out? The UNLFA, however, did more political work than physical fighting. They published hundreds of papers and booklets that exposed the Obote regime. Their psychological warfare was very effective.

The Federal Democratic Movement of Uganda

This organization was formed after the disintegration of the UFM's military wing in Uganda. After the September 1982 disaster, remnants of former UFM soldiers regrouped and constituted FEDEMU, the Federal Democratic Movement of Uganda. Lawrence Ssemakula, who had crossed from the NRM to UFM, became its leader. Ssemakula was abducted from Nairobi and returned to Uganda, where he was killed while in government custody. Dr Lwanga remained the nominal head of the movement. Nkwanga, the UFM commander, nicknamed "Mupakasi," became the commander or head of fighters that now called themselves FEDEMU. He was later killed by supporters of the Okello regime on suspicion of working with the NRM at a critical time. FEDEMU was, in reality, the UFM rejuvenated after its demise in September 1982. But unlike UFM, FEDEMU insisted on an internally administrated and led organization.

Two smaller groups should be mentioned in addition to those just discussed. The Uganda Democratic Redemption Union (UDRU) was

an élite organization under Dr Ssali in Nairobi. Some thought UDRU was fictitious while others thought that it was a front for Obote. Until Dr Ssali writes about his activities little more can be said about this group. The Former Uganda National Army, referred to above, consisted of former Ugandan army soldiers who had been disbanded in 1979 because they had fought for a government that happened to be ruled by Amin, who later lost power. They pointed out that it was their duty to obey the commander in chief and that any accusations of criminal wrongdoing on their part should be brought before the law courts. FUNA's aim in the struggle was less to bring peace to the country than to be readmitted into the army.

MILITARY MUTINY: THE SECOND FALL OF OBOTE, JULY 1985

Obote came to power through the use of violence and was removed violently. Although his soldiers administered the *coup de grâce*, his regime was rendered helpless by the opposition of fighting movements. Their bitter resistance sapped his energies, destroyed the morale of his troops, and ensured the stagnation of his economic activities. To save face, the soldiers removed Obote, whom they saw as the source of their misfortunes. Tired of fighting for the individual greed of their leaders, they mutinied. The bitter struggle against Obote lasted five years.

Although many movements fought him, the NRM contributed the lion's share in the planning and execution of the war.⁷ Between February and June 1981 the NRM's strategy was to conduct sharp, short, precise, and effective operations against government posts to capture arms, train and recruit fighters, and politicize the population. Enemy vehicles were ambushed, police stations attacked, and strategic roads mined. Between June and December 1981, the NRM curtailed hostilities to allow Tanzanian troops to withdraw. Nonetheless, confrontations occurred in the districts of Mukono, Mpigi, Luwero, and Mubende. Between January and June 1982 the NRM's forces grew in quality and quantity. Several units of more than a hundred fighters were formed: the Nkrumah Unit in Singo (Mubende); Kabarega Unit in Kapeeka; Lutta Unit in Semuto; Mondlane Unit in Makulubita; Abdel Nasser Unit in Matugga; and Mwanga Unit in Mukono, with a training unit in Lukoor. Political education was part of military training. By the end of this period, a combination of guerrilla and conventional warfare gave the NRM control of violence in a large part of Uganda, usurping Obote's monopoly of force.

From June 1982 through 1983 Obote mobilized to wipe out the

NRA guerrillas. His success in storming the UFM camps gave him the hope that the NRA would be as easy to crack. In June 1982 Oyite Ojok commanded the five-battalion offensive termed "Operation Bonanza" against the NRA, but the Resistance Army was victorious. UNLA soldiers vented their wrath on civilians, whose skulls still litter the Luwero Triangle. Further offensives against the NRA between 1983 and 1984 proved equally futile as the Resistance Army grew from strength to strength. Having built a fighting force that could engage Obote's army effectively, the NRA turned from guerrilla to conventional warfare and successfully attacked Masindi, Hoima, Gomba, and other areas formerly not considered part of the fighting zone.

Obote's decline in the period 1983-84 was partly brought about by a change in international attitude towards his regime. As evidence of his brutality leaked to the outside world, he began to lose credibility. His stay in power was financed, in large measure, by foreign sources. When these backers began to shuffle their feet, his problems increased. The Canadian and Australian members of the Commonwealth Military Team were withdrawn in this period. There was an erroneous assumption that Obote's problem was the lack of a well-trained army, so trainers were sent in to help him. Their trainees were, however, no match for the NRA. Outsiders did not want to recognize that Uganda's problem was mainly political; that unless the political problem was resolved nothing could be accomplished. The NRA sent videos overseas exposing the atrocities of the UNLA and the Obote regime against civilians. The IMF and World Bank began to reassess their involvement in Obote's Uganda. Although he had done almost everything they had asked him to do, Obote's misrule frustrated their hopes that Uganda would become a "model" of economic structural adjustment. Decreasing financial resources and intensification of armed struggle led to thousands of casualties in Obote's camp, among whom was Oyite Ojok, the chief of staff, whose helicopter was shot down by the NRA (though the government claimed it was an accident). Soldiers began to resist having to face the NRA "gorillas," as they called them; in 1983 many soldiers mutinied rather than fight.

As usual in Uganda, sectarian cleavages began to emerge. The Acholi complained that their deaths were disproportionately high and that only Langis were being promoted. They were confirmed in their belief when Obote, bypassing senior officers, chose a Langi, Smith Opon Acak, as his new chief of staff. The cabinet was divided

between two principal factions. The first, led by the president himself, consisted of young men in their early forties or late thirties and included Cris Rwakasisi, Peter Otai, Dr Luwuliza Kirunda, and others. It controlled the National Security Agency, or NASA, a spy network that had information on many people and organizations. The other faction was led by Paul Muwanga, possibly with the cooperation of Otema Alimadi and Tito Okello. Apart from Muwanga, most of its members were Acholi. By the beginning of 1985, Muwanga's section wanted to negotiate with the fighters in the bush, while the Obote group wanted to fight to the bitter end. The guerrilla war sharply divided the UPC administration and Obote's government. It seems that Obote never realized, even at this stage, that power never belongs to an individual but to an organized group. Once the group begins to disintegrate, the leader's power will weaken and wither. The weakening of the Acholi/Langi alliance meant that Obote could not hold on to power. The group was no longer united.

The government edifice began to smoulder in June 1985. The army chief of staff, Smith Opon Acak, reportedly gave orders that Acholi soldiers should go to Fort Portal to face the NRA. While it is unlikely that so improbably an order was ever issued, the Acholi in the army believed that it had been.⁸ It was also claimed that Obote ordered the arrest of all Acholi and Baganda officers before he left for eastern Uganda. Again, it is inconceivable that he did so but it was believed to be true. On 5 July 1985, General Tito Okello went to northern Uganda to officiate at a passing-out parade. While he was there Opon Acak removed ammunition and armoured personnel carriers from Mbuya. In the scuffle with those in charge of the equipment and ammunition one Acholi, Ocherro Nangai, was killed. When Tito returned he ordered that the missing items be taken back to their usual location, but the chief of staff refused. When Obote returned to Kampala he met with his inner group. By coincidence, the house of Captain Ocherro Nangai was shelled, as Muhamud Ntege-Lubwaama's had been. The Acholi's perception that Obote was trying to eliminate them solidified.

In the North, Barjilio Olara Okello mobilized his forces and disobeyed Obote's orders to return to Kampala. Despite a three-day lag between Barjilio Okello's rebellion in Gulu and his arrival in Kampala, Obote could not muster resistance to the mutiny. Barjilio Okello encountered minor resistance at Karuma Falls and Bombo. On 27 July 1985, he took control of Radio Uganda and announced that Obote had been deposed. By the time the new rulers consolidated their positions, Obote had fled. A Military

Council was formed to administer the country. Its chairman, General Tito Okello Lutwa, became government leader and president of Uganda, and Barjilio Olara Okello chief of staff. Uganda had seen yet another violent change of government. The next would occur within seven months.

THE NRA OVERTHROWS TITO OKELLO LUTWA: JANUARY 1986

The military junta rushed to incorporate all the fighting movements. The remnants of the UFM, those who had formed FEDEMU, and FUNA hurried to participate. But the main movement, the NRA, pointed out that there had been no fundamental political change in Kampala. The Resistance Army slowed its offensives but did not give up its positions. It realized that the UNLA soldiers who had snatched the people's mandate in 1980 and killed thousands of people still controlled the crucial area of the country. Only Obote and a few players had been removed. To join the Tito Okello regime would have been to compromise the democratic principles for which the NRA had fought for five years. The NRM wanted peace, but most observers realized how difficult it would be for them to work with a Military Council that included known human-rights violators such as Olara Okello. After intensive negotiations in Nairobi chaired by Kenyan president Daniel Arap Moi, the Nairobi Accord was signed in December 1985, only to fall apart a few weeks later when the NRM complained that the Military Council had not honoured its terms.⁹ In the first place, the military government in Kampala had taken unilateral decisions on major matters of policy and administration and made a number of appointments in key sectors of government and society without consulting the NRM. Secondly, the Military Council flew thousands of Amin's soldiers, many of them former Anyanya fighters from Sudan and Zaire, from West Nile to the central provinces and reintegrated them into the UNLA, contrary to the terms of the accord. The Military Council also failed to observe human rights, especially the protection of life: between July 1985 and January 1986 hundreds of Ugandans were killed by the UNLA. In the end, various elements within the NRM decided that they could not work with a "government" that so flagrantly abused human rights. In September 1985, the NRA occupied Mubende and Kawanda near Kampala. At the end of that month, Masaka and Mbarara barracks were occupied by NRA forces. Shaken, the UNLA leadership under Tito Okello Lutwa tried to reinforce their men trapped in the south and west of the country.

But their reinforcements, swelled by many former soldiers in the disgraced army of Amin including Anyanya mercenaries, were thoroughly defeated at Kayabwe and Bugomola. On 26 January 1986, the NRA stormed Kampala.¹⁰ The UNLA disintegrated as Amin's army had done. With no political or ideological cause to fight for, it was unable to put up a tough resistance.

The moment of truth had come when the UNLA failed to prevent the NRA from crossing the Katonga River, the natural barrier that has, for centuries, been used as a fort by the keepers of the grazing and agricultural forest lands of the western interlucustrine area of central Africa. It was on the Katonga that these keepers built the "Bigo-Bya-Mugenyi," a trench over ten feet deep and fifteen miles long surrounding a defensible piece of land adjacent to the river. It is thought that it was on the banks of the Katonga that the Chwezi made their last stand before the Bito from the North conquered the fertile lands of the South many centuries ago.

The crossing of the Katonga, that great geographical barrier in central Uganda, marked a shift in the political and military power in independent Uganda. The control of the means of violence shifted from the Northern Lwo- and Sudanic-speaking peoples of the nation who had been armed by the colonial state to subdue other groups in society. A legacy of seventy-five years was closed with the crossing of the Katonga by the NRA soldiers. Moreover, the myth of "martial tribes," that only Lwo and Sudanic speakers can, and that the Bantu speakers can't, fight, was blown at the banks of the river Katonga as many of the UNLA were either killed or were seen running as cowards from their enemies.

The NRA victory in Uganda was quite unusual in Africa. It marked the first successful overthrow of an indigenous government by a locally based guerrilla movement. The NRA was the first locally trained army on the continent to defeat a professionally trained army led by majors and captains who had trained in the best military colleges of the West and East. It was the first fighting movement in Africa to depend on internal resources: it captured most of its war materials from the enemy, it was sustained by local resources, and it depended on local manpower. What little help it got from abroad (not over five percent of its total needs) was of supplemental value only. And lastly, as far as Uganda was concerned, the myth of "warrior tribes" was exploded. There was a belief that only Lwo and Sudanic speakers (northerners) could fight and that Bantu speakers of the South could not. When in

1964 Ali Kisekka tried to point out that the imbalance in the army in favour of northerners should be corrected, he was told squarely by E. Lakidi (of Acholi North Constituency) that "you [Bantu] cannot fight."¹¹ It seems that Lakidi had no knowledge of the exploits of Semei Kakungulu or *Omukama* (King) Kabarega. The Bantu speakers can fight just as the Lwo speakers can, if they are well trained and equipped with a cause.

2 VICTIMIZATION OF ETHNIC GROUPS

Although Obote claimed to be a national leader whose concern was to build national consciousness and eliminate competing local and primordial loyalties, during his second administration political participation was conducted through ethnic (or tribal) units to such a degree that the latter became the basis for political rewards or retribution. As a result, certain ethnic groups that were held to be in the way of powerful politicians were victimized, the first being the people of the West Nile: the Kakwa, the Lugbara, the Madi, the Alur, and the Nubi urban groups. These people, ethnically akin to Amin, were not only perceived to have participated in the atrocities he committed but were also feared, as some of them were trained soldiers with the potential to fight back. The second group of victims were the Baganda. Since the 1966 confrontation Obote had viewed them as his enemies – and the evidence indicates that the Baganda did not, in fact, like him. When he returned to power he suppressed them, especially those in the Luwero Triangle. The third group was the Banyarwanda, whom Obote considered to be unfriendly because many were affiliated with the DP and many lived in Ankole, where the Banyarwanda voted DP like the majority of Catholic Bairu and the Hima cattle-keeping "class." There is strong evidence that the Banyarwanda were evicted from their settlements for political reasons. Karamoja suffered as well from the struggle by the petty bureaucratic bourgeoisie politicians to control the state. The following map shows the affected areas: the Luwero Triangle, the Mbarara Rakai-Masaka area, the Karamojong area, and the West Nile.

Revenge against West Nilers

West Nilers (Kakwa, Lugbara, Madi, Alur) were presumed to be enemies of the UPC government. In 1979 David Oyite Ojok had gone to President Yusefa Lule to demand that army units under his

command be sent to West Nile "to punish them for their misdeeds," but Lule had refused.¹² Instead, he asked Tanzanian authorities to station moderate and unprejudiced soldiers to garrison the West Nile, a move that secured the region from June 1979 to May 1980. Godfrey Binaisa tried to protect the area, but when he fell from power, the West Nile was helpless.

An attempt was made to assassinate Obote in Koboko in August 1980. Afterwards, Acholi/Langi soldiers and militia, armed with an excuse for genocide, descended upon West Nile without mercy. On 5 October, rebel UNRF soldiers from Zaire, backed by a popular uprising, attacked the Koboko military barracks and a UNLA detachment that was retreating to the south. By taking over many towns of the West Nile, including Arua, they put the region in the difficult position of appearing to having been a party to the UNRF incursion. The UNLA, Langi militia, and volunteers from the Acholi/Langi area advanced north from Pakwach to counter the move.

Although the aim of the exercise was to recapture the West Nile and reintegrate it into the rest of Uganda, destruction was the main achievement. The soldiers were on a mission of revenge and no one in West Nile was safe. In the words of an observer, "As one Acholi soldier allegedly announced to a Lugbara he was beating: 'You, who have made us suffer, now it is your turn to die.'"¹³ Between 3,000 and 30,000 West Nile residents are believed to have been killed. Although the rebel guerrillas had long since fled, the UNLA spent several days reducing large parts of Arua and Koboko districts to rubble; in the countryside huts were filled with people and set on fire, men were shot and women raped. Churches were desecrated, grain stores overturned, and fixed property wantonly destroyed. Acholi war-flutes piped their victory songs. The battalion at Moyo had also fled after hearing about the supposed Koboko invasion through a radio announcement made by Obote himself, who at the time had no official rank. Some days later a similar punitive expedition was mounted to retake Madi. Local people reported that Acholi soldiers were seen walking through Moyo with the genitals of their victims hanging from their belts, while in East Madi the militia are said to have brought their relatives along to assist with the looting and the removal of cattle.

So widespread was the damage that the government, out of shame, sent a mission led by two West Nile cabinet ministers, Moses Apiliga from Madi, and Anthony Butele, a Lugbara, to investigate. During October and November 1980 they visited the region and prepared a grisly report that implicated the UNLA and the militia in the deaths of civilians, destruction of property, and infliction of far-

reaching damage. The report stated that "the UNLA is very hostile towards civilians. Their activities clearly show feelings of revenge. Most civilians are shot on sight."¹⁴ From February to March 1981, Prime Minister Otema Alimadi, army commander Tito Okello, Moses Apiliga, aid workers, and journalists visited the West Nile to see for themselves. So upset was Otema Alimadi that he allowed the journalists, so it was reported, to publish what they saw without fear. Ben Bella Elakut of the *Uganda Times* filed a report, "Tragedy in East Moyo," that appeared on March 11 and told a sad tale of murder, destruction, vandalism, rape, and complete disregard for human life. The government, upset by the report, reversed its position and imprisoned Ben Bella Elakut. He was later dismissed from his job.

By May 1981 the UNRF was fighting back and controlled most of northern West Nile except the trading centres of Ladonga, Koboko, Yumbe, and Moyo. In fighting for Arua two of their commanders, Galla and Abiliga, were shot by a UNLA unit. The two were taken to the Ombachi Mission, which was sheltering refugees fleeing from government violence. Medical workers at Ombachi agreed to give the two soldiers immediate surgery if they did not molest the civilian refugees in the mission and if they would evacuate as soon as the operation was over. The two rebel leaders agreed. Abiliga died in the night and the following morning his body was carried away by members of the UNRF, along with Galla. The UNLA, incensed by the aid the two had been given, stormed the mission, shot at the crowd of refugees, molested the civilians and missionaries, and vandalized the facility. More than ten people were reported killed, over a hundred wounded, and hundreds of refugees forced to flee. Many were caught in the crossfire as they ran. When the Red Cross publicized the details of this and other massacres, it was asked to leave Uganda. The result was that, as the struggle for West Nile intensified, subsequent killings went unreported. Even during the stalemate of 1981–82 when many people were killed by opposing forces, their deaths were not reported outside of the West Nile.

The UNRF guerrillas were eventually weakened by the internal divisions discussed earlier. The infrastructure of the West Nile was severely damaged and its ruined streets, houses, and springs were stained with blood. While the UNRF tried to resolve differences among groups in the region as well as its internal problems, government troops took advantage of the opportunity to punish the people of the region. They reoccupied areas the rebels had once held and defined all civilians as rebel supporters. In Decem-

ber 1982 the UNLA mounted its "Christmas Offensive," chasing the UNRF north along the Arua-Moyo road. The UNRF withdrew to Mount Kei in the northwestern corner of the West Nile, and most of its territory except the area around Obongi was lost.¹⁵ In reoccupying the West Nile the UNLA demonstrated once again that it was not known for its kind-heartedness. Unable to forgive or forget West Nilers' perceived or actual crimes against the Acholi/Langi people, wherever the UNLA went it destroyed. The people of West Nile left their homes *en masse* and fled to neighbouring countries, taking with them as many of their animals and belongings as they could. By the middle of 1983 about 60,000 refugees were in Zaire and more than 200,000 in the Sudan, rising to about 350,000 in 1984.¹⁶ Meanwhile, government troops destroyed buildings, houses, and domestic animals. The West Nile, dealt with as though it were Sodom and Gomorrah, would never be the same again.

Desirous of improving its international image, Obote's regime tried to make the world believe that all was well in the West Nile by pointing out that it was in control there. The government was indeed in control, but of a territory empty of all but those not presumed to be the enemies of Acholi and Langi soldiers. About 60,000 people returned in 1984 because a good-hearted district commissioner at Arua worked to restore law and order. But three problems made large-scale repatriation difficult. First, in March 1984 Cris Rwakasisi, a minister responsible for security, warned the Arua district commissioner not to interfere in security matters, so that the district commissioner became very careful about what he did. Then in May, a prominent businessman, Alhaji Jabiri, returned from Zaire, turned himself over to the police, and announced his intention to return to his homeland to live a normal life. However, because he was thought to have collaborated with groups that had committed atrocities against the Acholi and Langi in the Amin period, he was removed from police custody by the Special Branch and killed. As a result of this incident and many others that went unreported but were generally known by people in the region, few West Nile residents would venture to return to their homeland. Finally, the High Commissioner for Refugees protested strongly against the killing of Alhaji Jabiri, but because the government took no notice and did not seem to accept any responsibility for protecting its citizens, many West Nilers felt they could not risk returning home. They remained abroad as refugees and waited for better times to come.

*The Suppression of Baganda Peasants:
The Luwero Triangle*

Obote, as already observed, identified the Baganda as his enemies. In a speech given at Soroti in April 1981, he reportedly warned: "I want to sent a message to the Baganda exactly as the one I sent to the people of West Nile and Madi in September that I am going to set loose my forces on them and spill more blood than has ever been spilt."¹⁷ Although he is unlikely to have said this, a number of people in Buganda believed that he did and that he was capable of putting his words into action. In March 1981 he had warned that areas harbouring guerrillas would be dealt with severely. Not only would government troops intervene to restore order, but essential commodities would be withheld from those areas.¹⁸ Guerrilla activity by the NRM and other fighting groups in the area known as the Luwero Triangle was widespread and intensive, involving hit-and-run tactics designed to train recruits as soldiers, capture ammunition, and politicize the population. Whenever government forces were unable to hunt down guerrillas, they victimized the local population instead, especially where language differences made communication difficult; while most of the UNLA spoke Lwo, the people in the Luwero Triangle generally spoke Luganda, a Bantu language.

The area known as the Luwero Triangle comprised three districts: Luwero proper; Mubende, which included the subcounties of Bukuya, Kiboga, Butemba, Bukomero, Ntwetwe, Sekanyonyi, Bulera, and Kkandwa; and Mpigi, with its subcounties of Namayumba, Wakiso, Kakiri, Kiziba, Gombe, Nangabo, Kyambogo, Nabweru, Muduma, Kiringente, Maddu, Mpenja, Kabulasoke, Kyegonza, and Masuuliita. Estimates of the number of people killed in these areas range anywhere from 50,000 to 200,000. The Obote government assigned Francis Mukama to investigate the area as a prelude to applying for international aid. His report showed that some 993,767 people had been displaced by the conflict and that another 188,000 were residents of fifty-three "relief centres."¹⁹ Of those displaced, 41.5 percent (412,474) were from the Luwero District, 33 percent (253,030) from Mpigi District, and 25.5 percent (328,263) from Mubende District – in all, about 200,000 families. These were Obote's figures.

As fighting intensified, residents of the Luwero Triangle were more heavily persecuted. By July 1982 the government had launched more than eight major military campaigns against NRM guerrillas without success. Any civilians in the battle zone were

either killed or put into concentration camps. In September 1982, after the collapse of the UFM, Obote's government was free to focus on the NRM and its army and organized "Operation Bonanza" to bring about its defeat. But the NRM was so well entrenched that offensives involving nine battalions were unable to dislodge them.

At each failure government forces directed their anger against the civilian population, a move which did nothing to improve the image of the government forces. UNLA soldiers killed people as they advanced and killed people as they retreated. Between January and September 1983 government forces suffered several reverses and heavy casualties, including three North Korean mercenaries. Enraged, the UNLA turned once again on the civilian population, killing, looting, vandalizing, raping, and destroying at will. The many skeletal remains found in the area in 1986 tell the tale of what happened. Hundreds of skeletons were scattered at Nakaseke trading centre, where the UNLA based itself and where anti-Baganda inscriptions remain on the walls to this day. What could not be carried away was destroyed, most residents were killed, some, admittedly, by the NRM or UFM, but the majority by government troops. The guerrilla fighters depended on the goodwill of the people to survive and therefore could not afford to antagonize them the way government forces did.

One of the most publicized of these military operations against civilians was the one undertaken in the Namugongo area. From 21 May 1984 to the end of the month, the area was consumed by shooting, looting, rape, killing, destruction of property, and a complete breakdown of law and order. By the time peace returned to the area, thirty people were reported killed. One of these was the Reverend Godfrey Charles Bazira, director of an Anglican theological school that was attacked, according to an eyewitness, in the following manner:

On 21 May 1984 when the students were in their classes, three military trucks advanced from the direction of Nakiyanja and parked on the road next to their school. Soldiers came out and lined up as if on a parade, they then marched down the hill on which the school is built. When the Director of the school, the late Rev. Godfrey C. Bazira, saw all these odd manoeuvres taking place around his school, he collected all the students into a large room and asked them to place themselves into God's hands and ask Him to help them pass through this critical time. While in the room hiding, the students heard one of the soldiers who sounded like a commander shout, "ADVANCE." This command was immediately followed by heavy shooting from all directions. It was only then they realized the

whole school was surrounded. This led many students to panic terribly. The Director tried as much as possible to cool them down by engaging them into prayers. As they were praying, a soldier in Uganda military uniform emerged from a window and shouted, "Who are you?" The director told him they were students of the school and that he was the Director. Immediately, the soldier pulled out a gun and fired a bullet, passing through the thigh of a girl, Elizabeth Namatovu, and landing into the leg of the Director. Outside the building there was heavy shooting still going on and more soldiers entered the room where the students were gathered. They accused the students of harbouring guerrillas who, as they said, spoiled their car. The students who were talking to the reporters wondered how a guerrilla could fire at a car leaving a soldier standing nearby. They went on to say that they had not seen any unusual activities around their school in the days preceding 21 May 1984 which could have suggested any guerrilla activity around the area. Thirty-eight students, including the two talking to reporters, were then packed into a truck and driven away. Reporters then asked the students what had happened to their director. They said that the Reverend Bazira was separated from the group after they had been collected outside and then beaten terribly. He was then led by four soldiers down the hill who continued to beat him and kick him at the same time. A few minutes later the students heard several gunshots in the direction he was led. That was the last time they saw their director alive. The students continued to narrate their ordeal after Namugong. They were driven to Kampala Police Station, but the police officer in charge refused to accept them because, he said, he did not see the reason why they were being held. They were then driven to Makindye Barracks but the Commander of the Barracks refused to accept them too, but he advised the soldiers holding them to send them to the District Commissioner of Mukono who controls Namugongo area.²⁰

A nearby mosque was also desecrated by the soldiers, who slaughtered, barbecued, and ate a pig in the prayer house. Namugongo was a turning point in the psychological warfare between Obote and his opponents. It became difficult for Obote's friends to defend him after this incident. The Anglican community in Uganda, which had not criticized him too publicly, came out strongly against the loss of human life in Uganda. The articulate Anglican bishop of southwest Uganda, the late Bishop Kivenjeri, denounced the killings. The Roman Catholics and the Muslim communities were also affected.

Namugongo was one of precolonial Buganda's execution places. It was here that the Uganda Martyrs were killed, and here that the spirit of the new Buganda nation based on a religious division of

society and resources began. It became, like Jerusalem, a symbol of Christianity and Islam. The Catholics have a shrine at Namugongo, dedicated by Pope Paul VI in 1969 when he visited Uganda, as do the Protestants and Muslims. The desecration of Namugongo was felt by many in Uganda as an attack on what they considered to be the most holy place in the country. Namugongo brought together Roman Catholics, Anglicans, and Muslims. They realized the threat to all religion just as they had done in 1888 when they combined to overthrow Mwanga II. This time they were more sophisticated; they did not aim at acquisition of open political power. They understood, however, that there was a political problem which lay beyond religious sectarianism.

Once again, after almost one hundred years, the fires of Namugongo were shaping the destiny of Uganda. They were giving a new life to the spirit of the Uganda nation. Embarrassed, the government admitted that its soldiers had been involved in the killings at Namugongo.

Such atrocities were visible to any who visited the Triangle after the NRM's assumption of power. The pictures included in this book show a minute fraction of the UNLA's destruction of property and human life in the area.

One of Obote's most violent gestures during his second government was the creation of concentration camps. As noted in chapter 7, thousands of people were herded into what the government called "relief centres" whose conditions were not much different from those of the Nazi death camps. Whenever the government "reclaimed" a part of the Luwero Triangle it concentrated civilians into camps, ostensibly for protection but actually to control the population. Anyone found outside these camps was presumed to be a guerilla. All civilians who tried to leave the Luwero Triangle were rounded up and moved to the camps. All males between the ages of nine and thirty-five were either shot or driven away on trucks; all females aged nine to thirty-five were either raped or forcibly taken as concubines. The camps, in other words, contained those under nine years of age or those over fifty. By September 1983 there were more than thirty-six relief camps, each holding between ten and two thousand people. The camp around the Ndejje educational complex contained more than eight thousand people and occupied an area of four hundred by two hundred metres.²¹ The camps were surrounded by barbed wire and guarded by soldiers under orders to shoot anyone breaking the dawn-to-dusk curfew. The huts

were thatched with grass, there were no medical facilities, food was poor, and there was often very little firewood. Inmates had to forage for miles for what little water and food they got and were often escorted at gunpoint.

Because of their age and maltreatment, inmates of the camps were very vulnerable to disease; thousands died. For example at the Ndejje camp more than a hundred children died in May 1983 from disease. The same number died at Masuliita and many of the other camps had their occupants attacked by disease. *Munnansi's* issue of 12 July 1983 describes the camp inmates as desperate people who had lost all hope and value in life: mere zombies.²² They were subjected to various forms of violence by troops and functionaries. Government agents such as NASA would march into camps, read out people's names, and take them away to undisclosed places for torture. There were often massacres in the camps. In one such incident in 1983, UPC youth wingers armed with machetes and spears and supported by the army killed hundreds of people in sweeps through Luwero camp (3 May), Kikyusa camp (24 May), and Masuliita camp (29 May). When people were evicted the army carried out a systematic ransacking of abandoned villages. The roofs, doors, and windows of houses were taken and coffee or other produce was loaded onto army trucks. Looted coffee contributed to Uganda's coffee exports from 1982 to 1984. Every conceivable item of property was taken.

The government denied the existence of these concentration camps until quite late for fear of ruining its international image and because it claimed that there were no antigovernment guerrillas. In fact, the government promoted the idea that the camps were to protect those in them: Obote, after giving the British, Canadian, and Australian high commissioners a tour of the camps, said that "the people who had got displaced due to bandit activities were voluntarily returning to certain centres such as police stations, army posts, administrative headquarters and schools."²³ Aid agencies were warned not to leak the existence of these camps to the international media. But certain agencies such as the Uganda Red Cross, OXFAM, the League of the Red Cross, the World Food Program, UNICEF, USAID, CARE, and various church groups pressed the government to do something for humanitarian reasons. The Mukama Report completed in September 1983 became the basis of the government's appeal for \$17 million. Because some of the money was intended for resettlement purposes the government was admitting that the situation in the Luwero Triangle was not quite as Obote had earlier tried to portray it. His administration was now

appealing for help to disband camps whose very existence it had previously denied. Embarrassed, the government in November 1984 began demolishing the camps, leaving people whose homes had been looted and destroyed by the UNLA to fend for themselves. Because the inmates had nowhere to go, Obote permitted the International Red Cross to open up a transit centre in Luwero to provide emergency aid, medical facilities, and food. But local officials interfered with its work. The district commissioner, Nathan Karema, and Lieutenant Colonel Orwoth of Bombo are reported to have stopped all food from entering Luwero District with the excuse that food and supplies were once discovered in "bandit" camps.

That Luwero was indeed the "killing fields" of Uganda is evident from the skeletons, the roofless houses, unkept roads, and destroyed schools found in the area from 1986, after the NRM victory. The sad situation in Luwero Triangle was revealed to the outside world by William Pike, an independent journalist who spent ten days in the bush with the NRA. Writing in the *Observer* of 19 August 1984, he stated that he had visited the subject areas, seen hundreds of corpses, and interviewed many civilians and several NRA officers. He supported his claims with photographs. This was the first time a credible journalist had given the outside world published reports of the massacres endured by the people of Luwero Triangle for more than three years.

Destruction of the Infrastructure

In addition to its violence against people, the UNLA destroyed the structures that had formerly supported social life. According to Mukama's report, by 1983 the infrastructure needed massive rehabilitation. In Luwero District itself more than seventy-two schools, whose enrolment had been 7,909, were destroyed or needed repair; the figures in Mpigi District were thirty-six schools (11,570 students), and in Mubende District thirty-eight schools (6,507 students). Agriculture was also severely affected: equipment worth more than 652 million Ugandan shillings was destroyed and thousands of head of livestock slaughtered. Of 854,346 cattle in the region in 1981, only 179,000 remained two years later. Health units also suffered enormously and would need a great deal of work to resume functioning. Springs, wells, dams, and valley tanks as well as roads were damaged. By 1984 the government needed some 432 million shillings to repair 1,610.4 kilometres of road in the Luwero Triangle.²¹ The catastrophic destruction of the infrastructure affected

the provision of food, shelter, and medical care, leaving people susceptible to disease. Human error in the Luwero Triangle, and indeed in the whole country, had created a fertile ground for natural disasters. Hunger, disease, and death followed conflict.

THE EVICTION OF THE BANYARWANDA

Beginning in September 1982 the Banyarwanda, who had long lived in Uganda and considered the country their home, were chased out of their nation, abused, imprisoned, and left to die while their property was vandalized or looted. Of the 75,000 Banyarwanda who were displaced, some 35,000 found shelter inside Uganda in camps run by the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR); 36,000 fled to Rwanda (4,000 more were trapped in Uganda without help when Rwanda closed her borders to the influx); and thirty-seven were reported killed. These were Banyarwanda from Ankole (Bushenyi and Mbarara districts). In 1983, over 19,000 were evicted from the Masaka area (Rakai and Masaka districts). It should be noted that in Ankole, the Bahima were victimized as well because Museveni, the guerilla leader, was assumed to be a Muhima.

The situation of the Banyarwanda was exacerbated by the Obote government's refusal to look after its citizens and care for refugees. Although the Ugandan and Rwandan governments came to an agreement between September and October 1982 on how to treat evicted people, Obote's government did not honour its commitment, and refugees residing in camps at Kyaaka II in Ankole were harassed by the army in 1985.

The earliest Banyarwanda residents of what is now Uganda arrived when Rwandan kings invaded the country in precolonial times. The European partition of Africa added a second group. In 1910 the British and Belgians, after hot verbal exchanges that almost led to fighting, defined the border of southwestern Uganda to include Banyarwanda living in what had been part of the precolonial Rwanda kingdom.²⁵ Other Banyawanda arrived as immigrant labourers to meet the labour needs of Uganda's peasant-based agriculture. Although "deprived" parts of Uganda supplied labour to the southern cash-crop-growing area of the country, the reader will recall that people from Rwanda/Burundi, most of them Banyarwanda, made up a significant section of rural workers in the

south.²⁶ Although many earned enough to return, most decided to stay and take an option to become "Baganda." This involved being adopted by one of Buganda's more than thirty clans, recognizing Buganda's king as both ruler and head of the clan structure, learning to speak Luganda, converting to the religion of one's patron, staying out of controversial issues, and acquiring land for building a house. Thus could a Munyarwanda become a Muganda and take part in local society. Baganda are not really an ethnoracial unit or an impermeable caste group so much as a social group united by language, culture, territory, and before 1966, common political institutions.

According to Richards, the Banyarwanda comprised more than twenty percent of Buganda's population.²⁷ The Uganda constitutions of 1962, 1966, and 1967 provide ample and incontrovertible evidence that the majority of the Banyarwanda were Ugandan citizens.²⁸

The other category of Banyarwanda in Uganda were Batutsi fleeing Rwanda following its independence. From around 1958 a shift of power in Rwanda from the Batutsi to the Bahutu saw many Banyarwanda Tutsi exiled.²⁹ About ten thousand fled to Uganda from 1959 onwards.

The evictions originated in a struggle to control resources in southwestern Uganda, where the population growth rate was rapidly outstripping resources.³⁰ The agricultural population needed more land for cultivation but the Hima and other cattle-keeping groups wanted vast areas for grazing. USAID and other international agencies had financed a successful scheme to enclose large tracts of land for ranching in the Ankole-Masaka area, resulting in increased meat and dairy production. However, the scheme benefited only a few people and created a scarcity of land for the rest. People were forced to fetch water and wood in private ranches and had nowhere to graze their animals. Compounding the problem were Tutsi refugees who, as they were phased out of the refugee camps, sought land to settle on.

Added to these economic problems were complex political forces in Ankole that would eventually affect the Banyarwanda as well. Alignments within Ankole were complicated by an uneasy relationship between Bairu farmers and Bahima cattle owners. Although the Hima were Protestants they voted in a way that addressed local problems. As noted earlier, Protestants in many parts of Uganda generally voted UPC while Catholics tended to vote

DP. In Ankole, on the other hand, the Bahima Protestants voted (in the 1960s) mainly for the DP while, as in other parts of the country, the Bairu Protestants voted UPC and the Catholic Bairu voted DP. The Bahima had realized that educated Protestant Bairu were edging them out of positions of social significance in the district.³¹ The influx of the mainly Catholic Banyarwanda cattle keepers upset this delicate political balance by voting DP. The Protestant Bairu realized that the combined vote of the Protestant Hima and the Catholic Bairu and Banyarwanda was more than they could challenge at the polls.

During his first regime, Obote had become nervous over the influx of Catholic Banyarwanda and planned to remove them from the political process by expelling them from the country after arranging a minicensus.³² Before he could do this, however, he was overthrown by Amin and his plan would have to wait. The Banyarwanda, who were not disappointed to see him go, were linked by the people in Ankole with Idi Amin. (Indeed, the former king, or *Omwaami*, of Rwanda was himself a friend of Amin's who fled Uganda when the latter was overthrown in 1979). In July 1984, Rwanyarare, Obote's minister of Culture and Community Development, reportedly said during a meeting of the International Conference for Assistance to Refugees in Africa in Geneva that "many of the Rwandese refugees identified themselves too closely with the death squads of the Amin Regime."³³ But this statement was widely assumed to have been part of a political smear campaign rather than fact. In the published list of the 240 most-wanted officials of the Amin regime, only seven were Banyarwanda, or 0.3 percent of a group that, in 1959, comprised 5.9 percent of Uganda's population. The Barundi, who are often mistaken for Banyarwanda, made up 2.2 percent of Uganda's population in 1959. The fear of the Banyarwanda in UPC circles was such that the UPC failed to register many of them in preparation for the 1980 elections. In some areas of the country the exclusion was disguised but in Bushenyi no attempt was made to hide the fact that the Banyarwanda were being denied the right to vote. The compilers of voting registers also left out a number of Bahima and Catholic Bairu. The result was the creation of a strong enclave of UPC voters in Bushenyi. By election time, the UPC was publicly announcing its perceived enemies, a significant proportion of whom were Banyarwanda.

The Eviction Process

In September 1982, two UPC youths and a policeman were killed in a scuffle in Mbarara District. The UPC claimed that the three were

killed by Banyarwanda while investigating the theft of cattle by other Banyarwanda; the Banyarwanda, however, are certain that the two youths were trying to steal cattle from them under police protection. By 30 September 1982, UPC officials in Mbarara announced that all Banyarwanda were to move into refugee camps. It appears that similar action was taken against some twelve thousand Bahima and Bakiga. To support the evictors, a detachment of the feared Special Force, dominated by Acholi/Langi, was sent to Lyantonde in Rakai District, thirty miles east of Mbarara. On 1 October 1982 the Banyarwanda were given the option of moving into the UNHCR's refugee camps at Oruchinga and Nakivale or leaving Uganda altogether. Because these choices were difficult, it is not surprising that many Banyarwanda did not move until UPC functionaries backed by the Special Force began a campaign of beatings, harassment, rape, and cattle theft (between thirty-five and fifty percent of their cattle were stolen). More than seventeen Banyarwanda were killed and about the same number committed suicide. Any "Ugandan" trying to help the Banyarwanda was labelled anti-Ugandan.³⁴

When the eviction in Mbarara was completed, government attention shifted to other areas where Banyarwanda lived in sizeable numbers. In the Rakai-Masaka districts some twenty thousand Banyarwanda, almost sixty percent of whom were Ugandan citizens, were evicted. About ten thousand rushed to UNHCR camps in Toro while others crossed into Tanzania.³⁵ The local member of Parliament, Luke Kazinja (DP), criticized the government, linking the chief of NASA, Cris Rwakasisi, to the evictions. Although Kazinja himself was protected by parliamentary immunity, his house was raided by government troops a few days later and he went into hiding.³⁶ The total breakdown of discipline in the army forced more Banyarwanda to leave their homes and seek refuge.

That the UPC government was a party to the evictions seems clear. In early 1982 ministers wanted to return the Banyarwanda to UNHCR camps but backed down when Tom Unwin, the UNHCR representative in Uganda, intervened.³⁷ The president himself reportedly said that "some people had been forced to be refugees in their own country because refugees from other countries had taken advantage of the hospitality of Ugandans. A visitor who does this is inviting himself to be sent away."³⁸ It was also reported that two ministers from the region, Cris Rwakasisi (in charge of national security) and Patrick Rubaihayo (a former Makerere University professor), toured the area and made inflammatory anti-Banyarwanda speeches.³⁹ In July 1982 the Mbarara District Council passed a resolution that all refugees should be moved from Uganda's

borders – a clear message indeed. When the evictions started, Unwin was ordered out of the country for leaking news of what was going on to the international press, but the order was rescinded after Unwin delivered what the radio news termed an apology; far from being evicted, Radio Uganda went on to say, the Banyarwanda had simply panicked and fled after the shooting incident in Mbarara District referred to above. According to another report, Prime Minister Otema Alimadi said that refugees were simply returning home because peace now prevailed in Rwanda.

While on 29 October 1982, Obote is believed to have announced that the government was not a party to the evictions,⁴⁰ the chairman of Mbarara District Council, Mr L.R. Makatu, is said to have taken a more uncompromising stand: "For the past 20 years we have been generous enough to accommodate these Rwandan refugees and normal aliens of Rwandan origin not knowing that we were nourishing a viper in our chest until recently we realized that they were dangerous."⁴¹ Days later, on 4 November 1982, he is believed to have thanked those who had participated in the evictions, saying that, "when lifting a roof off a house you cannot avoid the nasty happenings that may arise thereof. Be patient as the district council will determine a way for you to divide these [Banyarwanda] properties."⁴² Obote appointed him to a committee set up to identify who was a refugee and who was not. This committee evicted more than eight thousand people between December 1982 and the end of January 1983.

Finally, meetings were held between Rwandan and Ugandan authorities in October 1982 and March 1983 at which it was agreed that Ugandan nationals would be repatriated to Uganda. Between July and September 1983, Ministry of Justice officials visited camps in Rwanda to identify Uganda citizens but their findings were not published. No action was taken despite Rwanda's claim that ninety percent of the people in the Rwandan camps were Uganda citizens. The suffering of the Banyarwanda has been recorded in great detail.⁴³ It is to be hoped that similarly thorough studies of the Luwero and West Nile victimizations will be done.

THE DISPLACEMENT OF THE KARAMOJONG

Between 1981 and 1984, some one thousand Karamajong were killed and forty thousand displaced. Although the victimization of these people was not directly caused by the political conflicts that led to the eviction of the Banyarwanda, the Suppression of the

Baganda, or the revenge against the West Nilers, the suffering of the Karamojong was exacerbated by the struggle for the Ugandan state as the UPC government exploited and increased cleavages within Karamoja society as part of its quest for control.

The Karamojong Cluster (that is, the Karamojong, the Dodoth, and the Jie) was not developed by the colonial state or by independent Ugandan governments. By 1980 there were more than a hundred thousand Karamojong who had not been entirely integrated into the monetary economy of the South, who produced no crops for the international market, and for whom the single most important economic activity was accumulating cattle. Because acquiring cattle was the ultimate concern of the individual and the main measure of economic strength, the Karamojong considered cattle rustling an acceptable occupation. To them it was so legitimate that the term cattleraiding did not have negative connotations. The British tried to confine what they described as cattle rustling to Karamoja. In colonial Uganda the situation was not serious because the Karamoja were armed only with spears, sticks, and arrows. But this situation changed after independence. When the Karamoja acquired sophisticated weapons from Idi Amin's retreating soldiers and from abandoned barracks, the balance of power within Karamoja changed: those who had looted the most guns and who enjoyed the support of loyal followers became Karamojong warlords.

The UPC, in its quest for votes in Karamoja, allied itself in 1980 with Apa Loris, the leader of the Bokora clan, and could therefore not stop him raiding other clans and people. Apa Loris was killed in Soroti in 1982 *en route* to a government-sponsored peace mission to end Karamojong cattle raids in Teso. His death incensed the Bokora clan in particular and the Karamoja in general. The Karamojong raided Teso, Lango, and Acholi homelands in 1983. A retaliatory expedition by Langi militia was ambushed and wiped out at Kangole near Moroto. Members of another Langi expedition looted and destroyed Kangole and Matane before being forced to retreat into Moroto barracks after losing more than 157 of their number.

The Karamojong, it seemed, were not easy to discipline and Obote's government found that it had put its fingers in very hot soup. Because Kenya suffered the same cattle-rustling problems as Uganda, the two governments launched a joint military operation in February 1984 against cattle rustlers in northeast Uganda and northwest Kenya. Between 9 and 19 March the Acholi and Langi, helped by the militia and Special Force, systematically destroyed

cattle, houses, and crops in the Karamojong villages of Namalu and Nabilatuk, forcing over twenty thousand Karamojong to run for their lives. Because this region was Karamoja's granary, planting was disrupted and a serious famine occurred the following year. The government later announced that Karamoja was suffering from a "natural disaster" like the famine that had killed some fifty thousand Karamojong in 1980.⁴¹

But this so-called natural disaster had human origins. The Karamojong problem had escalated from cattle rustling to armed conflict because of the political struggle to control the Ugandan state. The UPC, which wanted to be seen as a party that stood for ethnic unity, equitable redistribution of resources, and the elimination of primordial forces from Uganda's politics, was fanning and exploiting these negative factors to stay in power. Instead of eliminating structural violence, UPC was reinforcing it.

CHAPTER NINE

Conclusion

By the time Obote fell in 1985, Uganda could no longer be described as a state. No one military or political organization commanded the legitimate use of violence in the country. The NRM controlled most of the West and Southwest. Obote's army was divided along ethnic cleavages and concentrated around Kampala and other urban centres. The Karamajong were still isolated and carrying on their traditional cattle-rustling activities irrespective of Kampala's wishes. The West Nile was bitter; a substantial number of its people were refugees in Sudan and Zaire. The Baganda were alienated. There was no full production of cash crops in the South or West. The international financial institutions had been slowing the pace of loans. Uganda was a mere geographical expression, not a political entity.

Prolonged violence in Uganda left permanent scars that are found in every facet of life. Scores of thousands chose to live the difficult life of exile rather than submit to a situation they were not even free to protest against at home. The near elimination in some places of the infrastructure that supported organized human endeavour lowered the quality of life. Violence, dishonesty, corruption, and moral degeneration permeated the whole social system. As political violence intensified, so to did domestic violence. It became increasingly difficult to live in Uganda because life was so easy to end: a person could be killed at any time, for any reason, without the intervention of state authority. Finally, the collapse of good government had a devastating impact on the environment. Because governments did not have the will or the means to protect natural resources, greedy deviants secured a free hand to exploit the environment at will. One result of the chaos is that the country's wildlife has been almost wiped out.

Refugees and Exiles

The political chaos in Uganda has driven many Ugandans abroad as refugees and exiles. By 1984, upwards of 350,000 Ugandans were living in the Sudan, only 200,000 of whom bothered to register with the United Nations High Commission for Refugees.¹ But the real figure was probably higher.² About 31,000 lived in Rwanda, 4,000 in Kenya, and 10,000 in Tanzania. By 1985 Ugandans comprised the world's fourth largest group of refugees, after Afghans, Palestinians, and Ethiopians.³

The majority of Ugandan refugees are ordinary people. When they flee their homes they confront a host of obstacles. Becoming a legal resident of a new country involves being accepted and registered by both the host country and the UNHCR. A number of people are rejected at the registration stage for no other reason than their inability to express themselves. Then there are financial reasons. Although most countries allow fully registered refugees to work, there are many obstacles to be overcome in finding employment. (The period between registration and employment has been called the "rehabilitation" period.)⁴ Many Ugandan refugees in Zaire, Kenya, Sudan, Rwanda, and Tanzania received no rehabilitation assistance from UNHCR and had to live with relatives, friends, or good-hearted people. Moreover, because refugees are often "the last hired and the first fired" in any country, it is often difficult to keep a job. If refugees go into business, they are open to treatment as "second class" citizens and often lack legal protection against nationals who can cheat them.

Refugees also face the psychologically difficult task of deciding how much to integrate into their host societies, and whether they should take out citizenship or not. Although doing so might appear unpatriotic to those who have not been violently removed from their homelands, conditions in exile are such that integration is often the best way for refugees to meet their material and psychological needs. Among the advantages of integrating into an advanced host society is the opportunity to help one's homeland. After a long period of residence abroad, Ugandans who decide to go back benefit the country by bringing with them the technical knowledge or capital they have acquired. Israel has been built by its own refugees, and countries like the Sudan, Egypt, India, and Bangladesh are very much dependent on money remitted by their nationals or former nationals living abroad.

The last problem refugees face is repatriation. Returning to one's beloved homeland is easier for peasant refugees than for the educated élite.⁵ Uganda's disrupted economy cannot absorb all the

educated élite at once; moreover, the latter are hesitant to break off acquired linkages in host societies before the resolution of political problems at home has brought about the rehabilitation of the economy. The exodus has cost Uganda some of its most skilled people who, while desperately needed at home, are unable to return immediately. *Africa Events* explains the problem clearly: "A comprehensive register of Uganda's skilled manpower today, would probably show that there are just as many Ugandan doctors, lawyers, engineers, educators etc. etc. working abroad as there are in Uganda itself. It is often said of the Irish that they have helped to build every country in the world except their own. An exaggeration no doubt, but in the last fifteen years the Uganda professional and business class has put nearly as much into servicing foreign countries as it has into building its own."⁶

It is clear that those who were torn away from the land of their ancestors, from their native land – from the environment in which they could perform best – suffered violence. But those who remain suffer too; the removal of so many highly skilled people makes their lives more difficult. And it must be remembered that not all "refugees" left Uganda. "Internal refugees" were uprooted from their homes by the civil conflict and began living elsewhere in the country – in the West Nile, the Luwero Triangle, Karamoja; and southwest Uganda. These people roamed the country, lived in areas not their own, suffered the loss of all their property, and knew violence as part of their daily bread. They too were true refugees.

Quality of Life

Continued social conflict led to the breakdown of the country's infrastructure. The destruction of roads, health centres, water supplies, agriculture, and schools in the Luwero Triangle described in chapter 8 was repeated throughout Uganda in varying degrees. The war to oust Amin cost most of the infrastructure of the southern districts of Rakai, Mbarara, Masaka, and Mpigi. The West Nile and Madi districts paid the same price in 1980–83. Lango District followed suit in 1985 when the July *coup d'état* brought the Acholis under Tito Okello to power, ending the honeymoon of the two Lwo-speaking groups. The civil war that followed the NRM's victory in 1986 gave Acholi a taste of how destructive conflict can be. Karamoja underwent the displacements mentioned above. Toro District suffered from the internal struggle caused by the Ruwenzururu movement. Thus, all of Uganda except Kigezi and Busoga witnessed the destruction of their infrastructure by social conflict.

Here is a numbing litany of what ordinary Ugandans faced when

the infrastructure of their society disappeared. People and commodities became increasingly immobilized because damaged roads were not repaired, and whatever motor vehicles were not stolen were apt to break down for want of spare parts. In 1970, there was one motor vehicle to every 178.5 people (50,419 vehicles for nine million people). By 1987, however, there was one motor vehicle per 511.07 people (31,307 motor vehicles – 3,235 lorries, 553 buses, 1,980 minibuses, and 5,933 pickups – for sixteen million people).⁷ Securing reasonable shelter became a major problem, as housing shortages, especially in urban areas, became acute. Houses destroyed in the conflict were not replaced, and people whose homes remained habitable usually learned that they had been looted. Public buildings and schools were either destroyed or left to decay. The supply of electricity decreased; the generating station at Owen Falls Dam in Jinja deteriorated for want of maintenance; power lines that fell were never repaired. When water-supply systems were destroyed, people in urban areas were left to fetch water from rivers and lakes in trucks, bicycles, or carts. Hospitals went without drugs and equipment.

These losses meant a reduction in the quality of life. Although there has been no systematic collection of reliable official statistics in Uganda since 1972, it is believed that life expectancy fell from forty-six years in 1970 to below forty years in 1985, and that the infant mortality rate (IMR) per thousand live births shot up from 91.9 in 1973–77 to over 104 in 1988. The latter is particularly disturbing since health workers are coming to the conclusion that the infant mortality rate – the number of deaths in the first year per thousand live births – is an indicator of social justice, economic development, and female literacy.⁸ By 1987, the IMR was 104 per thousand and the cumulative under-five mortality rate 172 per thousand.⁹ In the Luwero Triangle, the Red Cross estimated the IMR to be 300 per thousand among the displaced population at the height of the conflict.

A comparative look at Uganda's IMR shows how far our society had sunk. The United Nations calculates the IMR of various countries for that year as follows: Japan, 4.8; Sweden, 5.8; Canada, 7.3; East Germany, 8.1; UK, 8.8; US, 9.0; Cuba, 11.9; Mauritius, 25; Botswana, 71; Zimbabwe, 77; Kenya, 91; Ghana, 94; Nigeria, 109; Somalia, 152; Malawi, 156; and Ethiopia, 168.

As for maternal mortality, a senior Ugandan civil servant anonymously said that the rate rose from a single- to a double-digit figure between 1972 and 1984. However, credible reports from a number of hospitals showed an average maternal mortality rate of

3.5 per thousand births while admitting that over seventy percent of births in Uganda take place at home.¹⁰ The doctor-per-population ratio had moved from one doctor for every 10,000 people in the same period to one for every 25,000. Uganda is also one of the few countries that registered a negative change in the crude death rate: between 1965 and 1985 the death rate per thousand climbed from an estimated nineteen to over twenty per year. Meanwhile, the adult literacy rate is currently estimated at thirty percent for men and forty-five percent for women.

While the UN figures are estimates projected on the assumption that the quality of life will progressively improve, unofficial estimates by experienced civil servants seem to reflect the real situation. Not so long ago, Uganda had one of the best health-service delivery systems in sub-Saharan Africa. By 1969 there were more than forty government-owned and over twenty-five mission hospitals. Even today, sixty percent of the population lives within ten kilometres of a hospital, health centre, dispensary, or maternity centre.¹¹ This delivery system was supplemented by good preventive systems in the country. However, as a result of prolonged social conflict, both systems fell apart. The collapse of rural vector-control programs meant an increase in once controllable diseases. Malaria eradication and the bush-clearance projects, which had almost eliminated sleeping sickness from human populations and trypanosomias in cattle, were abandoned. Sleeping sickness reappeared in the Southeast and Northwest. Population movements and the breakdown of clean water supplies increased the spread of guinea-worm disease from the Sudan border into Acholi. As pointed out in the discussion of the Luwero Triangle, boreholes in the country were so wasted that they had been reduced to thirty-six percent in 1983.¹² Despite a very high fertility rate of about seven percent, Uganda had the lowest rates of population growth in East Africa from 1969 to 1980.¹³ While neighbouring countries registered a growth rate of over three percent per annum (Kenya, 3.8 percent; Rwanda, 3.4 percent; and Tanzania, 3.3 percent), Uganda's was 2.7 percent in the same period, falling to 2.5 percent between 1980 and 1991 (i.e., 9,535,060 people in 1969, 12,636,000 in 1980, and 16,583,000 in 1991).

This comparative stagnation in population growth is linked to the social conflagration that led to the destruction of Uganda's infrastructure and social fabric. Although further research and more accurate data are needed to determine how much the quality of life has deteriorated, available evidence and the experience of visitors to Uganda tell us that there has been an enormous drop,

and that it coincides with the eruption and persistence of social conflict.

Family Structure and the Status of Women

The political violence that weakened Uganda indirectly increased the level of family violence and undermined the structure of the family as envisaged by Christian and Muslim leaders. Preoccupied in their struggle to control the state, Ugandan regimes failed to pass laws that would have built stable families based on the mutual status of both partners. This failure led to wife battering, loose family structures, a lowering of the status of women, a reduction in moral standards; it probably also contributed to the increased spread of sexually transmitted diseases. In the precolonial period, most ethnic groups practised polygamy but maintained respect for women. These societies had elaborate mechanisms for resolving family conflict. Aggrieved women or men could appeal to elders who in turn resorted to specific judicial structures to resolve family conflict. Set guidelines and rules governed family life: for example, sex before or outside marriage was frowned upon, and an aggrieved wife could take her problems to her husband's parents for resolution, thus minimizing family violence. During the colonial period, ordinances based on the religious beliefs of Uganda's various communities regulated marriage, divorce, and inheritance: the Native Marriage Ordinance of 1902, the Divorce Ordinance of 1904, the Mohammedan Marriage and Divorce Ordinance of 1906, and the Hindu Marriage Ordinance of 1961.

In July 1964 the Obote government, in an effort to harmonize family law, appointed a commission under W.W. Kalema to report on marriage, divorce, and the status of women.¹⁴ The commission reported its findings the following year, but Obote, by then embroiled in the struggle to control the UPC, failed to act on its recommendations. Male chauvinism played a part in this. Further research is needed to determine the degree to which an increase in violent behaviour in society and in the family can be linked to husbands having greater power over their wives and the failure of governments to provide protection for women. Nonetheless, ninety percent of MPs at the time were men and the "honourable" members probably did not wish to relinquish to women any of the powers they possessed over their families. In 1967 the only reason the Obote government could give for not enacting a law based on the Kalema Report was lack of public interest. When Obote fell, Idi Amin passed a law that undermined the status of women. The 1973

Customary Marriage Decree allowed the official registration of African customary marriages and thus undermined all Christian efforts to stabilize the institution of marriage in Uganda. It also jeopardized the status of women. A man was free to register as many wives as the custom of a given social group allowed; marry into any ethnic group and be bound by its marriage customs; transfer a marriage from one customary law to another; or change it into a Christian, state, or Islamic marriage. Not all of these privileges extend to women, and the decree is silent on wife battering. Islam permits polygamy but restricts the number of permissible wives to four; although Amin was a Muslim, I wonder whether the Muslim elders approved the immorality enshrined in his decree. Surprisingly, while conducting a survey in Uganda from December 1986 to the end of February 1987, I found that the decree had not been amended. A number of educated people, especially lawyers, were marrying under it, but so too were people less prepared to take on family responsibilities.

Amin's decree has devastated the structure of the family. Because men are in positions of power, family violence, especially wife battering,¹⁵ has increased. Nor does the decree spell out the woman's rights to matrimonial property in case of divorce, rights of inheritance, or the means to resolve family conflict. As a result, the family unit as preindependence Ugandans had known it has drastically changed. It is my feeling, although I need to do more research before I can be more certain, that family violence is linked to the culture of violent social behaviour that has developed from political violence; that the increase in family violence springs from frustration with the difficult social environment. However, people who behave violently in their relations with other citizens are bound to do the same at home. Unless the powers that be in Uganda look into the position of the family in society, it will be difficult to rebuild the nation, for family units are the foundations of a healthy society.

The brutal elimination of so many thousands of people, most of whom were men, removed a multitude of bread winners and created widows and orphans across Uganda.¹⁶ This expanded the number of single-parent families headed by widowed women. By 1980 the male-to-female ratio had changed in favour of women. While there were 101.9 males per hundred females in 1969, the figure had dropped to 98.2 in 1980.¹⁷ Similarly, the number of orphans increased, especially in areas of conflict. In the Luwero Triangle 1.7 percent of children one to four years of age were orphans, compared to 0.1 percent in peaceful Kabale District.

Some of these orphans found refuge in Museveni's NRA as juvenile soldiers – *kadogos* – instead of roaming the countryside aimlessly.¹⁸ While the number of adults who were physically disabled in the conflict was large, the figures for children were also appalling. It is estimated that about 17,000 children aged four and under in Luwero and Kabale districts alone were disabled and became permanently handicapped. If these figures are typical of Uganda's thirty-four districts, then the number may be as high as a quarter of a million.

The transformation of the family weakened traditions that formerly applied to this important social unit, including control of sexual relations. Before and during the earlier days of colonialism, people did not engage in sexual intercourse before marriage. Girls were expected to be virgins or face rejection. A change in attitudes towards sex began in the colonial period. By the beginning of the 1960s, female virginity was no longer prized as a symbol of virtue. The eruption of violence in Ugandan society further undermined the only institution that kept a lid on sexual laxity, and many children were born out of wedlock. Although further study is needed to link the increase of sexually transmitted diseases, including AIDS, to the undermining of the Ugandan family structure, the few that have been done suggest that such a relationship exists.¹⁹

Undermining of Social Discipline

Social discipline deteriorated in the face of such difficult living conditions. To survive, people disregarded rules, procedures, and morals. Civil servants took advantage of their positions to rob the state. People in powerful positions broke the laws they were supposed to keep. Tax evasion, smuggling, misappropriation of funds, misuse of foreign exchange, and general dishonesty were practised by the very people who were supposed to enforce the law. Ordinary people were also affected by this moral degeneration. Lying, cheating, forging, looting, and stealing soon became increasingly normal and acceptable in social relations. Children would not consider it immoral to lie to their parents for material benefit. Immorality became institutionalized in social relations. Naive moralists have spoken out against corruption and preached the need for "moral rehabilitation." Religious fundamentalist organizations sprang up like mushrooms, all preaching a return to God as the only way to save society. Little did they realize that corruption in individuals was but a symptom of a complex phenomenon originating in the general sickness of the Ugandan state.

Unless the state was rebuilt in all its completeness, a means to resolve conflicts peacefully devised, and the economy reactivated, treating a single symptom like corruption would not cure the sick state. The key to rehabilitating the Ugandan Mind is rebuilding the country's political and economic institutions.

Wildlife, the Environment, and Violence

So far this discussion has concentrated on the effect of violence on human beings and social institutions, but mankind can survive on this planet only by living in harmony with nature, with the earth, plants, and animals. In Uganda, social conflict has had a devastating impact on wildlife and on the environment in general. Mired in turmoil, Ugandan politicians have failed to safeguard the natural world; the breakdown of law was a disaster for animals, plants, rivers, and lakes. Uganda was once known for its variety of animals, birds, and fish and took steps to protect them. The Queen Elizabeth National Park, which covers 1,978 square kilometres, was "a biosphere reserve" where in the past people had existed in a symbiotic relationship with nature and wild beasts.²⁰ Kabarega National Park was as large as the Queen Elizabeth and contained hundreds of species of animals and birds. Kidepo National Park was home to very rare animal species. But violence took its toll on the parks. Between 1970 and 1985 Uganda lost over seventy-five percent of its elephants, about ninety-eight percent of its rhinos, ninety percent of its crocodiles, eighty percent of its lions and leopards, and many bird species. Dr E. Edroma, head of the Institute of Ecology at Makerere University, has documented the threat to wildlife in Uganda: in 1970 Queen Elizabeth National Park had thirty thousand elephants, but by 1985 only three hundred remained; hippos were reduced from three thousand to five thousand and buffalo from eighty thousand to a mere ten thousand; the white rhino, a rare species that used to roam Kabarega National Park, is now thought to be extinct, as is its cousin, the black rhino. While there has been no thorough survey of the crocodile population, it is believed that they are also on the way to extinction in the area. The once-rich bird life of Uganda has been reduced. In 1987 more than twelve hundred birds were illegally exported.

The destruction of Uganda's wildlife escalated at the same rate as civil conflict in the country. While in the past poachers had used traditional weapons, after Amin's rise to power, they were equipped with firearms. In Edroma's words, "People from the neighbourhood of the park [Queen Elizabeth National Park] no longer

poach with spears and arrows for mere meat for family as the traditional poaching is known."²¹ Instead, they do so for commercial purposes with sophisticated and powerful arms. But it was not only ordinary civilians who destroyed Uganda's wildlife. Beginning in 1971 government leaders and soldiers openly killed animals in the parks. Edroma points out that "Amin personally participated in the depleting of wild game. Consequently, cronies, mainly army officers, followed suit and indiscriminately shot down prized animals for trophies. The Tanzania forces which fought Amin in 1978/79 reduced Queen Elizabeth National Park almost to an empty bush land. Soldiers randomly gunned down the game in their sight."²²

Foreign traders bought Uganda's animal products. Between 1980 and 1986, 222 elephant feet, 29 bellies, 631 ears, and 76 trunks were illegally exported; in 1987 more than 280 tonnes of ivory left the country and 550 crocodile skins were sent overseas, mainly to Italy and France. The removal of rare birds has also helped deprive Uganda of its wildlife. Uganda's animals, in addition to being slaughtered, were also victims of bad human policies. Involved in the struggle to control the state, political officials did not scrutinize the "development plans" brought to them by "experts," usually foreigners, but merely signed whatever blueprint was put before them. If governments had spent more time thinking about the impact these projects would have on the environment, Uganda might not have been damaged to the extent that it was.

Two examples will suffice. The first is the destruction of hundreds of varieties of fish – reportedly over three hundred – in Lake Victoria by the introduction of the Nile perch, a fish normally found downstream below Owen Falls in the Nile. In the 1960s foreign "experts" advised its introduction into Lake Victoria to increase the amount of protein available to Ugandans. The government listened and, without thinking of the consequences, agreed to a plan that unleashed a host of problems. To begin with, the Nile perch is a predator – it feeds on other fish. The predictions are that after eating up all the fish native in the lake it will turn on its own kind, ultimately leaving the lake with no fish. Secondly, the fish is so big (its average weight is one to two hundred pounds) that local fishermen cannot catch it. They do not have the nets, boats, or facilities to bring them ashore and store them. Only rich fishermen, and that often means foreign fishermen, can benefit from the disastrous experiment. That the "experts" might have planned this outcome is a possibility that cannot be ruled out. The introduction of

the Nile perch into Lake Victoria was both an ecological disaster and a human tragedy.

The second human error was the decision to dump toxic wastes – cobalt, sulphur, and copper – from Kilembe Mines into streams that feed Uganda's richest fish reserves: Lake George, Lake Edward, and, of course, the Kazinga Channel. Lake George is believed to have had more fish per cubic yard than any other lake in Africa, but all this is threatened by the mines. Waste from Kilembe has also burnt vegetation between Kasese and Muhokya and threatened human and animal life in the area. The weak governments of Uganda failed to realize that temporary sums of hard currency dished out by foreign mining companies cannot replace a food source that millions of Ugandans relied on. Lastly, government preoccupation with political survival robbed Uganda of its forest reserves, hundreds of square miles of which have been illegally cleared by lumbermen, traders, and squatters.²³ The deforestation of Uganda is certainly linked to social conflict; its impact on the environment has not yet been assessed. Future governments must pay special attention to these issues.

Thus, violence has had repercussions not only on human beings but on animals, fish, and nature. Man cannot exist without nature. If the destruction of the environment is not halted, our children will have nowhere to call their own. Uganda might become part of the great desert, the Sahara, which was itself once habitable.

MUST THE PAST BE REPEATED?

A people who do not learn from their past mistakes are condemned to repeat them. Yet history does not have to repeat itself, as some people think. It repeats itself only when we are prepared to be the servants rather than the masters of events. Rulers who are responsive to the mistakes of the past can prevent their recurrence. In Uganda, several mistakes in particular must be heeded.

Mechanisms of conflict resolution. One of the first lessons Ugandans can learn from their history is the need to establish social institutions that can address political, social, and economic disputes. It is imperative that the country build democratic social institutions acceptable to the majority of its citizens. One step in the right direction would be to replace the dictatorial constitution of 1967 with a new one whose ideas and terms truly represent the "general will" of society. It must be respected by the rulers as the primary

source of law and order. No one person or group should be allowed to change any line in the constitution except by following proper procedures laid down in the document itself: it must never again be possible for one man to discard a national constitution without reference to the population.

Violence is not a lasting instrument of administration. Although it is a final arbiter in political conflict, it can never be a permanent basis of political control. This is the mistake Obote and Amin made. Obote, for example, had a number of options for resolving the 1966 crisis peacefully. He could have dissolved Parliament and called elections conducted on his formula, convened an emergency UPC delegates' conference to explain his case, or waited for the Commission of Inquiry's findings. Any of these options would have given him the image of a "good guy" playing the political game within the legal bounds of the law. Instead, he chose the "perilous and apparently easier path" of violence.²⁴ His disrespect for the constitution, Parliament, traditional rulers, the courts, the cooperative unions, trade unions, and other institutions slowed their development. Amin's banning of political activities and institutions – Parliament, district councils, municipal councils – killed the very bodies that might have been used to resolve conflicts. A generation of Ugandans who neither knew nor respected political institutions took charge of the affairs of state.

The good will of the ruled is the taproot of social harmony; social harmony is the basis for economic development. No nation can develop its economy unless it has refined its political institutions – institutions that must offer the peaceful environment in which development can take place. This can only be achieved when citizens are allowed to participate in making the decisions that affect their lives. The views of every individual citizen who wishes to be heard must be listened to and a general consensus of the opinions of the majority respected. All people in a political community have a right to participate in the political process.

Reduction of social inequality. Social inequality that breeds structural violence – inequality based on region, religion, ethnicity, class, gender, and other social divisions – must be minimized. Where such inequalities persist, so too does the potential for violence. However, in rectifying inequality, leaders must be careful not to hinder the expansion of production: the past twenty-five years in Uganda make it clear that reducing national wealth contributes to violence by generating intensive struggle to control what little

wealth there is. This is the mistake Obote made when he concentrated on reducing regional inequality by blocking the upward mobility of the Baganda, which led to a decrease in national production. The suppression of the Baganda's entrepreneurial spirit was a severe blow to the country's prosperity. By 1985, the economic disparity between North and South was as it had been in 1962, except that both regions were far poorer than before independence. In industrialized countries, decreased production often leads to increases in deviant violence. In recessions and periods of high unemployment, there are more incidents of violence than in periods of affluence.

Encouraging economic growth. Since violence is caused by both inequality and scarcity of resources, governments must encourage overall economic development to produce goods needed to satisfy human needs. The best way to reduce inequality in Uganda is not to discourage development efforts in the central areas but to furnish the peripheral areas with incentives to uplift their regions to the same level as the advantaged regions.

Broadening the military base. There must be equality of access to the means of violence. No one region or ethnic group should monopolize the tools of physical force and use that advantage to cow other social groups into unfair submission. Obote, Amin, and the Okellos maintained their reign of terror by using loyal soldiers and paramilitary personnel from their home areas. The monopoly of the control of the instruments of physical force by the Lwo- and Sudanic-speaking peoples of the North led to the political domination of the northern élites over the southerners from 1966 to 1986. To his great credit, Yoweri Museveni has broken this monopoly and started distributing military skills among most of Uganda's people. It is to be hoped that this is not merely a shift in access to the means of violence from the Lwo and Sudanic speakers to the Bantu-speaking peoples of the country but that it represents a judicious redistribution of military power to all Ugandans.

Indeed, democratizing violence by teaching *every* Ugandan the knowledge and practice of military science is the best solution to this problem. All should be trained as soldiers with the government keeping only a small force to maintain law and order. This plan will be cheaper and more effective than maintaining a standing army while making the whole population available in case of a national emergency. It will preempt military *coup d'états* and prevent

dictators from centralizing violence for their own purposes. Uganda should look carefully at the Swiss model of managing military violence.

Devolution of power. Democratization of the means of violence should go hand in hand with the devolution of power from the centre to the provinces. While national institutions like Parliament and a central judicial system must be maintained, more powers should be transferred to the districts. District councils whose members are freely elected should have greater control over issues that concern their districts, such as education, maintenance of law, cooperative unions, municipal affairs, and the like. In this way, alternate arenas of political activity and participation will be created, local issues will be attended to more carefully, and the concentration of power at the centre (and the bitter struggle to influence it) will be reduced.

Establishing a class of property owners. Uganda governments must encourage the emergence of an indigenous property-owning class in agriculture, commerce, and industry. Such a class is likely to invest most of its profits, and therefore the country's surplus, at home. This will reduce the flight of capital, increase the accumulation of domestic capital, and bolster employment. As already observed, a local property-owning class is likely to have a stake in the preservation of peace because property can only be enjoyed and safeguarded when there is law and order.

The case of India illustrates how important a local property-owning class can be as a foundation and sustainer of stability and democracy. Of the "nonwhite" ex-colonies of the former British Empire, India alone developed the most viable democratic institutions.²⁵ The social base of this democracy was a local property-owning class with a high stake in the local socioeconomic system. Years before independence in 1947, Indians obtained ownership of large-scale agricultural enterprises and fully participated in industry. By the 1920s, Indians owned the cotton, jute, and iron industries; as early as 1854, they owned a spinning mill at Bombay. By 1914, India had 271 spinning mills with 6.8 million spindles and 104,000 looms, almost all of which were Indian owned. At the outbreak of the First World War, the country was already producing iron and steel. J.N. Tata's steel mill, established in 1907, expanded greatly during the war. Between 1939 and 1945, India's steel output increased from 842,900 tons to 1,150,000. By

1947, three other concerns produced iron and steel, including rails and rolling stock. Two years before independence, not only was India self-sufficient in a variety of consumer goods but over sixty percent of this market was held by Indian-controlled firms. Indians also controlled the capital market. By 1947, banks owned by Indians controlled eighty-three percent of deposits and, by 1952, handled over sixty percent of import/export trade.

India's property-owning class thus developed sufficient economic muscle to provide an alternative source of power to the political system. Its members participated in politics for ideological rather than selfish monetary purposes but also had a cushion to fall back on in case politics became stormy. This class was able to stand up to dictatorial tendencies in society, lay the foundations upon which democracy was built, and ensure that sufficient goods were produced for distribution amongst key sectors of society. Although African countries are too small to compare with the giant subcontinent, big countries like the Sudan, Zaire, Nigeria, and Angola can learn a lot from the Indian experience. The bitter results of encouraging the immigrant bourgeoisie at the expense of indigenous entrepreneurs should be a lesson to authorities. Besides generating conflict, Asian and European immigrants invested most of their profits abroad; after the expulsion of Asian Ugandans, no one should blame them. Whatever happened, Uganda paid, and is still paying, the price for this act.

It has also become clear that the government cannot do business. Most of the "parastatals" have lost money; peasants have subsidized the salaries and other expenditures of people working for government-run corporations. Government enterprises do not respond to market forces and they expand the realm of corruption. The main duty of a government is to keep law and order, not to do business: parastatals should be sold to indigenous businessmen as quickly as possible.

Victimization based on ethnicity. This must stop. It is foolish to condemn a group of people for crimes committed by one or two of their number, which is what happened to the Acholi/Langi, West Nilers, and Baganda. As far as the "Buganda problem" goes, the reader will recall that Obote treated all Baganda as enemies of the state; they in turn wrote him off as a leader they could support: in the 1980 elections, he did not get a single parliamentary seat from Buganda. Despite his apparent loss at the polls, he neither apologized nor reached out to the Baganda, who thus decided to

support his foes during the civil war of 1981–85. This war could have been avoided if Obote had handled the Buganda problem well in his first administration.

Now that Buganda is no longer as dominant a political issue as it was in the 1960s, most Baganda are prepared to live with other Ugandans as equals. Moreover, a casual study of income receipts in the years 1975 to 1985 indicates that the people of southwest Uganda (Ankole and Kigezi) receive the same income as the Baganda, if not more. In those years, Kabale was one of the fastest-growing urban centres in the country. Reduction in income inequality should reduce the possibilities of social conflict.

Language and communication. Lastly, Ugandan rulers must address the problem of communication without delay. They must undertake to develop a local language that will be understood by the majority of Ugandans, both the educated and the unschooled. This may take a long time, probably twenty years or more, but in order to minimize misunderstandings due to communication, the effort must start now.

Epilogue

The following account, which was given to me by the author, has appeared in a number of publications.¹ My aims in reproducing it are to emphasize the experience of torture at a personal level; to bring this experience into its sociological context; and to inform Ugandans of the need for vigilance lest such conditions return. Those who do not know their history are condemned to repeat it.

Bakulu-Mpagi Wamala was a well-loved teacher lecturing at Makerere University until he went into exile in 1976. He then became a politician. On Thursday, 26 March 1981, he was abducted from his home by the security forces. In April, the BBC, Voice of Germany, Voice of America, Radio RSA, *The Times* (London), and *The Nation* (Nairobi) carried news of his death, but he was still alive. This is his story.

It is not possible for me to write of my experience inside Obote's jail without stirring strong emotions deep within me. For, the suffering, the sheer physical brutality and unmentionable indignities to which we were subjected have seared my mind for all time. In spite of this I shall endeavour to render as objective an account of the ordeal as is humanly possible under the circumstances. I shall not deliberately distort nor exaggerate the facts; and any moral indictments on the Obote regime contained in this narrative will not be made out of bitterness on my part.

Thursday March 26 1981, it is about 5:30 PM and I have just returned to my flat at plot 176 Port Bell Road in the Kampala suburb of Mbuya. Shortly afterwards commotion begins outside in the compound below. Suddenly a stern voice barks out an order for everybody to come out of their flats. From a window of my top-floor flat I peer out to see what is happening. Between 35 to 40

soldiers of Obote's army have taken up positions all round our apartment block. They are in full combat uniforms and battle camouflage, their guns at ready. From the same window I can see somebody below pointing up at my flat. Another, more harsh order is barked out for everybody to get out.

I know they have come for me. Only weeks ago, Obote's troops burst into the residences of several of my colleagues on the party executive of the Uganda Patriotic Movement and abducted them. Among them was Jaberi Bidandi Sali, UPM Secretary General, Rev. Father Christopher Okoth, UPM Vice-President and Mrs Rhoda Kalema, UPM Secretary for Women's Affairs. Each of them has been a government Minister before. Leaders of other political parties, like the Democratic Party, among them several members of Parliament, have also been abducted from their homes in the last few weeks. Hundreds of other officials from both parties at the branch level have been either rounded up or killed.

As National Secretary for Publicity and Information of the party, I have naturally been one of the most outspoken members of our party executive. For that outspokenness I was once threatened with virtual physical extermination by Military Commission Government leader Paulo Muwange, currently Obote's Vice-President. Now, with Obote's soldiers waiting for me outside, I fear for my life. I advise my wife, Florence, and other members of the household to go down immediately. I snatch a few minutes to compose myself and then get out of the flat. Suddenly a burst of gunfire, and bullets begin flying past me. Instinctively I take cover by falling flat on the concrete landing of the flat. Miraculously none of the bullets hits me.

Somebody, presumably the commanding officer, gives an order to his men not to shoot. He orders me to go into the compound. Half dead with fright, I proceed down, my hands up.

By now a large crowd has assembled from the adjacent Silver Springs Hotel. There are almost two hundred people. As soon as I get to the compound a soldier gives me another Swahili order to lie down on the tarmac access road. I do so immediately, and the soldiers begin to stab me with their bayonets, rifle butts and military boots. Somebody among the residents, probably my wife, screams. Children and women begin screaming and crying. I am bleeding profusely, but have not begun to feel any pain. The stabbing, butting and boot kicks continue for what seems to me eternity.

At last the bayonet stabs, rifle butts and boot kicks stop. I am barely conscious, but I can hear the order that I should be driven

to Nile Mansions, the luxury apartment hotel that serves as a home for almost all Obote's ministers. Also the Hotel, a room 105 and two other rooms serve as torture chambers for Obote's nascent Secret Service.

Four men grab me by the limbs and throw me, as you would a sack of dry beans, on to a white Datsun 1200 pick-up van. One soldier stands with his heavy boots on my swollen head, another stands on my stomach while a third stands over my thighs. Bleeding intensifies. I can feel it. The van sets off. The soldiers sing and dance jumping up and down on top of me. I should report that somewhere along the road I am thorough searched and stripped of any valuables I have: my watch, a pocket pipe, tobacco, Shs. 7000/- cash (equivalent to US \$1000 at official rates), a trouser, belt, shoes, socks, and a pipe lighter. My identification papers are also taken from me. A fist fight ensues over who should take my watch.

Later we reach Nile Mansions. Again like a sack of beans, I am thrown off the van on to the hard tarmac, and I begin bleeding through the nose. Every inch of my beige safari suit is covered in blood from bayonet wounds and other injuries. I am subjected to another round of bayonet stabbing, boot kicks and rifle-butt blows. Then I am frog-marched to the entrance of Nile Mansions.

Without the aid of my spectacles I cannot see very far. All the same I can see there are many people about the place. As we pass I recognize two of Obote's Ministers who knew me. The soldiers are given order to take me to "Operations Control Room."

I am not sure whether this is the same as room 105, the notorious torture chamber. We are moving up the steps of Nile Mansions. An Army officer is coming down the same steps. He is told something by one of the soldiers guarding me. He looks at me and replies in Swahili, "I am tired, take him to Makindye [barracks]." I am pushed down the stair case, and land on my head in the lounge of Nile Mansions. I am picked up by the soldiers and taken back to the waiting Datsun 1200 pick-up truck. Once more I am thrown onto the back, face down this time. The soldiers resume their positions standing on me. We drive off, I am not sure where to. I have a suspicion that I am going to be killed and that my body will probably turn up in one of the forests around Kampala, like so many others have done in recent weeks.

From a corner of my eye I catch a glimpse of one of the soldiers. He tears up my identity papers, and says "He won't need them anymore." I am now convinced that I am going to my death. I become unconscious at this stage. A total black-out engulfs me.

Makindye Barracks: The First Night

When I open my eyes again we are already in Makindye Military Barracks, the notorious Makindye Military Barracks. It is barely daylight. I am thrown off the van. I am beaten and kicked once again, but no bayonet stabbing this time. Everybody seems convinced that I am "finished."

One of the soldiers who have brought me tells those we find on duty in Makindye that another *maiti* [dead body] has been brought. I am careful to note that no statement has been made by those who have brought me in. No record at all is made that I have been brought into the barracks. Anybody can do anything to me now – kill me, smuggle me out or whatever, and it could not be traced to Makindye barracks.

My hands and legs are tied with a rope. I am pushed into a room, nay, a dungeon right next to the main gate to Makindye barracks. No ventilation of any kind. Heavy metal door. Urine all over the floor and other human excrement in a corner. Fresh blood splattered on the walls. Maybe somebody has just been killed here. There is a nauseating smell of death and filth inside the cell. When I am pushed into the room, I fall down and become part of this filth. I guess it is about 7:00 PM local time.

Suddenly I become aware of pains, sharp pains all over my body. Both sides of my chest are painful and I cannot lie down sideways. I have to lie on my back, though this too, is considerably painful.

The heavy metal door opens. Somebody is brought in; another prisoner or someone to spy on me? My hands are tied to his, but his legs are free. I cannot possibly shift my body now without his co-operation. Other prisoners are pushed in; I suppose about ten in this tiny, ten-foot-by-ten dungeon. It is unbearably hot. I feel I am about to faint, but I must not allow myself to do so. I have a bad temperature. I want to undo the buttons of my safari suit, but with my hands bound up and tied to another person this is nearly impossible. However, with a lot of pain and effort I manoeuvre my hands into a position to unbutton the jacket. With even more difficulty I manage to shift my jacket so that my back remains bare. My hands have been cut by the sisal rope.

Now I feel cooler, now that my bare back is lying in the cold urine on the floor. Since my watch has been appropriated by the bandit soldiers, I cannot tell what time it is exactly. But I think it is around 8:00 PM. There is complete darkness inside and outside. The soldiers on guard outside our dungeon are smoking marijuana. Another voice, presumably of an officer, joins them. The

door of the dungeon is thrown ajar and one of them begins thrashing about the dungeon with a stick. A yell of pain from one of the prisoners. Most of the prisoners have been standing since there is no room for them to lie down or sit. Only me, my rope-mate and one or two others are lying on the floor. When the thrashing begins there is a stampede in the room, each prisoner trying to dodge the mad swing of the strokes. Several times I am trodden underfoot, but I am too ill to protest. Yells of pain from prisoners who are caught by the stick. Sadistic peals of laughter from the marijuana-loaded soldiers outside.

At last the mad stick stops. The door is bolted from outside. One of the drunken voices outside vows in Swahili, "*Lazima hapa watakufa maiti mbili leo*" ("I swear there will be two dead bodies here tonight"). He orders his men to fit his pistol with a silencer. Now I know for sure that I am going to be killed. I seem to be the most "dangerous" prisoner in the room. I am the only one bound hand and foot, and certainly the most roughly abused so far. The voice which has promised itself to kill two of us tonight says now he is going for supper and returning later.

A heavy cloud of death is hanging menacingly over us. My thoughts inevitably gravitate towards my children. My youngest child, a son, is only about 8 months old. My eldest child, a daughter, is under 9 years old. In between there are three other daughters. What will happen to them after my death? What will happen to my old mother whose husband (my father) was killed by the Amin regime? And what will happen to this poor country?

My thoughts are interrupted. A prisoner in this cell is pleading with the guards outside to allow him to go and ease himself. He is harshly told to shut up. Other prisoners mumble among themselves. I suppose everybody wants to ease themselves. An order is given by the guards that anybody wishing to ease themselves have to do it on the floor. For the next five minutes all other sounds are drowned in the sound of falling urine. I am still lying on my back, and can feel the urine level rising on the concrete floor. My clothes, every inch already covered in blood, are receiving an extra coating of filthy urine. But I am too preoccupied with other thoughts to worry about the cleanliness of a body I know will shortly be lifeless. I go back to my thoughts. Where will my dead body be thrown? Will it be recovered and be laid to rest in my ancestral burial ground beside my father and my grandfather? How will this be possible when my identity papers have all been destroyed? I wish I could find a pen and paper to write my name down somewhere!

Another interruption – this time from outside. A drunken soldier has been coming into the barracks through the gate, with his equally drunken girlfriend. A quarrel ensues between him and the soldiers on guard. It seems that this particular girlfriend was in the barracks earlier in the day, with another soldier. The arriving soldier and his girlfriend are making a lot of noisy protests. They too, are pushed into our dungeon. Their noise grows even louder. The guards outside open the door again and take out the wailing woman whom they take turns to rape on the veranda. There are now about five different excited voices outside. A number of women passing by on the adjacent road are stopped by the soldiers. They too, are brought into the barracks and raped on the veranda. Finally all the women are pushed into our dungeon. I reckon there are now about 15 people in this little room. The urine level on the floor is ever rising, as is the nauseous stench of putrefaction.

It is now about 11:00 AM but it may be later. I am only guessing. I go back to thoughts of my impending death. What will become of X? What will become of Y? All the people with whom I have shared my life? A million other thoughts and questions.

I emerge from these thoughts and realize that our drunken “executioner” is probably asleep and mostly not coming back tonight. It is about 1:00 PM. I might last the night if I do not die of bleeding. My thoughts now turn towards my body for the first time since my arrest. I feel an awful lot of pain everywhere, and my mind is full of questions. How badly injured am I? If I do not die tonight, shall I get emergency medical treatment tomorrow? Shall I survive the notorious crude torture of Makindye barracks, to which I shall certainly be subjected? Is anybody outside this barracks taking any interest in what is happening to us here? What is right now happening to my family who remained at the mercy of Obote’s soldiers when I was abducted? In incredible physical pain, and psychological torture I spend the remaining hours of the night till dawn. For the first time in my life I have spent a night without sleeping even one second, without even dozing.

Makindye Military Barracks: The First Day

It is about 7:00 AM on Friday March 27th, 1981 and I am still lying on my back in the urine bound hand and foot. The soldiers outside seem to be changing guard. Shortly afterwards the door of our small dungeon is thrown open. Some fresh air, sweet fresh air comes in to dilute the stench of sweat, urine and other human

excrement. Outside there is a heavy downpour of tropical torrential rain.

A soldier peers into our cell and recoils back – probably from the stench. He orders the women to run out and go back to their homes. The rest of us he orders to lick, without tongues, the urine off the floor. He says he will be back in five minutes and must find the room clean. The inmates take off their shirts and start drying the floor. I cannot join in since I am still bound. Moreover my clothes are thoroughly drenched in urine and can absorb no more. The urine is too much for the men's shirts to absorb. They cannot wrench them dry because the urine will get back on the floor. They put the shirts on their backs and remove their trousers which they use to dry the floor, and hastily wear again.

The guard returns and orders all of us to run out of the room. Everyone runs out except me and my rope-mate. After giving me a nasty kick in the ribs he unties the rope. I try to stand but collapse on the floor. The guard gets hold of me by my hair and drags me out into the rain where the rest of the inmates are.

Lying on the grass in the rain, I begin to feel a bit of life return to me. Also I feel somewhat cleansed of last night's filth. I can now sit, and even stand! Though with pain. For almost four hours the torrential downpour continues unabated. It is supposed to be punishment to us, but I am relishing it. I begin to examine myself but only one eye can see. The other is too swollen. I have several wounds which are still bleeding, but in the rain the blood is beginning to coagulate and prevent further bleeding. I know I have had wounds in the back, but I cannot see them.

After about 4 hours, we are ordered to get out of the still pouring rain, and are herded into a clerical office at the quarter-guard.

Each is informally asked by a corporal why he has been brought to the barracks. Obviously the soldiers on duty do not know anything about any of us. Each one explains. A school-boy, about 15 had been returning home in the evening from school when soldiers grabbed him at Mulago trading center, took his watch and shoes and brought him to Makindye barracks when he protested. Another boy, about 16, had gone to buy sugar from the trading center at Mulago when both the sugar and the boy were hijacked to Makindye by soldiers. And so on and so forth. When the Corporal comes to me I mumble something. No records taken. I don't know any of the prisoners.

It is now about mid-day. We are taken out of the clerical office to the adjacent quarter-guard cells. One cell, which acts as a

“transit” room for inmates – has a number of prisoners brought during the previous two days. There are about 15 in all. To this our own number is added. In an adjacent cell, separated from the “transit” room by a metal grille, one catches a glimpse of other prisoners – mainly army and air force men gated for one reason or another. But there are other civilian prisoners as well.

In the “transit” room I manage to sit up, with my back pressed against the wall. My clothes get stickier at the back. I look at the wall to check and find a block of fresh blood on the wall where my back has been pressed. A wound in my back is still bleeding!

One of the prisoners in the “transit” room has recognized me. An exclamation of shock. Two or three more inmates recognize me. We talk briefly. An examination of my wounds. I have eight bayonet wounds in all, one of them between two ribs in my back. Later examination reveals that this particular bayonet stab barely missed my heart by a fraction of an inch. Other bayonet wounds are on the limbs and at the back of the neck. I fear that savage boot kicks in the chest have dislocated a rib – because I can feel a lot of pain. It turns out on later examination that my spleen has been damaged. My face and head are swollen from rifle-butt hits and boot kicks. Only one eye can see.

After about one hour in the “transit” room all of us, including those we found there, are taken out for interrogation in the administrative quarter of the barracks; about two hundred yards farther down the hill inside the barracks. We are made to sit in the rain on the concrete pavement in front of an office which, I later learnt, belong to Intelligence Officer 1 Mukhwana. There are about 25 prisoners in all. There are also about 10 soldiers towering over the prisoners with various torture gadgets – most of them very crude and rudimentary: a bundle of barbed wire lengths, a pair of tongs, a club, etc. It is now about 1:30 PM.

The office of Intelligence Officer 1 Mukhwana is still locked. Meanwhile the captives are subjected to torture by the soldiers who seem to be amusing themselves. Barbed wire is used on the bare backs of the captives, and when the teeth have sunk into flesh, the barbed wire is pulled, violently tearing the flesh of the victim. All prisoners are subjected to this form of torture except myself. I look more dead than alive.

Then another form of torture starts: a soldier with a pair of tongs slits the lower lip of a prisoner, the upper lip of another one, the nose of a third, and the right hand ear of yet another!

The more you scream with pain, the more torture you invite because the soldiers find you more fun. A soldier breaks a bottle into several pieces and is determined to “shave” off my long beard

with one of the pieces! He is stopped by an elderly Acholi soldier who says that more respect should be given to the dead than to the living. He too was billing me as good as dead.

The office of Intelligence Officer 1 Mukhwana is now opened, and Mukhwana himself appears shortly. A vicious-looking character appears with him. I later learn that his name is Roger, and that he has taken the lives of many prisoners. On this occasion eight of the prisoners, apparently the healthiest, are selected. An order is given by Roger that they should be taken to the Go-Down and given the VIP Treatment. Sticks, clubs and boot kicks begin to rain on the eight as they are dragged to the Go-Down.

The "Go-Down" occupies one side, the lower side, of the administrative quarter which is a sort of square complex with a square green in the middle. The go-down is at right angles to the offices occupied by Intelligence officers. It is only five yards away from where I am sitting now. But to get into it one has to go outside the square, to the back of the block where the only entrance to the go-down is.

About three to four minutes later, the eight inmates begin yelling and crying in pain. There is a sound of whips, clubs, sticks and metal bars coming down. Louder cries of agony. After about 5 minutes the cries gradually weaken until they cease altogether, but the swishing and landing of the stocks continue with intensified ferocity for another five minutes. When this, too, stops, eight limp bodies are dragged out to near where we are sitting. Five of them, identified as dead, are thrown in a heap in one corner of the square. The other three, barely still breathing, are laid out in the rain. Two of them die the following day, but one of them survives miraculously.

As soon as the "VIP treatment" is thus concluded, Mukhwana addresses the remaining inmates, threatening to subject the rest of us to similar treatment unless we co-operate with him. It is not very clear to me what "co-operation" in this case means, but I suppose it means we must give the answers desired by him, not necessarily the truth – at interrogation sessions.

Three prisoners, one after the other, are taken into Mukhwana's room to make a statement and undergo interrogation. No torture. Before any more prisoners can take their turn, the interrogation session is stopped when Mukhwana is called away to go into town. The prisoners are now divided into two groups. Some are taken back to the quarter-guard cells while the rest of us – about six – are taken to what is called "DEATH CELL" at the bottom end of Makindye barracks.

Inside Death Cell

From the administrative quarters, Death Cell is about 20 yards behind the Go-down. The two are separated by two rows of barbed wire. The prisoners are driven with sticks down the path to Death Cell, a dull grey concrete building with corrugated iron roofing.

One of the soldiers opens the metal grille entrance to the cell, lets us in and locks up again. This one is about 90 feet by 30, and is subdivided into 7 cubicles each of which is separated from the main corridor by a metal grille. It has internal flush toilets but no water; so that the first thing that hits you, yards away from the building, is the stench of urine and human excrement. When you actually enter, your eyes are stung by airborne acid from the urine!

In this pot of filth we find about 180 inmates, most of them reduced to mere skeletons, and all of them so dirty that one can peel off layer after layer of dirt. Their eyes are filled with horror, and it is difficult to imagine a more terrified group of emaciated men. Among these men we take our positions. Even in this group of trapped, scared rabbits a certain social hierarchy is apparent. And, as new prisoners do in every prison, we take our position at the bottom of the social ladder.

On arrival in this cell I am thoroughly dehydrated; I collapse on the floor and start sweating profusely. Other inmates give the only first aid they can, they unbutton my safari jacket and my shirt, and fan me with them. Later, when I have recovered a little, I ask for some water. I am told there is no water anywhere in the cell. I am still lying on my back, and it is about 3:00 PM.

An old man – well, he is about 55, looks closely at me and is visibly moved. He moves away to a cubicle and brings me a few drops of water in a dirty mess tin. I drink it slowly, but before I finish it an inmate grabs the remainder from me and gulps it down. Other prisoners get hold of him and give him a thorough beating – for robbing “the dead.”

After about 30 minutes, I can stand, and even walk about. Mostly I observe life here, trying to discern patterns and rhythms of social order which I know exist, so that I may fit myself into it. As part of my self-education on prison life – I have never been to prison before, not even a police cell – I decide to have a discussion with the kind old man who has given me some water.

He asks me a few questions – why I have been brought here, where from, who by all of which I answer frankly, despite a nagging fear at the back of my mind that some of the inmates here must be informers and spies of the regime. He then tells me

that he, too, has been brought for political reasons. I am shocked by this because this man does not talk like a politician. He does not even know English. Finally I ask him some questions: How does one get anything to eat or drink here? How does one communicate with one's people outside?

(From listening to the prisoners I have already gathered that some of them communicate with their people.) How does one get medical treatment? How does one get a little corner to sleep in one of the cubicles? How does one get a bath? What is the likely fate of one such as myself? Most of the answers are distressing.

Food. Every two days food is brought to the cell in the form of third-grade, undercooked *posho* [maize meal]. Sometimes the food does not come for three days. When it comes it is inadequate, and about half the prisoners do not get anything. There have been numerous cases of death by starvation in the last three months that Ssalongo has spent here. Some food is expected today.

Water. Every two or three days 4 inmates are taken under heavy guard, to a water tap just outside the barracks to draw water for cleaning the lavatories. It is regarded as a great privilege to be one of the four on any day because the water drawers can keep a bit aside for drinking. Ssalongo has some influence with some of the soldiers, and he is often chosen to be one of the water-drawers (which is why he has been able to give me a few drops). But bathing or even washing your hands and face is out of the question – even for the water drawers themselves.

Medical treatment. According to Ssalongo, that is a subject I should not even mention in this cell because it has caused the death of at least two people since he came to Death Cell.

(Two days after my arrest, his words are given practical proof: a young man is suffering from Malaria; he gets some chloroquine tablets smuggled into Death Cell for him; he is reported by one of the regime's spies in the cell; he is collected, taken outside and clubbed to death in our full view, this time he is not even taken to the Go-down.)

Sleeping arrangements. Ssalongo tells me what I can see for myself that the cell is terribly overcrowded. There is not enough room for everybody to lie down, so that some inmates must spend the night on their feet!

The cubicles are a special privilege which come with status in the hierarchy of the prisoners, subject to vacancies occurring. Vacancies normally occur when some prisoners living in a cubicle are killed off in the Go-down. Then those who remain the cubicle invite one or more of the "stranded" prisoners to fill the vacancies. Until you are so invited you have to be one of the "stranded" ones.

Communication with our families. The old man tells me it is strictly forbidden to communicate with the outside world. You cannot communicate with your family. Lawyers are out of question, even priests for dying Roman Catholics! Some prisoners risk and bribe soldiers to take messages to their relations – the bribe being paid at the other end. This is dangerous for both prisoner and relations – as often, after demanding money with menaces from the relatives, the soldiers may kill both prisoner and relatives, to obliterate all evidence of their corruption. But Ssalongo gives me a bit of cheering news: that he has his own system which he uses for himself alone, and that out of respect for me he would use it to deliver my message.

Right now I am not sure whether I am talking to a planted spy or to a genuine friend – but I decide to trust the old man. It is a decision that, later, plays a significant role in my escape story. Ssalongo tells me, though, that pen and paper is one of the most difficult problems to solve. There is not, in this cell, even the toilet paper which served as note paper for luminaries such as Nkrumah, Ngugi wa Thiongo and others.

The probable fate of a captive in Makindye barracks. I ask because I want to know and prepare myself for the worst. Ssalongo tells me that once you come to Death Cell, the best one can expect is quick death without torture. Prisoners are collected regularly from Death Cell and taken to be clubbed to death in the Go-down. Then the day after, prisoners in the so-called Katwe Group of 12 are told to go and load the dead bodies onto an army truck for disposal in one of the forests.

Ssalongo tells me that occasionally, but only very occasionally, a prisoner in Death Cell has found his way out to freedom by paying large sums of money to key officials in the barracks. However, 95 percent of such attempts at escape to freedom have ended up in the death of those attempting to get out. More often than not an official will take your money and then kill you to destroy evidence of bribery.

Otherwise the common lot of the inmates of Death Cell is death by clubbing in the Go-down. If you are not killed in the Go-down, you may just as easily die of disease or of starvation.

Immediately my mind begins to work on ways of avoiding starvation and death by disease, while paving the way for the possibility of escape. As a first step towards self-preservation, I ask the old man how I can get hold of a mess tin with which I might queue for maize meal (I gather some food is expected today). He tells me one normally has to wait for an inmate to be killed and then struggle fiercely to inherit his mess tin.

The interview is over. It is now about 4:30 PM and I can hear some commotion outside. Inmates who have mess tins grab them and rush to take position in queue. I am told that food is on the way. But I have no mess tin, and my present physical condition cannot withstand the jostling and pushing in this queue, so I just sit on the side and watch, resigned to not eating for the next two days (in addition to today and yesterday – the day of my arrest). However, Ssalongo comes to my aid and bringing me a mess tin which, he says, I can use as long as I like. In the course of his three-month stay he has managed to acquire two.

So I take my place at the back of the queue. But somebody recognizes me. It is a young man, a garage owner of Bwaise suburb who has attended a number of my party rallies. He comes and talks to me, and offers to help me obtain some food. He takes my mess tin and enters one of the cubicles. Another young man gets out of the cubicle with the mess tin and goes to the head of the queue where *posho* meal is being distributed. My tin is filled, he brings it back and invites me to sit and eat with them in their cubicle. Later I learn that this young man, also from Bwaise suburb, is the “patron” of Death Cell – the evolved leader of the prison commune who keeps order and dispenses justice in feuds between prisoners.

As soon as I taste the food I feel like throwing up. It is virtually uncooked, has got maggots in it, and there is no salt. However, as I have promised myself not to let myself die of starvation I have to eat it. I shut my eyes and eat without looking.

After eating, the “patron” gives me a drop of water, and we begin talking. For about an hour I am educating myself with the help of these inmates who, for some reason or other, seem to have a lot of respect for me. Later I learn that a former student in one of my philosophy classes at Makerere University is among the inmates and has told them about me. For weeks while I am here hardly anybody knows my name in Death Cell – they all call me

"professor." At sunset, about 6:30 PM, I note an ominous silence in Death Cell. I cannot understand it. Nobody wants to speak, or be spoken to. Suddenly I hear the clanking of keys on a chain. Each prisoner is visibly nervous now. A soldier approaching the metal grille to Death Cell announces his arrival in Swahili – "*Nimekuja mimi Muwujaje*" ("I, the killer, have arrived"). At first I miss the significance of this statement.

The soldier calls out six names. Someone in the main corridor is sobbing. But all six people proceed to the door which a soldier opens for them. Meek and subdued, like sacrificial lambs, they walk out and the metal grille closes behind them. I shall never forget the faces of those men! A few minutes later the ritual of torture, whipping, clubbing and cries of agony begin in the Go-down. Finally the cries subside but the beatings rise to a crescendo and finally stop. We know that the inmates are dead. It is a sunset ritual that one witnesses many times at Makindye. When the grisly act has been concluded, there is a visible relaxation of tension in the cell. People resume their conversations from where they had stopped. Others gather at the door to kill off another batch of lice from their clothes, and prepare to spend another night on the filthy floor, or on your feet! Luckier than most prisoners, I am offered accommodation in two different cubicles.

The rest of the days. I spent a total of two and a half weeks in Makindye barracks before executing an escape plan. Each of those days was a day of waiting for death, of hunger, and a witness to untold human suffering. Above all, each day was a day of degradation and dehumanization. Among those killed was the garage proprietor from Bwaise, Laurenti Kate Musoke! A total of between 25 and 30 inmates were killed in these two and a half weeks I was in Makindye – that is from Death Cell alone.

At some point during my stay I was attacked by malaria and a liver complication. I was so ill I could not move on my own. I had to be carried to the toilet by other prisoners. I could not and did not eat anything. I had to break the rule against medical treatment and have a few chloroquine tablets smuggled into jail. I was luckier than many, because I was not caught. And in those two and a half weeks, I discovered that life in Makindye was much worse than Ssalongo had told me on my first day. The details are much more grisly. But some of these details, and details of my escape story have to be withheld for the moment.



Wamala survived the ordeal but lived for only five more years. He died in 1986, having contributed much to the struggle to oust the regime that put him in Makindye. He was appointed Uganda's ambassador to the United Nations by Museveni's NRM government in early 1986 but died, aged thirty-nine, before taking office. His time in captivity contributed in all likelihood to his fatal illness – liver cancer as a side-effect of drugs earlier administered to combat a severe form of meningitis.

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Appendices

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APPENDIX ONE

The Language Debate

As noted elsewhere, the need to come to grips with the problems posed by the absence of a common language in Uganda was apparent from colonial times. Certain members of the colonial bureaucracy tried to introduce an African language, Kiswahili, as the official language of administration, but they were opposed by three strong social forces that disliked this hybrid tongue: the Christian missionaries, their supporters among the colonial officials, and the Baganda ruling élite. In 1903 Governor Sadler made it obligatory for officers to learn Kiswahili, while Luganda was to be a "bonus" language.¹ But the missionaries pointed out that Kiswahili transmitted Islamic values and would give undue advantage to Islam. It would give Muslim employees an edge over Christians and make Islam credible in the eyes of the pagan masses whose souls both value systems were competing to win. Kiswahili was therefore a danger to the society the missionaries were trying to build in Uganda. The Anglican bishop refused to teach it in his schools, preferring English instead. He agreed with Uganda's having one language as long as it was not Kiswahili, which meant "Mohammedanism, moral and physical degeneration and ruin."²

While the missionaries went ahead with the development of Luganda by improving its orthography, translating a number of works into it, and making it the medium of instruction in the few schools that were available, the government did not follow up on its Kiswahili policy. It was not taught in schools, nor were local books translated into it. By 1910 Luganda was becoming more widespread than Kiswahili, especially for official communications. In 1909 the Public Works and Marine departments requested that Luganda replace Kiswahili in their transactions. In 1912 Governor F.J. Jackson, realizing how popular the missionaries had made Luganda, recom-

mended that it be used as an official language. He noted that “the Baganda area progressive race and their language and influence are extending rapidly.”³ Within a month consent was given and Luganda was made the obligatory language and Kiswahili the bonus language.⁴ The missionaries praised this step as a boost to their evangelizing efforts. The Church Missionary Society (CMS) in particular began to encourage the teaching of Luganda in the Eastern Province and (surprisingly) the Northern as well. Failing to implement its own policy, the government had instead accepted one advanced by the Christian missionaries, who saw Luganda as a better transmitter of Christian values than Kiswahili.

From 1912 on, there were heated debates between the supporters of Kiswahili and Luganda. Kiswahili was eventually accepted in 1927 by Governor Gowers and the Colonial Office, but they were ultimately defeated by the intervention of the Christian missionaries, who appealed directly to London to reverse the policy. The supporters of Luganda had a number of reasons for their choice. As the provincial commission (PC) of Buganda wrote, the Baganda were “the principle and most progressive tribe in the Protectorate” and their language deserved a corresponding prominence.⁵ This view was shared by other colonial officers working in Buganda and by Christian missionaries. Moreover, while Luganda was native to Uganda, Kiswahili was imported.⁶ The PC further pointed out that Bagandan influence had extended to all parts of the protectorate. The acting PC of Buganda recorded that “the push and progressiveness of the Muganda is markedly greater than that of the Munyoro.”⁷ Adding to the flattery, A.H. Cox, acting district commissioner of Bukedi, said that as the Baganda were role models for other ethnic groups, their language should be predominant.⁸ It was generally felt that adopting Kiswahili would reduce the dominant position of the Baganda,⁹ while Luganda would increase their social status in the protectorate.

The strong pro-Luganda lobby was buttressed by a number of missionary education experts like H.M. Grace,¹⁰ headmaster of Budo, by Christian missionaries, and by most of the African press, which was in Luganda anyway. *Uganda Notes*, a missionary journal, claimed that the Baganda “are the most intelligent and the most valuable servants of the church, state and commerce.”¹¹ *Gambuze* pointed out that not only was Kiswahili a foreign language, it was a “rootless and fatherless language.”¹² The missionaries, whose aim was to make the Bible thoroughly understood by native peoples, emphasized that this goal could best be achieved in the *mother tongue* of the people. It was also pointed out that Luganda was fast developing a literature of its own. The pioneer missionary Mackay had brought a

printing press that contributed to the development of the language. By 1897 Pilkington had recorded a grammar and printed parts of the Bible in Luganda. Now, in addition to the lively African press, an enormous Christian literature was being written in the language. The Reverend John Roscoe and the Reverend Mr Rowlings had written numerous works in Luganda, and the latter had studied the language thoroughly. They stressed that its development as a literate language gave it the capacity to transmit Christian values. Such was the strength of the pro-Luganda forces that in 1919 Governor Coryndon reaffirmed government policy to keep Luganda as the official native language for most of Uganda, and "Gang" (Acholi) for the northern region.¹³ In 1919 the conference of all provincial commissioners had supported the use of Kiswahili as the official native language and recommended that it be taught in schools by the missionaries.¹⁴ But because the missionaries refused to do so, the 1922 provincial commissioners' conference, recognizing the impossibility of implementing the Kiswahili language policy, reversed their earlier decision by three votes to one.¹⁵

However, the pro-Kiswahili lobby was also well prepared to defend its position. It argued that in a country with many ethnic groups, it was *unfair* and *impolitic* to select the language of one social group as the official language of the whole. Doing so would confer on its speakers an unfair advantage. This was the view of the provincial commissioner of the Northern Province,¹⁶ who supported the adoption of Kiswahili and praised Kenya and Tanganyika for selecting it as their official language. It was also argued that Luganda was difficult to learn, especially for the "Nilotic" peoples of northern Uganda.¹⁷ And, of course, the Baganda were very unpopular in the protectorate. When they acted as agents of the colonial rulers, their arrogance and insolence drew the hatred of other "tribes" in the protectorate. Their language was therefore viewed as cultural imperialism. In 1905 the Omukama and chiefs of Toro demanded the translation of the Bible into their language, Lunyoro/Lutoro. They did not like reading the gospel in Luganda, though the language is related to their own.¹⁸ In Bunyoro, the anti-British and anti-Baganda movement *Kyanyangire* was aimed not only at Baganda chiefs but also at Baganda cultural imperialism, especially in the use of Luganda in church, education, and administration.¹⁹ Pupils in schools either were reluctant to be taught in Luganda or refused.²⁰ The district commissioner of Gulu wrote in 1919 that, as the Baganda were not liked by other groups, it was politically prudent to select Kiswahili.²¹ Most of the officers administering districts outside Buganda were of this view. Moreover, European planters, whose

labour force was mostly recruited from areas outside Buganda, supported Kiswahili as a more useful local language.²² It is no wonder that the provincial commissioners opted for Kiswahili at their 1920 conference at Entebbe.²³

The Kiswahili lobby argued further that the missionaries themselves had undermined the prominence and monopoly of Luganda by committing other African languages to writing and translating works into those languages. Each major ethnic group in the protectorate thus had its own literature and could keep records in its own language. A former missionary turned businessman wrote to the governor that "the missions have made great mistakes in the past in allowing literature to be printed in so many local languages."²⁴ By 1915 the Church Missionary Society policy aimed at translating the Christian message into the various tribal languages of the protectorate. Luganda had lost its prominence as the CMS's only written official language. The supporters of Kiswahili also denied that the language was a carrier of Islam;²⁵ there was plenty of Christian literature written in Kiswahili,²⁶ particularly in Tanzania and Kenya, where the number is fifty percent of all translations into African languages.²⁷ The acting PC of the Northern Province noted that the ideas of Kiswahili's identification with Islam had originated with a Christian, Bishop Tucker.²⁸ He recommended the adoption of Kiswahili because it was "the language used in commerce"; those who travelled had to learn it. Nonetheless, the early missionaries perceived that Kiswahili was advantageous to Islam, and it is their perception, whether correct or not, that eventually influenced the protectorate's language policy.

Lastly, the supporters of Kiswahili argued that it was not only a commercial language but an international one, spoken in all the territories surrounding Uganda. Its use would facilitate communication between Uganda and her neighbours. One officer, exaggerating his case, wrote to his senior that "Swahili ... is the lingua franca of the whole Central Africa from Mombasa on the East to Boma on the west."²⁹ Several officers pointed out that even the Baganda became proud when they learned Kiswahili, and when spoken to by Europeans they always replied in Kiswahili, not Luganda.³⁰ Those who wanted to do long-distance trade outside the protectorate had no alternative but to learn Kiswahili. This argument was in line with the British desire in the 1920s to federate the three East African possessions into one territory: a language spoken throughout East Africa would encourage unity in any regional federation. One officer put it thus: "As the ultimate object of European control of East Africa is surely to weld the territory into one whole for commercial and

educational development," the adoption of a language that already possessed official status in the East African Protectorate and Tanganyika would be wise.³¹

With the appointment of Sir William Gowers, who took office as governor in 1925, the stage was set for the showdown between the state and the Christian missions over Kiswahili. The new governor favoured the language and suggested various ways of adopting it gradually. In 1927, the Advisory Council for Native Education suggested the development of Kiswahili as the future official language. The missionaries blocked this move, although they agreed to have Kiswahili in the curriculum.³² While it could be taught in Buganda, the missionaries insisted it should never be allowed to become the medium of instruction there. In non-Bantu areas, Kiswahili was to be used for instruction in the last three years of elementary school; on this latter point there was general agreement. Gowers, however, was determined to have his way. He sought permission from London to develop Kiswahili as a major language in the protectorate by reintroducing it as the *lingua franca*, encouraging its use in education and administration, restoring the bonus payable to officers passing higher Kiswahili examinations, and adopting it as an alternative to Luganda in the lower-standard language examinations for officers.³³ Within two months London approved almost all Gowers's major recommendations.³⁴ He then sought Colonial Office approval of his implementation plan whereby Kiswahili would become "the medium of instruction in all elementary vernacular schools"; government grants would be withheld from those who failed to comply. He also recommended that in the Bantu-speaking areas of Buganda, Bunyoro, Toro, Ankole, and perhaps Busoga, the medium of instruction should remain as it was but that Kiswahili should be "introduced in lieu of English"; that in "mixed areas" – the districts of Budama, Bukedi, Bugishu, Bugwere, Teso, Lango, Karamoja, Chua, Gulu, West Nile, and Kigezi – Kiswahili should be used in all elementary and normal schools; and that the government should pay teachers to teach the language, alter language regulations for officers, and announce its intention to discourage Luganda in Buganda.³⁵

The reaction from the missionaries was firmly negative. Four bishops belonging to missions engaged in educational work in Uganda wrote to the secretary of state for the Colonies that they would refuse to cooperate in implementing Gowers's policy;³⁶ between them they handled 242,000 out of a total 248,000 students enrolled in the protectorate schools. They pointed out that Kiswahili was not a mother tongue in the country and that using it for

instruction would lead “to the alienation of the child from his ancestral environment.” Luganda, on the other hand, was the language of a progressive ethnic group and had served Christianity well in the past. Moreover, Kiswahili was not popular in Buganda. “We are therefore quite prepared,” they concluded, “to co-operate in the teaching of Swahili as a subject in upper classes of elementary schools ... [but] we are not prepared to go further and use it as a medium of instruction in our elementary schools.”³⁷

The bishops, not the government, controlled the schools. The governor was furious. In 1931, at Makerere, he spoke out publicly against the “signatories of this memorandum” who opposed the government’s language policy, indirectly questioned an earlier acknowledgment of the missionaries’ labours in education by the principal of the college, and said he was extremely unhappy about their action.³⁸ What was surprising about this speech was not the difference of opinion between the colonial state and the Church – there had been many differences in the past – but the governor’s decision to go public and challenge fellow white men in front of “natives.” But the governor could not win. The missionaries had friends in political circles in Britain and could, as they had in the past, bring a colonial issue back home. The governor’s fury was perhaps due to his realization that it was impossible to implement a language policy without the cooperation of those who owned the schools and who had the power to stir up public opinion against him in Britain. When efforts to federate East Africa proved unworkable, and with Gowers’s departure in 1932, the Kiswahili policy lost powerful friends. In 1944 the Makerere Conference on Education recognized five local languages of instruction: Luganda, Acholi, Lunyoro/Lutor, Ateso, and Lugbara. It was hoped that, sooner or later, English would become the medium of instruction. From the seventh year of education, English was recommended for teaching.³⁹ Bishop Tucker wanted to use the vernacular in a student’s tender years but thereafter develop English as the lingua franca and medium of instruction. He believed that the success of the Church in Uganda had been due mainly to the dropping of Kiswahili from Christian teaching work and a persistent policy of giving the Baganda the word of God in their own tongue.⁴⁰

The 1948 report of the Department of Education noted that six African languages were used for teaching: Luganda, Lunyoro, Lwo, Ateso, Lugbara, and Kiswahili. From 1948 to the rise of Idi Amin, Kiswahili dropped from favour. The government did not again encourage its use. On the contrary, several study groups recommended against teaching it. The Nuffield study group that visited East and

Central Africa in 1951–52 recommended that, “because the present teaching of Swahili stands in the way of the strong development of both vernacular and English teaching, a policy should be followed which leads to its eventual elimination from all schools where it is taught as a *lingua franca*.”⁴¹ In 1952 Kiswahili was dropped as a language of instruction. The East African Royal Commission of 1953–55 stated that “we regard the teaching of Swahili as a second language to children whose early education has been in vernacular as a complete waste of time and effort.”⁴² In 1961 Runyankole/Rukiga was added to the list of five languages used for teaching. The situation has not changed since.⁴³

Ultimately, the colonial social system developed in Uganda between 1900 and 1950 worked against the use of Kiswahili. Colonial society was built on Euro-Christian values and rewarded individuals who spoke the master’s language. In testifying before the select committee on closer union in East Africa, Serwano Kulubya said that “English was the key to everything.” All social rewards were given to speakers of English, not Kiswahili. By the time independence was granted to Africans, Kiswahili was considered to be the language of the lowest classes in society; those who spoke it were despised. African women who spoke Kiswahili in rural Uganda were suspected of being prostitutes, and men of being thieves, liars, or crude. While this attitude seemed to change with the Tanzanian invasion of 1979, English, the official language of administration and instruction since independence, is still “the key to everything” in Uganda. But as noted elsewhere, it classifies society into two strata: the privileged, who speak it, and the deprived, who don’t.

Since independence Ugandan leaders have taken no concrete steps to develop or popularize a common local language. Although greater use of Kiswahili was urged by the UPC at its 1962 annual conference, no practical steps were taken to adopt it either as an official language of administration, a medium of instruction, or a tool of mass communication. In 1967, Obote said, “We find no alternative to English in Uganda’s present position.”⁴⁴ Although three years later he said he would add Kiswahili to the curricula of schools feeding Makerere University, he never formulated a coordinated Kiswahili policy. And yet it is Obote who once bemoaned the fact that he could not speak directly to many of his supporters; who regretted having to talk to his party workers through interpreters since it increased the risk of leakages;⁴⁵ and whose party could not hope to win the kind of mass support enjoyed by the Tanganyika African National Union, whose leader, Julius Nyerere, could speak directly to the people in their own language.

In 1974 Idi Amin declared Kiswahili a national language and a medium of instruction. At first he toyed with Luganda, saying that Kiswahili "is an international language like French and English and so could not be made a national language."⁴⁶ But he was forced by a vote of delegates of the seventeen districts of Uganda then assembled to select Kiswahili, which they thought would be advantageous to them.⁴⁷ If Amin had been familiar with Gowers's problems, he might have thought twice. But he was not. By this time the owners of schools did not even bother to reply to the decree: they just ignored him. He could not enforce his policy, and the problem is still unresolved.

The recent commission on education chaired by Professor Senteza Kajubi recommended teaching students in their mother tongues in elementary schools.⁴⁸ This policy would likely lead to further linguistic fragmentation; which would reinforce, and be reinforced by, ethnic divisions. Such fragmentation can only increase the potential for violence.

APPENDIX TWO

Buwunga Subcounty: A Case Study of the Impact of Violence on a Local Community

Buwunga subcounty, or *gombolola*, is located five miles south of the town of Masaka in Masaka District. It is where I was born and raised, and a close look at the subcounty will provide a few insights into how a small community has been affected by twenty-five years of violence.

Buwunga occupies an area of approximately five square miles and, in 1986, had a population of 35,000 of whom 16,000 were males and 19,000 females. Age groups ranged from 9 and under (500), 10–19 (800), 20–9 (400), 40–9 (400), 50–9 (150), and over 60 (150), while 400 were of undetermined age. The locations in the *gombolola* (wrongly called villages) were Kitengesa, Kyera, Narozali, Nakiyaga, Mizinga, Mukoni, Kkyasunsu, Lugazi, Misansala, Wabitembe, Kyamusenyi, and Kyanga; parts of Bukeeri and Kasozi were also in Buwunga. Each location contained a cluster of households located in banana plantations, as well as a *Mutongole* chief.

Formerly a prosperous area that grew coffee and bananas, Buwunga saw its happier days vanish as violence began to influence its residents. According to one *gombolola* official, the quality of life was lowered considerably.

Health service. Before 1975 there was a very good health centre on the periphery of Buwanga at Bukeeri. Its staff of two medical assistants and four nurses was supplemented by a doctor who used to visit it at least once a week. By 1986, however, most of the clinic's materials, furniture, and other property had been stolen (or, to use a softer word, looted), and the staff reduced to one miserably paid medical assistant and a nurse. Predictably, the death rate in Buwunga increased considerably, from about one death per year at each location to one per month.

Education. In 1970 education was still in the hands of missionaries, and parents sent their children to schools run by their own religious denominations. The Catholics had a number of "Primary Four" schools feeding a full primary school at their Narozaali Mission; the Anglicans ran three Primary Four schools whose students then went to the full primary school at Kasozi; and the Muslims, in addition to one Primary Four school at Kyabumba and a number of Koran schools, operated an advanced school at Bwala in Masaka Municipality. Fortunately, by 1986 not much had changed with regard to education. Although there were many underpaid teachers, the schools and churches had escaped heavy looting in the 1979 war and students continued to go to school. Nonetheless, school supplies and the physical structures of the schools were far below what they were before the era of violence.

Water and power supply. There is no electricity or pumped water in Buwunga despite its closeness to Masaka Municipality. The destruction of the Wabitembe Forest in the 1950s brought about an ecological change that reduced the once-famous Kagona Springs to a shadow of its former mightiness.

Family structure. In the 1960s most people in Buwunga subcounty lived in stable monogamous or polygamous homes. But by 1986, when I gathered the following data, such was no longer the case. In 1986–87 the family structure was as follows. Most people forty-five years or over were married and lived in stable monogamous or polygamous families. However, a number of families were headed by women whose absentee husbands visited them occasionally. There were about fifty known *nakyeyombekedde* (i.e., women who built their own houses and managed their own affairs). About thirty divorced young women lived a very precarious existence at Kitengeesa, Nakiyaga, and Kidda trading centres. Many young children born out of wedlock and fathered by both married and unmarried men roamed the sublocation. The old family structure based on socially recognized marriages had been undermined. Neither the government nor the leaders of the Christian parish were able to exert sufficient pressure to preserve the old family unit. The culture of violence that created violent social behaviour had an adverse impact on the structure of the family in Buwunga.

Religion. The religious affiliations of people in Buwunga were: Roman Catholic (about 65 percent); Anglican Protestants (about ten percent); Muslims (about 15 percent); and others (about ten

percent). Before Idi Amin came to power in 1971, Christian-Muslim relations were cordial. But after 1971, the delicate interfaith relationships were also badly strained by the impact of violence. Some foolish Muslims upset Christians by boasting and teasing; relations became so strained that by 1979 there was fear of conflict between the two. What saved the situation was the intervention of elders from both sides who were related by clan ties.

Clan affiliation and ethnic relations. These aspects of life in Buwunga seem not to have been adversely affected by violence. Although Buwunga residents might belong to different religions and classes, a number of them are united by clan ties. The major clans are the Grasshopper (Mukoni, Kyasunsu, Kitengesa), Bushbuck (Lwanunda, Lugazi, Kyera), and Cow (Kidda); the Monkey and Bird clans are also represented. Sixty percent of the people were estimated to be Baganda; thirty-five percent to be of Banyarwanda extraction; five percent of Banyankore/Bakiga extraction. About eighty percent of the people were born in the area and few immigrants had arrived since 1970. Unlike Ankole and Lango, there was no violence against the Banyarwanda or the cattle-owning Banyankore/Bakiga; they were accepted as full members of the community.

Income and class. By 1960 incomes in the area averaged between fifty and one hundred dollars per year. One level above the average were about a hundred middle peasants, including my father, who owned large coffee plantations, lived in iron-roofed houses, employed labourers, and could send their children to secondary schools. My father, who died in 1977, owned some ten acres and employed upwards of five workers in addition to his family. There were also two rich peasants, Nyansio Ddungu and Luka Ssajjabbi, who cultivated twenty to forty acres of coffee and about ten acres of matooke. Both were members of the district growers' union, to which they sold their coffee. But when the independence of these cooperative unions was curtailed and their members forced to sell to unions manned by government-appointed bureaucrats who did not pay cash when coffee was delivered, Ddungu and Ssajjabbi could not pay their bills. Their workers left and by 1972 their plantations were already reclaimed by bush. The other coffee farmers were similarly affected and lost interest in growing coffee. By 1975 the area produced less than twenty-five percent of the coffee grown in 1960. By 1986, there were very few coffee trees left in Buwunga.

The eclipse of coffee production led to reduced incomes in the top strata, leading to a levelling in class structure. On the other hand,

banana (*matooke*) production increased because producers controlled the price at the market level; they could get immediate cash and could decide what to charge for their produce. Many Muslims received slightly higher incomes because they worked in Masaka township as motor-vehicle drivers, butchers, tailors, etc. Social conflict, including the expulsion of the Asians and the failure of the *mafutamingi* – the new merchants – to fill the commercial vacuum, affected them adversely because it reduced opportunities. Two sons of the area, one Muslim and the other Catholic, benefited from the Asian expulsion by being given businesses in town. They made money and built mansions in Buwunga, but they failed to turn their fortunes into long-lasting business or industrial ventures. They are now as poor as the rest of the people. The destruction of the economy affected the area drastically.

Roads. The one major road in Buwunga connected Masaka and Kyanamukaka subcounty. Although it remained in relatively good condition, its feeder roads, formerly maintained by the *Bulungi Bwansi* system, were not cared for. When the Buganda government fell, the local authorities were weakened and no one was left to supervise *Bulungi Bwansi*. Yet the central government was too far away to know about and tend to the roads in Buwunga. Transport in the area suffered. A bus service to Kyanamukaka begun in the 1960s ceased in the 1970s. In the 1960s the area was served by about five *matatus* (taxis), but by 1986 these were reduced to three, all of which were in very bad shape.

Violence in Buwunga. Robbery with violence increased in the late 1960s and further intensified in the Amin period to the point where people began to form vigilante groups in 1975. In one incident, the sons of a man named Nnakumusana terrorized villages in Lwanuanda/Kyanjovu area and were thought to have shared their loot with him. In 1976 the vigilantes rounded them up, killed the whole family, and secretly buried them. Although the police tried to gather information about this unfortunate incident, people refused to talk and no vigilante was ever convicted. Family violence is now a daily phenomenon in the area. In the past, traditional authorities involving clans and the extended family operated courts to try such cases, but they no longer have binding authority to resolve them. Because the agents of the state are weak and are thought to believe that men have a right to beat their wives, battered wives will rarely report incidents to the authorities. Society as now structured does not adequately protect women from the violence of their husbands.

Murder and assault unconnected with robbery were rare. Violence stemming from adultery was reported to me, but no deaths.

Sexually transmitted diseases. According to a resident medical worker, sexually transmitted diseases are widespread. By 1975 venereal disease was rampant in the trading centres of Kitengeesa, Buwunga, and Nakiyaga. By 1988 AIDS had claimed a number of victims in Buwunga. In the two weeks I was last in the area (August 1988), two people died of AIDS in Kyanga and Lwanyi; the former was a son of the local head of my clan (Grasshopper). A number of others were waiting to die. Each of my two brothers lost a son to AIDS; one was sixteen, the other twenty-five.

APPENDIX THREE

Some of the Massacres under the Military Commission and Obote's Regime, 1980-84

<i>No. of People Murdered/ Dumped</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Place</i>	<i>Circumstances</i>
13	June 1980	Rubaga	Army killed 13 people on eve of Yusuf Lule's expected popular return.
43	June/July 1980	Kattambwa Entebbe Rd	43 dead bodies were dumped by UNLA lorries at Busabala & Kattambwa.
4	July/Aug. 1980	Rubaga Rd near Lohana Club	4 civilians ordered to stand out from the crowd & shot at orders of Barjilio Olara Okello.
4 or more	Sept./Oct. 1980	Natete	Four were known to have been killed by army men.
4	Jan. 1981	Wakiso	Forced to drink poison.
16	Jan. 5 1981	Wakiso	Shot by soldiers.
32	Jan. 1981	Matugga	
33	Jan. 1981	Migadde	
16	Feb. 1981	Kibibi (Mpigi Dist.)	
14	Feb. 1981	Bakuli-Mengo	Soldiers raided Mengo Bukuli, rounded up many people and killed them.
7	Feb. 1981	Namanve Forest	Seven bullet riddled bodies dumped in Namanve forest, Jinja road.
20	Feb. 1981	Kiboga Area	UNLA troops raided Kiboga area and killed off 20 civilians as scapegoats for guerrilla attacks.
79	March 1981	Namanve Forest	79 bullet riddled bodies found; 2 belonging to school girls in uniform. Evidence of rape present.
70	March 1981	Katabi Barracks	Prisoners killed in the barracks by soldiers.

<i>No. of People Murdered/ Dumped</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Place</i>	<i>Circumstances</i>
15	April 1981	Ndeebea town	An army Land Rover overturned in Ndeebea town. Soldiers from Malire barracks descended on the town and killed 15 people.
16	April 1981	Mukono area	Soldiers descended on Mukono area after a guerrilla attack and killed civilians as scapegoats.
4	May 1981	Namayumba (Luwero Dist.)	
3	May 1981	" "	
		(on a second occasion)	
3	May 1981	Kireka	Three people were shot dead at Kireka roadblock because they had no money to give to soldiers.
6	May 1981	Kawanda	A family of 6 wiped out by UNLA soldiers.
5	May 1981	Jinja	Soldiers shot 5 school boys in Jinja town.
25	May 1981	Mukono	Soldiers again raided Mukono area and shot 25 people.
250	May 1981	Kiboga	Claiming that Kiboga protected guerrillas, soldiers shot over 250 people.
11	June 1981	Kikandwa	Soldiers massacred 11 people in their homes.
8	June 1981	Nakaseke Bulemezi	
10	June 1981	Ombaci and Ladonga	Soldiers opened fire at innocent civilians and refugees at the Catholic mission, because of allegations that they had hospitalized and treated a guerrilla. This incident was mentioned by the UN Secretary General at the Nairobi OAU Conference.
8	July 1981	Lungujja	Soldiers killed 8 people at Lungujja village near Kampala.
3	July 1981	Kampala	Soldiers entered the Sardinia Pub in Kampala, opening fire on innocent civilians.
7	1 Aug. 1981	Naziri on Mityana Rd	House of John Mugwanya, heir to Stanslaus Mugwanya, destroyed by RGP and seven people killed. His soap factory was also destroyed.
35	Aug. 1981	Mukono	They were killed by soldiers.
33	Aug. 1981	Mityana	They were killed by UNLA soldiers.

<i>No. of People Murdered/ Dumped</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Place</i>	<i>Circumstances</i>
60	Sept. 1981	Wakiso (Mpigi)	60 people including women and children were killed in a UNIA raid on their district villages.
9	Aug. 1981	Kawempe	Nine people were murdered by men in military Rayon uniform at Kawempe Rayon Textiles.
6	July 1981	Namayumba (Luwero Dist.)	
30	Sept. 1981	Matugga	UNIA raided, looted and shot 30 people.
7	Sept. 1981	Kapeeka (Bulemezi)	Seven civilians were killed in their homes by government troops.
9	Oct. 1981	Karenge	
4	Oct. 1981	Kissuuna (Luwero Dist.)	
30	Oct. 1981	Ndeebea	
162	Oct. 1981	Kasese	<i>Uganda Digest</i> of Dec. 1981, p. 63, reported 162 people killed by government troops in Kasese District.
51	Nov. 1981	Luwero	51 innocent civilians were killed in their homes when UNIA raided the area.
3	Dec. 1981	Gombe-Kalasa (Mpigi Dist.)	Three worshippers killed when soldiers opened fire in a church.
200	23-24 Feb. 1982	Rubaga, Ndeebea Kabowa, Mutundwe Nalukolongo area of Kampala	Over 200 civilians were killed by UNIA soldiers on a rampage after a UFM attack on Malire barracks.
50	23. Feb. 1982	Mpigi roadblock	More than fifty people were shot at Mpigi roadblock.
19	27 Feb. 1982	Mpigi roadblock	Another 19 people were killed on Mpigi roadblock by soldiers.
50	24-29 Feb. 1982	Bujuuko, Muduuma and Nswanjere (Mpigi Dist.)	In the hunt for guerrillas, soldiers carried out a scorched-earth raid on these villages killing people, dogs, chickens - anything they found alive.
20	March 1982	Kakikiri- Sentema area	UNIA soldiers raided and killed villagers.
16	March 1982	Kawanda Re- search Station	Civilians shot by soldiers.
11	March 1982	Green Bar on Entebbe Rd	Shot by soldiers.
60	April 1982	Mende	Civilians killed by soldiers.

<i>No. of People Murdered/ Dumped</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Place</i>	<i>Circumstances</i>
30	April 1982	Mutugga Bombo Rd	Soldiers killed people; some of the dead were from Kawanda Research Station.
60	April 1982	Matugga	Again the people of Matugga were invaded by UNLA and the toll topped.
12	April 1982	Kakengere	Soldiers accused the people of Kakiri of possessing pieces of wood and grass for superstition purposes. Thirty bodies washed upon the shores of Lake Victoria.
55	April 1982	Kakiri	
30	May 1982	Lake Victoria	These people were hacked to death by soldiers.
35	28 May 1982	Nakaseta near Mityana	
100	May 1982	Kikyusa	51 bodies were dumped in this place by military truck.
51	June 1982	Mbanda near Matugga (Mpigi Dist.)	20 bodies dumped here by a UNLA lorry.
20	June 1982	Kakiri-Hoima Rd	
30	June 1982	Koyoga stream, Wakiso	Prisoners were brought by a military lorry and were machine-gunned to death.
30	June 1982	Myanzi on Mityana Mubende Rd	Innocent people who were picked up at Sekanyonyi near Mityana and shot.
100	June 1982	Lake Victoria	More bodies were picked up from Lake Victoria. Many had been rounded up in <i>Panda Gari</i> operations.
17	June 1982	Ibalya (Luwero Dist.)	17 people were packed into a house that was shelled by soldiers.
11	June 1982	Kanyogoga (Luwero Dist.)	Soldiers ordered people to pick corn (maize) after which 11 were shot to death. Soldiers laughed as they left the execution place.
9	June 1982	Kisubi, Nkumba area - Entebbe Rd	Soldiers on a rampage gunned down these people.
23	31 July 1981	Kiwoko in Luwero Dist.	All these people were shot by soldiers near the taxi part of Kiwoko.
6	July 1982	Ndeeba Kampala	Six bodies found decomposed in a trench.
56	July 1982	Buwaya, Entebbe (Mpigi Dist.)	These bodies were sighted at the side of the peninsula linking the channel to parts of Buwaya.

<i>No. of People Murdered/ Dumped</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Place</i>	<i>Circumstances</i>
65	July 1982	Kaberenge (Luwero Dist.)	Bodies in a state of decomposition dumped here.
14	July 1982	Naziri (Mityana Rd)	Bodies dumped by men in military uniform.
25	Aug. 1982	Kasengejje (Mpigi Dist.)	Shot
4	Sept. 1982	Mulungu (Mpigi Dist.)	"
4	Sept. 1982	Nansans (Mpigi Dist.)	"
17	10 Sept. 1982	Manja	17 bodies were located at this place. Deziderio Sembatya, who survived the holocaust, said that the bodies were of males 12-20 years old who were rounded up as suspected guer- rillas by the <i>Panda Gari</i> army opera- tion and shot dead.
12	Oct. 1982	Buloba (Mityana Rd)	Internal refugees who had ran away from their homes were rounded up by the army and killed.
26	Oct. 1982	Seenge (Wakiso)	Shot
19	Oct./Nov. 1982	Lungoola (Mpigi Dist.)	Nineteen bodies dumped here.
10	Oct./Nov. 1982	Kabindizi (Mpigi Dist.)	
17	Oct./Nov. 1982	Nabunya (Mpigi Dist.)	23
23	Oct./Nov. 1982	Kkongge (Mpigi Dist.)	
60	Oct./Nov. 1982	"	
68	Oct./Nov. 1982	Mpambiri (Mpigi Dist.)	
8	Oct./Nov. 1982	Nabukongo (Mpigi Dist.)	
78	Oct./Nov. 1982	(Mpigi Dist.)	Found in a big coffee plantation formerly owned by Europeans.
4	Oct./Nov. 1982	Boza (Mpigi Dist.)	
3	Oct./Nov. 1982	Kikamula	
13	Oct./Nov. 1982	Maziba (Mpigi Dist.)	
17	Oct./Nov. 1982	Nsangi and Buloba	Bodies belonged to prisoners who had been interned in Mpigi police cells from when soldiers took them.

<i>No. of People Murdered/ Dumped</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Place</i>	<i>Circumstances</i>
20	22 Nov. 1982	Mayangayanga	Killed on instructions of UPC youth wingers by UNLA soldiers.
19	Nov. 1982	Lungala (Mpigi Dist.)	
10	Nov. 1982	Kibindizi (Mpigi Dist.)	
17	Nov. 1982	Nabunya (Mpigi Dist.)	
23	Nov. 1982	Khonge (Mpigi Dist.)	
98	Nov. 1982	Mpigi township and nearby areas.	
68	Nov. 1982	Mpambie (Mpigi Dist.)	
8	Nov. 1982	Mpigi Dist.	
18	18 Jan. 1983	Kibibi town (Mpigi Dist.)	UNLA soldiers invaded the house of a prominent resident, killing him and all who were in sight.
60	Jan. 1983	Outskirts of Kampala	Mengo-Kibuye-Makindye area – over 60 people were picked up in <i>Panda-Gari</i> operations.
4	Feb. 1983	Katikamu	Children of a Mr Lukwaago were shot by soldiers.
4	Feb. 1983	Kinoni Mbarara	Four people were shot by soldiers.
3	3 March 1983	Bwaise	Three people were shot during a public rally.
7	19 March 1983	“Mbarara”	Men wearing army uniform and travelling on Kampala-Jinja road in army vehicles gunned down 7 people.
5	20 March 1983	Kyebando near Kampala	Ten gunmen showered bullets on people.
30	21 March 1983	Kyebando	30 people brutally murdered at Kyebando. Bodies were discovered at a place where army vehicles had parked.
3	23 March 1983	Mabira	Kenyan Trailer Drivers Haji Ahmed Mohammed, Musa Muhammed and a truck attendant killed.
30	24 March 1983	Kampala outskirts	A raid of the outskirts of Kampala left 30 people dead.
40	28 March 1983	Kitgum	Cattle rustlers killed 40 people.
40	March 1983	Lira Dist.	In the Olilim area of Lira District, cattle rustlers killed many people, at least 40.

<i>No. of People Murdered/ Dumped</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Place</i>	<i>Circumstances</i>
60	March 1983	Wabusaana (Luwero Dist.)	UNLA soldiers killed civilians.
90	5 April 1983	Kitgum Dist.	Cattle rustlers killed many people in the area; 90 is a conservative figure.
30	8 April 1983	Mukono	Soldiers in 4 army vehicles killed 30 people and abducted three prominent residents from their homes.
36	10 April 1983	Kalongo sub-district	Cattle raiders killed many civilians.
8	17 April 1983	Nakulabye	Eight people killed by army men at a roadblock at Nakulabye.
30	29 April 1983	Kampala	Killed by government troops who "mistook" them for guerrillas. The government acknowledged the mistake.
17	April 1983	Serere-Mbale area	A special force officer carrying the body of Oguti shot 17 people.
9	April 1983	Kiteezi, North of Kampalanine	Men in military gear shot nine people in a village.
7	7 May 1983	Busukuma	7 children were abducted from their homes and were never seen again.
4	7 May 1984	Masaka/Kampala road near Natete	Hamidu Mubiru, a banana trader, was killed, robbed of 3 million shillings. 3 witnesses were killed on site but the fourth survived to tell.
3	15 May 1983	Buwenge (Mpigi Dist.)	Three charcoal burners were killed by soldiers.
200	28 May 1983	Kikyusa	Army men entered the camp (Luwero) at Kikyusa killing residents. This is known as the Kikyusa Massacre.
50	29 May 1983	Masuliita	Men in army gear dumped 50 bodies at Masuliita.
500	29 May-3 June 1983	Luwero Dist.	UNLA soldiers were on the rampage in Luwero District. Among those killed was a correspondent for Voice of America.
80	3 June 1983	Wakiso (Luwero Dist.)	Men in military gear killed 80 in and around Wakiso.
70	3 June 1983	Kafu River	70 people were massacred at Kafu River.
12	3 June 1983	Gayaza	Twelve people, including 7 students, killed around Gayaza and Kabanyolo University farm.
100	6 June 1983	Luwero	A house-to-house raid for guerrillas in Luwero left 100 dead and thousands more displaced.

<i>No. of People Murdered/ Dumped</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Place</i>	<i>Circumstances</i>
6	3 June 1983	Kiwologoma- Cayaza	Six people including a 73-year-old Nalongo, killed by soldiers.
11	9 June 1983	Bulerejje (Mawokota)	Eleven people, including a former magistrate, Paul Mulindwa, Kalisti, Kato, Matiya Musoke, and Mulalo were killed by soldiers.
14	26 June 1983	Kisamula- Mityana road	Soldiers in full combat gear murdered civilians at Kisa- mula.
5	22 June 1983	Namavundu (Kasangati)	5 civilians, including Sonko, Ssemanda, Salongo, and Zalika Nalongo, were hacked to death.
8	June 1983	Nabweru (Mpigi Dist.)	Killed by men in military gear in Bulo area.
3	6 July 1983	Busega (near Kampala)	Thugs in army uniform killed three people in this suburb.
8	7 July 1983	Nabweru 8 km north of K'la	Jjuuko's family was attacked by soldiers and 8 of its members killed.
6	7 July 1983	Butambala Village, Gomba	Six people, including the Imam of the village mosque, were picked from prayer on Idd el Fitr by men in military uniform and taken to Lubugumu Kamooya and beheaded. The Imam's name was Sheikh Kawungeezi. Others were Abbasi Katumba Zziwa, Ssajjalyabeene, Sheikh Kalugendo, and a recent convert, Fred Mukasa.
100	11 July 1983	Luwero Town	Killed in an army sweep.
6	18 July 1983	Bdaale (Bugerere)	Six people were killed by men in military uniform and their bodies thrown in a pit latrine 15 feet deep.
7	19 Aug. 1983	Kiteego	Seven people were buried alive by soldiers.
7	24 Sept. 1983	Nsimbe	7 people were taken from Mpigi Prison and shot at Nsimbe.
7	Sept. 1983	Mawuki (Mpigi Dist.)	Shot by men in uniform.
80	Sept. 1983	Kanomi	More than 80 people perished in a military operation.
7	Sept. 1983	Star Forward Night Club	Seven people were killed by soldiers at Star Forward Night Club, Bunamwaya.
4	Sept. 1983	Mpenja (Mpigi Dist.)	Seven prisoners were taken out of Mpenja Prison and killed.

<i>No. of People Murdered/ Dumped</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Place</i>	<i>Circumstances</i>
150	Oct. 1983	Mpigi Dist.	In an operation commanded by Sokolo, over 150 people were killed.
80	Oct. 1983	Mubende S.E.	Over 80 people were victims of military operations.
7	Oct. 1983	Gombe area (Mpigi Dist.)	Seven people shot by men in uniform.
8	Oct. 1983	Mmamba Mpigi West	Eight people shot by UNLA soldiers.
28	Dec. 1983	Nyekashagazi	Killed by troops under, or who were with, Oyite Ojok before his fateful return to Kampala in a helicopter which was shot down, killing him.
8	Dec. 1983	Wankaka	Killed by soldiers.
8	Dec. 1983	Kyabalongo	Killed by men in army uniform.
9	Jan. 1984	Sumba	Killed by men in army gear.
4	Jan. 1984	Kampala	3 Swiss, 1 British killed in ambush.
30	Jan. 1984	Muduuma (Mpigi Dist.)	A military "operation" took the lives of 30 people.
5	Jan. 1984	Kasangati north of K'la	Shot by soldiers.
6	Mar. 1984	Luwero	Six children killed by UNLA soldiers.
6	Mar. 1984	Maya and Kyengera	Shot by men in army gear.
10	May 1984	Namugongo	Killed by soldiers.
30	21-25 May 1984	Namugongo	Soldiers invaded and desecrated the Anglican, Catholic, and Muslim shrines at Numugongo killing many including Rev. Bazira, the principal of a local seminary. Government acknowledged responsibility.
13	July 1984	Kampala Rubaga/ Nalukolongo	Killed by men in uniform in Rubaga/Nalukolongo area.
20	Aug. 1984	Kasanje area	Over 20 people killed in Kasanje area on orders of a UPC youth winger, Edward Kabira. The DP chief wrote a complaint to the president.

APPENDIX FOUR

Some of the Victims of Amin's Years of Terror, 1971-79

The following people are believed to have been killed during the period 1971-79.

January 1971. Colonel Mesura Arach of 1st Infantry at Jinja was arrested and subsequently slain. It is reported that his penis was severed and put in his mouth and the body shown to Amin. On 29 January, Brigadier Suleiman Hussein, the army chief of staff, was captured in Kampala, taken to Luzira Prison, and beaten in front of correctional officers. His head was cut off and taken to Idi Amin, who is believed to have kept it in a fridge for a night. On 25 January, Lt Col Akwango, the officer commanding Malire Mechanized regiment was arrested and beaten to death. It is believed that some four hundred soldiers presumed to be loyal to Obote throughout the North were rounded up, locked into Gulu barracks, and killed. In the same month some one hundred to three hundred detainees were killed at Mutukula Prison including a number of CID officers like Justus Wauyo, his deputies in the CID, and Ochungi. They had investigated Amin's involvement in Okoya's murder.

February 1971. Some two hundred soldiers, mainly Acholi/Langi, were screened, bayoneted, and thrown in the River Nile at Karuma Falls. Oget, a police officer, was killed and his body found floating in the Nile. On 8 February 1971, some two hundred soldiers are believed to have been killed along the Koch-to-Bodi road. In the same month, Lt Col Emmanuel Ogwal was shot in a house by a soldier using a recoilless rifle. Dr George Ebine, a Mulago Hospital gynaecologist, was dragged from the operating theatre and killed because his house had been the last hiding place for Emmanuel Ogwal. The patient he was operating on died later. Another doctor, an eye

specialist, Professor Vincent Emiru of the same hospital and Makerere University Medical School, was also butchered by soldiers. Private Okote was dragged out of Mutukula Prison and gunned down just ten yards from his cell. On 5 February 1971, one hundred and seventeen prisoners, including Michael Egeya, a relative of Obote's working in one of Obote's repressive organs, was killed. The carnage was prompted by an attempted escape from Mutukula Prison. Only twenty-three made it to Tanzania. On the same day Hassan, the chief of the CID was killed and his body is believed to have been delivered to Amin.

March 1971. On 5 March Lt Col Oboma Ayum, the commander of the Border Guard Unit at Fort Portal, was arrested at his brother-in-law's house, taken to Makindye, and blown up with thirty-two other prisoners. In the same week Lt Col Ekiring, a staff officer at army headquarters, was grabbed from his office and his body was found floating in Lake Victoria a few days later. Lt Col John Ebitu, the commanding officer at Magamaga Ordnance Depot, was reported missing. Lt Col Ojok, the commander of Burma Battalion at Jinja, went into hiding but was caught through the tapping of a telephone conversation he made from Silver Spring Hotel. Lt Col Prinimo Olol, an officer at army headquarters, is believed to have been poisoned on Amin's orders at Rock Hotel, Tororo. The hotel manager who witnessed the incident was himself killed. In the same month, Michael Kagwa, president of the Industrial Court and grandson of Sir Apolo Kagwa, the architect of British/Baganda colonial collaboration and successful businessman, was burnt to death in his expensive car. On 5 March some 371 soldiers are believed to have been killed at Makindye barracks. On 13 March Mr Labeya, a traffic officer with the Railways Corporation who was trying to flee to Kenya, was returned by the Kenya border guards. Once in Uganda he was killed. On 8 March, Colonel Ayum, a relative of Adoko Nekyon, and four other soldiers were taken from Luzira Prison and killed at Makindye. The same day, some thirty-two senior Acholi/Langi soldiers were slain at Makindye Barracks. Joshua Wakholi, a former minister in Obote's government, was also killed at Makindye.

April 1971. Some sixty young new Baganda army recruits who formed a Guard of Honour for the late *Kabaka* Mutesa II were believed to have been annihilated at Mubende barracks. Lt Col Tom Loyira, who was in hiding, answered Amin's call for soldiers to surrender. On giving himself in, he was blown up at Makindye. Lieutenant Colonel Abwala, the commander of Tiger Battalion,

Mubende, wished to stop Amin's *coup* by fighting. However, talked into acting peacefully and surrendering to Amin, he agreed. He was later killed at Amin's Commander Post at Kololo.

June 1971. Some 150 to 200 Acholi/Langi soldiers at Mbarara were herded into a truck, taken to a nearby ranch, and machine-gunned to death.

July 1971. On 7 July 1971 two Americans – Nicholas Stroh, a freelance journalist, and Robert Siedle, a Makerere University professor – who were trying to investigate the killing of soldiers at Mbarara Barracks were killed. On 11 July, Sergeant Major Ojok together with several other Acholi/Langi were hunted and killed in broad daylight in Jinja. The exercise was repeated at Kamuli from 11–22 July.

August 1971. Martin Okello, a member of Parliament, was killed and his body put in a shallow grave.

January 1972. A number of prominent people including Father Clement Kiggundu, editor of *Munno*, and William W. Kalema, a minister in Obote's government, were killed.

June 1972. George Kamba, a former ambassador to India, was abducted from a social gathering at the Apollo Hotel and was never seen again.

September 1972. James Buwembo, a pharmacist and brother-in-law to Obote was dragged from his car and "disappeared." Joseph Mubiru, the governor of the Central Bank, who was threatened with detention in "cold water" by Amin, did not take heed. He was arrested and taken to Makindye and subsequently "disappeared." His fate was to befall many others. It is believed that some 128 chiefs who were arrested after and during the first military incursion from Tanzania in 1972 were killed. In September 1972 workers at the Owen Falls Hydro Electric Dam discovered some thirty-two bodies in the Nile. Francis Walugembe, mayor of Masaka, was arrested by Isaac Maliyamungu at the Tropic Inn and was reported to have been cut to pieces with a sword. Chief Justice Benedicto Kiwanuka, the first prime minister of Uganda, was abducted from the bench into a waiting car (licence number UUU 171) and taken to Makindye. It is believed that his ears and penis were cut off before he was killed. In Mbarara, Nekenia Bananura and most of his family were killed as were more than a dozen chiefs and prominent UPC supporters. Amin

perceived them as collaborators with the Tanzanian exile infiltrators. In Lango, the secretary general, Ben Otim, was cut to pieces as was Simayo Oryema, the administrative secretary of Acholi. Louis Marton, an American Peace Corps workers travelling with Fred Roberts from the Queen Elizabeth National Park, was sprayed with bullets at a roadblock near Mbarara. The latter survived and told the tale.

October 1972. In October, Basil Bataringaya, a former leader of the DP opposition who crossed to the UPC in 1964, was killed and his body dismembered and displayed in Mbarara.

January 1973. Kampala journalists Sammuel Mwebe and John Sserwano were killed. Father Clement Musoke of Masaka was taken away from church and later killed. Lieutenant Colonel Kakuhiikire, one of the most educated soldiers, who was passed over for promotion by both Obote and Amin, was eliminated. He was working on a history of the Uganda army when he was killed. Joseph (Jully Joe) Kiwanuka and Captains Kenneth Onzika and Sam Aswa were refouled to Uganda with the consent of the Kenya government and killed.

1975. Erizofan Mawagi, a Kampala lawyer, was killed for writing a letter in the press suggesting that Ugandans should be allowed to read international news. In February 1976, two students were abducted from Entebbe Airport as they set out to study overseas. They disappeared.

1976. Dora Block, one of the hostages left behind by the Israelis after the rescue of their citizens, was abducted from Mulago Hospital and killed.

July 1976. It is believed that over two hundred soldiers were killed at Murchison Bay Prison near Kampala in the wake of the Israeli raid on Entebbe Airport. In the same year Jimmy Pamma, a photographer believed to have taken the picture of Dora Block's mutilated body, was killed. Also killed were Paul Serwanga, a Makerere University student, at Wandegaya by a security officer, and Dr Tereza Nanziri Bukenya Mukasa, a professor of mathematics, who knew the circumstances of the death of Ester Chesire, a Kenyan student killed in Uganda.

February 1977. About sixteen people were officially executed although appeals for clemency were sent to Amin from all corners of

the world. These included Abdalla Anyuru, former chairman of the Public Service Commission, Y.Y. Okot, Chief Inspector of Schools, nine prison officers, and two teachers. In the same month some fifty other prison officers were killed and their bodies taken to “Paradise” Island. About two hundred senior military and prisons officers were believed to have been killed at the “State Research’s” headquarters at Nakasero late in the month.

May 1977. Justus Byagagaire, a former minister in Amin’s government, was shot by soldiers at Mbarara.

October–November 1977. An estimated four hundred Christians were reported killed in the aftermath of the murder of Shaban Kaloddo, a wealthy Muslim. Byron Kawaddwa, a playwright, and other actors were killed. Kasule, a supplier of food to Makerere University, was killed late in 1977. It is believed that about two hundred wives and children of Acholi/Langi soldiers were killed at Mbarara barracks.

27 August 1978. Some 186 people are believed to have been killed at Kololo, near Kampala.

APPENDIX FIVE

*A Few of Those Reported Killed during Obote's Second Regime, 1981-85**

January 1981. The following people, all peasant cultivators of Bakijjulula in the Luwero Triangle, were reported killed during an army raid: Constance Kabula, I. Kintu, Mukasa Bhira, Donozio, Leo, Kaboggoza, Paul Banaaba, Najja, Lubwaama, and Nkange.

February/March 1981. An army raid in the early part of February 1981 is reported to have caused the violent deaths of the following peasant cultivators of Waluleeta in the Luwero area: Mrs Mutenda Kabonge, Wadi Bwabye, Geserwa, Ryagaba, N. Mulamula, Kagolo, G. Kawuma, Alipio, and Mutegaana of Ggandu. Second Lieutenants Mugisha, Byarugaba, Odongo, Muguta, Bingwa and Sgt Fred Berehera Kyakabale were killed in the same period. Civilians Lutta, Ssentongo, Katongole and his wife of Rubaga, Anna Nnantongo of Kakiri, and Joseph Ssalongo were slain around this time. A number of Baganda businessmen, specifically feared by the regime, were also eliminated. These included Stephen Mubiru of Bujuuko, Yosefu Kawaunga, Byansi, Yekko Nsubuga, and Martha Karugendo, all of Matugga, Luzze of Ggangu, Kisitu of Bakijulula, Ssentamu of Kaballe (Mpigi), William Kalungi of Luwero South, Yiga Budaza (Mpigi), Nyanzi Kataba (Kabaale, Mpigi), and Nusani Mulingo. Other famous entrepreneurs who lost their lives included Kimbowa, owner of Centenary Grocers at Wandegaya, and Leonard Mugwaanya, grandson of Stanslaus Mugwaanya who owned the Peacock Bar at Ndeeba. In the first week of March, Muyanji Kyeeyune, a teacher at Kabale Primary School (Mpigi), Mrs Kawalya,

* Spelling of personal and place names in this appendix may not conform to official Ugandan orthographies but are written in the form they were given to the author during his research.

Mrs Nakirwadde, Gabudyeri Kasumbuso, Kanyonyi Kasumuso of Mpigi, and Lutwaama of Buyenje were exterminated, as was Lutwaama of Buyenje.

April/May 1981. A number of residents of Muduuma area, Mpigi District, were reported killed in the early part of April by men in army uniforms including Angello Ssalongo Kijjwa, Deogratius Bulwa, Nkayivu, Karoli Kawunga, Yoana Lukwaago, Kibinge, Ndaula, Musisi, Katabalwa, Yosefu Lwebagga, Bosa, Kagugumale, and Fred Luswaata. A week or so later, Bukenya, a teacher at Masaka Technical, Kateregga, a teacher at Buyenje (Mpigi), and Tito Balaba of Kirolo, Mpigi, were believed to have been killed. In the middle of this period, amongst those reported killed were Professor Joseph Muhangi, an educator-turned-politician, on the Kampala-Masaka road by armed gunmen clad in UNLA uniforms; Dr Rajabu Kirumira, a medical officer at Lugazi Hospital, by soldiers who abducted him; and Cyprian Kalule Kawooya, Charles Ruhweza, John Kayemba, and Chris Nabeta of Jinja. These were followed by Dr Kigundu Luyimbazi, a Kampala medical officer, Mrs Juliet Ssebina of Muyenga, Mrs Biryahwaho and her daughter of Rukungiri, Ssenteza of Makindye, Dr Lusiba, a medical practitioner of Masaka, and Sserunjogi of Mpererwe.

June/July 1981. Dr Bwite, a medical officer in Kampala, Haji Mbiringi, a rich Muganda businessman in Mabarara, Lt Col William Ndahendekire of Mbarara, Ntege Lubwaama's daughter, Raymond Mutyaba of Kampala, Edward Ssempeebwa of Jinja, Watabe of Jinja, Fred Luswaata of Bunnamwaya, Serunjogi of Kabowa, Mutyaaba of Lungujja, Ssengendo of Kampala, Tony Bagonza of Kampala, Amina Nalukenge of Kampala, Haji Ismail Kyazze, Katongole of Mukono, and Father Jacob, a priest at Ladonga, were thought to have been killed at this time. Peasant cultivators of Mawa, Luwero District, killed in July 1981 included Mrs Agali, Kabaja, Mr Tofa Mwanje, Nsubuga, Kapalaga, Kidde, Muyite son of Kiguro, Aliseni, (a part-time brewer), Siraje son of Kittu, Kasirye, Ssepiriya Nsubuga, Sseguya, and Kasatira (a pastor of the Anglican Church of Uganda). Others thought to have been killed in this period included a number of people of Namayamba, Luwero District, among who were Lwambo (a butcher), Bulaka (butcher), Haji Kasule (businessman), Kamanya (businessman), Ssimbwa's son of three years, Juliana (an old woman), Mukasa Kupekera (driver), Tebewalwa (butcher), Kabula (butcher), Kasiriivu (mechanic), and Yonosani's brother (mechanic).

August 1981. In central Luwero, the following people are believed to have been killed: Byassali Mayanja (aged 60), Bumbakali (60), Janati (60), Y. Mwokya (50), J. Matovu (43), and Ssempagala (70, an *ex-muluka* chief). In the same period four people of Mpenja, Mpigi, B. Mukasa, Wesige Ssekiziyivu, Muwonge (a pork butcher), and George Lutaaya (a DP supporter), Charles Kasule Mpagi, and Bonaventuri Mukasa (local DP boss and businessman), lost their lives violently. Francis Musoke of Bujuuko suffered the same fate in this period. In the last days of August a number of people of Matugga including Francis Mukasa, Emmanuel Nsubuga, Zirefa, Andrea Ssebuliba, and Ruth Ssekimpi were believed to have been killed, as was Sheikh Salim Musoke of Wakiso.

September 1981. J. Kagimu of Kibuye, Lalobo (OC, Luwero Prison), Bukenya (of Nyendo Masaka), Henry Segujja (of Kitegomba Kyadondo), J.M. Ssegujja of Mitala Maria, Sentongo Mujambula of Mawokota, Kitudde (Buwungu Mawokota), Zanna Nankya (of Najjanankumbi), Ntambi (Nansana), and A.H. Mada Biggoto of Nakatoke were killed in this period. A number of people of Bulobula suffered violent deaths, including Haji Kawungeezi, M. Kiddimo, Sulaimani Zziwa, Fred Mukasa, A. Kasalu, M. Ssajjalyabeene, A. Kiggundu, and Nsubuga. Yosefu Male and Ntwaane Nsereko of Buwende, Kayong, a medical assistant (Kibibi), Lawrence Nsereko of Butende, Stephen Nabeeba (Kampal), Sergeant Major Valene Opio of Kampala as well as Peter Oringa, Dritch Silver (a missionary), and Rev Fr. O. Balboa were believed to have been killed in this period. Milala (DP Secretary, Tororo), P. Luande (Tororo), and Apa Loris (head of the Bokora clan of Karamoja), were slain in September 1981. Heneriko, Peter Sentamu, and Kamuanda, all of Ngando, were shot. At Kibibi Asumani Musisi, Wasswa, Sempere, Mrs Sumani, and Abdu Lule lost their lives in a similar manner. Tedi Kidiladi (Bulobula), Yakobo Mukasa, as well as Kizito, Y. Muyindi, Teluma, Kamyia, and Kosma of Kasaana were murdered.

October 1981. Jimmy Mugerwa of Rubaga and four people of Naggera – Mbabali, S. Kulubanga, Patisi Kate, and Musisi – were killed. Fourteen people of Kikoko village – Robert Ntenyo, James Ntenyo, John Kabugo, Matiya Luguye, Sam Nsereko, Paul Ddamulira, Joseph Nsubuga, L. Nkugga, Edward Kazibwe, John Kitonsa, B. Kitaka, L. Busulwa, J. Namikangula, J. Ndorikimpa, P. Kiwanuka, Ezekiel Kazibwe, and Y. Bukula – were believed to have been slain in early October 1981. At Wakiso in mid-month, the following people are believed to have been killed: Abdul Senfuka, Edirisa

Lubanga, Lusimbo-Ssebowa, Muhammadi Kisitu, Safina Ndagire, Ahmad Lusimb, Nashir Lubanga, Abdallah Ssengooba, A. Lubega, Ahmad Sseninde, E. Kafeero, K. Saidi, M. Bulaimu, and Z. Seguya. They were followed by Z. Lwasa and Lwamakuba of Kikooko, S. Kigozi, Z. Walusimbi, and L. Lukyaza of Nakikonge. A few days later S. Kinene, Z. Kyewalabye, and Kiwanuka of Makulubita were slain. Scarcely had the blood of those peasant cultivators dried when Gava, Mukasa Mukubya, Sabuni, and Kizito of Mugogo were eliminated. Nsobya and Mukiibi of Ndejeje were killed a little later on. Before month's end Rwabingi and J.B. Ssenkolooto Kaweesa of Kampala, Ssalongo Lule of Nakaseke, Ernest Kiwanuka of Bibbo-Bombo, Samuel Kasule of Makulubita, Nasanaeri Kipanda of Katiiti, Wilson Kizito of Kabira, Jamada Ddimuka of Kalasa, and Christopher of Kampala had joined the dead by a violent path.

November 1981. A number of peasant cultivators of the Kasaana Luwero area were slain in the first part of November. These included Kiramba and Maria. In Busenyi District Fideli Kibanda, Rwakudadara, Aloysius Kanyunya, Patrick Begumya, and Bunkyeneka are believed to have been killed. James Mukasa, Dirisa Kyazze, E. Katimba, Zabulambuki, and Wakiso were killed in the same period. Mariana Ssebane and Mugerwa of Kalambi were reported killed in this period. A number of DP supporters at Buloba were massacred towards the end of October including Mugerwa, Binuga, Mutebi, Ssenyonga, Asinasio Baleke, and Midone.

January 1982. J.S. Mwanje of Najjanankumbi and Vincent Bukenya, a catechist of Kijjaguzo-Ssemuto died at this time. The latter, together with Marko Kakonge, was pulled from the church and shot. Others killed in the same church were Ssekabira, Bekalaze, and Joseph Onyango. Temuteo Ssembiro, Samuel Kasule, Nasanairi Kipanda, Wilson Kizito, and Dimoka Ssemanda were killed at Katiiti Church in Bulemeezi. Kijjaguzo was the scene of the violent death of Vincent Bukenya, Ssekabira, and Bekalaze. Haji Mbabaali, a former *ssaza* chief, and Yoswa Zaake lost their lives in a similar way. Mpigi District witnessed the violent death of Bazana, Kakindu, Mrs Zaverio Makub, Mrs Jane Mwanaomu, and Suzana Wagaba. In the Bbale-Mukwenda area of the same district, Lubani Kalule, Kityo-Muwaza, Yakobo Bbosa, Fred Sabwe, and the widow Kasirye were reported to have died violently. In Mubende District, the following were reported Killed: Kayiggwa, Kakeeto Lusiba, Dan Wasswa Yosiya Lutaaya, Expedito Balimya, Flavia Kyakusse, Yona Lule (a teacher), Mrs Nakibuka, Mrs Rehema Namwandu, and Nakakawa.

February 1982. A member of Parliament, M. George Bamuturaki, was shot dead at Kisementi Bar Kamwokya, Kampala, together with a few others sitting beside him. Kampala was the scene of many killings; reported victims include Emmanuel Ntanaga (a businessman of Najjanankumbi), Asporo (a taxi driver), Mwanje (employee of the Customs department residing at Kabowa), Muhamud Musisi (Kabowa), Fred Ssekito (Kibuye), Beeka Kalyesubula (Rubaga), Kiryowa (Rubaga), Livingstone Kikonyogo (businessman of Mukono), and Rwabihiigi (Transport manager – Uganda Railways). The following residents of Mpigi were killed in this month: Yowana Manze, Kyeyune, Lusi Mpengano, Matovu Mulundi, Kawesa, Moses Kateregga, Yosefu Muyigga-Mafumbee, Mugambwa, Aligisi Walusi, Constance Ssozi, Ssekimpi, Nowa, Mrs Nowa Nagujja, Tamuzadde, Sebuliba, Ddamulira, Lukwaago, Ssemuyaga, Lubowa, Kimbowa, Mr and Mrs Kaava, Kisotoka, Abisaagi Naku, Maria Rosa Kalule, Kalule, the famous potter of Namanve, and Kaliisa of Lugujja. A number of people in and around Lwembedde, Mpigi, were killed in this month. These included Mayombwe, Gordon Nyanzi, Kiberu Namuna, Ssemakula, Muwanika, Wasswa, Kopoliyano Mukasa, Richard sn of Ssebwana, Ntwani Mukasa, Toffa Maliro, Mrs Gwewatumanga, Migadde, and Mzee Zedde Musoke. In the same period, a number of peasants of Kasangombe in Luwero South West including Lozio Lubega, Yoana Kalule, Yoana Busulwa, Augusti Kasule, Ben Ssebunya, David Seggayi, and Sam Kalule, were reported killed.

March 1982. A number of prominent people were killed in this period including Masembe Kabali (a politician) in Kampala, Fred Luswaata (an engineer of Makindye), Moses Kyazze, a UPC chairman at Kammengo, Kibuuka, a UPC chairman official in Kampala, Dr Ibanda, a medical officer at Jinja, Sseboyu Mulindwa, a businessman of Natete, Koloni of Kalagala, and James Kasirye of Kampala, who was shot with four rounds of pistol bullets by a UNLA soldier.

April 1982. April 1982 was a very sad month. Many people, mostly rural peasant cultivators with no political ambitions, lost their lives. These included Stanley Ssebunza (a cultivator and part-time cobbler), Ndugwa Mukiibi (a *mutongole* chief), Kiragga son of Bunkeddeko, Emmanuel Ssewamala, Ssebyaala Ssalongo son of Nkata Ssendawula of Kwezi – all of Kamuli and Lumpewe locations. Mpigi District suffered the violent loss of Wasswa Mubajamato, Nebilenzako, Yona, Yokana Ngobe, Yokana Lule, Kato, Mboga, Yafesi Mulengera, Yowana Kaluzikulabe, Eriyazali Bagenze, Amos

Ssewagaba, Kalegeya, Paulo Kyenkya, Ssekandi, Ssemambo, Kaggwa, Bukenya, A. Kamy, K. Ssemwanga, Ssali Nnalongo, Kizito Nsubuga, Peter Kiggundu, Masiga, Kagirisagi, M. Kiiya, S. Kalyebera, Yakobo Mukalazi, Kaloli Mukasa, Akaya, Apoki, Jalusinda, Paulo Mulima, R. Nkugwa, Kanonya, and Kositante Ssozi. In the same month tens of people were killed in the Kirolo Masuliita area, including Maliyamu Lubwama, Kalekeezi, Kirabira, Tom Kyengeza, Mubiru, Kayima, Busuulwa, Kabanda, Kyobe, Maria, Lameka, Yayiro, Yoweri Kityo, Kanakulya, and Nansamba. The people of Mmende Busiro area also lost their loved ones in April 1982, including the following: Sembazzi, Ssebuliba, Maliko, Muleefu Cakacaka, Giriva, Bakiwuta, Lutwama, Bitege, Sheikh Salim, Musoke, Budala Nkoboli, Kamadi Gwozadde, Jane Nakitto, Kalegeya, Paulo Kyenkya, Sekandi, Semambo, Kaggwa, bukenya, A. Kamy, Wasswa Mubajamato, Nebilenzako, Yona, Yokana Ngobe, Yokana Lule, Kato, Yona, Gwankuba, Nimani, Kimbugwe, Erinesti Luloko, Maliya Nakayiza, Zizinga, Nnalongo Nakibuuka, Stephen Tegwawa, Yozefu Maleya, Maria Nnalong, Kalolo Semazeri, Nakiraada (a child), Alexander Kimbugwe, Ssalongo Muwonge, Kafeero Toofa, Bwondo, Lugenda, Yokana Kizzi, Karoli, Kafeero George, Sekalongo, Peter Lubuulwa, Kategere, Ssengendo, Basiri Kalule, Nakitto, Muwanguzi, Joseph Bukenya, Kaliya, Mpulwa, Muhammadi, Mukasa, and Lumu. As usual in those days, Mpigi District had the lion's share of the people reported killed, amongst whom, in the Gombe area were Y. Kalanzi, Bule Ssalongo, Mutabaazi, Muzimba, Walugembe, Kibirango, Kamirabukyu, Frasiko Kasasa, Kalimu George, Bukenya Leonard, Teresi Gomansi, Nyanzi, Ssambya, Badru, Namwandu, John, Matiya, Kasule, Nnalongo, Ssekimpi, E. Jjuko, Bizibaana, Posiano, Bitamira, Walugembe, Miss Walugembe, Kalemera, Mukasa, Kaddu, and E. Semanda; and in Mpigi South East: S. Ssalongo, Sserwadda, Mis Kiberu, Mugerwa, Kajuma, Kabudiri, Falasiko, Lutaaya, Sipirano, Musisi, Ssali, Muhammad, Loziyo, Ntamenya, Maya, Leo, Nsekula, Matiya, Ssali Nnalongo, Kizito Nsubuga, Peter Kigundu, Masiga, Kagirisagi, M. Kiiya, S. Kalyebera, R. Nkugwa, Kanonya, Kositante Ssozi, Sserwaniko, Yakobo Mukalazi, Kaloli Mukasa, Akaya, Apoki, Jalusinda, Paulo Mulima, Mboga, Yafesi Mulengera, Yowana Kulazikulabe, Eriyazali Bagenze, Amos Ssewagaba, and Maliyamu. In the Matugga, Kawanda/Bombo area, the following were reported killed: John Batista, Joseph Migadi, Kyajohu, Ssempe, Lugonvu, Kisule, Kawesa Lwanga, Kiwende Nyanzi, Fenekans, C. Lukwago, Musisi, Peter Baibuli, Sowedi, Saidi, Tomasi, Tomasi Kawumuso, Edward Wulikukya, Kayima, Nakiyati, Matayo, Kalayirayi, and Naava.

May 1982. May 1982 was not sweet either. Many people were killed in this month, including W. Ssentamu; M. Ssekyondwa, Bitama, Kirabira, and Kayiso of Mpigi District; Mulengera of Kavule; Kagugube, Kinuge, and Ssande of Bakijulula in Luwero District; Siraji son of Namisango, Waswa son of Lutunda (Kamuli), and Maseruka of Lumpewe. Livngstone Kikonyogo (DP treasurer, Mukono), Maria Stephenia (aged seventy) of Rubaga, Eriya Bengo Kyegombe (Mukono North), Ibrahim, and Busuulwa of Nakaseta Mityana. Kapere Kayonza, Rhasidi Muhotane, Mukasa Rwensama, Donato Kananwa, and Musa Mashobe of Rukungiri were also reported killed in May 1982. Beatrice Kemigisha, a lecturer at Makerere University, was abducted at this time, never to be seen again. Kitya Muweesi, Henry Kanoonya, Ssentamu, Kabusu, Kigozi, Mukubangoma, Kirize, Katana, and Walusimbi of Mpigi District were killed. Kapeka was the scene of the violent deaths of Yozefu Ssettmba, Joswa Mukasa, Emmanuel Kabeera, Dominiko Byekwaso, Walugembe, Yoana Kimbugwe, Paulo Nsubuga, and Michael Kivumbi. Kyaddondo, Buganda's heartland, witnessed the violent deaths of Y. Katege, Mabulo, Kigozi, Y. Sofa, Y. Lwanga, Lubangi, Mutosi, Ssalong, Erina Wakozi Daudi, W. Kibedi, Z. Mugiri, Kat, Sserwadda, A. Nakalema, Kazibwe, Bamanya, Balugu, Mesigamaye, Kayanja, Kidigida, Kato (aged three months), Kibiriga (six months), Jjuko, Mpagi, Nakadambi, Babirye, Mustafa, Akibeewo, Mufumba, Sserunjogi, Leo Sserwanga, George Mubiru, Laurensi, E. Katongle, Yawe, Ziraba, Kaloli, Kidawalime, Ntabandi, Kafumbirangu, and Deku Dolosi. In the Semuto area of Bulemezi county, the following people were reported to have died violently: Kyagulanyi, Kafeero, Nsubuga Lwanga, Ali Kalugendo, Dan Nsonzi, and Badru Muwonge (aged twenty-five). In the Mpenja area, B. Mukasa, a party branch chairman, was killed by army men with the collaboration of UPC youth wingers and the *muluka* chief Alice Nassali.

June 1982. In June Mpigi District again paid a very high price through the deaths of Keziron, Kanakulya, Kanoki Simba, Andrew Nakibinge, D.K. Kyeyune, Bulasio Namudda (aged 75), Yozefu Kitta (80), Lubuzi (65), Kalemera (50), Y. Mutagubya (50), and Samuel Nsubuga. Solomon Ssalong, a prominent DP man of Naluwere, Iganga District, was tortured to death at Rubongi Military Barracks, Tororo. Y. Nugumba, a retired Musoga civil servant, Kabazire of Mbarara, and a former judge, George Kanamura of the same place, Zizoomu the DP treasurer at Iganga, Wilson Nyendwoha who worked for the Produce Marketing Board at Hoima, Amuli

Kalyankonko Kitimba of Kabarole District, Kamukama Kitumba of the same district, Kanagonago, a driver with Toro Administrations, and Yosefu Kiragga, an employee of Fort Portal Municipal Council, were reported killed. In Lumpewe, Luwero, Lenardi Mukasa and Jolly Joe Kaggwa of a nearby location were killed in this period. In Mpigi North East the following people were reportedly killed: Kezekiya Lwanga (aged 60), Mulisiyo (70), Kereti (65), Aguza (90), Katayi (90), Byasali (70), Erick Musoke (73), Kasumba son of Daniel Ssendyooowa, and Kayibanda. Paul Richard, a European working in Uganda, was reportedly shot by army men who wanted to rob his car, a Peugeot, with the registered number plate UZO 371. The armed men were travelling in a Datsun 120Y, number plate UWA 007. In another incident Wesige, headmaster of Kibuka Memorial School, was arrested with two other people by two UPC youth wingers and taken to Mpenja Gombolola Headquarters; their bodies were later found in the nearby stream of Lugala. Mrs Munyegera of Iganga and her son were shot several times by government security men. Sam Basoboke, an employee of a bank in Kampala, was abducted from a Bugolobi grocery by a UNLA soldier; his body was later found in the industrial area of Kampala. Simon Deo Ndaula of Kifubi Busiro, Atairi Mustapha of Fort Portal, Juma Luwata of Nakivubo, Rueben Ssenkatuka of Nabunnya, and Luweesi of Busunju were killed, as were numerous people from some specific areas of Ssinga and Kyaddondo. These included Mary Nambooze, L. Sentongo, C. Kabanda, N. Kaloli, Kasozi, Kayanja, Mukasa, Peter, and Nkongwe (Busunju); Kalidi Kigozi, Rudiya Nnamwandu, Kasule, Kaloli, Abdu, Ssekamanya, Ssempe Kironde, Mayengo, Dan Mwesigye, L. Kibuka, Sebagala Mugabo (Kyenegera); Rose Namigadde, E. Kalule, A. Mataba, B. Ssebyala, P. Mivule, I. Iga, Katwere, Pangalasi, W. Namagembe, Muzula Lukwa, Mukasa, Nassazi, wife of Mukasa, T. Nankinga, Teddy Jjibwa, Rose Namigadde, M. Walusimba, Y. Bugolobi, W. Lujumwa, N. Musanyusa, Aisa, Aldofu Ntimpa, M. Lunkuse, Babirye, E. Kanonya (Kangave). Mrs Muhammadi Kassim Ali of Fort Portal, Kabarole District, Denis Kaberinde of the same location, Edward Ssempebwa of Kasese District, Victor Mulindwa, a Kasese DP leader, Aneko Oloya of Gulu District, Alfred Ongoya Kitgum, Augustine Nono son of Alex Latim, and William Mwebwe of Mpigi were killed in mid-June. Mpigi North East suffered the following casualties in this period: Pamba (aged 75), Festto Kasaali, Livingstone Ssemenda son of Kasaali (50), Kibego Moses son of Kasaali, Sarah daughter of Kasaali, Sserubiri, Kapasi Ya Solo, Kaggwa, Stanley Kato, Ayida Mpaka, and Nkumba. Mrs Kasaali, Yosefu Ndaula, Firimoni Kimera

(Kiwoko) and Muyanja son of Byekwaaso suffered the same fate in the same period.

July 1982. The following people of Luwero District were killed in early July 1982: Kanamulagi, Wabitunga, Mzee Nyese, Yozefu Jambiya, Sikyadda, Nkangata, Mother Nakyzaze, Kibuka, Namata, and Kafero Kabangala. In Busoga District, Staff Sergeant Simon Katuba and Private Ruleeta were reportedly killed in detention. Others who were thought to have died in detention included Ruteera and Robert Kasozi (Kampala). Peter Ddamulira a Kampala businessman was reported killed. Nganda of Kasubi was shot dead while trying to resist the theft by soldiers of his two sewing machines. A number of Kasanje residents were killed, including Augustine Kamy, Nelson Ssabavuma, Nkugwa (headmaster), Karuna Kivumbi, John Kisitu Sserwanga, Kalanima, and Matovu. Deo Kasirye, a successful businessman of Kasanje, Mpigi, was arrested and loaded onto a lorry; his was one of twenty-one bodies later found in Bimbye forest eighteen miles away at Kabora on the road from Kasanje to Buddo. Other bodies were found in the Lumpwero forest and at Kamunye River. In Gombe, the following people were believed to have been killed: Ssenkungu, Magatto, Bugadde, Sserubiri R. Lwanga, Moli-siyo, Kalere, Minani, Nabankema, E. Musoke, Mbaziira, and Yokana Nsubuga. Kyengera-Bbikka witnessed the violent deaths of the following people: Nabizi, Yosefu, Ssenyonjoo Zena, Eraziyo, E. Kasule, Dodoviko, Ketty Namusisi, Kalugendo, Israel Ssebowa, George Iga, Sitasio Mukilbi, Livingstone Katende, Yakobo Baterinde, Nnamwandu, Mukyala Kawalya, Yowana Lubega, Kasiriivu, Anatoli Kazizano, Bidandi, Kasani Muyingo, K. Namagembe, Y. Kagumba, and Yokana Mukasa. Kiggundu and Ssali were killed and dumped in the River Kamunye. They were victims of Edward Kabira, UPC chairman, Mpigi South. Their bodies were among the twenty-three killed in the Kalandazzi forest by the UNLA. Joseph Ssetimba, of Wobulenzi was arrested by Haji Kasiriri and taken to Bombo army barracks. His body was later found at Kapeeka. Mrs Ruth Ssemakula of Nateete was shot dead during a crossfire between the police and UNLA soldiers who had stolen a car from a civilian.

August 1982. The following people of Kasanje, Mpigi District, were reportedly killed in early August: Kajabwangu, R. Katende, and Ssematimba. Ssenyonga of Mpugwe near Masaka and Kizito of Kamutuza also lost their lives. Mrs Kalanzi of Kasiiso died the same week as did the following people of Luwero: Nnalongo Nnamalwa, Mr Ssemukasa, Misusera, Kalanzi Bumba, Byekwaso, Kamy, and

Miriam Nnabitengero. Kasengejje suffered mass slaughters that took the lives of Stanley Mukasa, Mweebe, Damaza, Zirimenya, Lawrenso, Manueli son of Ssebirumbi, Lukomwa son of Ssenkumba, Lutaaya, Wasswa, Charles Kibuuka, Ndereya Kkungwa, and Mzeye Ssubi. Also reported killed in this period were Eriyazaali Kalegga (aged 68), Y. Kato (65), Guste Kasala (85), and Mulangira Kayima (88), a prince of Buganda, all of Ssinga. Christopher Nakabaale (Mpigi), Kabuye (Mpigi), Ssempagala (Kabale-Mpigi), Mrs Ssabataka (Kabale-Mpigi), Gerald Kavuma (Nakawuka), and Zot Lubega, a medical assistant residing at Nakawuka, were killed with the collaboration of UPC functionaries Edward Kabira and Lusimbo Nyindozaminy. Godfrey Bamundaga (a cooperative officer residing at Ntenjero-Bugere) and J. Muwanga (a medical laboratory technician at Mulago Hospital) were reported killed in mid-August. The following people of Busiro county were reported killed in this month: Yayiro Mukalazi, Rafairi Ssajjabi, F. Mukasa, Miss Kiviiri, M. Kalema, Malyamu, Bumali Kalanzi, Kirumira, Joswa, Kalundu, Mayanja, Jeloba, Bukenya, Manuel, Badru, Mijumbe, Ojeni, Balinya, Kasozi, Kasule, Kikoye, Bataya, Mukasa, Nathan Mukasa, Mrs Muddu, Kasibante, Temba, Ddamba, Matayo, Lutwama, Filipino, Biringanya, Andereya, Mukyale, Mazeze, Kongo Yosefu, Muganga, Kirabira, Mpagi, Sseguya, Zefaniya, Adam Kasule, Silas Sinanywa, Segulo, Kalisiti, Maliko, Yokana, Lumala, Bwerere, Bbosa, Kigongo, Kayangu, Bulizingiza, Y. Mukasa, Lutalo, Bbosa, Basikali, Ssempala, and Mikaili. The locations in Busiro that suffered most were Mmende and Kyasa, but other villages also tasted the bitter fruits of political violence. Matugga lost Kibalama, John Kamba, J. Kiwalabye, and Peter Bukenya. Bukenya Kasozi and Tamale of Kawanda died the same month. Ssendege (Ssendi), Bowazi Kayizzi (Kakola), and Keechi of Bikko were also reported killed. Nsala lost Mawejje, Kawungu, Budala, Namakula, Fenekansi Ssali, and Kasansula. Three people of Kituntumuzi, Kisoma Bwire, Kalule, and Kasimbaazi, died violently this month. Eleven people of Lunnya, Mubende District were killed in this period: Kasagla, Makubuya, Daniel Kasiwukira, Kalekezi Tom Ddumba, Lulenti, George Bukenya, Ssebina, Sowedi Ssebuliba, Mubiru, Loziyo, Kiyingi, and Mrs Slalio. In Luwero a number of people from various locations were killed towards the end of August, including Nyansio Kasalwe (Lusenke), Matovu, Kagwa, Musisi, and Yunusu, all of Nampunge.

September 1982. In early September, a successful Muganda businessman and architect, J.B. Kawesa, was gunned down at his

house; so was Sam Kintu (a former Buganda *Katikkiro*), whose business acumen and success was the envy of many people. In the Luwero District, Kibirango (Ssemuto), Irario Gijja, Samuel Kasule, both of Kalasa, Kyobe Kalyesubula of Ndejje, S.S. Kainamula of Kakinga, and Ssebutemba of Ssemuto were killed. Mrs Rose Ssendawula of Mpererwe, a successful businesswoman, was shot in her shop. Abby Kakeeto of Kibuli, Charles Kigoonya of Luwafu, Sula, and Lubowa, both of Makerere, were murdered in this period. A charcoal dealer in Kawanda called James was killed, together with three others, Musoke, Bazalwango, and Masiko, after being accused of conducting guerilla activities. Kanyike, a mechanic working in Kampala, was cut to pieces by a soldier with a butcher's knife till he died. Muzaula of Matugga, L. Kalanzi, John Kikulabye, Erinesti Sserwaniko, all of Gombe, and Kaloli Kamaka and Mustapha Butazimbe of Mmende lost their lives violently in mid-September. At Ssemuto location, the following died by the gun: J. Lwanga, Kigundu Lukwago, Kabira Hussein, Paulo Kigongo, Nsubuga, Nalikyolo, F. Kimera, George Ssebowa, Nakabale George, Diriisa, Minsaaki Tutu, John Sseguya, Mutesasira, and Muswayiri. Nakaseke suffered the loss of the following in similar style in the same month: H. Kasule, Bukenya, Kibuka, Kangavve, Musisi, Musaaazi, Munani, Kafufu, Nanyona, Musoke, Karoli, Kimbugwe Raphael, Walakira, Byakatonda, Ssali Lubowa, Sekyana, Mabira, Nkayuki, Kayiwa, Safina, Ssemakula, Babirye, and Kikonyogo. The Mmende area was not spared either: Juma Kasiliko, Semuwanga Ahmad, Musisi, Muzukulu, Kakumba, Lutaaya, Ayisa, Kigundu, Mulekeezi, Ronald, Kisitu, Muwaguma, and Kalangwa were all reportedly killed.

October 1982. Nakibinge of Mpigi District, Sserukenya of Nabweru, Mpigi, Ssempagala (aged 70) of Mpenja, B. Mukasa of Mpigi West, P. Kavuma of Masaka, Martin Luyima, J. Walakira, Kibimba (a bus conductor), and Kiggundu, a Nalukolongo coffin maker, were reported killed in early October. Kampala District was the site of the violent deaths of Ssekabeme, E. Musisi, Juma Mulumba, Mrs Mbogi, Mrs Kikawa, Kiggundu, Mrs Laisa Kabuliti, L. Baker, Kalyesubula, James Masembe, John Kambagira, and Mathias Kinyoowa. Luwero District, which had by October 1982 become the "killing fields" of Uganda, lost the following people violently in the early part of that month: Kibirige, Bawala, Ssali son of Kijenga, Kenesi Kijenga, Musingo, Mbanza Lawuliyano, Kayonga, Kabulugire, Ssalongo Katongole, Kiwanuka, Zakaliya Ssalongo, Byasali Mayanja, Y. Bumbakali, Janatio, Y. Mwokya, H. Namuyima, J.

Matovu, Nalubwama, Mugonola, Bulayimu, Kasule, Ntamenya, Maya, Leo, Nsekula, Matiya, C. Senjeru, Bulege, E. Jjingo, Mbogo, Ssebbale, Kateragga, Matovu, Muwanga, and Kigongo. The locations most affected were Kiboga, Bakijjulula, Kikamulo, Ssemuto, and Kapeeka. In the Kyengera area the following people were reported killed: Yokana, Baremba, Mukasa, Nakabugo, Ndagire, Alice, James Lutakome, Mukuba, Ssemujju, Kasakya, Nera, Kavuma, Semairi and his son of Kabulamuliro, Bwete, and John Ssentibiri, both of Bukomero.

November 1982. In the Bulemeezi area of the Luwero Triangle, Nsubuga of Nakaseke, Walusimbi of Kikumago, Bwabye, John son of Kiggo, Mukasa son of Kiggo, and Ssebagala of Kigegge were slaughtered. Others killed in this area were Ssebaana, Zedde Kukenge, Mulindwa, Lubowa, Falasiko Siriiri son of Siriiri, Muguluma, Ssekimwanyi, George Kagumba, Buuma, Mujjenya, Wakisimbi, Kasule, Kapipa, Ddumba, Lutaaya, Walakira, Muhammed Ssemalulu, and Sserunjogi. In the Mmende area Salapio Ssekabembe, Wilson Musisi, Baineto Mukasa, Yokana Kyasanku, Majembere, Nsimbi, Kimbugwe, Yuda Nkoobe, Kamenyero, Maria Nambooze, Maria Musanyusa, Sefoloza Nnamwandu, Zerida Nantume, Nazziwa Yondwe, and Muhamadi were reported killed, as were Lugumya, Betty Nakawanga, and Nyanzi in the Kyengera locations. Eleven people of Kalagala were reported killed, namely, Kikomeko, James Kibi, Bulazi, Kirimuki, Ssebowa, Mugerwa, Daniel Christ, Waswa, and Jane Nakibuule. Twelve people of Kasagga met a similar fate, including Matiya Nakabale, John Kabanda, David Lutakome, Nyenje, John Kakooza, Jaja Sentamu, Lidiya Kalibakya, Musisi, Nanyongo, M. Kezirni, Tibyenda, and Nsubuga.

December 1982. By December 1982, life in Uganda was indeed brutish, short, and miserable. In and around Katikumu area, some eighteen people were reported slain. These were: Eriya Kanzi, Lukoma, Matiya, Susana, Kabona, Alibayagadde, Fenekansi, Mary Siyani, Yoniya, Kalaveri, Eliasi, Kigongo, Mayanja, Kalekezi, Bosco, Mabindigiri, Rucumu, Kisago, Michael Kimera of Bukomero Ssing, Yosefu Buggabweru of Kikamulo, Mukasa of Bakijjulula, and Josefu Kayongo of Mbukiro, as well as two residents of Bakijjulula, Lumansana and Katende son of John Katende. Joseph Nsubuga, the DP chairman of Ntinda, E. Bakasembe, and Sikolastika Nakanwaagi of the same location were killed around this time. In Kiteezi, Nangabo subcounty, George Kisitu, Fred Musisi, Sserwanga, Benon Ssettanda, Fred Nkaivu, Tabanjanga, Gabula, Ivan Mukibi, and

Kanyamanza were reported killed. A number of them were students at various educational institutions like Uganda Technical College and Uganda College of Commerce, while others were technicians working for various departments. In the same month, Henry Ochol and Helna Kira were gunned down at Nakivubo Road, Kampala. A taxi driver named Mukasa was shot by a soldier in Kampala taxi park for not allowing him to take the front seat of the cab. Lwafa, a soldier, was killed by a fellow soldier after a quarrel over a prostitute at Nateete. Other victims included Michael Kalule (58), a priest at Namirembe Cathedral residing at Jinja, and Kalori, who worked with Larco Concrete Products was shot while paying out salaries for his company by UNLA soldiers who reportedly stole all the money.

January 1983. Haruna Ssegirinya of Kampala was killed early in 1983, as were Abdul Malik, Muhammod Sempereza, and Asumani Musisi of Kibibi, Butambala. Muwanga, Anne Naluggwa, Paulo Kanyandekwe, Samson, B. Matovu, Muslimi, and Gwasanga, all of Kasaana, were killed in this period. Aminisi Gwayambadde of Kanyogoga, Kabogoza of Luwero, Aloysious Ssebugwawo of Kiyuuni (Mubende), Kaggwa Ssezibwa, (Mubende), Bukya (Lusiba, Mubende), B. Ssebuwufu (Mubende), Dan Mbazzi, Firipo Kirima, Sserubogo (Mubende), Dirisa Wamboza (Kirolo Luwero District), Christopher Musisi, (Mpigi), and Kanonya (Mpigi) were slain in mid-month. Swahibi Mawanda, David Mukasa, Kanyaga Ssengooba, Wasswa (UPC youth winger), Matovu (businessman), John Kalule, Haji Kamadi Lule, Kamyia Ssalango, and Livingstone Lumiisa – all of Mpigi District – were killed in January 1983.

February 1983. A number of residents of Gayaza township were reported killed early in February, including Kato Ssekabira, Alezi Nzia, and Alifunsi Tai. In other areas, the killing of ordinary people did not abate. Mrs Kakimuli (Kiziba–Luwero), Kirikitya of Kisagala, Kibirige of Buyenje, Kasule Wamala of Masuliita, Ssozi, Ntambi, Nyenje son of Asummani, and Miss Esther Nakibuuka, all of Busujja, were killed at this time. In Luwero District, Suusi son of Sserunjogi, Mrs Kayiza, F. Fudyeri, B. Mubiru, and Laurenti (60) were reported killed; Mpigi North East suffered the loss of Wilberforce Lwanga, Bakudala, Ssebugwawo, Lwanga-Kintu, Pasikali Ssebusawo, and Misango. In other areas, more people such as George William Musoke of Bunnamwaya, Charles Muwanga (secretary general, YMCA), and Patrick Kibaalya, headmaster St James Secondary School at Jinja, were murdered on Entebbe road. Anna

Maria Namubiru, a relative of the late Cardinal Emmanuel Nsubuga, Benedicto Lubwaama (Ssinga), William Nkugwa, a lab assistant at Gayaza High School, and Kiryowa were reported to have died violently.

March 1983. Muhammadi Kabuye of Lugeya Kakiri was reported killed in a bomb explosion; Kikomeko, a chief in Kyebando-Busiro, was shot by the UNLA; Kiwanuka Lukanga, a UPC chairman, was similarly shot, as was Jackson Muwanga, an official of the Church of Uganda. Four other people of Kyebando, Ssalongo, Kkulanju, Madalena, and Kiggula, were reported murdered. Musisi, a UPC youth winger at Natete, was shot in the centre of that suburb by UNLA gunmen. Mulefu and Kasamba died in similar fashion in the same location. A number of people were killed at a DP rally by men in military uniform at Kawempe, including Etyang, a police officer in the area. Among those who died at Namugongo were Erifasi Jjagwe Ssalongo, Kigongo, Tamale Ssempe, Musisi son of Siriiri, Lucy Nakagwa, Nzantuma, Mukasa Namaswala, Nakityo, and Malebe. A permanent secretary to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Mr J.D. Turyagenda, was gunned down in his ministry car at Kololo Golf Club. In Luwero District, the following people were killed mid-month: Tito Yawe, Dasani Mukasa, Yokana Musoke, Erina Nambooze, Enna Nassimbwa, Erikana Bansiyabwe, Yakobo Kaggwa, Yunia Bansiyabwe, Miiro, Elina Nalwanga, Wasswa son of Mayanja, Nakimuli, Musa Lutte, Haji Juma Lutaaya, Achikeo, Goto, Kalule, and Kasabi. In other locations Kigozi and Maliko, both of Lwemerredde, Mugendadda of Manze (a successful businessman), Ssembatya of Manze, Ssali of Nkere, Bukenya of Kireka, Ssemanda and his wife of Kasangati, Ssemwogere, a *muluka* chief of Kkungu-Kira, and two Kenya truck operators, Haji Ahmed Mohammed and Musa Muhammed, were reported killed towards the end of March.

April 1983. Raymond Muyingwa, an accountant residing in Kampala, was locked in a house by the UNLA and blown up with a rocket-propelled grenade. A number of Ssinga residents, including, Kayongo, Mary Nalubowa, Ssebuliba, Nsereko, Busuulwa, Sekamate, Nakamate, Nambooze, Kiwalabye, Kigozi, and Kopuliano son of Kigozi, were killed in this month. In Luwero, the following people were reported killed in April 1983: Wassonko, Kasule, Falasiko son of Siriiri Kibowa, Ssempala, sister of Ssempala, Kata Leo, Musisi son of Kamyia, Kivumbi son of Kamyia, Joseph Mukasa Salongo, a veterinary officer, Mafaabi, a magistrate, Okello, Kabalira, Yonoka, Tebusweke son of Wanzira Galekana, Kayongo son of Kigongo,

Tofa Lutimba, Kirabira, Lwanga son of Nabbi, Mensi, Mawavvu, Zakaliya Makwasi, Vincent Byamukama, Yokana Luyombya, Paskale Kabayalaya, Kibundibundi, Zakariya Maru, Mukasa son of Kikyusa, Kayumba, Misisi, Mrs Byakatonda, Amos Ssewagaba, Dan Muzibe, Sowedi Kavuma, Musoke, Katende, Mandwa Mukasa, Kiberenge, Ntabile, Mrs Zakayo Kawesa, Nakato Mzeyi, Mzei Busuulwa, Nyombi, Gita Gaboggola, and S. Zigulaki. Kaddu Ssepiriya, a rich farmer and owner of a coffee factory residing at Ntinda, was reported killed by soldiers. In Bushenyi District, the following were reported killed in the month: Kanyumya, Rwabudadara, and Kibande. In the Kitgum District, Somtorino Oyoo-Aciite, D.K. Omara son of John Kodet, Isidiro Owiny (a subcounty chief), and Captain Sam, commander of a militia unit, were reported killed. In the same month, the Muganda chief of security at Makerere University was shot by a subordinate. Others killed in and around Kampala at this time were Habert Kibuuka, Teddy Lukowe, and Milly Ntongo, DP organizing secretary. Ngalore of Muhaugo-Kabale, the DP treasurer for Kabale East constituency, was killed while having dinner with his family.

May 1983. Mzee Ssuubi, Stanley Mukasa, and Gatulajjo, all of Mpigi District, Damaza (Kasengeje), Zirimenya (Kasengeje), and a number of Kamuli residents like Petro Mayanja, M. Ndakaze, and D. Bonabangaya, were killed in early May. Aminsi Mubiru of Nsujjwe, Mitti and his wife of the same location were killed in May.

June 1983. Joseph Kaweesa of Mawokota was reportedly beheaded by the UNLA in early June. Others killed in Mawokota at this time include Kasanvu, Mrs Kaweesa, Paulo Mulindwa, Kayiwa, Kamburu, Matiya Musoke, Kato, Kalisiti, and Christopher Mwofa. At Mitiyana, the following people were reported killed: Mulalo, Nakafero, Namiro, Misusera Bangire, Daniel Mwanje, Paulo Nsirambere, Sam Ssekitleko, Taddewo Wasswa, Mrs Nakalaalo, Charles Lwanga, Michael Nikuze, Christopher Munywabalinzi, Bangirana, Misusera Kigongo, Gerald Misaago, Lameka Tega, and Francis Luvugiro. The Kasangati UPC chairman was shot. While in Kyaddondo, Haji Bumaali Ssemanda and Alisa Ssemanda were killed. In the "killing fields" of Luwero the following people were slain: G. Mulyankuta, Nabembez, Makumbi, G. Cosma, Abdu Kizito, P. Kyakonye, Ssande son of Lutara, Israel Lutara, Mujoobe, D. Mawuti, A. Muwonge, S. Mikalo, I. Mulwana, R. Muwada, Z. Akaya, Sulaiti son of Vinali, Paulo son of Kyalisiima, Kawulukusi, S. Kazigizi, J. Mugerwa, Okello, and D. Ssali. In Kasanje (Busiro), Mubiru, Kizza, and

Gandalefu were also killed. Kaggwa of Maddu (Mpigi), Kapere of Kabulasoke, and Kiggundu of Mpigi West, Musoke and Bakabuba of Bunamwanya-Zana, Jeradi Nnanganda of Mpigi, and Ssebina of Munyonya-Kyamula did not survive June 1983.

July 1983. Mpigi District suffered many casualties in this period. A number of people in Gomba, Butambala, Mawokota, and Busiro were killed including the following: Yonia Banabaza Kagimu, Fred Mukasa, Migide, Kagombe, Bwoogi, Mubiru, Kalule, Erifazi Kyeere, Alozio Kato, Paskale, Mariko Lusasi, Fulansasi, Zabanita, Paulo Nsambu, Neriko Mubiru, L. Nzisabira, Kayinja, J.K. Jjuko, J.K. Lukanga, W.S. Wampamba, H.N. Kajumbe, B.N. Kyabaggu, B. Nabanaakulya, R. Nakabugo, B. Mugerwa, J.B. Lutaaya Salongo, Lawrensio, Manuueri son of Ssebirumbi, Zalwango, Erukan Lubwama, S. Kayiriba, Y. Kubula, G. Nyaga, Diika, and Peter Ssemenda. Successful Baganda businessmen Wamala (Kasaana) and Bumbakari (Luwero) were also killed in July 1983. In the Luwero District in the areas of Kasaana and Katuumu and the central areas, the following people were killed: Benya, I. Wasanga (businessman), Lulenti, Kasirye, Aloysius Lubega, William Ssali, B. Lutumba, S. Ssebuwufu, G. Mukasa, Mrs Mukasa, P. Ssepiraya, John Kiyaga, G. Babumba, S. Lutona, Stefano Kasumba, J. Ssekakone, B. Kitwe, S. Musoke, Mary Sifaliiko, and Francis Kigwe.

August 1983. In Bundibujjo, Bwamba, Erihanjeru Rusoke, Joseph Amos Mumbere, and Karungutu were reported killed. In Kampala, Alhaji Mulindwa, a UPC official, and J.N. Ssebina, a councillor, were killed. Kyebando suffered the loss of the following people in August 1983: Majwala, Herbert, Mukasa son of Kiberu, and others. Mbaziira, Tereza, Sala, Lwanga Salongo, Jimmy Bukenya, Stefano Luggya, Wakula, J. Lubega, a veterinary officer at Katikamu, Mawejeje, Haji Magidu, Ssenkaali son of Kisuule, Kirabira of Nakaseke, Falasiko Lutwaama (Bulemeezi), Christopher Kalanzi (Bulemeezi), Mbaziira Matayo of Busunju-Mubende, and Kavuma of the same location were killed in August. Dan Yiga (Bulemeezi), P. Ssebaggala (Bulemeezi), and G. Ssalongo were killed in August. Haji Abubakari Majwaala, a successful businessman in Mpigi, Musisi-Namugala (Bbiro-Sekanyonyi), Muwanga (Kasikolindo-Bukomero), Nalongo Lukwaga (Kako Masaka), Charles Kibuuka (Kasengejeje) were killed, along with the following residents of Kampala area: Ndereya Kkungwa, John Kakooza, Daniel Katumba, Kasaija, Yona Katonozi, John Ssebulime, Kamuzze, and Kirabira.

September 1983. Gerald Sserwanga (CID Rakai) was killed in September along with the following residents of Mpigi: P. Busuulwa, D. Male, Nsomola, H. Ssewagudde, Kibinge, and Nnanga. In Luwero District (Bulemeezi area), Kalinde, Silasi Micho, Mrs Mich, J. Lubega, Mawejje, Haji Magidu, Senkaali son of Kisule, and Katuffu were reported killed. September was a bad month for Mpigi District. Hundreds of people lost their lives including Kabanda, John Mukasa (Kiriri), Kaberuka Matayo, George Kanakulya, Isaac Kirumira (Bulo), Lutakome Mohamood, John Katende (Kitagobwa), Deo Walakira (Kabulassoke), Bajjabayira, Kibalama, Mary Nabitale, Mukasa (Nasangi), Kiggundu, Katongole, Matiya Kasozi (Nsangi), Ssebuzooya (Bulunagu), Mazima (Kibibi), Enenko (Kaloola), Mubiru (Kavule), Yozefu Nsobaya (Buloba), Kiyaka (Buloba), Kiyaka (Buloba), Musisi (Buloba), Kizito (Buloba), Nakabaale (Nasangi), Mawanda, Kalusoke (Bulungu), Luwemba (Butambala), Lwasa, Kyazze Haruna (Kyogonza), Kyanyandekwe, Kiribwa, Jusitafa, Simon, Kiwalabye, and Misingo all from Gombe; and Kyazze (Mpenja), Lubega, George Luginka (Butambala), Yosefu Male (Butende Butambala), Nikwani Nsereko (Kibibi), Kayonge (Kibibi), Lawrence Sseguya (Ngando), Kalyamaggwa (Lugaaga Gomba), Ssentamu (Katende), Filipino Bisoberwa (Maddu-Gomba), Mbogo, (Kiringete), Peter Ssenfuma (Butambala), and Kakooza (Bukunja). Tarsis Mulubya, a pastor at Kamira, was killed in the last days of September.

October 1983. One of the prominent people killed in October was Africanus B.K. Ssembatya, a DP member of Parliament gunned down at his Kampala home. He was a successful businessman and a Muganda and thus perceived as a threat to the regime. John Assendri, a high official in the president's office, was believed to have been shot by the Special Force. Edmund Lugumira of Wobulenzi was reportedly starved to death by the security forces. A successful dairy farmer, Nakayima of Kyamisi (Luwero), was killed in this period. Tarasis Byakatonda and Deo Kimbowa of Ssambwe were also reported slain, as was Lwamyalo of Buzibwera. Mpigi District was again the scene of unforgettable holocaust with very many people losing their lives violently, including: E. Kisule, W. Ssebandeke, Simon Mubiru, Nakayenga, Kalule, M. Kiriibwa (Kasiika), J. Kiwanuka (Mamba), W. Kisuule, J. Kintu, Kakooza, Sam Kasirye (Gombe), Zizinga, Matovu, Byannya, Mbazira, Muganga, Wasswa, Mutacuula, Kiwalabye, Kizza, Bugingo, Buyinza, Bwanika, Kyomukisa, Kyeyune, Ssenyonga, Kasumba, Katongole, Kayugi, J. Kizza, Maridaadi, Rushemeeza, Kaweesa Misaaki, Nyansiyi (Kasa-

limbe), Muganza, Minani (Maganjo), Ahmed Bamutta (Nabweru), and Tom Lukongwa. Likewise, Luwero suffered the violent deaths of many of her residents, including Paulo Magalo, Salongo Mbaziira, Mwebe, E. Walusimbi, Falasiko Ssempala, Hassan, Musonere, Andrea Sebuliba, etc.

November 1983. Kalule of Lumuli, Mpigi, Byambabazi Kirungu of the same location, and B. Simwogerere, a shopkeeper of Luwero District, were killed in early November. A number of young men in their late teens or early twenties were killed in Luwero District at this time as they were feared to be potential guerillas. The majority were residents of Buggala, Kigenge, and Kiziba. They included: Kalule, Byambambazzi Kirungu, B. Simwogere, Baggala son of Sebayigga, Luwagga son of Yileda, Magala son of Kavuma, Kayanja son of Yileda, Ssepuuya Kigegge, Ssejjemba son of Ssepuuya, Wamala son of Ssepuuya, Dodoviko son of Kaselebe, Manweri son of Kaselebe, Mutungi son of Katende, Tobalidi son of Madalena, Musisi Nkanja, Luutu son of Ssetimba, and Leo Kalyesubula. Other Luwero residents to suffer violent deaths included: Nyansiyo Muwanga, Leo Kagenza, Kizamulongo, George Bikka, Kezekiya Mulyanti, Ismaili Mukubuya, Kasolo, William Sekannyo, Jhn Sunday, Lusallidde, Fred Kulumba, Semakula Nakaziba, J. Museruka Byasali, S. Ssekakomo, J. Mukasa, B. Ssebina, P. Kyagulanyi, M. Senyama, N. Nalubanga, Kityo, Dan Mibuulo, Nasta Mukasolo, Y. Zziwa, and Yozefu Mibuulo.

December 1983. Bbosa, a UPC chairman in Mpigi, Sserugo of Kabulassoke who failed to raise a ransom for the killers, and the following peasant cultivators of Mpigi District were killed in early December 1983: Lukyamuzi, Mpengere, Matiya Sseggirinya, Edward Kasule, Edmund Kasule, Matayo, Eric Kintu, P. Busuulwa (Buzimba), D. Male, Nsomola, H. Ssewagudde, Kibinge, Nnanga, Kalinde, Lutaaya (Kasangenje), Kalisa of Kasalirwe (businessman), and Yonosani Kakiga of the same location. Bamuwamuto of Ddambwe, Yosefu Mugonnola of Kamuli, Aloysius Kawanda of Ddambwe, and a number of peasants in Luwero were also killed.

January 1984. By 1984, there were so many people dying that informers could not keep accurate track of the dead. Neither did those killed receive decent burials; they were left to rot where they were killed; hence the scattered skeletal remains. In January Daniel of Kasambya (Mubende West) was reported slaughtered, as was Ssengendo of Kayinja.

February 1984. Makupe of Mpigi North East, Richard Kabiswa, Kibirige Ssekitto, Sam Musisi, Muyanja, Ssemakula Nabambe, Father Petro Kizza, and Ssenfuma of the same area were reported killed. Edward Byekwaso of Kalasa (Luwero District) was accused of collaborating with guerillas and executed.

March 1984. Enugi Misinde and Sserunjogi, both of Kabira, were reported slain in March 1984.

April 1984. Dr (Major) Benon Ndahura (aged 32), head of Mbuya Military Hospital, was gunned down at Kapeeka in Luwero District. Killed with him was Sam Wande (25), believed to be a relative of Adonia Tiberondwa, then minister of Industry. In Kampala, Corporal Mark Okot, James Aryada, and Stephen Kyeswa were believed killed. In Luwero District John Kasibante, Kiyimba, Mugerwa, Mukasa, and Nsohya were believed slain.

May 1984. Ssebayanga, Tamusano, Tamuzadde, Mrs Lwampansa, Joseph Kakeeka, Karoli, and Banyerera, all of Buluma (Mpigi), were reported killed during this period. Joseph Mulindagwe of Nagalabi, Paul Kateregga, a truck driver, and the Reverend Mr Nzaana of Kabaale were also killed. Muhammad Namburu, a resident of Busiki County in Busoga, and Abdu Kabuto of Bugiri (Iganga District) were believed starved to death.

October 1984. Kaberenge of Gomba was killed in October, reportedly on the orders of Sergeant Sokolo. Others who died violently in this period included Rwegabo (60) of Ngeye and Dezideriyo of Buwanguzi.

December 1984. A number of residents of Kinoni were reported killed in this month, including Nyirakadeheri, Rwabuhihi, Nyiragasibura, Mukanyonge, Kakuba, Mukagatare, Kayinamura, Nyirawanaga, Jjajja, Nyiramihanda, Kananga, and Mukakibibi. Buyola location was reported to have suffered the following casualties: Kagarama, Ikula, Mushoshodooti, Buyera, Kadokiva (a child), Kahunga (a child), and Kayera. In Kyenshama, Deborah Nakata, Kezira Kenkunguru, and Maria Kyomutasya were reported killed.

APPENDIX SIX

Some of the Detainees at Luzira Gazetted by Ugandan Authorities

<i>Name</i>	<i>Date of Detention</i>	<i>Name</i>	<i>Date of Detention</i>
Pte Selesiano Lakwo	3/08/83	Pte Nathan Tumwine	3/08/83
Pte Ismail Matovu	3/08/83	n/Cpl Dean Olinga	16/08/83
Lawrence Matovu	2/09/83	James Kalega	2/09/83
Wycliffe Dathan Kitimbo		Peter Kabubi	2/09/84
Lwanyaga	2/09/83	Badru Sendese	3/09/83
Wilfred Benon Ibanda	3/09/83	Christopher Rwashote	3/09/83
PeterKaye	3/09/83	Samwiri Wamala	5/10/83
Ediriisa Kiwanuka	5/09/83	Nelson Kitogo	5/09/83
Joseph Serumaga	5/09/83	Patrick Musoke	5/09/83
Edward Nsubuga	28/09/83	Hassan Kiiza	2/10/83
Twaha Serunjogi	2/10/83	Charles Nakibinge	17/10/83
Godfrey Lubwama	17/10/83	Kirisa Kakande	17/10/83
Mohamed Serunkuma	17/10/83	Joseph Sebahufu	17/10/83
Robrt Semogerere	17/10/83	William Walaga	15/11/83
Emmanuel Owor Owere	15/11/83	Jimmy Sikanalya Walaga	15/11/83
Francis Mukiibi	15/11/83	Stephen Kalende	15/11/83
Aloysious Mutumba	22/11/83	Samuel Magala	22/11/83
Charles Mayanja	22/11/83	Godfrey Wanyama	22/11/83
Frank Kumbugwe	22/11/83	Fabb Ambanya	22/11/83
Godfrey Busulwa	11/11/83	Grasio Mwanje	24/11/83
Sam Kasanga	24/11/83	Deogatius Musoke	24/11/83
Alex Musanje	24/11/83	Nelson Kayondo	24/11/83
Nathan Kyasa	14/12/83	Lawrence Lugemwa	16/01/84
Isaac Irabizi	31/01/84	John Ruvuza	31/01/84
Charles Semugyeshi	31/01/84	Hannington Katable	31/01/84
Adam Kavuma	31/01/84	Yusuf Gayi	2/02/84
Mohammed Kimbugwe	2/02/84	PC Moses Lotta	6/02/84
George William Katende	6/02/84	Lawrence Setimba	10/02/84
Erinest Kigundu	10/02/84	Amuli Muyinja	10/02/84
Livingstone Kagwa	10/02/84	Abdu Gitta	13/02/84
PC Akusasi Kibwika	2/03/84	PC Simon Mijumbi	

<i>Name</i>	<i>Date of Detention</i>	<i>Name</i>	<i>Date of Detention</i>
Musisi Lwanyaga	12/03/84	Christopher	2/03/84
Bruhan Musuru	20/03/84	Kyagulanyi	12/03/84
Hon. Onesmus Katalikawe	26/03/84	John Owino	3/04/84
Stephen Kyalya Kunebe	13/04/84	Abel Mutanda	13/04/84
Fred Kabanda	13/04/84	Peter Lukong	24/04/84
Mudu Junju	4/05/84	Paul Kikomeko	4/05/84
Peter Kitata	4/05/84	SP Christopher Galla	5/05/84
Ezra Waiswa	7/05/84	Abdallah Kalenge	7/05/84
2d Lt Erukam Kabalirwa	8/05/84	2d Ltd Charles Musitwa	8/05/84
2d Lt David P.M. Oyet	9/05/84	2d Lt Anthony Tweesigye	9/05/84
2d Lt Bernard Ocom	9/05/84	Johnson Tibesigwa	
Abdi Rahaman Hassan		Serwadda	11/05/84
Mohamed	17/05/84	Joram Ndyaba	17/05/84
Abas Wabyibe	17/05/84	Iddi Kikomeko	17/05/84
Charles Ndiwa C.		Christopher Kiryowa	8/06/84
Chemasuet	17/05/84	George Ziwa	8/06/84
Pte Dvis Mugisha	8/06/84	PC Peter Olanya	8/06/84
Haji Kassim Nakabale	11/06/84	Fred Nkambwe	12/06/84
Lawrence Makuke		John Kizito	12/06/84
Begumanya	12/06/84	Josam William	
Kerere s/o Nyebirweki	1/07/84	Twinomucunguzi	22/06/84
Shem Bayanga	4/07/84	Bamwenzaki	4/07/84
Baptist J. Ndyabayunga	4/07/84	Victor Tibamwenda	4/07/84
Alfred Bernard Waiswa	5/07/84	Lawrence Kasozi	5/07/84
Paul Setya	10/07/84	Nassar Lubega	3/08/84
Mohammed Oonyu	20/09/84	Joseph Wamala	22/09/84
Edward Bamugye	11/09/84	Lawrence Magembe	11/09/84
Peter Kalyango	11/09/84	Sam Kasibante	11/09/84
Alex Kizza	11/09/84	Dulusi Katende	11/09/84
Issa Lumala	11/09/84	Johnson Kyeyune	11/09/84
Gidion Akolong Loyamo	15/08/84	Fidele Omugetum	15/08/84
Fred Musisi	12/04/84	Omeja Odalia	10/04/84
Mawazi Nali	10/04/84	David Okuni	12/04/84
Samuel Muholi	12/04/84	Anthony Nsiro	12/04/84
David Wanjala	12/04/84	Mohaumd Galiwango	12/04/84

Source: *Munnansi* 2, series no. 21, 3, Jan. 1985, and 14.

APPENDIX SEVEN

*Memorandum of Uganda's
Religious Leaders to
Obote, August 1981**

(1) Your Excellency, together with your closest collaborators, we the religious leaders of Uganda would like to assure you that we are praying for you and all your government for the heavy responsibility you are shouldering.

(2) We are grateful Your Excellency, for sparing us this time to come to meet you, not only today but also for the many other times we have sought an appointment with you. Thank you for accepting us to share in your leadership by accepting to listen to our constructive criticisms. Thank you for your untiring efforts to rehabilitate our country.

(3) While we do appreciate all the efforts being made to wipe out all bad elements in Uganda, what we experience in Uganda today is alarming. The security situation has gone from bad to worse. The groaning, tears, sighs, and the pains of the people of Uganda, especially in Arua and around Kampala, have forced us to seek an appointment with you, to bring to your notice our own experiences, to discuss with you and to suggest ways and means of solving the problem.

(4) The Uganda you lead is bleeding to death. It needs a Good Samaritan to give first aid and treatment and healing. The tears that the people around Kampala, especially at Kapeeka, Semuto, Wakiso, Kakiri, Matugga, Namanve, Luwero and Wobulenzi are shedding have reached a quantity that should force those who lead to stop, listen to God, and examine their principles and have more compassion over those that are suffering and many that have lost their lives. What the people around Kampala are going through is very much

* This is a translation of the original letter.

like what is going on in West Nile. For within three weeks, a total of over a hundred innocent citizens of Uganda, men, women, children, and old people have been murdered mainly by the gun and by people who are there to protect and defend the citizens of Uganda.

(5) We have no objection to operations made by the army to search for guns if they have enough evidence but we strongly object to the way it is done. Once they are sent in an area, they start shooting innocent people without discrimination. Property is looted, women and girls are raped, and many civilians desert their homes to save their lives. Thus the reputation of the army has been greatly damaged among the people. They can no longer trust them. As soon as they appear on site they run away.

(6) Our people today are confused. In areas where operations have been made those such areas have been attacked by bandits or guerrillas, and it seems the guerrillas have the same uniform as our regular army. Many of us cannot distinguish who is a rightful soldier and who is not. These men in army uniforms do not confuse the public only but also the Ugandan army. In this category of criminals is where you sometimes find people of this nature being killed by civilians in self-defence. The soldiers of the Ugandan army on finding people in army uniforms just assume that they are their fellow soldiers; hence the operation soon starts to trap enemies simply to end up arresting innocent citizens, killing, and leaving many wounded.

(7) In the Uganda of today, there is total lack of respect from the security forces. There should be a spirit of both self and human respect on the side of soldiers in relation to civilians. The security personnel should be taught to respect life and property of the people. They should be taught to carry out their noble duty in all faithfulness. Their noble duty is to defend the people and the property of the citizens but not to become a threat to life and property. Official army vehicles have been seen carrying loads and loads of civilian belongings and property after the search. What they are not able to take is crushed to pieces and houses damaged. One wonders what is the intention behind all this? What worries our people more than anything else is the indifference and spirit of no concern so far being exhibited by the government, even when serious tension evidently continues building up.

(8) The roadblocks have become places of torture, especially when mounted by army men. They have no respect for anybody. Some of us religious leaders have more than often fallen victims of these furious men. Something we had never experienced even during the last (Amin) regime. The dignity of our womenfolk has

been abused very much. When you see the army men and sometimes police search the women, it is very unhealthy and shameful. At gunpoint, they sometimes force the women to take off their clothes; they demand money even from children and old people. Taxi drivers and lorry drivers have become a constant source of revenue. What is more amazing is that roadblocks are manned only during the day and abandoned during the night. We cannot help making inferences that their main objective in putting up roadblocks is to collect money, not to search for wrongdoers and dangerous weapons. Some party men are also becoming too powerful, sometimes more powerful than the ministers of government. Such men need to be watched and guided and at times strongly corrected and have their political enthusiasm guided in the right direction of development. Such men have sometimes misbehaved with the public, and in the end they realize that they have lost the cooperation of the people in the area. For their own security they give false information to the security officers – invite them to come and guard the area and in many cases the situation has gone from bad to worse.

(9) The wrong attitudes that have existed ever since the beginning of political parties in Uganda have their own problems. To belong to different parties is not only a difference in opinion but makes them enemies of one another. The matter is made worse by some government officials who still entertain such ideas. For example in the *Uganda Post* of Thursday, 10 September, a certain minister said (if he was well quoted) that one of the reasons why there is chaos in the army is that three-quarters of the army men voted for DP during the last general elections. Were the soldiers not free to vote for a party of their own choice? If they voted for DP does that make them bad soldiers? Before he can prove to the public that the soldiers who are causing havoc are DP supporters, it is wrong to entertain such ideas. Such ideas cause more divisions than unity.

(10) We do realize that the whole world is with violence, both the developed and less-developed nations. However, our prayer and longing is that the nation of Uganda which is the most religious and Christian founded nation of Africa should be ambassador for peace to the rest of the world. Here are some of our humble suggestions which we think can be of some help in our search for peace and development:

- i There is need to reinforce more disciplinary measures in the army. Educate them to respect life and property of the common man. It is high time we aimed at quality rather than quantity. We appeal to the government to put into practice what the vice-president and minister of Defence had in mind to weed the army

as he did with the police. For we know quite well that many of those people who join the present army had no good record.

- ii We would also like to suggest that there is strong disagreement between government and the people and other parties, that His Excellency as the current leader, arrange for a round-table conference probably in a neutral country, for them all to meet, and Zimbabwe as an example where such means were used to restore peace, otherwise the gun cannot be the solution to our problems.
- iii We want to appeal to the government to respect your promise to restore the rule of law in Uganda. If army operations continue to take place without thorough investigations, if life continues to be cheap in Uganda, then the people cannot recognize the difference, and it is hard to sit on the people for ever.
- iv We as religious leaders for our part will continue to teach and work for peace among all men regardless of their creed, party, or tribe. It is on this way of peace, love, and forgiveness that the foundation of Uganda was laid from the very days of missionaries and this is beautifully reflected in our national motto, "For God And My Country."

Signed: Dunstan Nsubuga (Anglican) Bishop of Namirembe, Sylvanus Wani (Anglican) Archbishop of Uganda Theopheodos Nankyama (Orthodox) Bishop Emmanuel Cardinal Nsubuga (Roman Catholic) Archbishop of Kampala, Kassim Mulumba (Muslim) Chief Kadhi, Uganda.

APPENDIX EIGHT

*Letter of the Leader of the
Opposition to the President
of Atrocities**

Opposition Office
National
Assembly,
Parliament House
PO Box 122
KAMPALA

4th August, 1982

H.E. The President,
Dr A.M. Obote
Parliament Building

KAMPALA

Dear President Obote,

KILLING IN KASANJE
AND NAKAWUKA

This is the third time I write to you in connection with loss of lives in the Gombololas of Kasanje and Ssisa, apparently at the instigation of UPC activists, notably Mr Edward Kabira UPC Chairman Mpigi South East Constituency, Lusimbo Nyindozaminy, Local UPC leader and Muluka Chief of Nakawuka, Kigwana, Ssonko, (Militia) Lwanga, Muluka chief Bulwanyi and the father of Ssonko.

* This document is typed from a photocopy of the original.

In my first letter I called on you to set up a commission of inquiry into the killings of so many people in the area, who, at that time, were estimated around twenty. (20). In the second letter I reported to you that according to information which reached me after my first letter to you, the number of people killed was then estimated to be about sixty (60). I have since received more information from the area and according to the latest information the number killed at the hands of some members of our army (UNLA) is anything between eighty (80) and one hundred (100).

According to the information reaching me a large number of people were arrested at Kasanje during and after the public meeting organised and addressed by Mr Edward Kabira. Apparently at least as many as forty-three (43) of those arrested were subsequently killed and their dead bodies left in different places as follows: (a) Twenty-one (21) at Bimbye between Kasanje and Nakawuka; (b) Eighteen (18) at Kabwa between Kasanje and Bubebbere; (c) Four (4) at Kamunye between Kasanje and Mpigi.

Among those killed in Kasanje were the following:

- a) Nelson Ssabavuma, a well known singer;
- b) Kulanima Sserwange, an old man aged over seventy years;
- c) Ludoviko Nkugwa, leader of the Christian Lay Movement in Buyege Catholic Parish;
- d) Nkugwa, Headmaster of Kasanje Primary School;
- e) Haruna Kivumbi, Teacher at Kasanje Primary School;
- f) John Kistu, Pork trader at Kasanje;
- g) Matovu, better known as Laale who used to sell water on a wheel barrow;
- h) Deogratius Kasirye, a businessman with a shop at Kitoro, Entebbe;
- i) Kiggundu, Assistant Secretary of DP branch at Kasanje;
- j) A certain Nnalongo;
- k) A certain Francis X, Ssali of Bbaale.

Over forty (40) people in the Nakawuka areas were killed apparently at the instigation and/or at the hands of the Leaders of UPC in the area, who included Lusimbo, Ssonko and Lwanga. As stated in my second letter to you, an estimated number of seventy (70) UNLA soldiers with the assistance of the above named persons arrested a large number of people at Nakawuka Trading Centre on 12th July, 1982 and severely assaulted them before carting them off for execution. The majority of these people were picked up on the basis of their tribal background. They were mostly Westerners notably Banyankore and Banyarwanda. Here again dead bodies appear to have been deposited in different places.

Seventeen (17) such bodies were found at Tema Estate, at Lumpewo, between Kasanje and Kisubi. Twenty-three (23) other bodies were found at Kalandazi, between Nakawuka and Kasanje. Those killed in Nakawuka area and subsequently identified included the following:

- a) Peter Kiggundu who used to cut down trees for preparing charcoal;
- b) Misiga who used to collect and sell water on a wheel barrow;
- c) Misiga Kiiza who used to make charcoal;
- d) Richard Nkugga also called Malevu because of his beard;
- e) Kanyabere Ssalongo who used to prepare charcoal;
- f) Yosefu Kajabangu who used to sell pork;
- g) Richard Katende a nephew of Lusimbo but who had on several occasions confronted his uncle (Lusimbo) over the latter's conduct;
- h) Ssematimba an official in the Veterinary Department in the area.

I also understand that the UPC leader and Muluka Chief for Bulwanyi, Mr Lwanga, arranged the arrest and execution of two people, apparently both Westerners, *viz*: Bakuuse Nditufugo (a Murundi) and Marceli Kabokomuwaawo (a Mukiga). The total number of persons killed whose dead bodies were found as indicated above is eighty (80). It is however believed that it could be much bigger, probably around one hundred (100).

A large number of UNLA soldiers and Special Force personnel are reported to have been stationed in these Gombololas of Kasanje and Ssisia. It is further reported that many of them are engaged in looting and assaulting innocent civilians. As a result of this reign of terror, large numbers of innocent civilians have been forced to flee the area and abandon all their things.

It is still my hope that you will, dear President, treat this matter as a very serious one which calls for your prompt attention and action.

Yours Sincerely,

Paul Ssemogerere

APPENDIX NINE

*Memorandum from the
Chairman of the National
Resistance Movement to
the Commonwealth Prime
Ministers and Heads of
Government**

(Conference held from 30 September to 7 October 1981)

Your Excellencies,
The Commonwealth Prime Ministers
and Heads of Government

As you prepare to assemble for your conference in Melbourne, Australia, I must draw your attention to the appalling situation that exists in a fellow Commonwealth country, Uganda, which is again caught up in the grip of a brutal and murderous dictatorship. It is with the deepest regret that I must point out that the Commonwealth itself must bear a heavy responsibility for this state of affairs.

You are aware that a Commonwealth Observer Group (COG) was in Uganda last December to observe the conduct of the elections which were supposed to restore Uganda to democratic government. It must be borne in mind that certain crucial stages in the electoral process were never witnessed by COG, such as the demarcation of boundaries, registration of voters and nomination of candidates – all of which were manipulated in favour of Milton Obote and his Uganda Peoples Congress (UPC), supported by Paul[.] Muwanga, head of the Military Commission, and effectively supported by Obote's proxy as head of government. All foul and unfair means possible were employed, including the murder of opposing candidates, detention

* I obtained a photocopy of the original from NRM papers kept with Robert Kitavujja in Vienna, Austria.

and the declaration that seventeen out of 126 constituencies were to be awarded unopposed to the UPC.

Nevertheless, despite all these factors the people of Uganda were not to be deterred. On 10th December 1980, Ugandans went to the polls. By late afternoon on 11th December, it was clear that Obote and UPC were heading for resounding defeat. Their reaction was predictable. Muwanga usurped the powers of the Electoral Commission by a decree barring returning officers and the Commission itself from declaring any results unless such results were approved by him personally. His decree further directed all returning officers not to submit their constituency results to the Electoral Commission but to himself alone. A record fine equivalent to US \$70,000 was imposed by Muwanga for non-compliance with his decree.

At a conclave throughout the night of 11 December, Obote and Muwanga proceeded to reverse the authentic results and to allocate seats to their party cohorts, even where UPC candidates had polled less than 10% of the votes cast and had already conceded defeat.

The following day, 12 December, 1980, using their control of the radio, the army, police and other machinery of state and backed by the Tanzania army, Obote and Muwanga announced their coup. The one became President the other Vice-President and Minister [of] Defence.

By the time the falsified results were declared on 12 December, the COG had left Uganda. Nevertheless the details of their report leaves no doubt as to the massive scale of manipulation and blatant rigging of the election as perpetrated by UPC. No conclusion other than that the entire election was a manifest fraud is possible.

Against this background the conclusion reached by the COG that on the whole the election was a "valid exercise" is a curious one indeed. It is of course, entirely negated by the details of their own report.

Fundamentally, the gravest possible damage has been done to Uganda by the COG's trite conclusion which has led to a degree of legitimacy in no way justified by UPC's electoral performance nor indeed by the consequent activities of Obote's Government.

It is not the intention of this document to give a catalogue of the human misery that now afflicts Uganda, the murders, detentions [and] indeed the total collapse of the rule of law which have forced Ugandans to take up arms and fight for their basic survival. Suffice it to say that the open support of certain Commonwealth states for Obote and his murderous regime have been carefully noted by all thinking Ugandans. Those who believe that they are promoting political reconciliation and economic recovery for Uganda should note

that neither reconciliation nor recovery are possible under Obote and his repressive minority regime backed, once more, by Tanzanian troops under a bogus military pact. The only way forward is to remove this evil man, root and branch, from the political life of Uganda, for good, and to send the Tanzanians back to their own Country.

Your Excellencies, we appeal to you to recognize the responsibility you bear collectively for the present situation in Uganda and to consider your individual and collective relations with Uganda in the not too distant future when, we pray to God, Uganda will be free.

Y.K. Lule,
Chairman of the National Resistance Council
National Resistance Movement

APPENDIX TEN

*Public Statement by
Uganda's Ambassador to
the Scandinavian
Countries, Ibrahim Mukiibi*

The reason for my resignation is to demonstrate my indignation against the rampant persecution of [the] innocent civilian population by the present regime in Uganda whose security forces are engaged in a systematic and unwarranted looting, arresting, torturing, raping and killing of members of selected Uganda tribes or Ugandans who are not members of the ruling party. Thousands of Ugandans have had their properties destroyed including houses for no apparent reasons. Thousands have been detained in Police Stations or Military Barracks for indefinite periods. Many of these detainees never get the chance to get out alive and many of the survivors of these dungeons are crippled as a result of torture and beating.

The injustices and atrocities perpetrated by the present regime in Uganda have reached such a horrifying proportion that many Ugandans are wondering whether their country was not liberated from a frying pan to a fire. These persecutions coupled with the widespread corruption of the present regime have become a source of disgrace for every Ugandan and they have turned our country into the sick man of Africa.

It is because of these unwarranted violations of human rights in my country that the Uganda regime decided to ban all foreign reporters from Uganda in a bid to stop them from exposing these atrocities to the outside world. It is for the same reason that the Uganda Government recently ordered the Representative of the International Red Cross to close his office in Kampala.

The tragic events in Uganda have proved beyond any doubt that the present regime's so-called policy of national reconciliation is but a smokescreen for the undeclared and notorious policy and vendetta against entire tribes and political opponents.

It is erroneous for the outside world to believe that the present regime in Uganda has restored the rule of the law just because there is the so-called elected government. This is a false image. What we have in Uganda is unofficial military dictatorship, officially administered by a civilian President. Regrettably, in Uganda of today the same as in Uganda of yesterday, the gun still speaks louder than any law of rational rules. Anybody who has been in Uganda or has been closely following the development[s] in my country knows what I am talking about.

In the name of the persecuted people of Uganda irrespective of their tribal, religious or political affiliation, in the name of those Ugandans who sacrificed their lives so that Uganda may be free, in the name of thousands of women and children who have been rendered widows and orphans by the merciless soldiers, in the name of justice and respect for human rights and in the name of all those sacred principles and high ideals for which the African peoples and indeed the peoples of the whole world have sacrificed so much to defend and protect, I deplore the present state of affairs and call upon all the dignified Ugandans, especially the civil servants and the educated class, to shake off the attitude of complacency. I urge them to speak out against the injustices and atrocities which have engulfed the Ugandan civilian population.

Furthermore, I implore the Ugandan rulers to put an end to the senseless persecutions and disrespect for the personal property and human life being perpetuated by members of the security forces in the country, especially in the southern and West Nile Provinces. Uganda cannot be considered genuinely free as long as some of its tribes are being subjugated and perpetually persecuted. There is no freedom without justice.

In Uganda today, any person who harbours tribal hatred or religious bias cannot provide an effective and successful leadership. A leadership capable of restoring the much needed stability, peace and social justice. Uganda today, needs a magnanimous and open-minded leader who is above tribal differences and quarrels. A leader who is prepared to take the interest of all Uganda tribes in[to] account and who is willing and capable to work for the reconciliation and harmonization of these various interests with the object of creating a peaceful and just multiracial nation in a new Uganda with a genuine democratic system conducive to social progress.

Finally, I would like to thank all the well wishers and friends of the people of Uganda especially in the Scandinavian countries for their moral and humanitarian support. I am confident that the

people of Scandinavia whose political and social institutions provide the best models of an ideal democratic system, will continue to be a source of support and inspiration of the people of Uganda, victims of despotic rulers and ruthless soldiers. For I believe that in our small world of today, injustice committed anywhere, constitutes a threat to justice everywhere.

(signed)

Ibrahim Mukiibi

Former Uganda Ambassador to the Scandinavian Countries

May 1982

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Notes

INTRODUCTION

- 1 Wrigley, *Crops and Wealth in Uganda*.
- 2 Kyemba, *State of Blood*. Read also Martin, *General Amin*; Kleinschmid, *The Amin Collection*; International Commission of Jurists, *Uganda and Human Rights*, 69–85.
- 3 The Commission of Inquiry headed by Justice David Jeffreys Jones implicated two high-ranking officials for the murder of Strohm and Siedle at Mabarara Barracks in 1971, but Amin never prosecuted them. Nor was the officer commanding the operation at Nakulabye in 1964 prosecuted; instead, he was promoted.
- 4 Ryan, "Uganda," 37–63.
- 5 Amnesty International, *Human Rights in Uganda* (June 1978), 13.
- 6 In August 1985, the National Resistance Movement estimated that political violence had claimed "over a million people." *Uganda Resistance News* 3, no. 3 (August 1985): 1.
- 7 The figure was given by Elliott Abrams, US assistant secretary of state, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, in his testimony before the US Congress Joint Committee on Human Rights and African Affairs. Reported in the *Washington Post*, 5 and 10 August 1984; *Christian Science Monitor*, 9 August 1984; and *The Times*, 6 and 9 August 1984. Obote's minister of Information, while conceding that the killings had taken place, put the figure at only 15,000. *International Herald Tribune*, 21 August 1984.
- 8 The Uganda Asians are a case in point. I shall discuss their expulsion in chapter 7.
- 9 *International Herald Tribune*, 18 September 1984.
- 10 Clay, "Eviction of the Banyarwanda."

- 11 US Committee for Refugees, *Human Rights in Uganda*; Harrell-Bond, *Imposing Aid*, 32.
- 12 These data are the estimates of a high official of the Ministry of Health whom I interviewed in February 1987. He did not wish his name to be revealed. Ever since Amin's social disorganization, Government departments do not take the recording of statistics very seriously.
- 13 Wiebe and Dodge, *Beyond Crisis Development*, 101–12.
- 14 Wiebe and Dodge, *Beyond Crisis in Uganda*, 1985; Hooper, "AIDS in Uganda," 10–22; Caputo, *National Geographic* 173 (1988): 468–91.
- 15 Kleinschmid, *The Amin Collection*.
- 16 Kagwa, *Ekitabo ky'Abasekabaka*; Gomotoka, "Makula"; Apter, *The Political Kingdom in Uganda*; Kiwanuka, *A History of Buganda*; Uzoigwe, *Uganda*, xiv–xv.
- 17 Lee, "Buganda's Position in Federal Uganda," 165–8.
- 18 Ibingira, *The Forging of an African Nation*, 105–222.
- 19 Hansen, *Mission Church and State*, 370–3, 376, 402.
- 20 Welbourn, *Religion and Politics*; Gingyera-Pinychwa, *Issues in Pre-Independence Politics*; Hansen, *Mission, Church and State*.
- 21 Jorgensen, "Structural Dependence," 43–72.
- 22 Wallestein, "Class and Class Conflict," 375–80; Sandbrook, "Patrons, Clients and Factions," 104–19; Chodak, "Social Stratification in Sub-Saharan Africa."
- 23 Nabudere, *Imperialism and Revolution in Uganda*; Mamdani, "Class Struggle in Uganda," 26–61; Jorgensen, *Uganda*, 204; Sathyarmurthy, *The Political Development of Uganda*; Saul, *The State and Revolution in Eastern Africa*, chapter 13.
- 24 Harden, *Africa*.
- 25 Sigelman and Simpson, "A Cross-National Test," 105–28.
- 26 Ladefoged *et al.*, *Language in Uganda*, 83.
- 27 Mazrui, *Cultural Engineering*.
- 28 Jorgensen, *Uganda*, 249–52.
- 29 The first Kenyan president, Jomo Kenyatta, had long experience of leadership before he became head of state, was highly educated, revered as the old man (*Mzee*), and did not resort to violence to solve internal political problems without thoroughly exhausting peaceful options. By the time he received his MA from the London School of Economics, he had been secretary of the Kikuyu Central Association and editor of the Kikuyu paper *Mwigwithania* in the 1920s. In 1947, he became leader of the Kenya African Union. For almost twenty years before independence, Kenyatta was in the forefront of nationalist struggle in his country, an experience that was later to benefit the whole nation. Like Kenyatta, Tanzania's

- Julius Nyerere was highly educated, experienced as a leader before he became head of state, and revered with the honorary title “the Teacher” (*Mwalimu*). After successfully completing Makerere College and obtaining an MA from Edinburgh, he began participating in politics early in the 1950s. He became leader of the Tanganyika African National Union in 1954, some seven years before he led his country to independence. This experience was beneficial not only for him but for the party and state when he assumed political power.
- 30 Domenac, *Violence and Its Causes*, 30. For structural violence look at Johan Galtung’s two articles, “The Specific Contribution of Peace Research to the Study of Violence,” 83–96, and “Violence, Peace and Peace Research,” 169–91.
- 31 Mazrui, *Soldiers and Kinsmen*, 83.
- 32 Gurr, *Why Men Rebel*, 3–4.
- 33 Rubenstein, “Group Violence in America,” 437–54. The Black Muslims seem to have been the exception in that they wanted to withdraw from the mainstream American society instead of striving to become full participants in it.
- 34 For further reading on how violence can spread to the “body politic” of a nation, see Arendt, *On Violence*.
- 35 Khiddu-Makubuya, “Paramilitarism and Human Rights,” 141–57.
- 36 For the proper elaboration of negative and positive uses of violence, see Darwin, *The Descent of Man*, 1883; Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, 73–4; Museveni, *Fanon’s Theory of Violence*, 1–24.
- 37 Mazrui, *Soldiers and Kinsmen*, 84–91.

CHAPTER ONE

- 1 See, for example, *Ekitabo Ky’Abasekabaka*, and, also by Kagwa, *Ekitabo Kye Mpisa za Baganda*, and *Nyakatura Abakama ba Bunyoro-Kitara*; see also Ogot, *A History of the Southern Luo*; Crazzolara, *The Luo*.
- 2 Southall, “Stateless Societies,” 157–67.
- 3 Karugire, *A Political History*, 13.
- 4 Tosh, “Colonial Chiefs,” 472–90, and *Clan Leaders and Colonial Chiefs*.
- 5 For Lango, refer to Tosh, *ibid*; for Sebei, see Goldschmidt, *The Sebei*, 86–111.
- 6 Weatherby, “Inter-tribal Warfare”; Hudson, *Karimajong Politics*; Girling, *The Acholi of Uganda*; La Fontaine, *The Gisu of Uganda*; Webster, *The Iteso during the Asonya*.
- 7 Minority Rights Group, “Uganda and the Sudan,” 14.
- 8 Gertzel, *Party and Locality*.
- 9 Kagwa, *Ekitabo Ky’Abasekabaka*, chapters 1–5.

- 10 Karugire, *A History*, 66.
- 11 Kagwa, *Ekitabo Ky'Abasekabaka*, 7.
- 12 Speke, *Journal of Discovery*; Stanley, *Through the Dark Continent*.
- 13 Kagwa, *Ekitabo Ky'Abasekabaka*, 154.
- 14 Kasirye, *Abateregga*, 43, 59–61.
- 15 Low, "Uganda: The Establishment," 57–120; Hemphill, *The British Sphere*, 391–432.
- 16 Article 15 of the 1902 Order in Council, quoted in Morris and Read, *Uganda*, 20. For the administration of law, especially family and "moral" laws in East Africa, see Ojwang, "Polygamy," and "Native Courts Regulation," 1897.
- 17 Kabwejere, "The Dynamics of Colonial Violence," 303–14, and *The Politics of State Formation*, 70–7.
- 18 Denoon, *A History of Kigezi*.
- 19 King, "The Yakan Cult," 1–25.
- 20 Tosh, "Small-Scale Resistance in Uganda," 51–64.
- 21 Kabwejere, *The Politics of State Formation*, 72.
- 22 Tucker, *Eighteen Years*, 219.
- 23 Tosh, *Clan Leaders and Colonial Chiefs*, 141.
- 24 Roberts, "The Sub-Imperialism of the Baganda," 435–50.
- 25 Tosh, *Clan Leaders and Colonial Chiefs*, 115; Twaddle, "Decentralized Violence," 71–85.
- 26 Uzoigwe, "The Kyanyangire, 1907," 179–212.
- 27 Steinhart, *Conflict and Collaboration*, 103.
- 28 Low and Pratt, *Buganda and British Overrule*, 137–48.
- 29 See the studies done by Atanda, "The Bakopi," 151–62 and Hansen, *Mission, Church and State*, 176–204.
- 30 Jorgensen, *Uganda*, 61.
- 31 Steinhart, *Conflict and Collaboration*, 88.
- 32 Tosh, *Clan Leaders and Colonial Chiefs*, 120, 197–212.
- 33 Uzoigwe, *The Kyanyangire*, 179–212.
- 34 Scotton, "The First African Press," 211–28.
- 35 Kirunda-Kivejinja, "Crisis of Confidence."
- 36 Ingham, *The Making of Modern Uganda*, 107–8.
- 37 Low, *Political Parties in Uganda*, 3.
- 38 Hansen, *Mission, Church and State*, 38.
- 39 Perham and Bull, eds., *The Diaries of Lord Lugard*, 3 May and 1 June 1892.
- 40 Records of the Muslim Revolt, Public Records Office (PRO), Foreign Office (FO) 403/184(1893); FO 403/193(1893); FO 2/61(1893).
- 41 Jorgensen, *Uganda*, 56–62.
- 42 Thomas and Scott, *Uganda*, 298–301.
- 43 Jorgensen, *Uganda*, 61.

- 44 Roberts, "The Evolution of the Uganda Protectorate," 95–106; Ingham, *The Making of Modern Uganda*. For the colonial origins of social conflict, see Lwanga-Lunyiigo, "The Colonial Roots of Conflict," 24–44.

CHAPTER TWO

- 1 Joxe, "A Critical Examination," 69.
- 2 Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*; Rupesinghe, *Conflict Resolution in Uganda*, 1–20.
- 3 Jorgensen, *Uganda*, 154.
- 4 Ehrlich, "Cotton and the Uganda Economy," 169–72; "The Uganda Economy," 404.
- 5 Nabudere, *Imperialism and Revolution*, 90.
- 6 Jorgensen, *Uganda*, 154.
- 7 Nabudere, *Imperialism and Revolution*, 90–3.
- 8 Jorgensen, *Uganda*, 188.
- 9 Nabudere, *Imperialism and Revolution*, 188.
- 10 Fort, "Land Tenure," 66–84; Mair, *An African People*, 170.
- 11 Uganda, Ministry of Agriculture and Co-operatives, *Report*, vol. 3, Table 4, 5.
- 12 West, *Land Policy in Buganda*.
- 13 Wrigley, *Crops and Wealth in Uganda*, 50.
- 14 Brett, *Colonialism and Underdevelopment*, 273–4.
- 15 World Bank, *Uganda: Country Economic Memorandum*; Seers et al., "The Rehabilitation of the Economy of Uganda."
- 16 Blomstrom, "Capital Flight."
- 17 Jorgensen, "Structural Dependence," 47.
- 18 Uganda, Ministry of Planning and Economic Development, "Action Program," 2.
- 19 For the appropriation of Uganda's income after the construction of the "Uganda Railway" see Ingham, *A History of East Africa*, 224–5; for the construction of the railway and the problems involved, see Patterson, *Permanent Way*, Hill, *The Man-Eaters of Tsavo*.
- 20 For the Kenya/Uganda controversy of 1987–88, see *Weekly Review*, 10 April 1987, 28–30; 8 May, 38–9; 22 May, 58–9; 15 May, 25–6; 29 May, 59–63; 5 June, 34–5; 12 June, 39–41; 26 June, 42–3; 28 August, 28–32. See also *Africa Concord*, 14 May 1987; *Weekly Topic*, May, 29 July 1987, 149.
- 21 *Weekly Topic*, 2 September 1987, 5; Jorgensen, *Uganda*, 295.
- 22 Seers et al., "The Rehabilitation of the Economy," vol. 2, 62–4, 627–56; World Bank, *Uganda: Country Economic Memorandum*, 13; Muwafu, "Aminism," 1980.

- 23 *African Letter* (Toronto), 16–29 February 1988, 6.
- 24 *African Business*, June 1987, 43; *Weekly Topic*, 29 July 1987.
- 25 *Weekly Review*, 29 May 1987.
- 26 *Times* (London), 19 December 1987.
- 27 *The Independent* (London), 21 December 1987, 8. A more recent appraisal is Throup, “Kenya’s Relations with Museveni’s Uganda.”
- 28 Furlley and May, “Tanzania Military Intervention in Uganda.”
- 29 Klein, *Peasants in Africa*, 9–43.
- 30 Elkan, *The Economic Development of Uganda*, 36.
- 31 Jorgensen, *Uganda*, 70.
- 32 Kyesimira, *Agricultural Export Development*.
- 33 Wrigley, *Crops and Wealth in Uganda*, 70.
- 34 Scotton, *The First African Press*, 211–28.
- 35 Low, *The Mind of Buganda*, 131.
- 36 Ibingira, *The Forging of an African Nation*, 109.
- 37 These were E.K. Ntende, Joseph Mubiru, and Sam Sabagereka; see: Jorgensen, *Uganda*, 285; *Uganda Argus*, 6 July 1959, 6 and 12 August 1971.
- 38 Jorgensen, *Uganda*, 239.
- 39 *Ibid.*
- 40 Goldthorpe, “An African Elite,” 31–47.
- 41 Burke, *Local Government*, 149–51.
- 42 Leys, *Politicians and Policies*.
- 43 The Rwenzururus were a group of Bamba and Bakonjo who sought to create their own district out of the kingdom of Toro.
- 44 Scotton, *The First African Press*, 211–28.
- 45 Roberts, “The Evolution of the Uganda Protectorate,” 95–106, and “The Sub-Imperialism of the Baganda,” 435–50.
- 46 Low, *Buganda in Modern History; The Mind of Buganda*; Twaddle, “Ganda Receptivity to Change,” 303–15.
- 47 Twaddle, “Ganda Receptivity to Change,” 303–15.
- 48 La Fontaine, *Tradition and Transition*, 177–93, referred to the Gishu as having been helped to consolidate as a “tribe” by anti-Ganda feelings.
- 49 Hansen, *Mission, Church and State*, 146.
- 50 *Ibid.*, 179.
- 51 Wrigley, “The Changing Economic Structure,” 18–63.
- 52 Wrigley, “Buganda,” 69–80.
- 53 Low, *The Mind of Buganda*, 225.
- 54 Wrigley, “The Changing Economic Structure,” 53.
- 55 Kasfir, “Cultural Sub-nationalism,” 51–148.
- 56 *Ibid.*, 82.
- 57 Elkan, *An African Labour Force*, 33.

- 58 Powesland, *Economic Policy and Labour*, 40.
- 59 Elkan, *The Economic Development of Uganda*, 13.
- 60 Richards et al., *Subsistence to Commercial Farming*, 294.
- 61 Mair, *An African People*, 11.
- 62 Omara-Otunu, *Politics and the Military*, 82.
- 63 Mudoola, "Communal Conflict," 116–40. For Kabarega, see Uzoigwe, "Kabarega and the Making of a New Kitara," 5–21; for Kakungulu, see Gray, "Kakungulu in Bukedi," 31–59, and Thomas, "Capax Imperii," 125–36.
- 64 Mazrui, "The Lumpen Proletariat," 1–12.

CHAPTER THREE

- 1 The type of schools the Protestant missionaries established in Uganda are discussed in Furley and Watson, *A History of Education*; Carter, "Cooperation in Education."
- 2 Fallers, "Social Stratification in Buganda," 55–71; Wrigley, "The Changing Economic Structure," 16–63. In Ankole, for example, the competition for positions promoted the Protestant Bahima to vote DP in the 1961 elections instead of UPC like most Protestants in the country.
- 3 Brief biographies of various UPC leaders show how few of them had any economic stake in the country. One of the strongest men in the party was W.W. Nadiope, the traditional ruler of Bugabula, in Busoga. His dynasty claimed descent from the Bito rulers of Bunyoro, and he was connected by marriage to the Buganda establishment (Mudoola, "The UPC-ification," 74–8). He had gone through Uganda's public-school system and was popular in Busoga because its peasants perceived that he was anticolonial – he had been deposed for abuse of power by the colonial state, but the peasants saw his deposition as an anti-British, and therefore a nationalistic, move. George Magezi, the first secretary general of the UPC, was intelligent, articulate, and presentable, though only moderately well educated. He was connected to the royal family of Bunyoro by marriage. Like his colleagues he was Protestant. Apolo Milton Obote, who would become party leader, came from a respected clan in Akokoro County, Lango. His grandfather was a famous clan leader and chief. He went to a public school at Busoga College Mwiri. He was not rich when he entered politics – few in the party were – nor did he have a professional qualification to fall back on. Grace Ibingira, who became UPC secretary general in 1964, belonged to the royal family of Ankole. His main source of wealth was his qualification as a lawyer, with which he could earn a living

once out of power. Felix Onama was one of the exceptions. A rich farmer and an important leader in the West Nile cooperative movement, he was Catholic, well educated, and an independent thinker. He would have joined the Democratic Party but bowed to Balaki Kirya's appeals to join the Uganda Peoples' Congress instead (Personal interview, Nairobi, 1983). Dr I. Majugo was a member of the Bunyoro royal family. He derived his income from his professional medical practice. John Babiiha, vice president in the latter part of Obote's first administration, was a district notable from Toro and a Catholic. He was not rich; he used to earn his living as an assistant veterinary officer. John Lwamafa from Kigezi was also notable in his district, a well-respected Protestant, moderately well educated, and intelligent, but with no high stakes in the economy. John Kakonge was a Protestant, educated in the same school system as other Protestant leaders, and popular in most of Uganda. He had earned a master's degree and was involved in the politics of colonialism at an international level but had no independent secure source of income. He studied in India – where, as head of the African students' organization he had audiences with Prime Minister Nehru (Kirunda-Kivejinja, "The Crisis of Confidence") – and watched Indian politics closely. Of all UPC executive members, he seems to have been the most knowledgeable about Uganda's precarious position in the international community and about the lot of Uganda's peasants.

- 4 One of the reasons Ibingira disagreed with Obote, and suffered for it, was that Obote failed to keep his promises to the Buganda neotraditionalist establishment at Mengo. Ibingira, *The Forging of an African Nation*, 204.
- 5 Jorgensen, *Uganda*, 257.
- 6 Mutesa II, *The Desecration*, 86–7.
- 7 Ignatius Musaazi was notable among Ugandan politicians in that he stuck to a consistent principle throughout his career. He may have shifted party allegiance, but his desire for the just distribution of wealth remained constant. Son of a *gombolola* chief in Bulemeezi, Musaazi began his political career in the early 1930s and became famous in the late 1940s. In 1938 he became a prominent member in the *Bana Ba Kintu* Association and joined the Uganda Motor Drivers' Association, which aimed at improving road conditions and safety. He always preached the democratization of political institutions, first in Buganda, and later in Uganda; railed against established and inherited privilege; and called for the participation of Africans in marketing their produce. His message threatened the Buganda establishment, which, when it realized he was a critic of the

system, began to persecute him. In 1940 the Buganda government imprisoned him for eighteen months. In 1945, having played a leading role in the disturbances caused by popular demand for the conditions he espoused, Musaazi was deported by the colonial state.

When he returned, he did not rest. In 1946 he helped start the Uganda General Transport and Workers' Union. He was also involved in the new *Bataka* party in the same year. *Bataka* articulated the same concerns as *Baana Ba Kintu*: to stop the appropriation of peasant produce and encourage the democratization of Buganda's political institutions. In 1947 he helped found the Uganda African Farmers' Union, which demanded African participation in marketing agricultural produce. Two years later he was involved in the strikes staged in support of African participation in the political and economic systems of their country. He was again exiled for a year by the colonial state. Upon his return, he helped found the Federation of Partnership of Uganda African Farmers.

Musaazi's crowning moment came in 1952 when he helped found the Uganda National Congress – a party dedicated to the interests of Africans, especially African farmers. In 1958 he joined the Uganda National Movement, a populist political organization led by Augustine Kamywa, as a way of advancing the interests of African businessmen and encouraging them to participate in lucrative economic activity. In 1961 he joined *Kabaka Yekka*, which might have been opportunistic, but was forced to leave it in 1963 because he disagreed with the chiefs at Mengo, who controlled the party, on the issue of privileges. Thus, although it could be said that before 1980 most politicians in Uganda were opportunistic, treacherous, undependable, prone to shift from one party to another, and unable to stick to ideologies, Musaazi was not like them. He stuck to a consistent political principle.

- 8 Interview in 1974 with Prince Badru Kakungulu (1907–91), a great uncle of Mutesa II. Felix Rwambalali, a Mutoro from Fort Portal, was one of a Uganda National Congress delegation that went to London in 1953–54 to appeal for the *Kabaka's* return from exile. See Mujaja, "The Role of the UPC," 448.
- 9 Apter, *The Political Kingdom in Uganda*.
- 10 Low and Pratt, *Buganda and British Overrule*, 106–36.
- 11 Gee, "A Century of Mohammedan Influence," 139–50.
- 12 Low, "Composition of the Buganda Lukiiko," 64–8. The oligarchy included the descendants of the families of Sir Apolo Kagwa, Stanislaus Mugwanya, Ham Mukasa, Petero Sendikwaanawa, Zakariya Kizito Kisingiri, Batulumaaayo Musoke, Yayiro Mutakyala, B. Mulyanti, Kisosonkole, Kulubya, Kasule, and a few others. In Kagwa's family

alone, five of his thirty children became *gombolola*, or subcounty, chiefs, one a deputy *Katikkiro* (prime minister), and another a *Katikkiro*. His grandchildren are very prominent in Uganda and have prospered from their head start in terms of income and education.

- 13 Hansen, *Mission, Church and State*, 344–58.
- 14 Ibid., 111, 324–60.
- 15 Low and Pratt, *Buganda and British Overrule*, 97, 136.
- 16 The leaders were Amos Sempa, Masembe Kabali, Michael Kntu, James Lutaaya, Pokino Matovu, and others.
- 17 Welbourn, *Religion and Politics*, 17.
- 18 Low, *The Mind of Buganda*, 211–13.
- 19 Ibid.
- 20 Pratt, *Nationalism in Uganda*, 157–78.
- 21 Francis Walugembe, minister of Local Government in the *Kabaka's* government, quoted in the *Uganda Argus*, 13 and 19 March 1964.
- 22 Hancock, "The Buganda Crisis," 109–23, 275.
- 23 *Uganda Herald*, 24 April 1952; *Uganda Argus*, 3 February 1960; Lugira, "Some Policy Revelations," 20.
- 24 Ibingira, *The Forging of an African Nation*, 195.
- 25 *Uganda Argus*, 21 and 22 May 1962. Kirunda-Kivejinja, "The Crisis of Confidence"; Majaju, "The Role of the UPC," 443–67.
- 26 Adoko, *From Obote to Obote*, 1983.
- 27 Information obtained from his colleague, Kirunda-Kivejinja. See Kirunda-Kivejinja, "The Crisis of Confidence," 242; Mujaju, "The Political Crisis," 443–67.
- 28 Mujaju, *ibid.*
- 29 Nabudere, *Imperialism and Revolution*, 256.
- 30 Kasfir, "Cultural Sub-Nationalism in Uganda," 51–148.
- 31 Mujaju, "The Gold Allegations," 30–53.
- 32 Mujaju, "The Demise of UPCYL," 291–307.
- 33 Engholm, "Crossing the Floor," 137–55; Pratt, "Nationalism in Uganda," 157–8.
- 34 Low, *The Mind of Buganda*, 215–20.
- 35 Sempa's actions are probably typical of Baganda politicians, who have been characterized by their slow reaction to change and sudden volte-face once a winner is identified (Richards et al., *Subsistence to Commercial Farming*, 307). Because of the patron-client method of distributing social rewards, the Baganda were always afraid of the danger of being caught on the losing side in a political system that is full of conflict "anxiety" and accepts "spying, intimidation," lying, dishonesty, and murder as normal political fare (Lee, "Buganda's Position in Federal Uganda," 165–81). The Baganda reflect this undependability in popular sayings and speeches like

- Abaganda busa bwa mbogo, bukala kungulu so munda bubisi* (The Baganda are treacherous though they may appear perfect on the surface); *Abaganda nswa, zebikka Kungulu* (The Baganda are outwardly honest but internally treacherous; like white ants which decorate their outer surface, they hide their dark intentions); and *Abaganda bamilira alidde* (The Baganda will congratulate only the successful).
- 36 Pratt, "Nationalism in Uganda," 157-8.
 - 37 Personal interview, 1981 and 1986.
 - 38 Low, *The Mind of Buganda*, 193-4.
 - 39 Mafejje, "The Legitimacy of the Ugandan Government," 165-81.
 - 40 Mutesa II, *The Desecration*, 170.
 - 41 Jorgensen, *Uganda*, 221; Hopkins, "Politics in Uganda," 251-90; Adoko, *Uganda Crisis*, 7, 119.
 - 42 Hopkins, "Politics in Uganda," 251-90.
 - 43 Ibingira, *The Forging of an African Nation*, 69.
 - 44 Young, "The Obote Revolution," 8-14.
 - 45 *Africa Report* 11 (December 1966): 38.
 - 46 Hancock, "The Buganda Crisis," 109-23.
 - 47 *Ibid.*; "Buganda's Position," 165-81; Kiwanuka, "Nationality and Nationalism," 229-47.
 - 48 Report provided by Daudi Ochieng, *Parliamentary Debates* (February 1965), 755-89.
 - 49 *Reporter* (Nairobi) 3, no. 120 (20 November 1964): 9-10; *Munno* 54, no. 265 (12 November 1964): 1; *Munno*, 1 December 1964, *Uganda Argus*, 14, 26, 27 November 1964.
 - 50 *Parliamentary Debates*, (February 1965), 767-70.
 - 51 *Ibid.*
 - 52 Ibingira, *African Upheavals*, 98.
 - 53 *Parliamentary Debates* (February 1965).
 - 54 *Ibid.*, 780-1.
 - 55 So Mayanja and Kisekka implied. See *Uganda Argus*, 5, 8, 16 April 1965. See also Engholm and Mazrui, "Violent Constitutionalism," 137-5.
 - 56 Hopkins, "Politics in Uganda," 259.
 - 57 Nabudere, *Imperialism and Revolution*, 259-64; Adoko, *From Obote to Obote*, 16-76.
 - 58 Omara-Otunu, *Politics and the Military*, 67.
 - 59 Mazrui, "Socialism and Neo-McCarthyism," 16-19.
 - 60 *Africa Digest* 16 (October 1965): 36.
 - 61 *Uganda Argus*, 27 July 1967, 3. For the same Bantu-Nilotic issue see Leys, *Politicians and Policies*, 12, and *Weekly News*, 14 July 1967, 15.
 - 62 Mujaju, "The Gold Allegations," 30-53.
 - 63 Mudoola, "Communal Conflict in the Military," 116-40.

- 64 Omara-Otunu, *Politics and the Military*, 72.
- 65 Ibid., 74.
- 66 Mutesa II, *The Desecration*, 186.
- 67 Ibid., 13.
- 68 Ibid.
- 69 Ibid.
- 70 For a thorough survey of these relics see Roscoe, *The Baganda*.
- 71 Mutesa II, *The Desecration*, 19. Various proverbs reveal the centrality of the *Kabaka* in daily life: *Kabaka akira oluganda* (The *Kabaka* is better than brotherhood); *Kabaka akussa owuwo* (The *Kabaka* can make you kill your son, i.e., given the choice between killing one or the other, you'd better kill your son); and *Kabaka muzawula* (The *Kabaka* is the greatest finder and redeemer of society). Ibid.
- 72 Ryan, "Uganda," 1.
- 73 Munno 61 (8 February 1971): 32. Interview with Joan Kakwenzire, a member of the Human Rights Commission, 1989.
- 74 In July 1966, journeying between Kampala and Entebbe, I travelled through four roadblocks, at one of which I was forced to drink dirty water from a nearby ditch.
- 75 Omara-Otunu, *Politics and the Military*, 76.

CHAPTER FOUR

- 1 Southall, "General Amin and the Coup," 85–105.
- 2 Lofchie, "The Uganda Coup," 19–35; Omara-Otunu, *Politics and the Military*, chapters 5, 6.
- 3 Omara-Otunu, *Politics and the Military*, 82.
- 4 Ibid., 83.
- 5 E.M.K. Mulira (*Parliamentary Debates*, Second Session, 1965, 503) and Ali Kisekka (ibid., 1963–64, 954) had both appealed to the government to recruit from all areas of Uganda.
- 6 *Parliamentary Debates*, 28: (1963–64), 2087–118.
- 7 Omara-Otunu, *Politics and the Military*, 67.
- 8 Adoko, *From Obote to Obote*, 82–122. His book does not point out the GSU's many critical failures that resulted in tragedy for Uganda, like the 1969 attempt to assassinate Obote and the 1971 *coup*. Adoko should be congratulated for writing his account of what happened. However, he personifies issues to such an extent that the ordinary reader might think that only the evil individuals he names and not structural violence were to blame for Uganda's tragedy from 1964 to 1985.
- 9 Hussein Marella belonged to the Baka group (tribe) of southern Sudan. Amin put him in charge of the Military Police until 1974. A resentment against southern Sudanese by Ugandan recruits, espe-

cially Marella, resulted in a rebellion led by Charles Arube and Elly Anseni, both Kakwa, in 1974. As a result, Marella was allowed to retire, with a handsome financial and material package, to Yei, in the Sudan. Arube, who led the attack on Marella's headquarters at Makindye, was killed but Anseni survived to become Amin's ambassador to Moscow.

- 10 Mazrui, "The Lumpen Proletariat," 9.
- 11 *Uganda Argus*, 2 November 1968; Ryan, "Economic Nationalism," 141.
- 12 Adoko Nekyon had warned of this state of affairs. See *Parliamentary Debates*, vol. 87, 8–10.
- 13 Gupta, *Obote*, 22. Gupta lifted most of the paragraph from Jorgensen, *Uganda*, 247. On the touchy subject of government participation in business, see Jorgensen, "Restructuring State Enterprises," and Katorobo, "Public Enterprises Management."
- 14 Mamdani, "Class Struggle in Uganda," 26–61.
- 15 Ryan, "The Balance Sheet of the Revolution," 38.
- 16 Lockard, "Religion and Political Development," chapter 7.
- 17 *Parliamentary Debates*, vol. 80. (1968), 2780–6; vol. 91, 1335; *Uganda Argus*, 5 December 1968; Kasozi, *The Spread of Islam*, 113–16.
- 18 *Munno*, 21 July 1970.
- 19 Mujaju, "The Political Crisis," 67–85.
- 20 *Transition*, no. 37 (1968).
- 21 Mudoola, "Communal Conflict," 125.
- 22 Obote, "The Footsteps of Uganda's Revolution"; Adoko, *From Obote to Obote*, 1–80. See also Gupta, *Obote*, 33–86.
- 23 Sathyamurthy, *The Political Development*, 508.
- 24 Nabudere, *Imperialism and Revolution*, 250–60; Willets, "The Politics of Uganda," 278–99.
- 25 Kasfir, *The Shrinking Political Arena*.
- 26 Jorgensen, *Uganda*, 253; *Uganda Argus*, 29 September 1966.
- 27 Ryan, "Uganda," 39.
- 28 Ibingira, *African Upheavals*, 72–6.
- 29 *Uganda Argus*, 18 June 1968.
- 30 Omara-Otunu, *Politics and the Military*, for understanding the ethnic composition of the Uganda army; see also Gingyera-Pinychwa, "Is There a Northern Question?" 44–64.
- 31 Nabudere, *Imperialism and Revolution*, 250–60.
- 32 Cohen and Parson, "The Uganda People's Congress Branch," 44–66.
- 33 "Coups tactics" are "abnormal or illegal actions aimed at dislodging a set of people from the exercise of power." Gingyera-Pinychwa, *Apolo Milton Obote*, 217.
- 34 In response to an enquiry whether there would be a cabinet

reshuffle, one minister reportedly said, “Even the president can be reshuffled.” My professor at Makerere, to whom the remark was made, told me of this incident in 1970, but I did not comprehend its implications until much later.

- 35 Omara-Otunu, *Politics and the Military*, chapters 5, 6.
- 36 Ibid., 86–7.
- 37 Martin, *General Amin*, 1974; Mamdani, *Politics and Class Formation*, 292–3, 302, and “Class Struggle,” 26–61; Nabudere, *Imperialism and Revolution*, 274–7; and Ofer, *Operation Thunder*, 66–7. Some writers deny Israeli involvement; see Gitelson, “Major Shifts in Recent Ugandan Foreign Policy,” 359–80; Lofchie, “The Uganda Coup,” 19–35.
- 38 Gingyera-Pinychwa is partly, and only partly, right in his view that the Baganda could not influence the direction of events since they did not control or influence the army. But they were a powerful social force to be reckoned with and, as events have shown in the second Obote regime, they can put up a successful resistance provided they are well led. See Gingyera-Pinychwa, “A. Milton Obote,” 32–44.

CHAPTER FIVE

- 1 Amnesty International, *Human Rights in Uganda* (June 1978), 19.
- 2 Southall, “General Idi Amin,” 85–105.
- 3 See Nsibambi, “Political Integration in Uganda,” 31–9, for understanding problems of political integration in Uganda.
- 4 Amnesty International, *Human Rights in Uganda* (June 1978), 13.
- 5 For full descriptions of Amin’s terror machine, see Kyemba, *A State of Blood*, 111–18; Martin, *General Amin*, chapters 8–12; International Commission of Jurists, *Uganda and Human Rights*.
- 6 Adoko, *From Obote to Obote*, 131–76.
- 7 *Uganda Argus*, 27 January, 29 February 1971.
- 8 Decrees 6 and 18, March, May 1971.
- 9 Kokole, “The Nubians,” 410–47.
- 10 *Uganda Argus*, 11 October 1971.
- 11 *Daily Telegraph*, 26 and 29 January 1971, 12 July 1971.
- 12 Martin, *General Amin*, 43–4, 158–9; Ofer, *Operation Thunder*, 1976.
- 13 Mazrui, “Religious Strangers,” 21–38.
- 14 Mujaju, “The Political Crisis,” 67–85.
- 15 Low, “Uganda Unhinged,” 219–28.
- 16 *Uganda Argus*, 13 July 1971.
- 17 Ibid., 28 February 1972.
- 18 Ibid., 31 March 1972.
- 19 Ibid., 16–17 November 1972.

- 20 The victims included: Brig. Suleiman Hussein, army chief of staff; Col. Mesusera Arach, commander of the First Infantry Brigade; Col. Albertino Langoya, commander of the School of Infantry; Lt. Akwangu, officer commanding Malire Mechanized Regiment; Lt. Tom Loyira, Moroto Battalion; Lt. Col. Abwola, commander of the Tiger Battalion at Mubende; Col. Aboma, commander of the Border Guard at Fort Portal; Lt. Col. Ekiringa; Col. John Ebitu; and Lt. Col. Emmanuel Ogwal, Artillery Unit at Masindi.
- 21 Mazrui, *Soldiers and Kinsmen*; Hansen, "Ethnicity and Military Rule."
- 22 *The Observer*, 4 February 1973.
- 23 For example, Sulaiman Zziwa, a successful merchant at Mityana, was imprisoned for ten years for hoarding and overcharging. However, my investigations show that the regional commander wanted his girlfriend and business.
- 24 The forms of torture mentioned here come from Amnesty International, *Human Rights in Uganda* (June 1978), 13–15. Two survivors of these tortures are friends of mine: Aziz Kasujja was manager of the Libyan Arab Bank. He was thrown in Makindye by Amin in 1978 with his friend Majid Bosa.
- 25 Many survivors of this ordeal could relate the story, though few have recorded their painful and traumatic experience.
- 26 Amnesty International, *Human Rights in Uganda* (June 1978), 3–6.
- 27 Decrees 7, 13, and 15, 1971.
- 28 Decree 8, May 1972.
- 29 Decree 7, May 1972.
- 30 Decree 3, 24 January 1973.
- 31 Decree 12, June 1973.
- 32 World Bank, *Report on Uganda*, 1971–9, Publ. 1982, 13.
- 33 Mishambi, "Idi Amin," 29–37.
- 34 Twaddle, *Expulsion of a Minority*; Kuepper et al., *Uganda Asians in Britain*; Mamdani, *From Citizen to Refugee*.
- 35 Jorgensen, *Uganda*, 285–9.
- 36 *Africa Research Bulletin* (Economic Series), 1969, 1535.
- 37 Mamdani, "Class Struggle in Uganda," 26–61.
- 38 *International Herald Tribune*, 23 December 1976.
- 39 *Ibid.*, 16 May 1977.
- 40 Rumulika, "Tanzania's Policy," chapter 4; Legum, ed., *Africa Contemporary Records*, B425–6.
- 41 Speech at Juba to the Amred Forces, *African Research Bulletin* 21 (September 1971): 2220.
- 42 *Ibid.*, 2220.
- 43 See Martin, *General Amin*, for details.
- 44 Interviews in Kyotera with Matayo and two old men in 1974.

- 45 International Commission of Jurists, *Uganda and Human Rights*, 53.
- 46 Omara-Otunu, *Politics and the Military*, 139.
- 47 Kirunda-Kivejinja, "The Crisis of Confidence," 260.
- 48 Nyerere in an interview in *Africa Now* (December 1983).
- 49 *Weekly Topic*, 11 April 1980; Gertzel "Uganda after Amin," 461–8.
- 50 Seers, *The Rehabilitation*, quoting from World Bank, *Uganda: Country Economic Memorandum*, 8.

CHAPTER SIX

- 1 *Weekly Review*, 20 July 1979.
- 2 Mazrui, "The Social Origins of Ugandan Presidents," 3–23.
- 3 Among those wounded at the Kampala city square was Paulo Kavuma, a former *Katikkiro* of Buganda, who has written an interesting account of his time in power (Kavuma, *Crisis in Buganda*, 1979). Yoweri Museveni, then minister responsible for defence, visited Kavuma in hospital – a switch from the usual indifference among Ugandan leaders to their forces' crimes against civilians. This was one of the gestures that earned Museveni good relations with the masses.
- 4 Jorgensen, *Uganda*, 333–5.
- 5 A number of "stayees" led by Olaya, Onen Oyera, C. Rwaheru, and L.B. Ntambi formed the Uganda National Union to pressure the government to permit those who had not gone into exile to participate in politics once again. Jorgensen, *Uganda*, 333–5.
- 6 *Uganda Times*, 3, 18 October 1979; Jorgensen, *Uganda*, 333–5.
- 7 *The Citizen*, 9 November 1979; *Sunday Nation*, 27 January 1982; *Weekly Review*, 14 September 1979.
- 8 *Weekly Review*, 14 March 1980.
- 9 Legal Notice no. 5, 12 May 1980.
- 10 *Uganda Times*, 12 May 1980.
- 11 *Africa Confidential*, 11 February 1981. Minority Rights Group, "Uganda and Sudan"; Nabudere, "The Obote Election Fraud," 1981.
- 12 *The Citizen*, 4 June 1980.
- 13 *The Citizen*, 18 July 1980.
- 14 *Weekly Topic*, 18 July 1980; *The Citizen*, 25 August 1980, also complained of the pre-election violence.
- 15 *Uganda Times*, 10 September 1980.
- 16 See note 8, chapter 7.
- 17 A letter of 11 July 1980 to the inspector general of Police.
- 18 *Uganda Times*, 19 July 1980.
- 19 Nabudere, "The Obote Election Fraud," 20.
- 20 *Sunday Standard*, 7 December 1980.

- 21 Legal Notice no. 7, 1980.
- 22 *Weekly Topic*, 20 June 1980.
- 23 *Weekly Topic*, 11 July 1980.
- 24 He was the publicity secretary of the UPM. Civil Suit 606 1980, *Weekly Topic*, 9 October 1980.
- 25 Paragraphs 39–41 of the Commonwealth Observer Group's report, *Uganda Elections*.
- 26 Article 47 of the 1967 constitution.
- 27 Commonwealth Observer Group, *Uganda Elections*, 32.
- 28 *The Standard*, 12 December 1980.
- 29 *The Guardian*, 13 December 1980; "Uganda: Minority Government." *Africa Confidential* 22, no. 4 (11 February 1981): 2; "Uganda: Unending Blood." *Africa Confidential* 24, no. 12 (8 June 1983): 3–5. The DP secretary general has since published an account of what he feels took place. See Bwengye, *The Agony of Uganda*, chapters 3–8.
- 30 Commonwealth Observer Group, *Uganda Elections*.

CHAPTER SEVEN

- 1 For the purpose of this study, a massacre is any indiscriminate killing of more than three people, a general slaughter. This definition is arbitrary and used only to give the reader a perception of what the study is trying to review.
- 2 The villages were Kitende, Nalumuli, Nakigala, Katale, and Sseguku.
- 3 One member of Parliament for Kabarole North East, J. Karugaba, and a prominent DP member, Sam Drale, were trapped in the operation.
- 4 *Munnansi*, 24 December 1981.
- 5 *Ibid.*, 24 May 1986.
- 6 *Ibid.*, 6, 13 February 1982.
- 7 *Munnansi*, 23 June 1983. *Munnansi*, used widely in this chapter, is dependable because: i) It recorded events after thorough investigation; ii) The materials it recorded were published in Obote's Uganda in full knowledge of the brutal consequences that could result; iii) The Obote Government was aware of accounts published in *Munnansi*; iv) I have cross-checked it with other sources.
- 8 Barjilio Olara Okello is said to have ordered the killing of people without trial and to have made inflammatory anti-Baganda statements. In July–August 1980, a certain Lieutenant George Karenzi of Lubiri barracks was killed along with two other soldiers on Rubaga Road near the Lohana Club as they returned from Bugoolobi. Although they were believed to have been killed by a certain Okello Okwera of the *Kikoosi Maluum*, Barjilio Olara Okello used the

incident to blame the Baganda. He rounded up some three thousand residents of the area and accused them of the deaths. Civilians were made to sit on the ground in heavy rainfall to listen to him. When he arrived he ordered the shooting of four people out of the crowd. This having been done, he is reported to have said: "I have never seen people who are as stupid as the Baganda. I can order my soldiers to kill all of you now but I am giving you the last warning. If you do not stop killing my soldiers now, we will take ten of your lives for every soldier killed." I was in the vicinity when Okello delivered his fatal words. Sitting on a balcony of a Musaj-jalumbwa flat, I could see and hear part of what was going on. Later, after the crowd dispersed, I gathered more accurate data from three individuals who were part of the crowd. Each narrated the same story with only minor deviations. The Nairobi *Nation* of 20 October 1980 reported a number of incidents that occurred in Kampala during that period. In August 1982 Okello approved his soldiers' violence towards civilians in Mukono District. During one raid thirty-five people were killed and five houses blown up. After the whole area was razed the local district commissioner assembled the people to hear Olara Okello speak. Okello did not regret the continued loss of lives but instead "promised heavier punishment by security forces against those stubborn people harbouring guerrillas and supporting anti-government elements."

In December 1983 a contingent of Ugandan soldiers led by Sokolo raided a number of villages, killed scores of people, burned down a number of houses, raped women, and looted property. The villages affected were Nakibanga, Nagalabi, Bulesa, Kitungo, Konde, Namutunku, and Bukola. Over 150 people are believed to have been killed by UNLA soldiers in Mpigi, thirty-three kilometres south of Kampala, in these raids. In the neighbouring constituency of Mubende Southeast, eighty people are known to have lost their lives at the hands of UNLA soldiers under this officer. He is believed to have killed or caused the death of over a thousand people in Mpigi District alone.

9 *Uganda Digest* 1, no. 4 (1984): 7.

10 As noted, ordinary soldiers followed the example set by their superiors. One soldier was walking along the road in front of Sardinia Bar, Kampala, when he suddenly opened fire on three people having a drink, killing two and injuring the third. The soldier walked away totally unconcerned by what he had done (*Munnansi*, 16 July 1981). In April 1981 an army Land Rover driven carelessly by soldiers overturned at Ndeeba and soldiers from Lubiri Barracks overreacted by shelling a passing truck with four rocket-propelled

grenades. The entire town was then looted, eight women raped, and fifteen residents killed (Ibid., 10 April 1981). On 28 November 1981 government soldiers attacked and ransacked the villages of Ndejje, Nakunsibyaki, Naggera, Nakikonge, Kikooko, Makulubita, Mugogo, Katiiti, Bibbo, Kabira, and Kalasa in Luwero District. They killed all the able-bodied males they happened to come across, arrested and tortured the elderly, raped women in appalling situations (in the presence of their children or, in the case of young girls, in front of their parents), destroyed houses, and burned crops. In May 1981 a family of six was liquidated at Kawanda village and their house looted and then blown up by UNLA soldiers (Ibid., 10 May 1981). The previous month, UNLA soldiers blew up the house of a UFM supporter at Mukono. Sixteen civilians, including four school children, were killed at a bus stop (ibid., 21 April 1981).

- 11 His victims included A. Kanya, M. Sabarumo, J. Nkugwa, K. Semwanga, J. Kisitu, K. Kivumbi, Mr Ssali, Mr Kajabirango, R. Katende, Mr Ssematimba, Mrs Nnalongo, Kizito Nsubuga, Peter Kiggundu, Mr Masige, R. Kagingagi, M. Kiye, Mrs S. Kalyobera, G.M. Kavuma, and Z. Lubega.

- 12 *Munnansi*, series 80 (25 November 1983): 445.

- 13 A few more examples follow. *Lusimbo Nyindozaminy*: A resident of Nakawuka, he helped Edward Kabira (*Munnansi*, series 80, 24 November 1983, 445). He participated in the Kasanje and Nakawuka Massacres and is reported to have stolen cows and sold their meat: from Henry Kiggala, two cows; from Mr Bisobye, one cow; from Mr Misaaki Kizito, two cows; from Mr Magabo, one cow; from Mr Mugambe, two cows; from Mr Benon, two cows; and from Mr Ssemeere, one. *Miss Alice Nassali Kiseegwu*: This notorious party functionary was formerly a Muluka chief of Mpenja in Gomba and later promoted to the rank of *gombolola* chief in Mpigi District. She organized the murder of Mr Bonaventule Mukasa, the DP chairman for Mpenja subcounty, on 26 May 1982. She was known to have organized other killings in collaboration with UNLA soldiers in the area. Among those murdered were Mr Wesije and Mr Ssekiziivuvu of Mpenga (Ibid.). *Ahmad Galabuzi*: A resident of Luwero District, Galabuzi reportedly caused the deaths of over a hundred people in his area. He burned three people to death early in 1983 at the village of Kasiiso. Among his victims were Mrs Kalanzi Nnalongo Nnamaalwa and two of her daughters; Mrs Batasi of Katuumu; Mr Israel Nakabaale of Katuugo; and in Lusenke, Mr Ssemukasa, Mr Misussera, Mr Kalanzi-Bumba, Mr Byekwaso, Mr Kanya, Mrs Miriam Nabitengero, Mr Bukambagga, Mr Nyansio Kasalirwe, and Mr Mato-vu (Ibid.). Members of Galabuzi's death squad included Sula, son of

Zakaliya of Kasiiso village; Mutemeko Wasswa, son of Amani Mukalazi; Abaasi; Kaluuna; Bulahimu; Nawango; Kalinaebbango; and Sseminde. The last six were sons of Mr Amiisi Lubwama of Nabongo. All their operations were made with the express collaboration of the UNLA. *Peter Sebuchuzi*: A thirty-five-year-old Rwandese who immigrated as a labourer to Uganda in 1972, Sebuchuzi joined the UPC during the 1980 general-election campaign and was rewarded with an appointment as divisional UPC chairman. A few weeks later he was appointed parish chief of Kyengonza subcounty in Mpigi District (Ibid., 12 July 1983). He is said to have imposed a dusk-to-dawn curfew over his jurisdiction. One day, he found Peter Semanda, fifty-one, walking along the road at 7:00 P.M.; using a stick, he savagely assaulted him, nearly gouging out his right eye. He is said to have built a cell where he tortured and detained some of his "criminal subjects" for a day or two before extorting huge ransoms from them or confiscating their property. Some of his victims were Mr Kanyike, whose cow was confiscated; Mr Musui, whose bicycles were confiscated; Mr Kagubaale; and Mr Badru Mbowa, from whom he got 30,000 shillings. *Haji Kateregga*: Another UPC functionary who caused havoc and chaos (Ibid., 24 November 1983), Kateregga, a resident of Masaka, was a soldier under Amin from 1971 to 1979. He established a unit at Matanga, seventy-two kilometres from Kampala. In collaboration with Kato of the village of Kasaali, who was also a former Amin soldier, he shot dead a number of people in 1982, including Mr Kizito of Kamutuuza and Mr Ssenyonga of Mpugwe. *Abdalla Kanganga*: The son of Alimiya Muniina of Luwero town, Kanganga was reportedly responsible for the deaths of over a hundred people there in 1982-83. His terror group included Asumani Kabuye, Migade, the subcounty chief of Luwero, Yusufu Serwanga, Kibirige, and several others. All their operations were carried out in conjunction with the UNLA and UPC youth wingers of the area (ibid.). *Sseziwa Tayali*: The acting UPC chairman of Luwero District, he collaborated with UNLA soldiers to raid several ranches in the district in 1982-83, stealing more than two thousand cows. Some of these ranches belonged to the East Mengo Ranchers Co-operative Society, others to Nicholas, Kulanima, Kagya, and Lameka Lumu. *Erunansi Nsamba*: A UPC official and an official of Butuntumula Coffee Growers Society, he organized the theft of unprocessed coffee from the peasants of Kasiiso, Lusenke, Nnakakono, Kyangabi, Lummonde, Kibikke, Katungo, Nakatage, Buteera, and other villages. The looting was conducted with the collaboration, and in most cases in the company, of UNLA soldiers. Local civilians in Nsamba's group included Elli Kivumbi, Sikabunda, and Walakira. *J.*

Waliggo: This was a UPC youth winger who lived at Kasaana in Luwero District. His truck, registration number UVR 648, was used for carrying looted coffee, roofing, iron sheets, and domestic property. There is no evidence that he did not take a share of the spoils.

Kigwaana: Another UPC functionary who assisted Edward Kabira in carrying out the Kasanje and Nakawuka massacres. It is reported that he personally shot two people, Kakooza and Kizza, of the Kasanje area. *A. Musaana*: UPC chairman of Mukono. He was believed to have been responsible for many deaths and the confiscation of private property.

- 14 Winter, "The Armies of Uganda."
- 15 "The Polite Highwaymen of Uganda." *The Economist* 290, no. 7333 (17 March 1984): 34; *The Times*, 27 August 1984.
- 16 *Munnansi*, 20 August 1983, 9.
- 17 In 1980 Chief Justice Wako Wambuzi was removed and George Masika was appointed. Masika had no long experience at the bench but, as a UPC supporter, he could make decisions favourable to the government. He had served as Director of Public Prosecutions in the first Obote regime. Masika's cousin, Denis Wakesa, was appointed solicitor general while the experienced Francis Ayume was fired. Another UPC supporter, Oteng, who had been dismissed for incompetence, unfitness, and general misconduct by the Judicial Service Commission, was reappointed by the UPC government.
- 18 Amnesty International, *Human Rights Violations*, 7. In 1982 Galdino Okello, a chief magistrate, was arrested and imprisoned without trial. An attempt was made by soldiers on the life of Mr Justice Sekandi. Mr Justice Lubogo fled the country following a civil suit he decided against the vice president. Mr Justice Ntabgoba went into exile after making decisions displeasing to the authorities. In May 1981 E. Kabazaire, a magistrate, was arrested in Mbarara and later taken to Nile Mansions to face the top officials. Another magistrate, Andrew Kagwa, was detained in July 1981. In the same year, the chief magistrate of Jinja was abducted from his house.
- 19 Minority Rights Group, "Uganda and Sudan," 15; *Africa Now*, March 1984.
- 20 Amnesty International, *Uganda: Six Years after Amin*, 7-12, 28-40.
- 21 *Ibid.*, 1982, 9.
- 22 *Ibid.*, 11.
- 23 *Munnansi*, Series 76 (15 October 1983): 2.
- 24 Bombo military barracks was another centre of torture. Robert J. Rosenthal, a reporter for the *Philadelphia Inquirer*, and Charles P. Towers of the *Los Angeles Times* spent forty-eight hours in Bombo barracks in May 1982. Rosenthal writes that "most prisoners looked

to be teenagers or young men ... Many in Uganda believe that the current period of random killings and torture is worse than anything inflicted during the reign of the Idi Amin who was ousted from power three years ago" (*Philadelphia Inquirer*, 23 May 1982). In another form of torture reported in the Luwero Triangle, "a whole family of six children and a father was wiped out and the survivors (the mother and wife of the family) forced [by UNLA soldiers] to drink the blood of the victims" (*Munnansi* Series 88 [1 March 1982]: 15).

- 25 The following are examples of such clashes. A heavily armed group of people in UNLA uniform burst into the police station at Kira Road on 20 September 1982, shot dead a policeman on duty, and released a number of prisoners. The soldiers had gone to release a colleague who had been arrested on charges of robbery (*Munnansi*, Series 88 [27 September 1982]: 9). Two policemen and one woman were shot dead when a fight between police and UNLA erupted on 7 July 1983 at the main taxi car park in Kampala. According to *Munnansi*, a group of policemen arrived at the car park around 10:00 A.M. to arrest the driver of a Mercedes Benz minibus and his three taxi conductors who had allegedly contravened taxi car park regulations. The offender resisted arrest and in the scuffle the taxi driver and the conductors, who were also armed, opened fire, shot one of the policemen in the stomach, and drove off to Makindye military barracks reportedly to inform the owner of the vehicle about the incident. The police shot at the speeding car, fatally wounding a woman passenger and her one-year-old baby. The woman later died in Mbuya Hospital. After a short while the same car returned to the car park followed by several vehicles full of UNLA soldiers who besieged the place and started firing. Two policemen were killed and another severely wounded. Several uniformed policemen were rounded up and beaten by the soldiers and whisked away to the military barracks. Another example of the lack of coordination amongst the repressive agencies took place in Gulu. A street fight flared up in the town on 12 September 1982 between UNLA and the police following an incident in which an assistant inspector of the police shot and wounded a soldier (*ibid.*, 16). Afterwards the UNLA mounted an operation against the police force, rounding up and beating anyone with police identity. On the same day, an assistant inspector of police and a UNLA sergeant quarrelled over a woman. The policeman, afraid of the soldier's pistol, decided not to provoke him further and went home to get his gun. The soldier followed him to his house and drew his gun on him. The police officer was faster and shot the sergeant in the head. More deaths followed this incident as policemen and soldiers battled.

- 26 These included Bidandi Ssali, a former cabinet minister and secretary general of the Uganda Patriotic Movement; the Reverend Christopher Okoth, a Roman Catholic priest, former cabinet minister, and vice president of the UPM; Professor Y.Z. Kyesimira, DP member of Parliament from Iganga; Haji Ali Sserunjoji, DP member for Kampala North; Yafesi Sabiti, DP member for Mpigi West; Father Vincent Okoth, a former MP and prominent DP leader in Acholi; Ambrose Okullu, a key DP leader in Acholi and a former junior minister; and many others.
- 27 Amnesty International reports such as *Political Detainees in Uganda*; *Detention of Journalists in Uganda*; *Uganda: Disappearances*; and others.
- 28 Amnesty International Report, Uganda, June 1985, 16.
- 29 Ibid., 19.
- 30 Zakaria Maru, Pio Bwete, Emmanuel Kayongo, and Kabayalaya reportedly died in the cells of the Central Police Station, Kampala, in May 1983 after being tortured; George Ssemakula is reported to have committed suicide there in the same month: *Munnansi*, Series 61 (25 May 1983). Prisoners endured similar conditions in police stations at Kira Road, Jinja Road, and Katwe.
- 31 Obote: "Massacres and the Reign of Terror in Uganda," a press release, Lusaka Zambia (November 1987): 6–7.
- 32 *Munnansi* (24 September 1984): 2 gives the names, ages, parents, former villages, and date of arrest for a few of the children held in ordinary prisons.
- 33 Ibid.
- 34 Ibid., Series 23 (27 October 1983).
- 35 In this context, violence is defined as the causing of a repulsive impulse to the weak by the armed, or those who control the means of violence.
- 36 *Munnansi*, Series 23 (8 September 1982).
- 37 Ibid., (February 1982).
- 38 Ibid., (24 May 1982).
- 39 *Catholic Herald*, 3 July 1981; *The Guardian*, 6 July 1981; *Uganda Resistance News* 4, no. 2.
- 40 Those beheaded were Sheikh Kawungeezi, the imam; Abbasi Katumba; Ziwa; Ssajjalyabeene; Sheikh Kalugendo; and a recent convert to Islam, Fred Mukasa.
- 41 By June 1981 the following journalists had spent months behind bars: Ben Bella Illakut of the government-owned *Uganda Times*; Roland Kakooza (*The Economy*); Anthony Sekweyama (*Munnansi*); Sam Kiwanuka and Francis Kanyeihamba (*Uganda Pilot*); Andrew Mulindwa, John Baptist Kyeyune, David Kasujja (*Munnansi*); and Sam Katwere (*The Star*). Don Kabeba (*New Africa*) and Mukotani Rugyendo (*Uganda Times*) fled into exile.

- 42 By January 1982, a year after Obote's seizure of power, a number of foreign journalists had been forced to leave: June Decker, Nick Worral, and Cameron Morton (BBC); Hugh Davis (*Daily Telegraph*, London); Norman Rees and his crew (Independent Television); Mark Lee (Reuters, London, and IPA); Allen Cowell (*New York Times*); Hugh Muir (Voice of America); and Ayub Mirza (ITN).
- 43 *Munnansi*, 22 and 26 January 1982.
- 44 See Legum, "Uganda," 15–22.
- 45 Nurnberger, "The United States and Idi Amin."
- 46 Furley, "Britain and Uganda from Amin to Museveni"; Mujaju, "Internal Conflict."
- 47 I have consulted a photocopy of the speech, "Uganda, Country Report," 1984. See *Washington Post*, 10 August 1984; *Le Monde*, 20 June 1984; *ICRC Review*, 1984; Crisp, "Nationality, Human Rights."
- 48 Most of these ambassadors were career diplomats of high national standing who had had Obote's personal confidence and blessing in their appointment. Ambassador Mukiibi was very close to Obote's vice president, Paulo Muwanga. Obote and Muwanga's participation in the liquidation of so many Ugandans robbed them of all old friends of clear conscience.
- 49 *Washington Post*, 29 November 1983.
- 50 Tumwine, "The Progress of the War," 19.

CHAPTER EIGHT

- 1 Museveni, "The Right of a People to Rebel Against Tyranny." *Uganda Resistance News* 1, no. 1 (March/April 1981): 2–7.
- 2 Museveni, quoted in *Uganda Resistance News* 3, no. 2 (March/April 1985): 7.
- 3 *Ibid.*, 6.
- 4 Harrell-Bond, *Imposing Aid*, 35.
- 5 *Ibid.*, 47.
- 6 *Africa Confidential* 24, no. 22.
- 7 Elly Tumwine has summarized the course of the struggle against Obote. See *Uganda Resistance News* 3, no. 2 (March/April 1985): 17–32.
- 8 Omara-Otuna, *Politics and the Military*, 163.
- 9 Gazozo, "Uganda's Stalemate." *AfricaAsia*, no. 25 (January 1986): 43–4.
- 10 Britain, "Guerrillas Celebrate Kampala Takeover," *The Guardian*, 27 January 1986.
- 11 *Parliamentary Debates*, 23 (6 February 1964), quoted in Ibingira, *African Upeheavals*, 84.

- 12 Minority Rights Group, "Uganda and Sudan," 8.
- 13 Ibid., 9.
- 14 Ibid.
- 15 Harrell-Bond, *Imposing Aid*, 31–63.
- 16 Harrell-Bond, personal communication, Queen Elizabeth House, Oxford, March 1987.
- 17 The speech was reportedly given at Soroti on 11 April 1981. Lugira, "Some Policy Revelations." *Uganda Digest* 4, no. 8 (August 1984): 20.
- 18 *Daily Telegraph*, 30 March 1981.
- 19 Mukama, *Report*.
- 20 *Musizi*, no. 347 (July 1984): 20.
- 21 Minority Rights Group, "Uganda and Sudan," 13.
- 22 *Munnansi*, July 1983.
- 23 *The People*, 11 July 1983.
- 24 Mukama, *Report*, 15.
- 25 Coote, "The Kivu Mission."
- 26 Powesland, *Economic Policy and Labour*, 1957.
- 27 Richards, "The Assimilation of Immigrants," 161–93.
- 28 Nabudere, "Defend and Uphold," 30–2.
- 29 Dodd, "The Chasing of the Banyarwanda," 3–5.
- 30 Muwonge, "Populaton Growth."
- 31 Karugire, *A Political History*, 160–1.
- 32 Clay, "The Eviction of the Banyarwanda," 28.
- 33 Ibid., 4.
- 34 Ibid., 3.
- 35 *The Times*, 6 January 1984.
- 36 Clay, "The Eviction of the Banyarwanda."
- 37 Ibid., 33. This statement was issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 5 February 1982; a similar statement was issued by the Ministry of Culture and Community Development, 11 February 1982.
- 38 *Uganda Times*, 11 January 1982.
- 39 Minority Rights Group, "Uganda and Sudan," 10.
- 40 Communication frm the president to the district councillors of Bushenyi, Kabarole, Kabale, Kasese, Mbarara, and Rukungiri assembled in Mbarara Town Hall on 29 October 1982; quoted in Clay, "The Eviction of the Banyarwanda," 57. Clay (ibid.) is of the opinion that this speech was "primarily for international consumption."
- 41 Ibid., 31.
- 42 Part of a speech by the Mbarara District Council chairman to councillors, county, and subcounty chiefs, Kamukuzi Hall, 4 November 1982.
- 43 Many of the Banyerwanda who died are named in Clay, "The Eviction of the Banyarwanda."

- 44 Beilluk and Henderson, “Mortality, Nutrition Status.”

CHAPTER NINE

- 1 US Committee for Refugees, *Human Rights in Uganda*, 3.
- 2 Harrell-Bond, *Imposing Aid*, 32, 163–80, and personal communication, March 1987; Harrell-Bond, “Returnees and Refugees”; Pirouet, “Refugees in and from Uganda.”
- 3 Winter, director of the US Committee for Refugee, in testimony to the US Congress. A copy (“The Armies of Uganda”) was obtained from the Uganda High Commission, Ottawa. The full text will appear in *Cultural Survival*.
- 4 Tandon, “Ugandan Refugees in Kenya.”
- 5 Crisp, “Uganda Refugees in Sudan and Zaire,” 163–80.
- 6 *Africa Events* (London), October 1987, 38.
- 7 UNICEF, “Children and Women in Uganda,” 33–57. Comparable figures for the US are 1.4 people per vehicle, Canada 1.8, UK 2.5, Brazil 12.6, Algeria 18.6.
- 8 I received this information from a highly placed civil servant in the Ministry of Health in 1987; additional material is from the United Nations *Demographic Year Books* for 1987 and 1988. It must be remembered that since 1972–73 Ugandan authorities have not been collecting statistics in a systematic manner, therefore most of the data included here are estimates.
- 9 Ministry of Health, *Uganda Health and Demographic Survey*.
- 10 Kampikaho, “Maternal Mortality.”
- 11 Wiebe and Dodge, *Beyond Crisis Development*, 7.
- 12 UNICEF, “Children and Women in Uganda,” 85.
- 13 Ministry of Planning and Economic Development, “Provisional Results,” 3–10.
- 14 Commission on Marriage, Divorce and Status of Women, *Report*. The various ordinances are in Morris, “Marriage Law and Divorce in Uganda.”
- 15 By wife battering I refer to “The loss of dignity, control, and safety as well as the feeling of powerlessness and entrapment experienced by women who are the direct victims of *ongoing or repeated* physical, psychological, economic, sexual, and/or verbal violence.” Macleod, *Battered but Not Beaten*, 10.
- 16 Harmsworthy, “The Uganda Family in Transition,” 99–100. Nakan-yike-Musisi’s PhD on women was completed in 1991. Obbo, “Women, Children and Living Age,” is a valuable contribution to this subject.
- 17 Uganda, Ministry of Planning and Economic Development, “Provisional Results,” 3–10.

- 18 Nalwanga-Sebina and Sengendo, "Orphans and Displaced Children," and Dodge and Raundalen, *War, Violence and Children in Uganda*, have insights into this problem.
- 19 Vincent and Bond, "Living on the Edge."
- 20 Edroma, "Queen Elizabeth National Park," 6–7. For a detailed account of the companies and organizations involved in trading Uganda's wildlife products, see *Globe and Mail* (Toronto), 24 May 1988.
- 21 Edroma, "Queen Elizabeth National Park," 7.
- 22 Ibid.
- 23 Hamilton, *Deforestation in Uganda*.
- 24 Mudoola, "Communal Conflict in the Military," 125.
- 25 Fieldhouse, *Colonialism*, 92.

EPILOGUE

- 1 For example see "Inside Obote's Jail," in Yusuf Lule's "Human Rights Violations in Uganda under Obote."

APPENDIX ONE

- 1 Sadler to Foreign Office, 4 February 1903, 02/732; 7 October 1903, A23/1, EGA.
- 2 Tucker, *Eighteen Years*, 216.
- 3 Jackson to Secretary of State, 4 July 1912, SMP 134, EGA.
- 4 Secretary of State to Jackson, 10 August 1912, SMP 134, EGA.
- 5 P.W. Cooper, PC, Buganda, to Chief Secretary, 21 February 1919, SMP 134, EGA.
- 6 Ibid.
- 7 Sturrock, acting PC, Buganda, to Chief Secretary, 1 July 1919, SMP 134, EGA.
- 8 A.H. Cox to PC, Eastern Province, 13 July 1920, Min. no. 137, SMP 134, EGA.
- 9 Whiteley, *Swahili*, 70.
- 10 Ingham, *The Making of Modern Uganda*, 162–5.
- 11 *Uganda Notes*, editorial, January 1920.
- 12 *Gambuze*, July 1928, 10.
- 13 Coryndon to Chief Secretary, 12 March 1919, SMP 134, EGA.
- 14 Report of the Meeting of Provincial Commissioners, 1919, Min. no. 136, SMP 134 (original in SMP 384/A Min. no. 13), EGA.
- 15 E.L. Scott to Chief Secretary, 22 June 1922, Min. no. 153, SMP 134, EGA.
- 16 Acting DC, Northern Province, to Chief Secretary, 14 February 1919, Min. no. 126, SMP 134, EGA.

- 17 Acting DC Chua to PC, Northern Region, February 1919, Min. no. 30, SMP 134, EGA.
- 18 Pirouet, *Black Evangelists*, 104.
- 19 Pirouet points out the link between language and anti-Baganda feeling. For a review of the Nyangire movement see Uziogwe, "The Kyanyangire," 179–214; Steinhart, "The Nyangire Rebellion, 1907," and Steinhart, *Conflict and Collaboration*, 239–54.
- 20 Cubit to DC, 21 February 1907; also Eden to DC Wilson, 11 May 1907, SMP 710/1907, EGA.
- 21 J.H.G. McDougal to the Chief Secretary, 18 February 1919, Min. no. 17, SMP 134, EGA.
- 22 C.W. Hattersley to R.T. Coryndon, 12 April 1919, SMP 134, EGA. Hattersley, a missionary who became an employee of Mengo Planters, expressed the view of most planters. The *Uganda Herald*, the voice of the planters, in April 1927, supported making Kiswahili the official native language.
- 23 Report of Conference of Provincial Commissioners, Min. no. 136, SMP 134; 22 November 1920 (SMP 3841A, Min. no. 13), EGA.
- 24 C.W. Hattersley to R.T. Coryndon, 12 April 1919, SMP 134, EGA.
- 25 A recent study of the use of Kiswahili in Uganda tends to confirm this view. See Mugalasi, "The Role of Kiswahili in Uganda," 109.
- 26 Acting DC, Gulu, to PC, Northern Province, Masindi, 1 July 1919, SMP 134, EGA. See also PC, Western Province, to Chief Secretary, 14 July 1919, Min. no. 123, SMP, EGA.
- 27 Barrett et al., eds., *Kenya Churches Handbook*, 98–9.
- 28 Acting PC, Northern Province, to Chief Secretary, Min. no. 126, 14 February 1919, SMP 134, EGA.
- 29 Ashton-Warner, DC, Kitgum, to PC, Masindi, 8 February 1919, Min. no. 80, SMP 134, EGA.
- 30 PC, Western Region, to Chief Secretary, 14 June 1919, Min. no. 123, SMP 134, EGA.
- 31 Acting PC, Northern Region, *ibid.*
- 32 Minutes of the Advisory Council on Native Education, 28 November 1927, SMP 8636, EGA.
- 33 W.F. Gowers to Secretary of State, 26 September 1927, Min. no. 306, SMP 134, EGA.
- 34 W. Ormsby Gore to Gowers, 10 November 1927, Min. no. 485, SMP 134, EGA.
- 35 Gowers to Chief Secretary, 25 November 1927, SMP 134, EGA.
- 36 The memorandum is reproduced in *Uganda Herald*, 29 April 1932, 19–22.
- 37 *Uganda Herald*, 18 December 1931, 15–16.
- 38 *Ibid.*

- 39 Ladefoged et al., *Language in Uganda*, 90.
- 40 Tucker, *Eighteen Years*, 216.
- 41 Whiteley, *Swahili*, 10.
- 42 Musisi, "Proposed Language Policy," 11-17.
- 43 Scotton, "The First African Press," 23.
- 44 Obote, "Language in Uganda."
- 45 Mazrui, "Language Policy," 20-2; "The National Language Question," 12-19; Obote, "Language in Uganda."
- 46 Personal communication with Mohammed Hassan, a close associate of Amin's, 1978.
- 47 Mukama, "The Linguistic Dimension," 181.
- 48 Personal communication with Professor Kajubi, 22 September 1989, Copenhagen, Denmark.

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Erratum: The following figure is a corrected version of Figure 3, p. 72.

*Some of Uganda's politicians
from 1910 to the 1980s*

	Political Parties or Assns	Young Baganda Assn.	Bataka Assn.	Abaama Ba Kintu	Uganda Motor Drivers Assn.	Bataka Union	UCT & Workers' Union	Bataka Party	Uganda Af. Farmers Union	pp Uganda Af. Farmers	Uganda National Congress	Progressive Party	The Democratic Party	Uganda People's Union	Uganda National Party	Uganda National Movement	Uganda People's Congress	Kabaka Yekka	Conservative Party	Uganda Patriotic Movement
1	Kate, Joswa Mugema		x																	
2	Bassudde, Daudi		x																	
3	Musaazi, I.K.			x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x					x		x		
4	Miti, James		x		x															
5	Mukubira, D.			x																
6	Ssemakula Mulumba					x	x													
7	Kivu, J.			x																
8	Bamutta, Yusufu				x	x					x									
9	Musoke, Fenekansi			x																
10	Ssonko, Peter				x						x									
11	Kununka, Dr E.										x									
12	Muwazi, Dr								x		x					x		x		
13	Kulubya, Sserwano				x												x			
14	Kavuma, Paulo			x																
15	Oda, G.												x							
16	Oola, P.										x									
17	Obwangor, Cutbert												x							
18	Mukasa, Spartas				x	x														
19	Mulira, E.M.K.										x	x				x		x		
20	Mayanja, Abu Kakyama										x	x				x		x		
21	Obote, Apolo Milton										x									
22	Kiwanuka, "Jolly Joe" J.W.										x					x	x	x		
23	Kiwanuka, Ben K.												x							
24	Kironde, A.K.										x									
25	Kironde, Erisa										x									
26	Kirya, Balaki										x	x								
27	Magezi, George												x							
28	Lule, Y.K.										x	x								
29	Mkombe Mpambara												x							
30	Babiiha, John													x						
31	Binaisa, Godfrey										x									
32	Ssemogere, Paul												x							
33	Kanya, Augustine															x				
34	Mayanja-Nkangi										x									
35	Senteza-Kajubi, W.												x							
36	Kalule Ssetaala															x				
37	Luyimbazi-Zzaake												x							
38	Nekyon, Adoko A.													x						
39	Batarigaya, Basil												x							
40	Onama, Felix																			
41	Babumba, Eriya																			
42	Muwanga, Paulo										x									
43	Museveni, Yoweri K.															x				
44	Bidani-Ssali, J.																			
45	Kintu-Musoke																			
46	Kirunda-Kivejinja, A.																			
47	Kisekka, Dr S.																			
48	Ruhakana-Rugunda, Dr																			
49	Kategaya, E.																			
50	Chango-Macho																			

Figure 3

Changing Loyalties of Politicians to Political Parties and Associations, 1919–80